India Tilts Toward BRICS as Pakistan Stays Close to Washington

James Durso 

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Trump hit India with two 25% tariff rounds, pushing New Delhi to hedge closer to BRICS and reopen channels with China/Russia.

Islamabad avoided new tariffs and leans on its long, transactional security ties with Washington.

A tighter BRICS could blunt U.S. leverage as India faces limited China FDI and a $107B China trade gap.

U.S. President Donald Trump is taking India to task, and we are a long way from what then-President Barack Obama called a "defining partnership of the 21st century."

But India’s neighbor, and enemy, and America’s frenemy, escaped Trump’s ire. Why?

Despite a successful visit to India by Vice-President J.D. Vance in April 2025, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the White House in February 2025, Trump hit India, America’s #12 trade partner, with two rounds of 25% tariffs. (Pakistan’s tariff of 19%, down from 29%, and is America’s #56 trade partner.)

The first round of tariffs is for India’s protectionist policies that shield its agriculture sector, the biggest employer in India, with almost 46% of the workforce. Trump then imposed an additional 25% tariff on India’s purchases of Russian oil. (Pakistan media claims the second tariff was retaliation for Modi’s refusal to credit Trump for mediating the May 2025 ceasefire between India and Pakistan, which may be true as no Indian leader wants to be seen acknowledging foreign mediation in Kashmir.)

India responded that Trump’s actions were "unfair, unjustified and unreasonable," and it has moved closer to its fellow BRICS members in turn.

India and the U.S. have historically been cordial but were never good friends. India was a leader in the Cold War Non- Aligned Movement and always steered an independent foreign policy course, but it was always close to Moscow and remains a major buyer of Russian arms.

Hard rivalry for Buddhism’s soft power

Jack Meng-Tat Chia

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In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, punctuated by trade wars, rising costs, and fractured alliances, diplomacy is increasingly being conducted not just in boardrooms and embassies but in temples and pilgrimage sites.

From May to June this year, India loaned sacred relics of the Buddha to Vietnam for a historic multi-city exposition. Drawing nearly 15 million devotees, the event underscored not only the enduring appeal of Buddhist piety but also religion’s growing role in diplomacy.

A year earlier, India had loaned similar relics to Thailand to mark Makha Bucha Day and King Vajiralongkorn’s birthday, reflecting a growing pattern of religious soft power.

China has also embraced Buddhist diplomacy to advance its foreign policy objectives and shape cultural narratives. In December last year, it sent the Buddha’s tooth relic from Beijing’s Lingguang Temple on a high-profile loan to Thailand, an event that was widely promoted and attended by Thai elites.

Beijing has also asserted its authority over Tibetan Buddhism by claiming the right to determine the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. While religious in form, these actions reflect a deeper geopolitical strategy: the use of Buddhism in foreign policy.

Buddhist diplomacy is not a new phenomenon. Monarchs across Asia historically used Buddhist relics, texts and emissaries to assert legitimacy and affirm alliances. Today, this practice is experiencing a revival across the Asia-Pacific, which is home to nearly half a billion Buddhists.

Governments are rediscovering Buddhism as a vehicle for cultural diplomacy, narrative-building and strategic influence. While this opens new avenues for connection and cooperation, it also carries risks, especially when spiritual traditions are co-opted for political purposes or become entangled in geopolitical rivalries.

India, China and the contest for influence

Should Asia Make It Official?

Ken Jimbo; Ely Ratner

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Ely Ratner’s article, “The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact” (July/August 2025), reflects an appropriate sense of urgency about deterring Chinese aggression among Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. Yet his central argument—that these countries should codify mutual defense obligations—overlooks crucial realities that make what others have termed an “Asian NATO” counterproductive.

Relative political homogeneity and a degree of institutional trust have made NATO possible in Europe. No such consensus on the threat posed by China has emerged in the Indo-­Pacific, even among Ratner’s “core four” countries. Japan’s security strategy prioritizes defense cooperation with like-minded neighbors but not mutual defense commitments. Australia’s geographic distance from potential conflict zones in East Asia and shifting defense posture—from expeditionary peacekeeping to deterrence by denial and regional force projection—set it apart from other countries in the region. The Philippines is not yet capable of meaningful joint military operations with treaty allies such as Japan or the United States.

Thanks in part to the policies Ratner himself helped put in place as a senior official in the Biden administration, the region’s security architecture is already evolving organically, through a flexible network of bilateral and trilateral agreements that makes the most of these diverse (and ambiguous) postures. Elevating these arrangements into a treaty-based mutual defense pact could disrupt an already effective system, create a commitment hazard that China would certainly test, and alienate partners not yet ready—or willing—to formalize security commitments, such as India and South Korea. Attempting to institutionalize collective defense without the support of these key actors could fracture the very trust and coordination Ratner seeks to enhance.

Ratner is right to call attention to the growing sense of shared purpose among U.S. allies in Asia. But this commonality is better advanced by deepening existing mechanisms, not rushing toward formal alliance structures. The challenge in Asia is not a lack of cooperation, but a temptation to institutionalize cooperation faster than the region can support. It should be resisted.

The Front Line | New tank shows China adapting to drone-era battlefield and landing operations: analyst

Amber Wang

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China is set to unveil a new-generation, lighter tank during next month’s military parade, designed to better survive drone strikes and be more suitable for potential Taiwan operations, according to a Chinese analyst.

A new type of tank was recently spotted on Beijing’s streets during rehearsals for the September 3 massive military parade, which marks the 80th anniversary of China’s victory over Japan in World War II.

The vehicle appears to be a medium-weight tank, lighter than the third-generation Type 99A main battle tank (MBT), and is equipped with advanced active protection systems, according to photos and videos circulating online in recent weeks. It is expected to be among the advanced weaponry China will showcase at the event.

Analysts say it reflects Beijing’s evolving thinking about the role of tanks in future warfare and the lessons it has drawn from the Ukraine war, where both sides have suffered heavy tank losses from drone and missile attacks.

The tank features the GL6 active protection system (APS) and a quad-faced phased array radar that provides 360-degree threat detection, according to Chinese military analyst Fu Qianshao.

“The system can continuously monitor the surrounding environment, automatically deploy countermeasures and intercept incoming missiles, rockets and drones, significantly enhancing survivability,” he said.

The Ukraine war has highlighted the vulnerability of modern tanks. Open-source analysts with the Oryx intelligence collective estimate that Russia has lost around 3,800 tanks – destroyed, damaged, abandoned or captured – while Ukraine has lost about 1,100, according to a report in May by Business Insider.

The Key to Taiwan’s National Defense Lies Beyond Budget Figures

Alfred Chia Hsing Lin

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Taiwan’s security is too often reduced to a number on a spreadsheet or a partisan talking point. Commentators such as Alexander B. Gray have issued valid warnings: that Taiwan’s defense spending remains inadequate, that the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait is tilting toward Beijing, and that U.S. support is not guaranteed. These are legitimate concerns. But the exclusive focus on budget figures and political blame games risks obscuring the far greater challenge: Taiwan’s misallocated budget and energy on domestic politics rather than managing military procurement projects.

The most urgent reality is that the ambitions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are no longer limited to Taiwan; Beijing’s military modernization is aimed at achieving political reordering. Taipei cannot be expected to shoulder the burden alone, because the defense of Taiwan is not a parochial issue. Taiwan’s arms procurement plans and military doctrine, no matter how ambitious, cannot by themselves pose a credible counterweight to the PLA’s systemic rise.

Just as Europe’s security depends on NATO’s collective strength, Asia’s stability requires multilateral coordination. A formal alliance structure akin to NATO may be politically unrealistic in the short term, given the region’s fragmented geopolitics. But this does not invalidate the need for multilateral thinking. When planning for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and assessing the regional implications of PLA expansion, leaders must resist the temptation to demand that Taiwan engage in an unsustainable arms race – such as calls to increase its military budget to over 10 percent of GDP. This is not only fiscally irresponsible; it is strategically misguided.

Instead, the United States should lead efforts to embed Taiwan into a broader, institutionalized network of regional resilience. This includes automated and secure intelligence sharing, joint logistical and ammunition planning, and cooperative frameworks for maritime security and coastal defense training with key regional partners. For its part, Taiwan must orient its defense priorities toward this multilateral strategy – not reduce defense policy to a domestic contest over political credit or procurement contracts.

What Does China Want?

David C. Kang, Jackie S. H. Wong, Zenobia T. Chan

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The conventional wisdom is that China is a rising hegemon eager to replace the United States, dominate international institutions, and re-create the liberal international order in its own image. Drawing on data from 12,000 articles and hundreds of speeches by Xi Jinping, to discern China's intentions we analyze three terms or phrases from Chinese rhetoric: “struggle” (斗争), “rise of the East, decline of the West” (东升西降), and “no intention to replace the United States” ((无意取代美国). Our findings indicate that China is a status quo power concerned with regime stability and is more inwardly focused than externally oriented. China's aims are unambiguous, enduring, and limited: It cares about its borders, sovereignty, and foreign economic relations. China's main concerns are almost all regional and related to parts of China that the rest of the region has agreed are Chinese—Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Our argument has three main implications. First, China does not pose the type of military threat that the conventional wisdom claims it does. Thus, a hostile U.S. military posture in the Pacific is unwise and may unnecessarily create tensions. Second, the two countries could cooperate on several overlooked issue areas. Third, the conventional view of China plays down the economic and diplomatic arenas that a war-fighting approach is unsuited to address.

There is much about China that is disturbing for the West. China's gross domestic product grew from $1.2 trillion in 2000 to $17 trillion in 2023.1 Having modernized the People's Liberation Army over the past generation, China is also rapidly increasing its stockpile of nuclear warheads. China spends almost $300 billion annually on defense.2 Current leader Xi Jinping has consolidated power and appears set to rule the authoritarian Communist country indefinitely. Chinese firms often engage in questionable activities, such as restricting data, inadequately enforcing intellectual property rights, and engaging in cyber theft.3 The Chinese government violates human rights and restricts numerous personal freedoms for its citizens. In violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), every country in the region, including China, is reclaiming land and militarizing islets in the disputed East and South China Seas. In short, China poses many potential problems to the United States and indeed to the world.

China’s slowdown puts the world economy at risk

John Rapley

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China’s economy may be slowing again. While the country has weathered the storm of Donald Trump’s trade war better than the United States — thanks to a more diversified set of trade relationships — its domestic economy is beginning to sputter. Exports rose in the last quarter, even as American exports fell, but internal economic growth is less promising.

Industrial output grew 5.7% last month, which is robust by Western standards but still marks a significant reduction from June’s 6.8% rate. More worrying yet is that retail sales grew only 3.7%, sharply down from the previous month’s 4.8% pace.

US needs to take Ukrainian and Russian drone operations seriously

Stephen Bryen

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Drones have changed warfare on the battlefield and beyond. At present there are more drones than practical countermeasures, although that could possibly change in future.

The preponderance of battlefield drones removes the shooter from the battlefield, preserving manpower, enhances target accuracy well beyond almost any other tool and subjects traditional hardware, especially armor, to effective interdiction and immobilization if not outright destruction.

Ukraine has the most advanced drone operations program today, followed by Russia, with the US and China far behind. Experts believe warfare has changed irrevocably, with the drone in the forefront of tactical battlefield changes. That is why Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on June 10th called for a program called “Unleashing America’s Drone Dominance.”

He foresaw a three-point program, first, to bolster US drone manufacturing.

Second, Hegseth looked for a technological leapfrog to arm US combat units with a variety of low-cost drones.

Third, he wanted to improve training for the US military “as we expect to fight in future.”

Hegseth’s overall proposal, however, did not reform any sector sufficiently to obtain the end result he hoped to achieve. To do that, the US would need to adopt either the Ukrainian or the Russian approach to supporting drone operations from the factory to the battlefield.

Protests in Tel Aviv, army reservists refusing to serve: in Israel, more of us are saying no to this endless war

Ofer Cassif

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As Israel pushes ahead with its expanded military offensive in Gaza to devastating effect, closer to home, dissent is growing. On Saturday, thousands of people gathered in Habima Square in central Tel Aviv to demand an end to the war – one of the largest rallies since the fighting broke out. Israeli police revoked a prior permit for a march through the city, in a clear attempt to silence our voices of opposition – but we refused to let them succeed. It had been 24 hours since the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) declared a famine in Gaza and revealed the horrors of Israel’s full-scale starvation campaign. Many Israelis felt it was our duty to rally in the streets.

Since the cabinet resolution to reoccupy Gaza City, the Israeli military has issued 60,000 new recruitment warrants for reserve service. When the warrants come into effect in early September, the reserve forces will be at their highest level since the outbreak of the war – 130,000. But the military is not the only thing increasing in size. So, too, is the refusal movement.

In recent weeks, a surge of refusers emerged in response to the political cynicism of Benjamin Netanyahu. In private talks between family members or in public declarations of objection, more and more Israelis are realising that participating in military service is to be complicit with the government’s crimes. The movement is not homogenous – either in age and social grouping, or in motive or ideology. Some conscientious objectors, like the teenagers of Mesarvot, go public with their refusal to be part of the war machine. They are treated with extreme severity and often subjected to cycles of imprisonment in military jail. I have personally conducted regulatory visits at such facilities, meeting these brave people who have come to be known as “soldiers of peace”.

Putin’s Play for Time

Alexander Gabuev

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In the lead-up to the summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska this month, things did not look good for Ukraine. Characterizations of the summit oscillated between a “new Yalta,” in which the U.S. president might agree to the Kremlin’s demands for a Russian sphere of influence over Ukraine, and a “new Munich,” in which Trump would throw Ukraine under the bus and withdraw U.S. support for the country’s defense. In other words, expectations in Ukraine and among Kyiv’s allies were low.

Yet the summit didn’t end in a major disaster for Ukraine. Trump didn’t negotiate with Putin on Kyiv’s behalf; he didn’t agree to start normalizing relations with Russia before the war in Ukraine was resolved; and on August 18, he received Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and a phalanx of European leaders at the White House, where they collectively managed to throw the diplomatic ball back into Putin’s court. “This was very much a day of team Europe and team U.S. together supporting Ukraine,” Finnish President Alexander Stubb said afterward.

But although Putin now knows that his aspirational Plan A, in which Trump would simply impose a deal on Kyiv written in Moscow, is unlikely to materialize, he has shifted to his more workable Plan B, in which Trump will lose patience and significantly reduce U.S. assistance to Ukraine. In the Kremlin’s calculus, this still counts as winning, and Putin’s diplomatic strategy is still following the three-pronged approach that my co-authors and I outlined in Foreign Affairs a few months ago. Moscow is holding the U.S. president’s attention, forestalling a new round of painful U.S. sanctions, and keeping the fighting going.

This is because, in the Kremlin’s assessment, time is on Russia’s side. Moscow has the upper hand on the battlefield: it has maintained a significant numerical advantage in personnel and equipment, and despite mounting casualties, it has continued to gradually gnaw through the fortified lines in the Donbas. Moreover, Russia is catching up in drone warfare, denying Ukraine its competitive edge. Moscow doesn’t want a cease-fire to stop the war right now—unless, of course, all of its political demands are simply met.

Global Perspective: Comprehensive security is needed to counter Russia's hybrid war

Yoko Hirose

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Japan's defense white paper this year strongly advocated for strengthening responses to "hybrid warfare," along with readiness for China's military coercion and gray zone situations. Hybrid warfare refers to modern warfare that combines regular warfare using military and irregular warfare that is not limited to military activities.

The irregular warfare is also called "invisible war," and it aims to collapse the society and institutions of the adversary from the inside, covering a wide range of tactics, including cyberattacks, information warfare, political threats, economic pressure, and the use of proxy forces. Especially in democratic countries, directly attacking weak foundations such as elections and speech space can cause considerable damage.

'Invisible War'

Russia is at the forefront of this hybrid warfare. During the war in Ukraine, especially since 2023, the number of Russian attacks in the West has increased, and their scope has expanded, and their quality has become extremely sophisticated and vicious. According to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a U.S. think tank, the most prominent hybrid methods are election interference and information campaigns, attacks on critical infrastructure, including cutting submarine cables and sabotaging global positioning systems (GPS) for flights, violent acts including sabotage and terrorism, and "weaponization of refugees and migrants," which intentionally flood refugees and migrants to other countries.

Let's pay attention to information warfare and election interference, which account for the largest proportion. Now, Russia has gone beyond simply spreading disinformation and is also using artificial intelligence (AI) to engage in "doppelganger campaigns" of information manipulation in many Western countries.

Putin’s New Cyber Empire

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

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In late April 2024, Nikolai Patrushev, the longtime head of Russia’s Security Council, chaired a meeting in St. Petersburg of top security officials from countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The meeting was about information sovereignty and security—the Kremlin’s way of describing cybertechnologies that are designed to protect against Western surveillance, influence, and interference. But Patrushev also had a more specific message. Flanked by Sergei Naryshkin, the head of the Kremlin’s SVR Foreign Intelligence Service, Patrushev informed the audience that Russia’s top cybersecurity companies could help their governments gain control of their national information space.

At the time, the event was little noted in the United States or Europe. Just days earlier, the U.S. Congress had approved a long-delayed $60 billion aid package to Ukraine, and Europe was preparing its 14th round of sanctions against Russia. Yet governments in many other parts of the world were paying attention. Although the full list was not released, participants in the meeting included national security advisers, the heads of national security councils, and the heads of security and intelligence agencies from a wide variety of countries including Brazil, Sudan, Thailand, and Uganda; close Russian allies such as China and Iran; as well as the Arab League.

For many of these security officials, Patrushev’s pitch was welcome: Russia has long excelled at cybertechnologies, and they understood that its resources could be valuable to securing their national digital infrastructures. Some of them had witnessed the “Twitter revolutions” of the last two decades and tended to share Russian President Vladimir Putin’s view that such events—enabled by American-owned social media—reflected a U.S. tactic of fomenting mass protests that were often destabilizing. Moreover, many of their governments have maintained business relations with Moscow despite the war in Ukraine and are not particularly concerned about Russian influence in their countries.

What’s Next for Ukraine After All That Diplomacy?

Matthew Mpoke Bigg

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In the last 10 days, Ukraine has seen one of the most intense bursts of diplomatic activity since Russia’s full-scale invasion began more than three years ago.

First, President Trump held a summit in Alaska with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. Days later, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine and seven other European leaders met with Mr. Trump in Washington.

Now that the dust has settled, here’s a look at what is next for Ukraine, both on and off the battlefield.

What’s next for diplomacy?

The summits ended with no peace deal or cease-fire.

Despite optimistic statements, they also did not appear to generate much momentum toward a resolution of the war — and major sticking points remain. There seems to be little immediate prospect of a summit between Mr. Putin and Mr. Zelensky, even though the Ukrainian president has repeatedly said he would be ready for one, calling it the only way to negotiate an end to the war. After the Alaska summit, the White House said that Mr. Putin had agreed to Mr. Trump’s effort to broker such a meeting.

But the White House has since sounded a more pessimistic note. And Sergey V. Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, said in an interview broadcast on Sunday on NBC’s “Meet the Press” that no meeting was planned and, anyway, an agenda would need to be agreed on first.

On the U.S. side, Mr. Trump followed up the meetings by giving Secretary of State Marco Rubio the task of proposing security guarantees for Ukraine if and when hostilities end. Mr. Zelensky said on Monday that American and Ukrainian teams would meet at the end of the week to discuss the possibility of future talks between Moscow and Kyiv.

Russia is mastering a new type of drone that cannot be jammed - and the West has work to do

Dominic Waghorn

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Ukrainians say they are in danger of losing the drone arms race with Russia and need more help.

And that is worrying not just for Ukraine, because the drone is becoming the likely weapon of choice in other future conflicts.

Sky News has been given exclusive access to a Ukrainian drone factory to watch its start up ingenuity at work.

Ukrainians have turned the drone into their most effective weapon against the invaders. But they are now, we are told, losing the upper hand in the skies over Ukraine.

Drone company General Cherry was started by volunteers at the beginning of the war, making 100 a month, but is now producing 1,000 times that. The company's Andriy Lavrenovych said it is never enough.

"The Russians have a lot of troops, a lot of vehicles and our soldiers every day tell us we need more, we need more weapons, we need better, we need faster, we need higher."

The comments echo the words of Ukraine's leader, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who told reporters this week "the Russians have increased the number of drones, while due to a lack of funding, we have not yet been able to scale up."

The factory's location is a closely-guarded secret, moved often. Russia strikes weapons factories when it can.

In a nondescript office building, we watched drones being assembled and stacked in their thousands. Put together like toys, they are hand assembled and customised.

The quadcopters vary in size, some carry explosives to attack the enemy. Others fly as high as six kilometres to ambush Russian surveillance drones.

From $300K to $70K: How Russia Mass-Produced Cheaper Shahed Drones

IVAN KHOMENKO

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Russia has significantly reduced the unit cost of its long-range Shahed-type attack drones over the past three years, according to Ukrainian intelligence and independent defense analysts.

In 2022, leaked documents from the Iran–Russia drone cooperation project showed that Russia was initially paying over $370,000 per unit for the Shahed drones. These costs reportedly dropped to $290,000 with bulk orders of 2,000 units and further to approximately $193,000 per unit for orders of 6,000.

According to CNN, citing Ukrainian military intelligence, current production at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone has allowed Russia to lower the per-unit cost of these drones to approximately $70,000.

Better Than Pantsir? China’s New Anti-Drone Combat Vehicle Adapts to Ukraine War Lessons

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The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has begun fielding a new air defence combat vehicle designed to provide short range defence against drone attacks, the FK-3000, which was seen during rehearsals for the country’s upcoming military parade scheduled for September 3. The procurement of the system appears to reflect one of the multiple ways in which China’s armed forces have responded to lessons from the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War, during which the use of drones for both attacks and for reconnaissance have played very central roles in both sides’ war efforts. The air defence combat vehicle has some similarities to the Russian Pantsir system, which has been used extensively for anti-drone duties in Syria, Libya and in the Ukrainain theatre, and proven highly effective. The Chinese system appears to be more heavily specialised to wards defending targets against drones, and as a much newer design developed by a defence sector that is considerably more advanced it is expected to have a superior performance.

The FK-3000 uses a three-axle all-wheel-drive vehicle with an armoured cab, and two launch pods each carrying 12 short-range missiles, as well as a 30mm automatic cannon. Its fire controls allow of the engagement of multiple targets simultaneously. The use of a cannon allows the vehicle to provide a defence against lower value drones such as quadcopter without expending costly missiles, providing a two layered defence. The system has an engagement range of up to 1200 meters, and can integrate a number of different missile types. It is expected to be deployed both to defend ground units on or near the frontlines, and to protect key military facilities and critical infrastructure. China has complemented the development of the FK-3000 with the operationalisation of a number of laser weapons systems, such as the new OW5-A50 system unveiled in mid-July. As laser weapons technologies improve, it is expected. That the utility of cannon and missiles for anti-drone duties will diminish.

Ukraine’s Black Widow ground drone carries six FPVs—costs less than a single Javelin missile

Yuri Zoria

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Ukraine has unveiled a new tracked robotic vehicle called Black Widow, designed to act as a carrier for FPV drones. Forbes reports that the system marks a shift from traditional gun-armed vehicles to uncrewed carriers capable of launching multiple drones.

Amid the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, drones dominate the battlefield. Forbes notes that drone carriers like Black Widow are likely to evolve quickly, with future versions potentially being larger or smaller, tracked, wheeled, legged, crewed, or uncrewed. They may carry just one or two drones—or entire swarms. According to Forbes, Black Widow is likely only the beginning of a long series of such carriers, pointing toward a battlefield future where tanks are reduced to museum relics.

From Little Boar to Black Widow

Forbes writes that Ukrainian company IRV presented the Karakurt or Black Widow last week at the Iron Demo event near Lviv. The robot is based on the Vepryk, or Little Boar, a modular uncrewed ground vehicle previously used for missions such as cargo carrying, casualty evacuation, mine laying, one-way kamikaze attacks, and combat with mounted machine guns. According to Forbes, its conversion into a drone carrier required relatively minor changes.

The Black Widow has a control range of 4 kilometers, limited by terrain masking. Forbes notes that the vehicle overcomes this limitation by carrying a relay drone that extends the effective range of FPV strikes to 30 kilometers. The vehicle mounts six FPV drones on two rails, which can be launched either directly or through a repeater. Forbes highlights an unusual feature: the ability to launch two drones together, with one observing the strike of the other and enabling a rapid follow-up attack.

Reconstitution Under Fire: Insights from the 1973 Yom Kippur War

Nathan Jennings

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The 1973 Arab-Israeli War confronted Israel’s military with a sudden and existential crisis. Initiated by simultaneous Syrian and Egyptian offensives from the north and south, the bitter conflict demonstrated the value of operational endurance as each side sustained unexpected attrition. Within hours, Israeli assumptions about intelligence overmatch, maneuver superiority, and air dominance collapsed under the weight of the Arab assaults. Responding to significant losses in men and materiel, Israel subsequently initiated a painful process of battlefield regeneration to recreate combat power and establish conditions for large-scale counteroffensives that could end the war on favorable terms. While combatants on both sides demonstrated courage and commitment in the face of daunting challenges, the Israeli capacity to persevere ultimately paid the highest dividends and yielded a conditional strategic victory.

How did the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) achieve, albeit at a tremendous societal cost, this systemic regeneration across both ground and air services while continuously engaged on multiple active fronts? The Israelis’ desperate response to simultaneous crises in the Sinai and the Golan Heights—which derailed prewar plans for synchronized air-ground maneuver designed to achieve rapid decision—combined important aspects of veteran leadership, logistical resiliency, and strategic adaptation with critical functions of tactical recovery and tiered mobilization to achieve formation reconstitution at echelon. Characterized, as US Army General Donn Starry described it, by “enormous equipment losses in a relatively short time” and “lethality at extended ranges,” the conflict now underscores the enduring imperative for military institutions to avoid the quicksand of wishful thinking and instead prepare to fight, and win, in the bitter crucible of attritional combat.

Recovery, Regeneration, and Reconstitution

Should Asia Make It Official?

Ken Jimbo; Ely Ratner

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Ely Ratner’s article, “The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact” (July/August 2025), reflects an appropriate sense of urgency about deterring Chinese aggression among Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. Yet his central argument—that these countries should codify mutual defense obligations—overlooks crucial realities that make what others have termed an “Asian NATO” counterproductive.

Relative political homogeneity and a degree of institutional trust have made NATO possible in Europe. No such consensus on the threat posed by China has emerged in the Indo-­Pacific, even among Ratner’s “core four” countries. Japan’s security strategy prioritizes defense cooperation with like-minded neighbors but not mutual defense commitments. Australia’s geographic distance from potential conflict zones in East Asia and shifting defense posture—from expeditionary peacekeeping to deterrence by denial and regional force projection—set it apart from other countries in the region. The Philippines is not yet capable of meaningful joint military operations with treaty allies such as Japan or the United States.

Thanks in part to the policies Ratner himself helped put in place as a senior official in the Biden administration, the region’s security architecture is already evolving organically, through a flexible network of bilateral and trilateral agreements that makes the most of these diverse (and ambiguous) postures. Elevating these arrangements into a treaty-based mutual defense pact could disrupt an already effective system, create a commitment hazard that China would certainly test, and alienate partners not yet ready—or willing—to formalize security commitments, such as India and South Korea. Attempting to institutionalize collective defense without the support of these key actors could fracture the very trust and coordination Ratner seeks to enhance.

Ratner is right to call attention to the growing sense of shared purpose among U.S. allies in Asia. But this commonality is better advanced by deepening existing mechanisms, not rushing toward formal alliance structures. The challenge in Asia is not a lack of cooperation, but a temptation to institutionalize cooperation faster than the region can support. It should be resisted.

Trump deal threatens EU’s image as champion of rules-based trade

Camille Gijs

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BRUSSELS — Most thumbs were up. Some smiles were uneasy. And, in the middle of it all, the EU’s top trade official, Sabine Weyand, wore the kind of look that told the whole story: The bloc had gotten itself into a tricky spot.

The photo, taken as the European Union and the United States sealed a fragile tariff truce at President Donald Trump’s Scottish golf resort on July 27, captured the discomfort on the European side over an agreement that was merely "the best it could get."

The two sides have finally firmed up Trump’s handshake deal with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen into a joint statement that sets a 15 percent baseline U.S. tariff; promises a reduction in tariffs on European cars; caps levies on pharmaceuticals and semiconductors; and fully exempts EU exports of aircraft.

Throughout, Europe has been engaged in a delicate dance with Trump — seeking to hold him to his trade promises while its leaders lobby him to commit to security guarantees for Ukraine against Russian aggression.

What is Key Terrain? Rethinking a Fundamental Military Concept in the Age of Economic Warfar

Benjamin Backsmeier

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In an era where economic linkages are global and dense, strategic competition increasingly unfolds in the networks of supply chains, finance, and data rather than purely on physical battlefields. US military doctrine has long emphasized key terrain—ranging from hilltops or river crossings at the tactical level to major features whose control carries operational or even strategic implications such as the Bashi Channel, Fulda Gap, or Strait of Hormuz. But today’s most consequential terrain may be nonphysical: manufacturing dominance in key sectors like semiconductors, assured access to minerals like rare earth elements, control over natural gas infrastructure, or the security of undersea cables. These systems, once considered logistical backdrops, are now central instruments of national power.

As Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman have described with their theory of “weaponized interdependence,” states can increasingly use control over nodes in global networks to extract coercive leverage, shape rival behavior, and compromise operational readiness. For military professionals, recognizing these dependencies as strategic terrain beyond the traditional DIME (diplomacy, information, military, economics) framework is critical to effective planning.

China’s Rare Earth Elements: Strategic Denial in Practice

China’s dominance in the rare earth market offers a textbook example of weaponized interdependence. By controlling more than 85 percent of heavy rare earth processing and nearly 70 percent of global mining output as of 2024, China occupies a central node in the defense-industrial value chain. Rare earths are indispensable in night vision goggles, precision-guided munitions, missile guidance systems, and electric propulsion, placing downstream US defense manufacturers at risk.

Steel and Silicon: The Case for Teaming Armored Formations with UAVs

Charlie Phelps

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Dawn broke over the rolling hills of Eastern Europe as Task Force Loki, a combined arms battalion, prepared to breach a fortified enemy defensive belt. Intelligence reports confirmed that an enemy motorized rifle regiment had emplaced antitank ditches, minefields, and dismounted infantry armed with antitank guided missiles and supported by artillery. Instead of pushing scouts blindly into the kill zone, the battalion launched a swarm of rotary-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from the turrets of the lead tanks and fixed-wing drones from the battalion’s organic multidomain reconnaissance element. Within minutes, overhead feeds revealed camouflaged fighting positions, artillery hides, and an unseen second belt of defense two kilometers to the rear.

One drone, a loitering munition linked to the battalion’s AI-enabled targeting system, locked onto a thermal signature of personnel in a tree line confirming the presence of a fighting position. A second drone armed with advanced imagining systems and pattern recognition software queued and confirmed the presence of a wire-guided antitank weapon system. Seconds later, the enemy antitank team was gone. This process was rapidly repeated over a dozen times in a matter of minutes as surveillance UAVs communicated targeting information in real time to additional loitering munitions. Another UAV dropped decoy electronic emitters mimicking armored formations maneuvering to a breach point, drawing enemy artillery onto empty ground. As enemy sensors fixated on the deception point, the true breach force moved up under cover of smoke and UAV overwatch. Thermobaric munitions impacted enemy bunkers and pillboxes just prior to direct fire suppression from Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Combat engineers, guided by real-time drone feeds, cleared a safe lane through the obstacle belt. An M1A2 platoon surged forward, supported by dismounted infantry and Apache attack helicopters conducting synchronized fires on vehicle positions identified by UAVs. The vulnerability of the attack helicopters was reduced through the employment of cheap, small UAVs whose purpose was to serve as targets for enemy air defense systems.

Unconventional Warfare: Solving Complex Political-Military Problems and Creating Dilemmas for Adversaries

David Maxwell 

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In the 21st century strategic landscape, unconventional warfare (UW) is not a relic of Cold War shadow conflicts. It is a vital instrument of national power: a disciplined, sophisticated, and intellectually demanding capability required to solve the most complex political-military problems (or assist in solving them alongside the Joint Force or Intelligence Community). In addition to solving problems, UW creates dilemmas for adversaries operating in the gray zone between peace and war. It is also a necessary capability before, during, and after large scale combat operations. It is, as many have long argued, a foundational component of the Special Forces identity and one of the three legs of what I call the “two SOF trinities.”

The Strategic Value of Unconventional Warfare

At its core, UW is about solving irregular problems with irregular solutions. When statecraft and conventional deterrence fall short, when kinetic strikes are too blunt an instrument, and when allies and partners are struggling under pressure from revisionist or rogue regimes, UW offers the United States the ability to enable local resistance, disrupt adversary plans, and seize the initiative.

The Department of Defense defines UW as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.” But I have always argued that UW is far more than that sterile definition. It is an entire philosophy of warfare that blends the strategic with the operational and tactical; that synchronizes influence, legitimacy, governance, and indigenous partnership into a coherent campaign. It is the heart of Special Warfare, and without it, our understanding of irregular warfare is incomplete.

A Better Way to Think About AI

David Autor and James Manyika

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No one doubts that our future will feature more automation than our past or present. The question is how we get from here to there, and how we do so in a way that is good for humanity.

Sometimes it seems the most direct route is to automate wherever possible, and to keep iterating until we get it right. Here’s why that would be a mistake: imperfect automation is not a first step toward perfect automation, anymore than jumping halfway across a canyon is a first step toward jumping the full distance. Recognizing that the rim is out of reach, we may find better alternatives to leaping—for example, building a bridge, hiking the trail, or driving around the perimeter. This is exactly where we are with artificial intelligence. AI is not yet ready to jump the canyon, and it probably won’t be in a meaningful sense for most of the next decade.

Rather than asking AI to hurl itself over the abyss while hoping for the best, we should instead use AI’s extraordinary and improving capabilities to build bridges. What this means in practical terms: We should insist on AI that can collaborate with, say, doctors—as well as teachers, lawyers, building contractors, and many others—instead of AI that aims to automate them out of a job.

Agile Mindset – A Combat-Ready Framework for the Army Transformation Initiative

Bol Jock 

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Modernization isn’t coming: It is here. Will today’s Soldiers be ready for tomorrow’s fight? As the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Army transform rapidly Soldiers must adapt even faster physically, mentally and emotionally. To counter emerging threats and match rapid technological advances, the Army is accelerating its modernization efforts to stay ahead of near-peer adversaries. Yet with directives pouring in from higher headquarters at lightning speed, it can be difficult to discern their practical implications for service members at the brigade and below. This article clarifies the Army Transformation Initiative (ATI) and offers the Agile mindset as a practical approach to implementing these sweeping changes.

Understanding the Army Transformation Initiative

The ATI reflects the Secretary of the Army’s directive to operationalize the Secretary of Defense’s Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform guidance, issued in April 2025. The message from Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll and Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George is clear: transformation is mandatory. As battlefields grow more unpredictable and contested, adaptation is no longer optional. It is a matter of survival. Every individual, function, and formation must actively ensure the Army remains ready to fight and win, whatever the future battlefield brings.

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth summed it up: “Winning on the rapidly evolving battlefield requires Soldiers who are physically and mentally resilient, rigorously trained, and equipped with the best technology available.” He called for a shift toward capability-based acquisition, emphasizing rapid integration of new technologies and continuous skill development across the force.

The Problem: Ever-Changing Battlefield

Hard rivalry for Buddhism’s soft power

Jack Meng-Tat Chia

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In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, punctuated by trade wars, rising costs, and fractured alliances, diplomacy is increasingly being conducted not just in boardrooms and embassies but in temples and pilgrimage sites.

From May to June this year, India loaned sacred relics of the Buddha to Vietnam for a historic multi-city exposition. Drawing nearly 15 million devotees, the event underscored not only the enduring appeal of Buddhist piety but also religion’s growing role in diplomacy.

A year earlier, India had loaned similar relics to Thailand to mark Makha Bucha Day and King Vajiralongkorn’s birthday, reflecting a growing pattern of religious soft power.

China has also embraced Buddhist diplomacy to advance its foreign policy objectives and shape cultural narratives. In December last year, it sent the Buddha’s tooth relic from Beijing’s Lingguang Temple on a high-profile loan to Thailand, an event that was widely promoted and attended by Thai elites.

Beijing has also asserted its authority over Tibetan Buddhism by claiming the right to determine the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. While religious in form, these actions reflect a deeper geopolitical strategy: the use of Buddhism in foreign policy.

Buddhist diplomacy is not a new phenomenon. Monarchs across Asia historically used Buddhist relics, texts and emissaries to assert legitimacy and affirm alliances. Today, this practice is experiencing a revival across the Asia-Pacific, which is home to nearly half a billion Buddhists.

Governments are rediscovering Buddhism as a vehicle for cultural diplomacy, narrative-building and strategic influence. While this opens new avenues for connection and cooperation, it also carries risks, especially when spiritual traditions are co-opted for political purposes or become entangled in geopolitical rivalries.

Exclusive: China's new mega dam triggers fears of water war in India

Sarita Chaganti Singh and Krishna N. Das

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PARONG, India, Aug 25 (Reuters) - India fears a planned Chinese mega-dam in Tibet will reduce water flows on a major river by up to 85% during the dry season, according to four sources familiar with the matter and a government analysis seen by Reuters, prompting Delhi to fast-track plans for its own dam to mitigate the effects.

The Indian government has been considering projects since the early 2000s to control the flow of water from Tibet's Angsi Glacier, which sustains more than 100 million people downstream in China, India and Bangladesh. But the plans have been hindered by fierce and occasionally violent resistance from residents of the border state of Arunachal Pradesh, who fear their villages will be submerged and way of life destroyed by any dam.

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Then in December, China announced that it would build the world's largest hydropower dam in a border county just before the Yarlung Zangbo river crosses into India. That triggered fears in New Delhi that its longtime strategic rival - which has some territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh - could weaponize its control of the river, which originates in the Angsi Glacier and is known as the Siang and Brahmaputra in India.

India's largest hydropower company in May moved survey materials under armed police protection near a prospective site of the Upper Siang Multipurpose Storage Dam, which would be the country's biggest dam, if completed. Senior Indian officials have also been holding meetings about accelerating construction this year, including one organized in July by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's office, according to two of the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive government matters.

This Isn’t India-China Rapprochement

Sumit Ganguly

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Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to New Delhi this week, marking the first visit of a high-level Chinese official to the Indian capital since the two countries agreed to disengage along their Himalayan border last October. Deadly border clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020 had previously sent bilateral relations into a deep freeze.

Wang met with at least three key Indian officials: Prime Minister Narendra Modi, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. After Modi’s meeting with Wang, the Indian leader highlighted the “steady progress” made since the 2020 military standoff. Wang reiterated a familiar platitude about the need for India and China not to be “adversaries” but “partners” and that the two sides should “trust and support” each other.

How the Cold War Forged India’s Intelligence Setup

Sushant Singh

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When Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned under pressure amid mass student protests in August, some of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist supporters were quick to blame—without much evidence—the CIA.

Labeling Hasina’s forced resignation a “color revolution,” these Indian conspiracy theorists suggested that something similar could be attempted in New Delhi. They aimed to discredit India’s political opposition and possible protests against Modi; the alleged role of the United States in destabilizing Hasina’s government made the United States a convenient scapegoat.

A man, a plan, an electoral sham in Myanmar

Bertil Lintner

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A new name, fresh appointments and a minor reshuffle at the top — it’s all part of the Myanmar junta’s bid to prepare the nation and sell the outside world on its controversial general election plan for December.

The generals in Naypyitaw are counting on the election to confer the legitimacy they’ve lacked since seizing power in a February 2021 coup that ousted an elected government.

Critics have dismissed the planned vote as a junta ploy, branding it a “generals’ election” rather than a genuine general election — a label that may prove more accurate than not.

Since the coup, the military has faced armed resistance across large parts of the country. While the anti-junta forces—both political and ethnic—may not control as much territory as they claim, it is clear that the upcoming elections can hardly be described as “nationwide” and will likely be dismissed by many as a sham.

But that may not concern the generals in Naypyitaw, and the stark reality is military rule in Myanmar is here to stay — in one form or another — as it has been since the men in green first seized power in a 1962 coup.

The country experienced a decade of relative openness, starting in 2011, with the introduction of limited freedoms; however, the generals never truly relinquished power. They remained in the background, protected by a pro-military constitution and ready to intervene when threatened, as they decisively did in the 2021 coup that overthrew a democratically elected government.

Regardless of how Myanmar’s democratic forces and their international supporters view the upcoming election, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, is almost certain to endorse the result as a positive step after more than four years of intensified civil conflict.

Breaking News: China tests FPV controlled ground drones with rocket launchers in urban assault drills

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On August 22, 2025, footage broadcast on Chinese state television, CCTV, revealed an unprecedented training exercise of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force, as reported by X account user Jesús Román. The images showed armored infantry units of the 83rd Group Army, Central Theater Command, experimenting with unmanned ground vehicles armed with rocket launchers and remotely operated through first-person-view goggles and handheld manipulators. This development highlights Beijing’s increasing reliance on manned-unmanned teaming for high-intensity combat. Its relevance lies in the PLA’s effort to expand robotic warfare capabilities in semi-urban environments, signaling a potential shift in modern battlefield tactics.

By equipping unmanned ground platforms with rocket launchers and controlling them through FPV systems, the PLA is laying the groundwork for a new phase of combined-arms warfare where machines precede soldiers into danger (Picture source: CCTV)

The training exercise involved the integration of Type 08 (ZBL-08) infantry fighting vehicles, infantry dismounts equipped with 120 mm rocket launchers and heavy machine guns, and newly introduced unmanned ground systems mounting rocket and grenade-type weapons. In a notable addition, some drones also carried loudspeakers, suggesting potential applications in psychological operations or crowd control. The robots advanced alongside infantry and armor, providing suppressive fire against fortified positions in the simulated semi-urban battlefield.

The unmanned systems used during the drills were remotely piloted with FPV goggles and handheld controllers, replicating methods widely adopted in small aerial drones. This allowed operators to maneuver the vehicles from secure positions while retaining real-time situational awareness. Development of such systems has followed the PLA’s broader trajectory of robotics integration, moving from reconnaissance drones to more heavily armed platforms capable of supporting mechanized infantry.

We Are Watching China Become an Air Force Superpower

Reuben Johnson

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Key Points and Summary – China’s airpower has entered a startling new era, moving beyond its history of copying Russian designs and stealing U.S. technology to producing a flurry of unique, indigenous combat aircraft.

-In the last year, several new variants and at least three truly new, tailless fighter concepts have appeared.

-While the exact purpose of these secret programs remains a mystery, two facts are clear: China is now innovating independently, and it currently has more new aircraft types in development than the rest of the world combined, raising a critical question about whether the West can keep pace.

China’s Air Force Is Rising Fast

WARSAW, POLAND – Beginning in December 2024, the world has been introduced to several new combat aircraft that were manufactured, as well as designed, in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The latter point is important because since the 1990s, PRC fighters and other military aircraft have been either copies of Russian designs, or there were major sections of the aircraft having not been designed in the PRC (as in the wings of the Y-20 transport/C-17 lookalike that were designed by Antonov in Ukraine), or were otherwise inspired by Russian designs.

Then there is the J-35A/B model fighter aircraft. Both the land-based “A” model and the carrier-capable “B” configuration bear a remarkable resemblance to the US F-35 design. The most significant difference is that this Chinese aircraft is powered by two engines in the class of the US GE F414 engine rather than a single, higher thrust engine with GE F110 performance, as in the case of the F-35.

In 2016, a Chinese national named Su Bin, who was living in Canada, was convicted of stealing classified data on the F-22 and F-35 programs, translating the material into Chinese, and then selling it to entities in the PRC to support their military R&D programs. He had also made numerous trips to the US to interact with hackers and other sources.

Why China’s “Type 99A” Is Its Greatest Tank Ever

Brandon J. Weichert

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Even as wild rumors circulate in the West that China’s economy and political system are teetering towards collapse, the country’s military modernization continues apace. Take, for example, the Type 99A main battle tank (MBT), which stands as a true testament to the nation’s rapid military modernization.

As the pinnacle of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Ground Force tank fleet, the Type 99A combines cutting-edge technology with a robust design, making it a formidable asset on the battlefield.

What to Know About China’s Type 99A Tank

Introduced as an upgraded variant of the original Type 99, this tank represents China’s strategic shift towards high-tech, network-centric warfare. Western sources will underestimate the Type 99A, as they do all Chinese systems. Whatever shortfalls this platform may possess, though, the fact that China has churned out 700 Type 99As—and counting—indicates how significant of a threat to China’s neighbors their tank force could pose. Numerically speaking, the PLA has an impressive capability.

Of course, warfare is not just done by the numbers. Combined arms is, of course, as much of an art as it is a theory of military science. While China has worked assiduously to transition their force into a modern military, they do lack experience. But the quality versus quantity argument that Western observers so often use to write off Chinese military technology will only get one so far.

The origins of the Type 99A trace back to the late 1980s, when China sought to bridge the gap with Western tank technologies. Influenced by Soviet designs like the iconic T-72 but incorporating lessons from the Gulf War, the initial “Type 98” prototype evolved into the Type 99, which first entered service in 1991. Developed by Chinese state defense conglomerate Norinco, the Type 99 marked a significant leap in firepower, mobility, and protection compared to older models like the Type 59.

China’s Cyber Playbook for the Indo-Pacific

Nathan Lee 

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Cyber operations are now a defining feature of modern warfare, as the war in Ukraine has demonstrated—and China is taking note. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has served as a testing ground for the integration of emerging technologies into hybrid warfare. Drawing from the lessons of the Ukraine war, China’s new military strategy establishes a joint and multi-domain doctrine that prioritizes a modernized wartime cyber approach, targeting key future conflicts such as a Taiwan contingency.

China’s Great Cyber Rejuvenation

Modern Chinese national military strategy seeks to leverage cyber power through constant readiness and information technology to enhance information dominance—the operational advantage gained from the ability to control, manipulate, and defend information to maximize warfighting effects. Starting in 2014, Xi Jinping began ambitiously envisioning China as a “cyber great power” capable of defending critical infrastructure from cyber intrusions, ensuring internal stability, and launching offensive operations against foreign adversaries. Critically, this shift affected People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military doctrine on cyber warfare.

The PLA’s focus on cyber power traces back to its study of the US military’s technological dominance in the Gulf War, primarily in information technologies, to control the battlefield. Cyber capabilities were subsequently incorporated into PLA doctrine and formally articulated in major policy documents such as the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, which emphasized the significant role of cyber in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. As military technology has advanced, Chinese military doctrine has become increasingly focused on information operations within the “three dominances” (三权), achieving superiority in the information, air, and sea domains, to determine the viability of a successful military operation, specifically against Taiwan, the United States, and its allies. In the 2020 Science of Military Strategy, the PLA states that cyberspace is the “basic platform for information warfare” because blinding cyberattacks on an adversary’s computer C4ISR networks can paralyze its combat processes at the outset of a conflict, thereby ensuring one’s own information dominance. To operationalize this strategy, the PLA advanced the doctrine of “peacetime-wartime integration,” a central principle under its military-civil fusion strategy. Designed to secure prepositioned information dominance, peacetime-wartime integration streamlines cyber operations by maintaining a constant state of readiness, ensuring these assets can be rapidly leveraged during wartime. Thus, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly designated cyber as a central cornerstone of military power in attaining information dominance, soon accelerating these reforms based on lessons from the Ukraine war.