Hard rivalry for Buddhism’s soft power

Jack Meng-Tat Chia

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In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, punctuated by trade wars, rising costs, and fractured alliances, diplomacy is increasingly being conducted not just in boardrooms and embassies but in temples and pilgrimage sites.

From May to June this year, India loaned sacred relics of the Buddha to Vietnam for a historic multi-city exposition. Drawing nearly 15 million devotees, the event underscored not only the enduring appeal of Buddhist piety but also religion’s growing role in diplomacy.

A year earlier, India had loaned similar relics to Thailand to mark Makha Bucha Day and King Vajiralongkorn’s birthday, reflecting a growing pattern of religious soft power.

China has also embraced Buddhist diplomacy to advance its foreign policy objectives and shape cultural narratives. In December last year, it sent the Buddha’s tooth relic from Beijing’s Lingguang Temple on a high-profile loan to Thailand, an event that was widely promoted and attended by Thai elites.

Beijing has also asserted its authority over Tibetan Buddhism by claiming the right to determine the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. While religious in form, these actions reflect a deeper geopolitical strategy: the use of Buddhism in foreign policy.

Buddhist diplomacy is not a new phenomenon. Monarchs across Asia historically used Buddhist relics, texts and emissaries to assert legitimacy and affirm alliances. Today, this practice is experiencing a revival across the Asia-Pacific, which is home to nearly half a billion Buddhists.

Governments are rediscovering Buddhism as a vehicle for cultural diplomacy, narrative-building and strategic influence. While this opens new avenues for connection and cooperation, it also carries risks, especially when spiritual traditions are co-opted for political purposes or become entangled in geopolitical rivalries.

Exclusive: China's new mega dam triggers fears of water war in India

Sarita Chaganti Singh and Krishna N. Das

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PARONG, India, Aug 25 (Reuters) - India fears a planned Chinese mega-dam in Tibet will reduce water flows on a major river by up to 85% during the dry season, according to four sources familiar with the matter and a government analysis seen by Reuters, prompting Delhi to fast-track plans for its own dam to mitigate the effects.

The Indian government has been considering projects since the early 2000s to control the flow of water from Tibet's Angsi Glacier, which sustains more than 100 million people downstream in China, India and Bangladesh. But the plans have been hindered by fierce and occasionally violent resistance from residents of the border state of Arunachal Pradesh, who fear their villages will be submerged and way of life destroyed by any dam.

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Then in December, China announced that it would build the world's largest hydropower dam in a border county just before the Yarlung Zangbo river crosses into India. That triggered fears in New Delhi that its longtime strategic rival - which has some territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh - could weaponize its control of the river, which originates in the Angsi Glacier and is known as the Siang and Brahmaputra in India.

India's largest hydropower company in May moved survey materials under armed police protection near a prospective site of the Upper Siang Multipurpose Storage Dam, which would be the country's biggest dam, if completed. Senior Indian officials have also been holding meetings about accelerating construction this year, including one organized in July by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's office, according to two of the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive government matters.

This Isn’t India-China Rapprochement

Sumit Ganguly

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Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to New Delhi this week, marking the first visit of a high-level Chinese official to the Indian capital since the two countries agreed to disengage along their Himalayan border last October. Deadly border clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020 had previously sent bilateral relations into a deep freeze.

Wang met with at least three key Indian officials: Prime Minister Narendra Modi, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. After Modi’s meeting with Wang, the Indian leader highlighted the “steady progress” made since the 2020 military standoff. Wang reiterated a familiar platitude about the need for India and China not to be “adversaries” but “partners” and that the two sides should “trust and support” each other.

How the Cold War Forged India’s Intelligence Setup

Sushant Singh

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When Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned under pressure amid mass student protests in August, some of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist supporters were quick to blame—without much evidence—the CIA.

Labeling Hasina’s forced resignation a “color revolution,” these Indian conspiracy theorists suggested that something similar could be attempted in New Delhi. They aimed to discredit India’s political opposition and possible protests against Modi; the alleged role of the United States in destabilizing Hasina’s government made the United States a convenient scapegoat.

A man, a plan, an electoral sham in Myanmar

Bertil Lintner

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A new name, fresh appointments and a minor reshuffle at the top — it’s all part of the Myanmar junta’s bid to prepare the nation and sell the outside world on its controversial general election plan for December.

The generals in Naypyitaw are counting on the election to confer the legitimacy they’ve lacked since seizing power in a February 2021 coup that ousted an elected government.

Critics have dismissed the planned vote as a junta ploy, branding it a “generals’ election” rather than a genuine general election — a label that may prove more accurate than not.

Since the coup, the military has faced armed resistance across large parts of the country. While the anti-junta forces—both political and ethnic—may not control as much territory as they claim, it is clear that the upcoming elections can hardly be described as “nationwide” and will likely be dismissed by many as a sham.

But that may not concern the generals in Naypyitaw, and the stark reality is military rule in Myanmar is here to stay — in one form or another — as it has been since the men in green first seized power in a 1962 coup.

The country experienced a decade of relative openness, starting in 2011, with the introduction of limited freedoms; however, the generals never truly relinquished power. They remained in the background, protected by a pro-military constitution and ready to intervene when threatened, as they decisively did in the 2021 coup that overthrew a democratically elected government.

Regardless of how Myanmar’s democratic forces and their international supporters view the upcoming election, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, is almost certain to endorse the result as a positive step after more than four years of intensified civil conflict.

Breaking News: China tests FPV controlled ground drones with rocket launchers in urban assault drills

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On August 22, 2025, footage broadcast on Chinese state television, CCTV, revealed an unprecedented training exercise of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force, as reported by X account user Jesús Román. The images showed armored infantry units of the 83rd Group Army, Central Theater Command, experimenting with unmanned ground vehicles armed with rocket launchers and remotely operated through first-person-view goggles and handheld manipulators. This development highlights Beijing’s increasing reliance on manned-unmanned teaming for high-intensity combat. Its relevance lies in the PLA’s effort to expand robotic warfare capabilities in semi-urban environments, signaling a potential shift in modern battlefield tactics.

By equipping unmanned ground platforms with rocket launchers and controlling them through FPV systems, the PLA is laying the groundwork for a new phase of combined-arms warfare where machines precede soldiers into danger (Picture source: CCTV)

The training exercise involved the integration of Type 08 (ZBL-08) infantry fighting vehicles, infantry dismounts equipped with 120 mm rocket launchers and heavy machine guns, and newly introduced unmanned ground systems mounting rocket and grenade-type weapons. In a notable addition, some drones also carried loudspeakers, suggesting potential applications in psychological operations or crowd control. The robots advanced alongside infantry and armor, providing suppressive fire against fortified positions in the simulated semi-urban battlefield.

The unmanned systems used during the drills were remotely piloted with FPV goggles and handheld controllers, replicating methods widely adopted in small aerial drones. This allowed operators to maneuver the vehicles from secure positions while retaining real-time situational awareness. Development of such systems has followed the PLA’s broader trajectory of robotics integration, moving from reconnaissance drones to more heavily armed platforms capable of supporting mechanized infantry.

We Are Watching China Become an Air Force Superpower

Reuben Johnson

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Key Points and Summary – China’s airpower has entered a startling new era, moving beyond its history of copying Russian designs and stealing U.S. technology to producing a flurry of unique, indigenous combat aircraft.

-In the last year, several new variants and at least three truly new, tailless fighter concepts have appeared.

-While the exact purpose of these secret programs remains a mystery, two facts are clear: China is now innovating independently, and it currently has more new aircraft types in development than the rest of the world combined, raising a critical question about whether the West can keep pace.

China’s Air Force Is Rising Fast

WARSAW, POLAND – Beginning in December 2024, the world has been introduced to several new combat aircraft that were manufactured, as well as designed, in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The latter point is important because since the 1990s, PRC fighters and other military aircraft have been either copies of Russian designs, or there were major sections of the aircraft having not been designed in the PRC (as in the wings of the Y-20 transport/C-17 lookalike that were designed by Antonov in Ukraine), or were otherwise inspired by Russian designs.

Then there is the J-35A/B model fighter aircraft. Both the land-based “A” model and the carrier-capable “B” configuration bear a remarkable resemblance to the US F-35 design. The most significant difference is that this Chinese aircraft is powered by two engines in the class of the US GE F414 engine rather than a single, higher thrust engine with GE F110 performance, as in the case of the F-35.

In 2016, a Chinese national named Su Bin, who was living in Canada, was convicted of stealing classified data on the F-22 and F-35 programs, translating the material into Chinese, and then selling it to entities in the PRC to support their military R&D programs. He had also made numerous trips to the US to interact with hackers and other sources.

Why China’s “Type 99A” Is Its Greatest Tank Ever

Brandon J. Weichert

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Even as wild rumors circulate in the West that China’s economy and political system are teetering towards collapse, the country’s military modernization continues apace. Take, for example, the Type 99A main battle tank (MBT), which stands as a true testament to the nation’s rapid military modernization.

As the pinnacle of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Ground Force tank fleet, the Type 99A combines cutting-edge technology with a robust design, making it a formidable asset on the battlefield.

What to Know About China’s Type 99A Tank

Introduced as an upgraded variant of the original Type 99, this tank represents China’s strategic shift towards high-tech, network-centric warfare. Western sources will underestimate the Type 99A, as they do all Chinese systems. Whatever shortfalls this platform may possess, though, the fact that China has churned out 700 Type 99As—and counting—indicates how significant of a threat to China’s neighbors their tank force could pose. Numerically speaking, the PLA has an impressive capability.

Of course, warfare is not just done by the numbers. Combined arms is, of course, as much of an art as it is a theory of military science. While China has worked assiduously to transition their force into a modern military, they do lack experience. But the quality versus quantity argument that Western observers so often use to write off Chinese military technology will only get one so far.

The origins of the Type 99A trace back to the late 1980s, when China sought to bridge the gap with Western tank technologies. Influenced by Soviet designs like the iconic T-72 but incorporating lessons from the Gulf War, the initial “Type 98” prototype evolved into the Type 99, which first entered service in 1991. Developed by Chinese state defense conglomerate Norinco, the Type 99 marked a significant leap in firepower, mobility, and protection compared to older models like the Type 59.

China’s Cyber Playbook for the Indo-Pacific

Nathan Lee 

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Cyber operations are now a defining feature of modern warfare, as the war in Ukraine has demonstrated—and China is taking note. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has served as a testing ground for the integration of emerging technologies into hybrid warfare. Drawing from the lessons of the Ukraine war, China’s new military strategy establishes a joint and multi-domain doctrine that prioritizes a modernized wartime cyber approach, targeting key future conflicts such as a Taiwan contingency.

China’s Great Cyber Rejuvenation

Modern Chinese national military strategy seeks to leverage cyber power through constant readiness and information technology to enhance information dominance—the operational advantage gained from the ability to control, manipulate, and defend information to maximize warfighting effects. Starting in 2014, Xi Jinping began ambitiously envisioning China as a “cyber great power” capable of defending critical infrastructure from cyber intrusions, ensuring internal stability, and launching offensive operations against foreign adversaries. Critically, this shift affected People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military doctrine on cyber warfare.

The PLA’s focus on cyber power traces back to its study of the US military’s technological dominance in the Gulf War, primarily in information technologies, to control the battlefield. Cyber capabilities were subsequently incorporated into PLA doctrine and formally articulated in major policy documents such as the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, which emphasized the significant role of cyber in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. As military technology has advanced, Chinese military doctrine has become increasingly focused on information operations within the “three dominances” (三权), achieving superiority in the information, air, and sea domains, to determine the viability of a successful military operation, specifically against Taiwan, the United States, and its allies. In the 2020 Science of Military Strategy, the PLA states that cyberspace is the “basic platform for information warfare” because blinding cyberattacks on an adversary’s computer C4ISR networks can paralyze its combat processes at the outset of a conflict, thereby ensuring one’s own information dominance. To operationalize this strategy, the PLA advanced the doctrine of “peacetime-wartime integration,” a central principle under its military-civil fusion strategy. Designed to secure prepositioned information dominance, peacetime-wartime integration streamlines cyber operations by maintaining a constant state of readiness, ensuring these assets can be rapidly leveraged during wartime. Thus, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly designated cyber as a central cornerstone of military power in attaining information dominance, soon accelerating these reforms based on lessons from the Ukraine war.

Is Kosovo the model for a UK peacekeeping mission in Ukraine?

Richard Thomas

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The UK maintains a 600-strong force in Kosovo as part of KFOR. Credit: UK MoD/Crown copyright

Amomentous step towards a future peace deal or the latest in a series of false dawns in the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war, the end result of recent diplomatic efforts by the warring parties with the US and Europeans remain as yet unknown.

Following a bilateral with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 15 August 2025, US President Donald Trump followed that up days later with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Determined not to be left out, European leaders invited themselves and tagged along to the White House summit on 18 August.

What comes next is the prospect of a trilateral Trump-Putin-Zelenskyy meeting, possibly in Saudi Arabia as neutral territory, which would in theory begin to trash out the details of a ‘let’s skip a ceasefire and go straight to peace’ deal.

Calibrating Capability and Interest in Ukraine

George Friedman

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Last week, in my column in which I answer readers’ questions, I wrote that the United States must calibrate and measure its geopolitical interests in Ukraine with the risks of military intervention, concluding that the strategy pursued under presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump – that is, supplying intelligence and weapons but not troops to Ukraine – was the rational policy. Several readers took issue with this, arguing that the U.S. will inevitably have to deal with Russia if Ukraine falls, and that therefore Washington should intervene now before Russia ventures farther west. This is not an unreasonable argument, but I believe the risks still outweigh the benefits.

I should start by noting that since World War II, the U.S. has not done well in wars in the Eastern Hemisphere. In Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington failed to achieve its desired outcomes, and these failures need to be remembered when discussing the prospect of war. The problem in all these conflicts is that the objectives, as in all wars, were political. The means were military, but the force and strategy with which the U.S. approached those wars did not achieve the political goals. This is not because the U.S. was not militarily powerful, of course; it can win any war if it is prepared to send overwhelming force, accept substantial casualties, restructure its military doctrine and training appropriately, and maintain occupation for an extended period of time. Such was the case in and after World War II in Europe.

Of these requirements, the most important is to send overwhelming force. The idea of limited war is an illusion. For those fighting, no war is limited. Yet in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, there were limits placed on the military – both in terms of the force fielded and the allowable strategies and tactics used to achieve the political end. Since World War II, the U.S. has tended to underestimate its capabilities and the endurance of its enemies. I’m no pacifist, but caution should be taken in engaging in “limited” wars.

The View from NATO’s Eastern Flank

Garry Kasparov

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Garry Kasparov: I have several things in common with my guest in this episode. Viktorija Čmilytė-Nielsen and I were both born into Soviet republics. We both became chess grand masters, and we both left chess to enter politics. I think it is fair to say that while I reached greater heights in the chess world, as a former speaker of the Lithuanian legislature, she definitely rose higher in the political world.

Her home of Vlinius, Lithuania, has a special place in my heart. My first chess baptism by fire outside my home city of Baku, Azerbaijan, came at the All-Union Youth Games in Vilnius in 1973. I was just 10 while most of my opponents were four or five years older. I did not perform well, but I did meet Alexander Sergeevich Nikitin: state trainer of the U.S.S.R. Sports Committee, my future friend, mentor, and reliable supporter in the most difficult periods of my chess career.

From The Atlantic, this is Autocracy in America. I’m Garry Kasparov.

Kasparov: Putting nostalgia aside, Lithuania has become a hot spot as one of the most ardent defenders of Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. Lithuania also recognizes that, should Ukraine fall, it is at the top of the list of targets for Putin’s attempt to rebuild the Soviet Union in his image.

But despite obvious threats, this Baltic country has offered refuge to many Russian political dissidents. All of this is why I wanted to speak with Viktorija. She’s part of a conversation now unfolding all across Europe about how to face newly aggressive authoritarian states, as the United States reevaluates its role as the global leader of the free world.

Hungary is right: Ukraine should not join the EU

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As US President Donald J. Trump’s courageous and much-needed efforts to put an end to the Ukrainian war gain momentum, with the American leader having now met with Russian President Vladimir V. Putin in Anchorage, Alaska, and then with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky in Washington, there are rumours that the EU’s leadership has not given up on its dreams of having Ukraine join the bloc. Brussels, Paris, Berlin, and London have apparently all asked Trump to pressure Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán into abandoning his long-lasting reservations to the Ukrainians beginning accession talks. If true, this would signal yet another grave misjudgment on the part of the Europeans. In fact, however, Budapest’s position is not obstinacy—it is foresight. And foresight is precisely what the rest of Europe now lacks.

It is often said that politics is the art of the possible. When it comes to Ukraine’s EU ambitions, the numbers speak for themselves—and with brutal candour. Three and a half years after the beginning of full-scale hostilities, Ukraine is a wrecked nation. To “rebuild” it would require a sum scarcely imaginable—€2.5 trillion, according to the calculations of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs. This is twelve times the entire budget of the Union. Europe cannot afford such a fantasy: Germany, once the continent’s economic and industrial motor, is crippled by deindustrialisation and stagnation; France is being suffocated by unsustainable deficits; Italy is barely growing, and, with a government debt of almost 140 per cent of GDP, hardly has the fiscal flexibility to fund geopolitical adventurism. How can these nations, themselves overwhelmed by debt and poor growth, be expected to bankroll the recovery of a country shattered by war?

Smuggling for the Motherland? Using Ukraine’s Criminal Organizations Against Russia

Katharine Petrich 

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This article explores the possibility of Ukraine’s strategic use of domestic organized crime networks as an asset in its asymmetric war against Russia, using the case study of Operation Spider’s Web. By leveraging the logistical expertise, transnational reach, and deniability of criminal groups, Ukrainian security services could amplify their operational capabilities beyond conventional means. While effective, this collaboration raises complex risks for governance, legitimacy, and long-term postwar stability.

Introduction

On June 1, 2025, after eighteen months of preparation, Ukraine launched a covert attack deep inside Russia, causing upwards of $7 billion USD in damage. Called Operation Spider’s Web, the attacks were executed by small drones that had been smuggled into Russia over the course of the past year through “covert logistical routes.” The drones were moved overland using trucks ostensibly hauling routine cargo – in this case, prefabricated buildings with drones concealed in the roofs.

Beyond the immediate damage, the secondary costs are significant: Russia must either accept the expense of fortifying or relocating countless military assets – those previously thought to be protected by ‘safe’ geography – or they must accept that these assets now exist on the front lines. Operation Spider’s Web was a clear success and much has been written about it, but fundamental logistical questions persist: How, exactly, did a production line in Ukraine deliver drones throughout Russia? Who dropped the containers off on the side of the road or parked them at gas stations within striking distance of the Russian airfields? Who confirmed the assets were in position?

Open-source reporting and Ukrainian government characterizes this as a highly sophisticated, technical covert operation carried out by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU). According to President Zelensky, the SBU set up a secret assembly line within Russia itself – so component parts were manufactured in Ukraine, smuggled across the border, transported to Central Russia, assembled, hidden in shipping containers, and then deployed. Some reporting suggests that the truck drivers who transported the goods were unknowing patsies, but the Ukrainian government has stated any personnel who were involved in the operation were safely back on the Ukrainian side of the border before the attack commenced, with the implication all personnel involved were Ukrainian intelligence and special operations.

The Scale of Russian Sabotage Operations Against Europe’s Critical Infrastructure

Charlie Edwards

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Russia is waging an unconventional war on Europe. Through its campaign of sabotage, vandalism, espionage and covert action, Russia’s aim has been to destabilise European governments, undermine public support for Ukraine by imposing social and economic costs on Europe, and weaken the collective ability of NATO and the European Union to respond to Russian aggression. This unconventional war began to escalate in 2022 in parallel to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While Russia has so far failed to achieve its primary aim, European capitals have struggled to respond to Russian sabotage operations and have found it challenging to agree a unified response, coordinate action, develop effective deterrence measures and impose sufficient costs on the Kremlin.

IISS has created the most comprehensive open-source database of suspected and confirmed Russian sabotage operations targeting Europe. The data reveals Russian sabotage has been aimed at Europe’s critical infrastructure, is decentralised and, despite European security and intelligence officials raising the alarm, is largely unaffected by NATO, EU and member state responses to date. Russia has exploited gaps in legal systems through its ‘gig economy’ approach, enabling it to avoid attribution and responsibility. Since 2022 and the expulsion of hundreds of its intelligence officers from European capitals, Russia has been highly effective in its online recruitment of third-country nationals to circumvent European counter-intelligence measures. While the tactic has proven successful in terms of reach and volume, enabling operations at scale, the key challenge facing the Russian intelligence services has been the quality of the proxies, who are often poorly trained or ill-equipped, making their activities prone to detection, disruption or failure.

Russia’s military doctrine deeply integrates Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sabotage within gibridnaya voyna (hybrid warfare). Europe’s critical infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to sabotage because it is in such a poor state following decades of deferred maintenance and a lack of investment from national governments and the private sector. Russia has targeted critical infrastructure to generate direct strategic gain in its war in Ukraine and as part of its broader conflict with the West. While some initiatives, such as the Baltic Sentry NATO maritime operation in the Baltic Sea, have been somewhat effective, the lack of budget and resources has kept NATO and the EU from adopting a long-term and sustained response. Furthermore, it is unclear, faced with competing national security priorities, how committed European capitals are to deterring Russia’s unconventional war on Europe.

The Era of the Aircraft Carrier Is About to End

Harry Kazianis

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For the better part of a century, nothing has projected American power more effectively than the aircraft carrier.

A 100,000-ton behemoth of sovereign U.S. territory, capable of launching a more powerful air force than most nations possess, the supercarrier has been the undisputed king of the seas.

It is the centerpiece of our naval strategy, the first asset sent to any global crisis, and the ultimate symbol of our military might.

The Aircraft Carrier Era Is Over

But what if the king is now vulnerable?

What if a weapon exists that can turn our most powerful asset into our most catastrophic liability?

Take it from me: that weapon is no longer theoretical.

China’s development and deployment of advanced anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), specifically the DF-21D and the longer-range DF-26B, represents the most significant threat to U.S. naval supremacy since the Cold War.

These are not just another class of missile; they are a revolutionary capability designed for a single purpose: to hold American aircraft carriers at risk and push them out of the Western Pacific. To understand their impact is to understand the daunting new reality of a potential U.S.-China conflict.

To grasp why these missiles are such a game-changer, you have to understand how they differ from traditional anti-ship weapons. For decades, the primary threat to a carrier was from cruise missiles or submarines. While dangerous, these were threats the Navy’s layered defense systems were designed to counter. A cruise missile flies low and relatively slow, giving a carrier strike group’s Aegis cruisers and destroyers a chance to detect, track, and shoot it down.

The New Economic Geography

Adam S. Posen

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The post-American world economy has arrived. U.S. President Donald Trump’s radical shift in economic approach has already begun to change norms, behaviors, and institutions globally. Like a major earthquake, it has given rise to new features in the landscape and rendered many existing economic structures unusable. This event was a political choice, not an inevitable natural disaster. But the changes that it is driving are here to stay. No guardrails will automatically restore the previous status quo.

To understand these changes, many analysts and politicians focus on the degree to which supply chains and trade in manufactured goods are shifting between the United States and China. But that focus is too narrow. Asking whether the United States or China will remain central to the world’s economy—or looking primarily at trade balances—yields a dramatic underestimate of the scope and impact of Trump’s changed approach and how comprehensively the prior U.S. framework undergirded the economic decisions made by almost every state, financial institution, and company worldwide.

In essence, the global public goods that the United States provided after the end of World War II—among others, the ability to securely navigate the air and seas, the presumption that property is safe from expropriation, rules for international trade, and stable dollar assets in which to transact business and store money—can be thought of, in economic terms, as forms of insurance. The United States collected premiums from the countries that participated in the system it led in a variety of ways, including through its ability to set rules that made the U.S. economy the most attractive one to investors. In return, the societies that bought into the system were freed to expend much less effort on securing their economies against uncertainty, enabling them to pursue the commerce that helped them flourish.

Ukraine Will Not Be a Pawn

Dmytro Kuleba

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For almost everyone involved, the diplomacy around ending the war in Ukraine seems to be an exercise in faking it till they make it. Russian President Vladimir Putin is pretending he wants peace. U.S. President Donald Trump is riding along with him, pretending (or perhaps truly thinking) that Putin is sincere. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is pretending he believes Trump, as are leaders in Europe. The summits in Alaska and Washington reflected this, generating lots of noise without any breakthroughs. Call it the fog of diplomacy.

Still, it would be a mistake to say the gatherings accomplished nothing. In fact, every leader in attendance walked away with some sort of achievement. By traveling to Alaska, Putin placated Trump, who was growing exasperated with the Russian leader, and lived out his long-held fantasy of meeting with a U.S. president and carving up part of Europe. Trump, meanwhile, used the Alaska meeting to free himself from domestic pressure to impose harsh sanctions on Russian oil or to take other forceful measures. In Washington, Ukraine and Europe received promises that Trump would continue selling arms to Ukraine and demonstrated that they have seats at the negotiating table. Trump, for his part, reassured critics that he was not cutting a deal with Putin behind the backs of his NATO allies.

But although the summits mark a departure from Trump’s early strategy—when Ukraine and Europe received only sticks, and Russia only carrots—the president is mercurial. He has repeatedly expressed admiration for powerful dictatorships and endorsed the idea that, in international relations, strong countries should do as they like. Trump doesn’t even think he needs to listen to Putin, although Russia’s president also believes that the weak must submit to the will of the great. As the talks continue, Trump could flip back to threatening Kyiv and Europe.

But no matter how many times Putin and Trump speak, and no matter what they do, Ukrainians are strong enough to avoid having their future dictated to them. Kyiv is not opposed to a negotiated settlement, as Trump occasionally suggests. But unless it is abandoned by Europe and experiences a domestic collapse, Ukraine will not surrender. To become a great peacemaker, Trump will thus have to better understand what Kyiv requires before the country puts down its weapons.

Why Haven’t Sanctions on Russia Stopped the War? The Money Is Still Flowing.

Aaron Krolik

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What kind of power can the United States exert to punish other countries for their misdeeds? The answer, in the age of nuclear weapons, has been economic power. Impose sanctions and cut off access to the U.S. dollar, the thinking goes, and the excruciating economic pain will force a rogue country to play nice.

And yet Russia — by some measures the most sanctioned country on earth — shows little urgency to do what the United States and European nations want: End its war in Ukraine.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the United States has put more than 6,000 individuals and companies with ties to the Russian war effort on the official sanctions list. For these prohibitions to work, the financial institutions that move money across borders must screen transactions and cut off illicit activity. If they don’t, they could face steep penalties from the United States, including fines or exile to the sanctions list themselves.

Nonetheless, Russia has managed to conduct hundreds of billions of dollars in cross-border trade. One reason could be that the financial institutions necessary to facilitate that trade are not being found and punished.

A New York Times analysis found that eight of the 10 largest settlements for global sanctions violations since 2014, when sanctions were first imposed on Russia over its annexation of Crimea, were against financial institutions. But only two of those cases involved Russia: one against a venture capital firm that managed money for a Russian oligarch who was under sanctions and another against Binance, a cryptocurrency exchange. And Binance was not primarily fined for helping Russia; it had also greased the financial pathway for other countries facing sanctions, including Iran, North Korea, Syria and Cuba.

As for the more than 6,000 entities on the Russian sanctions list, most are individuals and small shell companies; fewer than 30 are large firms based outside of Russia, and only five of those are financial firms.

Bringing down the hammer on financial firms that are helping Russia’s war machine has become only more complicated as the war in Ukraine has progressed. Cut off from much of the Western world, Russia has forged deeper ties with India and China, large economies that provide an economic lifeline.

Peace Talks in Ukraine All Lead to the Donbas

Kim Barker and Constant Méheut

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For President Trump, the map of Ukraine on an easel in the Oval Office had an obvious message. Russia has taken a big chunk of territory in an eastern region known as the Donbas. That territory, shaded in red, was gone. Ukraine needed to make a deal to get peace, or it risked losing more.

For President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, the map, displayed at a meeting on Monday with the two presidents and European leaders, presented a far more complicated picture. This was not a business deal or a poker game. This was personal.

Away from the cameras, he told Mr. Trump that his grandfather had fought in World War II to free the cities of the Donbas from the Nazis. He could not just give it up.

On Wednesday, hours after he returned to Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, Mr. Zelensky reiterated the point.

“There were many such families” who fought to free the Donbas, Mr. Zelensky told reporters. “Many fell and many were wounded. And I explained that this is a particularly painful moment in our history and a particularly painful part of life in Ukraine. It is not as simple as it may appear to some.”

It is not clear where exactly the recent flurry of diplomacy spearheaded by Mr. Trump to end the deadliest war in Europe since World War II will lead. But the Donbas — a mineral-rich territory that consists mainly of two regions, Donetsk and Luhansk — will be at the center of any negotiations.

Almost the size of West Virginia, the Donbas is where much of this war has been fought. Tens of thousands of soldiers on both sides have died there for the smallest of gains. Russia is now trying to seize the last 2,500 square miles of the Donbas still under Ukrainian control.

Lessons from Ukraine’s ‘First World Drone War’

Trudy Rubin

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In a warren of rooms filled with computers, 3D printers, colorful wires, and drone frames, the atmosphere was casual, but the intentions were deadly.

The young men in their 20s and 30s, dressed in cargo pants and T-shirts, wouldn’t have looked out of place at a Silicon Valley start-up. Except they were fighting for their lives — and their country’s survival.

In the basement command center, three of the soldier-techies stared at multiple screens with dozens of views delivered by Ukrainian-made surveillance drones. They were looking for Russian targets in a war that had lasted for three and a half years.

As I peered over their shoulders during a June visit to the rear of the front lines, a moving car was spotted.

Orders were quickly passed to a frontline drone navigator and pilot in a trench or basement who would make the final call as to whether the target was clearly visible and worth destroying — at which point the pilot’s goggles would let him watch the little exploding drone descend until a flash signaled another kill.

It was a slow day, and everyone’s attention had turned to other screens before I could learn the fate of the car. But there were always more targets to find.

By my side, the 31-year-old commander of an elite drone battalion of the 59th Assault Brigade, call sign Condor, told me there are up to 300 targets a day, which can range from a single fighter in the grass to a moving motorcycle to a small Russian dugout covered with branches or nets.

“The orcs outnumber us, and they don’t care about loss of lives,” Condor said, using the name of the grotesque enemy warriors in the Lord of the Rings series to refer to the Russians. “In this new way of war, infantry and artillery and mortars still matter, but everything is controlled by air. Now, a military is just a way of supporting drones.”

Trump Is Penalizing 1.4 Billion People for the Actions of 2 Companies

Syed Akbaruddin

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In recent days, senior members of the Trump administration have made a strange accusation against India. Writing in the Financial Times on Aug. 18, Peter Navarro, the White House counselor for trade and manufacturing, claimed that India’s “Big Oil Lobby” was profiteering on discounted Russian crude, selling it to Europe, and “shielding India from sanctions scrutiny.” U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent echoed that view in an interview with CNBC on Aug. 19, saying that “India is just profiteering … which is unacceptable.”

Yes, refined Russian crude is reaching Europe. It comes through multiple routes, including Turkey and India. But Europe’s imports from India come mainly from just two private companies, not public sector ones. These are business decisions, not acts of state. Calling them the conduct of India confuses private commerce with national policy.

The Future of the Dollar Lies With

Theodore Bunzel

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Talk of the U.S. dollar can have a frustratingly abstract, near-mystical quality to it. Even putting aside the crypto crowd’s pseudo-philosophising about the future of money, when most commentators speak of the dollar as a “reserve currency,” it’s often imprecise and conjures up an image of greenbacks stored in central bank vaults. This, in turn, is meant to provide the United States with far-reaching economic superpowers.

Yet the fate of the dollar is nonetheless an important story to tell, especially these days. After April 2, when U.S. President Donald Trump imposed sweeping tariffs—bringing the U.S. average effective tariff to its highest level in nearly a century—the dollar started behaving strangely. An economic textbook would tell you that U.S. tariff hikes strengthen the dollar: Higher duties decrease U.S. demand for (now higher priced) foreign goods and therefore demand to swap dollars for foreign currencies to pay for those goods. Yet the dollar fell after April 2—it has declined 8 percent thus far this year—and there were periods in April when the dollar fell, bond prices fell, and U.S. equity markets fell, an alarming trifecta mostly seen in emerging markets as a sign of panicked capital flight. What’s going on here?

Space is the new battlefield with hijacked satellites and orbiting weapons

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WASHINGTON (AP) — As Russia held its Victory Day parade this year, hackers backing the Kremlin hijacked an orbiting satellite that provides television service to Ukraine.

Instead of normal programing, Ukrainian viewers saw parade footage beamed in from Moscow: waves of tanks, soldiers and weaponry. The message was meant to intimidate and was an illustration that 21st-century war is waged not just on land, sea and air but also in cyberspace and the reaches of outer space.

Disabling a satellite could deal a devastating blow without one bullet, and it can be done by targeting the satellite’s security software or disrupting its ability to send or receive signals from Earth.

“If you can impede a satellite’s ability to communicate, you can cause a significant disruption,” said Tom Pace, CEO of NetRise, a cybersecurity firm focused on protecting supply chains.

“Think about GPS,” said Pace, who served in the Marines before working on cyber issues at the Department of Energy. “Imagine if a population lost that and the confusion it would cause.”

Satellites are the short-term challenge

More than 12,000 operating satellites now orbit the planet, playing a critical role not just in broadcast communications but also in military operations, navigation systems like GPS, intelligence gathering and economic supply chains. They are also key to early launch-detection efforts, which can warn of approaching missiles.

That makes them a significant national security vulnerability, and a prime target for anyone looking to undermine an adversary’s economy or military readiness — or deliver a psychological blow like the hackers supporting Russia did when they hijacked television signals to Ukraine.

Restructuring Our Military for a Multi-Front War

Arnold Punaro

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Urgent Action Is Necessary to Rework and Restructure Our Military for a Multi-Front War

Over the course of our nation’s relatively brief history, Americans have risen to the occasion to defeat our enemies and protect our freedoms. Whether it was those brave souls parachuting into Normandy on D-Day or those in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, American sacrifice serves as a powerful example of what can be accomplished when we dedicate the best of ourselves to the greatest good.

Global strategic conditions are rapidly evolving, and so too is the necessity of preparing for wars that we neither want nor seek. Conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza serve as a reminder of this challenge, as well as a stark warning that the American military must restructure in order to grapple with the realities of the world today.

In recent history, the United States has attempted to build a force and strategy capable of addressing conflicts on multiple fronts, learning critical lessons along the way. Vietnam proved that even what is perceived to be a “small war” requires a significant force, dispelling the Johnson administration’s belief that the military of the time could fight two wars simultaneously in Europe and the Pacific, as well as a smaller conflict in the third world. Under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, we reduced our force structure by thirty percent from its 1990 levels.

A Bottom Up Review from the Clinton administration read, in part, that “one of the central factors in our analysis was the judgment that the United States must field forces capable, in concert with its allies, of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously.” Although the report does acknowledge that strategic force reductions could be made and still maintain this capability, then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin qualified it by adding that a series of “critical force enhancements to improve our strategic mobility and strengthen our early-arriving antiarmor capability” should be made.

Developing a national defense structure capable of a multi-front war continued to morph under George W. Bush’s administration, which aimed to build a force which was capable of deterring hostilities in four key regions at any given time. Of those four regions, the goal was to have a force prepared to win swiftly in two of those regions, and of those two, to win decisively in one region.