Indian Strategic Studies: 08/17/25

17 August 2025

How much is Trump pocketing off the Presidency?

David D. Kirkpatrick

At a press conference on January 11, 2017, President-elect Donald Trump explained for the first time how he would handle the many conflicts of interest that his business empire posed for his new role. His company, the Trump Organisation, collected money from all over the world for luxury condos, hotel rentals, development projects, and club memberships, and he had made deals that put his name on everything from mail-order steaks to get-rich-quick courses. Could citizens trust him to put the common good ahead of personal profit? How would he assure Americans that payments to his business weren’t doubling as payoffs?

A journalist asked Trump if he would release his tax returns, as Presidents had done for decades. Trump said no, and then explained just how unconstrained he felt by such conventions. He’d recently learned that the President, being beholden only to the voters, is subject to none of the regulations that restrict subordinate officials from conducting private business on the side. He called the loophole “a no-conflict-of-interest provision,” as if it were a perk of his employment contract.

To illustrate just how glaring a conflict the law allowed him, Trump volunteered that, during the transition, he’d entertained a two-billion-dollar offer “to do a deal in Dubai.” The offer had come from Hussain Sajwani, an Emirati real-estate tycoon with close ties to his country’s rulers. Trump emphasised that he “didn’t have to turn it down.” Nevertheless, he’d passed, because he didn’t “want to take advantage of something”; he disliked “the way that looks.” Therefore, he continued, his eldest sons, Donald, Jr., and Eric, would assume daily management of his businesses until he left office

The Dawn of Automated Warfare

Eric Schmidt and Greg Grant

Artificial Intelligence Will Be the Key to Victory in Ukraine—and Elsewhere RIC SCHMIDT is CEO and Chair of Relativity Space and Chair of the Special Competitive Studies Project. He previously served as CEO and Chair of Google and is a co-author, with Henry Kissinger and Craig Mundie, of Genesis: Artificial Intelligence, Hope, and the Human Spirit.

GREG GRANT is an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security. He previously served as Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defence Bob Work, and as a speechwriter for Secretaries of Defence Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, and Chuck Hagel

When Russia first launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict drew comparisons to wars of the twentieth century. Tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery dominated the battlefield, and both sides’ infantry were dug into trenches. We witnessed this old-school style of war when we made our first visit to Ukraine in September 2022. Since then, we have made regular trips to Ukraine, affording us firsthand insight into a monumental transformation: the beginning of a new kind of warfare.

Incentives for U.S.-China Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation Across Artificial General Intelligence’s Five Hard National Security Problems

Michael S. Chase, William Marcellino

In a relationship marked by strategic rivalry and mutual suspicion, the prospect of either the United States or the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—or both—achieving artificial general intelligence (AGI) is likely to heighten tensions and could even increase the risk of competition spiralling into conflict. This is unsurprising, as AGI could reshape the global balance of power or yield “wonder weapons” capable of overwhelming intelligence systems, information ecosystems, and cyber defences (Mitre and Predd, 2025).

Yet the emergence of AGI could also create incentives for risk reduction and cooperation. We argue that both will not only be possible but essential. The United States and China will both want to avoid miscalculation and misunderstandings that could lead to an unwanted war. Neither will be able to manage alone the risks of AGI misuse—whether from rogue actors developing novel weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), autonomous agents triggering crises, or cascading disruptions that exceed state capacity. But such progress on risk reduction or on cooperation will not emerge organically. It will require a deliberate and carefully calibrated diplomatic effort to make it viable. In this paper, we offer some ideas for where to start, building on existing yet underdeveloped platforms and avenues for dialogue.

The PRC’s choices will be a principal factor in shaping the risks and opportunities that U.S. policymakers will face on the path to AGI, and, likewise, Chinese officials will likely view the United States as the most consequential external actor shaping AGI outcomes. At first glance, it might seem that the intensifying friction between Washington and Beijing over security, economic, and technology issues, along with each side’s extremely negative views of the other’s intentions, will drive relations between them in areas related to AGI.

The Militarization of Silicon Valley

Sheera Frenkel

In a ceremony in June at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall in Arlington, Va., four current and former executives from Meta, OpenAI and Palantir lined up onstage to swear an oath to support and defend the United States. The U.S. Army had just created a technical innovation unit for the executives, who were dressed in combat gear and boots. At the event, they were pronounced lieutenant colonels in the new unit, Detachment 201, which will advise the Army on new technologies for potential combat.

“We desperately need what they are good at,” Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll said of the tech executives, who have since undergone basic training. “It’s an understatement how grateful we are that they are taking this risk to come and try to build this out with us.” ImageAndrew Bosworth, Meta’s chief technology officer; Bob McGrew, an adviser at Thinking Machines Lab and OpenAI’s former chief research officer; Shyam Sankar, Palantir’s chief technology officer; and Kevin Weil, OpenAI’s chief product officer at a military ceremony in June.Credit...Staff Sgt. Leroy Council/United States Army

The military is not just courting Silicon Valley tech companies. In the age of President Trump, it has successfully recruited them. Over the past two years, Silicon Valley’s leaders and investors — many of whom had once forsworn involvement in weapons and war — have plunged headfirst into the military industrial complex. Meta, Google and OpenAI, which once had language in their corporate policies banning the use of artificial intelligence in weapons, have removed such wording. OpenAI is creating anti-drone technology, while Meta is making virtual reality glasses to train soldiers for battle.

So Long to Tech’s Dream Job

Kate Conger

When Rachel Grey started working at Google as a software engineer in 2007, it was a good time to be a Noogler, or what the search giant called new employees. At a two-week orientation at Google’s headquarters in Mountain View, Calif., Ms. Grey discovered a utopia of perks. The company’s cafeterias served steak and shrimp, kitchens were stocked with fresh juices and gyms offered free workout classes. Workers received stock grants on top of their salaries, a 50 per cent match on their retirement contributions and a Christmas bonus that came in the form of $1,000 tucked in an envelope.

What also made an impression on Ms. Grey during orientation was that Google revealed how many machines were in its data centres. “I saw how transparent things were in the company,” she said about the normally hush-hush information. Over the years, though, her experience changed as she became a software engineering manager. The Christmas bonus shrank. Employees were no longer provided a fire hose of corporate information. The company abandoned a pledge that its artificial intelligence would not be used for weapons. The budget for promotions dried up, pressuring Ms. Grey to lower performance ratings, which she said was “stunningly painful.” In April, just shy of 18 years, the 48-year-old quit what was once her dream job.

Life for workers at Silicon Valley’s biggest tech companies is different. Very different. Gone are the days when Google, Apple, Meta and Netflix were the dream destinations for tech workers, offering fat salaries, lush corporate campuses and say-anything, do-anything cultures. Now the behemoth firms have aged into large bureaucracies. While many of them still provide free food and pay well, they have little compunction cutting jobs, ordering mandatory office attendance and clamping down on employee debate.

Expanding China’s Geopolitical Influence through Peripheral Communication

Andrew Grant

The discourse of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and trio of global initiatives implies that the country’s geopolitical interests are firmly global. Nonetheless, in recent years Chinese scholars and intellectuals have increased their attention on the periphery of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For many PRC scholars, this is presented as a course-corrective to earlier efforts to improve China’s position and status in “far away” places around the globe—efforts that in Western countries have produced weak results or backfired. The turn to its periphery can also be understood as an effort by China to reimagine its borderlands as geopolitical spaces that will serve as natural stepping stones between the consolidation of domestic frontier territories and long-term goals of extending China’s great-power influence around the world. From this viewpoint, control of China’s periphery is seen as a testing ground for the country’s global power.

In October 2013 and April 2025, Xi Jinping convened special meetings on China’s periphery. In his 2025 speech at the Central Peripheral Work Conference, he emphasized the importance of creating a “peripheral community of a shared future” (周边命运共同体). While development and a large assortment of “mutual” projects are presented as key to the establishment of this community, there is also a strong emphasis on finding a basis in cultural commonalities expressed via terms such as “affinity” (亲) and “tolerance” (容). Such shared traits are seen as attributes of populations on either side of the border that must be cultivated to strengthen peripheral states’ ties to China. These attributes will then become the foundations of a peripheral community that will serve China’s geopolitical interests and is responsive to “China’s new era foreign discursive system,” which, in line with Xi’s calls for building Chinese-centered narrative and conceptual frameworks, ensures that positive stories about China and its benevolent deeds are told, heard, and further disseminated.1 Such a peripheral propaganda program can help counter Western influence, thereby helping establish China’s stepping stones to greater world influence. At the heart of this approach is the concept of “peripheral communication” (周边传播)—an emerging field of study and action pioneered by the Peking University scholar Lu Di that seeks to control the discourse about China in the countries proximate to its borders.

A.I. is fueling a “poverty of imagination.” Here’s how we can fix it.

Meher AhmadJessica Grose, and Tressie McMillan Cottom

Artificial intelligence is already showing up in the classroom, so how are colleges, professors and students adapting to it? The New York Times Opinion editor Meher Ahmad is joined by the writer Jessica Grose and the columnist Tressie McMillan Cottom to talk about how the humanities are charting a new course, and whether ChatGPT is comparable to SparkNotes.

A.I. Is Fueling a ‘Poverty of Imagination.’ Here’s How We Can Fix It.What bots are really doing in the classroom. Below is a transcript of an episode of “The Opinions.” We recommend listening to it in its original form for the full effect. You can do so using the player above or on the NYT Audio app, Apple, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcasts. The transcript has been lightly edited for length and claritMeher Ahmad: I’m Meher Ahmad and I’m an editor for the New York Times Opinion section. Today I am joined by my colleagues the writer Jessica Grose and the columnist Tressie McMillan Cotto, to talk about artificial intelligence and education. Hi to both of you.

Jessica Grose: Thanks so much for having me.Tressie McMillan Cottom: Hello. Always a pleasure to be here. And hi, Jessica. Good to see you. Ahmad: So both of you have given this a lot of thought. Tressie, you’re in the classroom often as a sociology professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and have called generative A.I. “mid tech,” which we’ll get into. Jess, you’ve spent time interviewing parents, students and most recently educators across the humanities to write a series of pieces on A.I. and education for your newsletter.

Taiwan readying 'carrier killer' missile to thwart China invasion

Gabriel Honrada

Betting on stealth over speed, Taiwan is forging a long-range “carrier killer” to push back China’s carriers and toughen the First Island Chain—even as layered Chinese defences and shaky allied politics cloud the gambit. This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Taiwan is developing a long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile that defence analysts say could significantly strengthen deterrence against China’s growing naval power, citing a defence ministry procurement list.

Under the Defence Industry Development Act, the ministry will spend NT$40 million (US$1.3 million) over two years on 80 frequency-agile coaxial magnetrons, radar components for the new missile and existing models. Meanwhile, local media said more than NT$800 million (US$26 million) was allocated in 2021–2022 to adapt Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack technology with enhanced stealth. Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) is believed to have led the weapon’s development since 2021.

Analysts, citing the US AGM-158B and C as references, estimate the missile will have a range of 600–1,000 kilometres—enough to reach beyond Chinese carrier-based aircraft and cover large parts of the East and South China Seas. The new weapon aims to offset the Hsiung Feng III’s 400-kilometre limit and the US-made Harpoon’s 200-kilometre reach, both requiring risky penetration of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) layered defences.

The Battle Inside Russia’s Elite

Kirill Shamiev

As Russia’s economic situation worsens and Ukrainian defences continue to hold, elite factions in Moscow are manoeuvring for position in an uncertain future. Their goal is twofold: to protect the profits and privileges gained during the war, and to deflect blame for its mounting human and financial costs. Russian President Vladimir Putin is concerned that the elite’s disunity and anxiety about the country’s future could undermine the cohesion of the Russian regime. To counteract this trend, the Kremlin has introduced unprecedented legal mechanisms for redistributing wealth under the banner of national security: from those suspected of even minimal disloyalty or Western ties, to individuals who may be less competent but demonstrably supportive of Putin. This puts the elites in a Russian-style prisoner’s dilemma, in which the safest strategy is to perform exaggerated loyalty while quietly undermining rivals to survive the conflict.

From the United States’ perspective, the challenge is to make sure these dynamics don’t become an obstacle to ending the Russia-Ukraine war. To do so, U.S. policy should continue making Russia’s government and industrial leadership feel anxious about the war’s costs and eventual settlement. Policymakers should signal that accountability for the invasion will be targeted rather than collective or indiscriminate. The war’s architects should continue to face sanctions, while elites who increasingly abstain from publicly backing the war effort should be led to expect more forgiving treatment.

Ukrainians have changed their minds on ending war

Brendan Cole

Brendan Cole is a Newsweek Senior News Reporter based in London, UK. His focus is Russia and Ukraine, in particular the war started by Moscow. He also covers other areas of geopolitics, including China. Brendan joined Newsweek in 2018 from the International Business Times and well knows English, knows Russian and French. You can get in touch with Brendan by emailing b.cole@newsweek.com or follow on him on his X account @brendanmarkcole.

Support among Ukrainians for continuing the fight against Russia has slumped, according to polling that shows most want to end the war through negotiations. The Gallup survey found that most Ukrainians backed ending the war with Russia through negotiations, as support for Kyiv fighting on until victory has dropped sharply since the early days of the conflict.

This is a reversal from 2022, the year the war started, when most favoured Ukraine fighting until victory, and only a fifth wanted a negotiated end as soon as possible. Gallup also found that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had an approval rating of 67 per cent, up seven percentage points from 2024. Benedict Vigers, a senior global news writer at Gallup, told Newsweek that since 2023, Gallup has observed "meaningful shifts in how Ukrainians feel about the war with Russia."

Trump and Putin Could Decide Others’ Fates, Echoing Yalta Summit

Steven Erlanger

The world’s superpowers met in 1945 in the Black Sea port of Yalta to divide up Europe after the defeat of Nazi Germany. They drew lines on the map that tore apart countries, effectively delivered Eastern Europe to Soviet occupation and dismembered Poland. And none of those countries were represented or had a say. As President Trump prepares to meet President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia on Friday in Alaska, there is more talk — and anxiety — among Ukrainians and Europeans about a second Yalta. They are not scheduled to be present, and Mr. Trump has said he plans to negotiate “land swaps” with Mr. Putin over Ukrainian territory.

“Yalta is a symbol of everything we fear,” said Peter Schneider, a German novelist who wrote “The Wall Jumper,” about the division of Berlin. At Yalta, the world itself was divided and “countries were handed to Stalin,” he said. “Now we see that Putin wants to reconstruct the world as it was at Yalta. For him, it begins with Ukraine, but that’s not his ending.” Yalta, itself in Russian-annexed Crimea, has become a symbol for how superpowers can decide the fates of other nations and peoples. “It’s a linchpin moment, when the European world is divided in two and the fate of Europeans in the East is locked in without any possible say,” said Ivan Vejvoda, a Serb political scientist with the Institute for Human Sciences, a research institution in Vienna.

Vladimir Putin Could Be Laying a Trap

Jonathan Lemire

Vladimir Putin has had a tough few months. His military’s much-feared summer offensive has made incremental gains in Ukraine but not nearly the advances he had hoped. His economy has sputtered. Donald Trump has grown fed up with Putin’s repeated defiance of his calls for a cease-fire and, for the first time, has targeted the Russian president with consistently harsh rhetoric. Last week, Trump slapped one of Russia’s major trading partners, India, with sanctions.

Putin needs to buy time to change the trajectory of the conflict. So the former KGB spymaster has given Trump something that the U.S. president has wanted for months: a one-on-one summit to discuss the end of the conflict. Trump leaped at the chance. But as the two men prepare to meet in Alaska on Friday, foreign-policy experts—and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky—are warning that Trump could be walking into a trap that the Russian leader is setting on American soil.

“Putin has already won. He is the leader of a rogue state, and he’ll get a picture on U.S. soil with the president of the United States,” John Bolton, one of Trump’s former national security advisers, told me. “Trump wants a deal. And if he can’t get one now, he may walk away from it entirely.” Putin has shown no sign of compromising his positions. His demands to reach an end to hostilities remain maximalist: He wants Russia to keep the territory it conquered, and Ukraine to forgo the security guarantees that could prevent Moscow from attacking again. Those terms are nonstarters for Ukraine and the European nations that have rallied to its defence.

China Is Winning the Cyberwar

Anne Neuberger

ANNE NEUBERGER is Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University and a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Before serving as Deputy National Security Adviser for Cyber and Emerging Technology on the U.S. National Security Council in the Biden administration, she spent over a decade in various roles at the U.S. National Security Agency.

American companies are world leaders in technology—be it innovative software, cloud services, artificial intelligence, or cybersecurity products. Yet beginning as many as three years ago, hackers believed to be backed by the Chinese government did something the United States, the tech powerhouse, could not adequately defend against: they gained and maintained access to major U.S. telecommunications networks, copying conversations and building the ability to track the movements of U.S. intelligence officers and law enforcement agents across the country. The attack, dubbed “Salt Typhoon,” constituted a large part of a global campaign against telecoms, and it penetrated systems at many U.S. carriers so thoroughly that officials will almost certainly never know the full scope of the capabilities China achieved to spy on Americans’ communications.

Salt Typhoon was more than a one-off intelligence success for China. It reflected a deeper, troubling reality. Mere decades after the widespread adoption of the Internet opened a new realm of geopolitical contestation, China is positioning itself to dominate the digital battle space. The United States has fallen behind, failing to secure a vast digital home front—and the physical assets that depend on it. Because cyberspace has no borders, the U.S. homeland is always in the fight. Every hospital, power grid, pipeline, water treatment plant, and telecommunications system is on the frontlines, and most of the United States’ critical infrastructure is unready for battle.

Exploring War Termination in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Jerry Landrum

During his 2024 presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised that, if elected, he would end the Russo-Ukraine War within 24 hours by meeting personally with Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. Six months into his term, however, the war persists. This gap between political rhetoric and reality reflects not a deficiency in negotiation skills but the deeper dynamics that H.E. Goemans’ theory of war termination reveals about how battlefield outcomes reshape war aims, exacerbate commitment problems, and interact with domestic political constraints to prevent peace. Applying Goemans’ framework to the Russo-Ukraine War reveals why even sustained US pressure has failed to produce a settlement and why similar dynamics recur in protracted conflicts. Any future peace negotiations over the Russo-Ukraine War must successfully navigate the challenges highlighted within this theoretical framework.

Variance in War Aims

Goemans argues that bargaining space for war termination opens only when neither side demands more than the other can accept. Yet war aims vary based on battlefield outcomes. For Russia, the Kremlin’s illegal annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia marked a pivot from an early focus on capturing Kyiv to securing territorial control in the east and south. Putin’s rhetoric, however, continues to invoke a vision of a culturally unified Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, suggesting that if conditions allowed, the Kremlin would once again pursue control over all of Ukraine. At the 2025 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Putin reiterated that he considers “Ukraine and Russian peoples to be one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours. We have a rule. Wherever a Russian soldier sets foot is ours.”

The Collapse of Iran’s Proxy Strategy Exposes the Limits of Asymmetric Warfare

Rufat Ahmadzada

With the conclusion of Operation Rising Lion, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu iterated that Israel has accomplished its strategic operational goals, in particular, rolling back the Iranian threat in terms of both its nuclear weapons program and ballistic missiles. The accuracy of the conduct of the military operation by the Israeli air force, military intelligence, and Mossad, and the intense focus in the opening stage of the operation, particularly the decapitation of the Iranian military chain of command, inflicted a strategic and humiliating defeat on Iran. The Israeli air force flew more than 1,000 sorties from a distance of more than 1,500km and struck Iranian nuclear sites Natanz and Isfahan, as well as ballistic missile sites and launchers in western Iran. In doing so, the Israelis disabled the Iranian air defence systems, thereby establishing complete air superiority, including over the capital Tehran, and attacked regime power structures such as the Basij paramilitary, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Ministry of Defence, and police. Likewise, the targeted assassinations of Iran’s nuclear scientists, a vital group of people with know-how for the nuclear weapons program, were also a strategic action, eliminating or setting back Iran’s nuclear program. The US’s operation, codenamed Midnight Hammer, dealt the final blow against the nuclear program with strikes on nuclear enrichment sites Natanz, Isfahan, and the Fordow uranium enrichment site, buried deep underground. This operation essentially paved the way for a ceasefire after 12 days of confrontation.

Israel and the US’s direct confrontation with Iran marks the total collapse of Tehran’s asymmetric warfare strategy. It is timely, therefore, to analyse the concept of proxy war and the limits of proxy war strategy. More importantly, Operation Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer raise questions about Iran’s proxy war strategy and whether that strategy has been successful or has finally failed. In looking at Iranian strategy, it is thus important to examine the following questions: What is proxy warfare? Why do states use it, and why are proxy groups unreliable? What is Iran’s proxy war strategy, and why has it failed?

Israel Announces "Final Plan" to Occupy Gaza

Simplicius

Aug 12Netanyahu has announced plans for the “final” takeover of Gaza, which he’s instead billing as a “liberation” from Hamas: It’s interesting how, given Netanyahu’s above infographic, Israel’s objectives in Gaza can be superficially compared to the Russian SMO. The difference is, Russia is following international law, whereas Israel is breaking it. It was the UN itself which established the known precedent that a people have the right to self-determination when it came to Serbia being pressured to recognise Kosovo’s independence. But in Donbass or even Gaza, no such right to self-determination and official recognition apparently exists. In Ukraine, Russia is only enforcing the UN’s very own standards on self-determination, while in Gaza, Israel is breaking it.

To further highlight the hypocrisy, listen to JD Vance’s latest statement, wherein he so confidently describes taking military control over Gaza as being “up to Israel”—but the same privilege is for some reason not afforded to Russia in taking over Donbass—why is that? There are mounting issues for Bibi, who seeks as swift an operation as possible to mitigate the growing disaster. Echoes of brewing civil war have erupted in Israeli society over growing exhaustion and the issue of Haredi military ‘exceptionalism’:

A year after ouster, where is Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina?

FP Explainers

On August 5, 2024, Sheikh Hasina, then prime minister of Bangladesh, boarded a military aircraft and landed at the Hindon Airbase in India’s Ghaziabad along with her younger sister Rehana. This moment marked the end of her 15-year rule in the neighbouring country. Now, a year later, Bangladesh is under an interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. The country continues to battle political and economic instability with a growing number of voices demanding for elections to be held by the end of this year.

Hasina’s hasty departure from Bangladesh

Last August, Hasina resigned from her position and fled to India following weeks of unrest. Her exit came after crowds broke a curfew and stormed the prime minister’s residence in the capital Dhaka, following weeks of bloody protest. As she exited, Bangladesh army General Waker-uz-Zaman announced that the military had taken control of the government; parliament had been dissolved, and the government was formulating a plan for fresh elections. “The country is going through a revolutionary period,” Zaman said in a national television address. “We request you to have faith in the army of the country. Please don’t go back to the path of violence and please return to nonviolent and peaceful ways.”

How India's hollowed-out hills have become extremely dangerous

India Today News Desk

Uttarkashi, Wayanad, Kedarnath, Chamoli, Kinnaur, and Joshimath are just a few names from a much longer list. Landslides and sinking human settlements have become grim realities in India, with cities and villages in several hilly areas succumbing to nature's fury. But what mostly seem like natural calamities are, in fact, man-made disasters. The latest disaster in this series struck Uttarakhand on Tuesday. Cloudburst-induced landslides and flash floods struck Uttarkashi and claimed at least four lives. Over 50 people are still missing. The financial cost of the calamity hasn't even been ascertained yet, but it's bound to be as high as in past tragedies.

These horrifying incidents of loss of lives, destruction of property worth hundreds of crores, and damage to the environment and ecology stem from a dangerous cocktail of unchecked construction (including government projects) in high-risk zones, riverbed encroachments, apathy towards climate change, failure to anticipate erratic weather patterns, and widespread environmental degradation. All of it, enabled by the usual culprit: corruption, turning hollowed-out hills into ticking time bombs.

However, people and governments are deaf to the alarm bells that are ringing out loud and clear in India. Waking up to the scary reality would be the first step to fixing these discrepancies, adaptability concerns and loopholes. As climate activist Harjeet Singh from the Satat Sampada Climate Foundation puts it, "This tragedy is a deadly cocktail... This devastating loss must be our final wake-up call."

China's ‘Super Dam' isn't a threat to Brahmaputra flow, analysis finds

Bidisha Saha

Chief ministers of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam strongly disagree on whether China's "Super Dam" will affect the Brahmaputra River's flow in India. While Pema Khandu has called it a "ticking water bomb", Himanta Biswa Sarma downplays the fear. Who is right? While the mega dam will undoubtedly give China the capability of weaponising the water of Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo in China), it is unlikely to make any consequential alteration to the river flow, according to an analysis by India Today's Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) team.

BRAHMAPUTRA'S SUPPORT SYSTEM

Brahmaputra is a complex river system, consisting of several tributaries. Its mainstream traverses a total distance of 2880 km. Out of which, 56 per cent falls in Tibet, 43 per cent in India and 337 km in Bangladesh. The majority (nearly 50.5 per cent) of the Brahmaputra River's catchment area falls in China. A river's flow is sustained by mountain springs, glacial melt, upland wetlands or peat bogs, aquifers, and perennial tributaries. Though most of these sources of water fall in China-controlled Tibet, the Brahmaputra get an estimated 70 per cent of its water from rainfall.

As with many major rivers, Yarlung Tsangpo appears as a stream at its point of origin near Mount Kailash but continues to grow in size further downstream. It becomes the mighty Brahmaputra after absorbing three tributaries, Luhit and Dibang, near Assam's Sadiya.

JAS 39 Gripen vs. China’s J-20 Mighty Dragon: Who Wins in 4 Words

Isaac Seitz

J-20 vs. JAS 39 Gripen: A Duel in the Sky?

The Chinese J-20 is the most advanced fighter jet in service with the PLAAF. It was designed to compete with American fighters, such as the F-22 and F-35, and provide deterrence against its neighbors. Meanwhile, the JAS 39 Gripen is a Swedish fourth-generation fighter that has been gaining traction in the international market. With countries like Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries acquiring the Gripen, there is a non-zero chance that the J-20 may one day meet the JAS 39 in the skies. The Chengdu J-20, also known as the “Mighty Dragon,” is China’s premier fifth-generation stealth fighter.

Chengdu Aerospace Corporation developed it and first flew in 2011. The J-20 is designed primarily for air superiority and long-range interception missions, with a strong emphasis on stealth, sensor fusion, and advanced avionics. It is a large twin-engine aircraft with internal weapons bays, radar-absorbent materials, and a shape optimized for low radar cross-section. These features allow it to penetrate deep into contested airspace and engage high-value targets while remaining difficult to detect.

Our Best Look At China’s New J-15DT Carrier-Based Electronic Warfare Jet

Thomas Newdick

A new image provides our best view of the latest addition to China’s growing family of Shenyang J-15 carrier-based fighter series, the J-15DT electronic warfare version. There is also some indication that it may have entered operational service, or got very close to it. Crucially, this electronic attack Flanker is outfitted for operations aboard catapult-equipped aircraft carriers like the Fujian. Evidence emerged recently suggesting this carrier may have begun to host fixed-wing aircraft trials. Overall, progress with the J-15DT program points not only to the scope of China’s carrier aviation ambitions, but also the growing focus on catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) operations, which offer many advantages.

The recently emerged photo, seen at the top of this story, shows an airborne J-15DT seen with at least three external electronic warfare pods, two on the pylons under the engine intake ducts and one (likely two) on the wingtips. It wears the low-visibility national and unit insignia and individual two-digit code number (in this case ‘23’) associated with operational J-15s, which suggests that the aircraft could be a part of the frontline People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) inventory. At the same time, we shouldn’t rule out the possibility of image manipulation by official sources or otherwise. Although the catapult launch bar is not visible, the aircraft can be confirmed as the CATOBAR version since it has gray tailfin caps and slightly different wingtip pods associated with this aircraft. Most likely, it also has a two-part front landing gear door. Some reports suggest the J-15DT also has the dorsal airbrake removed.

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