Indian Strategic Studies: 08/27/25

27 August 2025

12 satellites at Rs 0: A constellation of questions for India's space future

India’s first fully private Earth Observation (EO) satellite constellation is on the horizon as India rushes to build a network, witnessing its critical need during Operation Sindoor.

Announced by the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) on August 12, the project brings together four private players, Pixxel, PierSight, SatSure, and Dhruva Space, under a public-private partnership (PPP) model to build the constellation.

The consortium plans to deploy 12 cutting-edge satellites equipped with sub-metre resolution cameras, multispectral sensors, hyperspectral instruments, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR). These satellites will deliver high-quality imaging for agriculture, infrastructure, disaster response, and even defence applications.

Unlike traditional ISRO-led missions, the government is investing zero rupees, while private companies are committing over Rs 1,200 crore. In exchange, official agencies are guaranteed access to the data.

On the surface, this model appears to display the strength of India’s space economy: private capital, reduced public expenditure, and accelerated innovation.

Yet, the decision has sparked debate on issues of sovereignty, technological authenticity, and the future role of ISRO.

A CONSTELLATION OF QUESTIONS

Critics argue the consortium is not building entirely new missions, but rather consolidating projects companies had already planned independently. By branding them under IN-SPACe, the firms gain "guaranteed markets and national legitimacy" without the costs of commercial client acquisition.

"A new set of satellites is required to be built by the consortium to meet the technical specifications of panchromatic, multispectral, hyperspectral and microwave SAR sensors as per demands laid down by IN-SPACe after due consultation with industry and user agencies," Rajeev Jyoti, Director, Technical Directorate, IN-SPACe told IndiaToday.in.

How a Multi-Domain Command in Japan Would Reshape US Alliances in the Indo-Pacific

Park Ki-Chul

U.S. Army Soldiers with Alpha Battery, 5th Battalion, 3rd Artillery Regiment, 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, U.S. Marines with 12th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force service members with 8th Division, Western Army pose for a group picture during the field training exercise portion of Resolute Dragon 23 at Hijyudai Maneuver Area, Oita Prefecture, Japan, Oct. 25, 2023.Credit: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Paley Fenner

One of the most consequential military transformations underway in the Indo-Pacific region is the expansion and forward deployment of Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) units by the United States. Recent discussions between the U.S. and Japanese governments have centered on the establishment of a new MDTF headquarters in Japan. Simultaneously, there are indications that a key subordinate unit of the MDTF, the Multi-Domain Effects Battalion (MDEB), may be deployed in South Korea.

This decision is not merely about troop redeployment; it signifies a profound shift in the geopolitical landscape, driven by the rising influence of China and Russia, evolving Indo-Pacific strategies, and a reconfiguration of trilateral security cooperation among the United States., South Korea, and Japan.

For South Korea, the establishment of the MDTF is intricately linked to the redefinition of the role of U.S. forces stationed in the country, the strengthening of trilateral cooperation, and an increased imperative to counter China, thereby necessitating a strategic response.

Understanding the MDTF Concept and Mission

The MDTF is a novel military formation initiated by the U.S. Army in 2017, designed to counter the anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies employed by China and Russia. These nations have developed capabilities such as long-range missiles, maritime denial systems, advanced air defense networks, and electronic warfare capabilities, which can potentially impede U.S. forces from reaching the battlefield. To overcome these challenges, the MDTF implements “multi-domain integrated operations,” which encompass not only traditional land, sea, and air operations but also cyber, space, and electronic warfare.

Indigenous clocks delay ISRO’s plans to replace defunct Navic satellites

Jacob Koshy

Officials at the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) say they are looking to launch at least three satellites before 2026-end, to replace defunct satellites that are part of the ‘Indian GPS’ or Navic (Navigation with Indian constellation) system. However, there seems to be a key element impeding the launch — the development of indigenous clocks.

These high-precision clocks — now proposed at five per satellite — are what provides accurate timing (and hence location) services to users on earth. The Navic satellites provide more accurate location services to the military and slightly less accurate ones for civilian purposes.

Nine satellites of the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), informally called Navic, have been launched since 2013. Eight of them reached their intended orbit. The last of this constellation of satellites (IRNSS-1I) was launched in 2018. These constellation of satellites are akin to the Russian GLONASS, the Chinese Beidou, the American GPS and European Galileo constellation of satellites to provide location services. However, the Navic, is expected to do so only within India and a radius of 1,500 km. This is however viewed more as a fall back system in the case of future global conflicts and India being denied access to these foreign constellations.

Last month, the ISRO revealed via a Right To Information request that five of the Navic satellites were completely defunct with all three of their clocks in each satellite not working. In one of the three satellites with functioning atomic clocks, two of the three clocks have failed. Only two satellites of the constellation, therefore, have functional atomic clocks. The atomic clocks in this constellation of satellites were imported by the ISRO from the firm SpectraTime.

For the next series of satellites to replace the impaired and ageing fleet of IRNSS satellites —two of the three being used have passed or are close to their rated shelf life of 10 years though it’s possible for these systems to function beyond — the ISRO has decided to install indigenously developed rubidium clocks.

Russia’s Losses In Ukraine War: 15 Times More Deaths Than Afghanistan

Stephen Silver

Key Points and Summary – Russian casualties in the Ukraine war have surpassed the “stunning and grisly milestone” of 1 million, a figure confirmed by Ukrainian officials and in line with Western intelligence estimates.

-A recent CSIS report highlights the catastrophic scale, noting that Russian fatalities are roughly 15 times greater than the Soviet Union’s entire decade-long war in Afghanistan.

-In addition to the staggering human toll, Russia has lost thousands of tanks and armored vehicles. Compounding the tragedy, reports indicate Moscow is systematically reclassifying its missing soldiers as “deserters” to hide the true numbers and deny compensation to families.

How Bad Are Russia’s Losses in Ukraine? The Numbers Are Staggering.

In June, the General Staff of the Ukrainian armed forces announced that the number of Russian casualties since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war had crossed the 1 million mark. The AP reported at the time that the 1 million figure was “in line with Western intelligence estimates.”

Also in June, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a report called “Russia’s Battlefield Woes in Ukraine.”

In addition to noting that Russia’s advance had been very slow and that Russia had lost a great deal of equipment, the casualty counts were huge.

“Russian fatalities and casualties have been extraordinary. Russia will likely hit the 1 million casualty mark in the summer of 2025—a stunning and grisly milestone,” the report said, comparing it to massive losses in Russian and Soviet wars of the past.

“Overall, a high of 250,000 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine, with over 950,000 total Russian casualties, a sign of Putin’s blatant disregard for his soldiers. To put these numbers into historical perspective, Russia has suffered roughly five times as many fatalities in Ukraine as in all Russian and Soviet wars combined between the end of World War II and the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. In addition, Russian fatalities in Ukraine (in just over three years) are 15 times larger than the Soviet Union’s decade-long war in Afghanistan and 10 times larger than Russia’s 13 years of war in Chechnya.”

The Era of the Aircraft Carrier Is About to End

Harry Kazianis

The U.S. Navy Gerald R. Ford–class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) and the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) underway in the Atlantic Ocean on 4 June 2020, marking the first time a Gerald R. Ford–class and a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier operated together underway.

For the better part of a century, nothing has projected American power more effectively than the aircraft carrier.

A 100,000-ton behemoth of sovereign U.S. territory, capable of launching a more powerful air force than most nations possess, the supercarrier has been the undisputed king of the seas.

It is the centerpiece of our naval strategy, the first asset sent to any global crisis, and the ultimate symbol of our military might.

The Aircraft Carrier Era Is Over

But what if the king is now vulnerable?

What if a weapon exists that can turn our most powerful asset into our most catastrophic liability?

Take it from me: that weapon is no longer theoretical.

China’s development and deployment of advanced anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), specifically the DF-21D and the longer-range DF-26B, represents the most significant threat to U.S. naval supremacy since the Cold War.

These are not just another class of missile; they are a revolutionary capability designed for a single purpose: to hold American aircraft carriers at risk and push them out of the Western Pacific. To understand their impact is to understand the daunting new reality of a potential U.S.-China conflict.

Taiwan’s drone surge aims to offset China’s edge

Gabriel Honrada

Taiwan’s plan to procure tens of thousands of domestically built drones signals a deliberate bid for asymmetric leverage vis-à-vis China. However, production delays and training deficiencies raise questions about the effectiveness of stockpiling more drones to shift the strategic balance across the Taiwan Strait.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense plans to acquire nearly 50,000 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) between 2026 and 2027, aiming to strengthen asymmetric capabilities amid increasing military pressure from Beijing.

According to a government tender notice, the Armaments Bureau will purchase drones across five categories, from short-endurance multi-rotor platforms to long-range fixed-wing systems with payloads between 2.5 and 10 kilograms, all manufactured domestically and excluding mainland Chinese parts.

The initiative aligns with Taiwan’s new doctrine to treat drones as expendable munitions, similar to recent US military practice. The announcement followed televised demonstrations of indigenous drone models, including first-person view (FPV) strike drones, bomb-dropping platforms, and reconnaissance systems with electro-optic/infrared sensors.

Analysts say the specifications match existing prototypes, indicating synchronized development and procurement. However, experts warn that Taiwan’s limited training infrastructure and logistical base may reduce operational effectiveness. A government audit revealed gaps in operator qualifications and night-flight readiness, and strategic scholars have called for tiered licensing and maintenance systems to support deployment.

Beijing accuses US of holding Chinese students in ‘small, dark rooms’ for over 70 hours

Fan Chen

Beijing has lashed out at the United States for questioning Chinese students at the border, accusing it of discrimination and of taking them into “small, dark rooms” for over 70 hours.

Mao Ning, a spokeswoman for the foreign ministry, said on Friday that these actions “seriously infringed upon the legitimate and legal rights and interests of Chinese citizens, severely obstructed normal personnel exchanges between the two countries, and seriously undermined the atmosphere for people-to-people and cultural exchanges”.

She told a scheduled press conference: “Recently, the US has frequently engaged in discriminatory, politically motivated and selective law enforcement against Chinese students travelling to the US.

“These students are subjected to unfair treatment, including being taken into small, dark rooms for repeated and prolonged interrogations,” she said, speaking colloquially about the interrogation facilities.

“Some have been detained for over 70 hours and questioned about topics completely unrelated to their purpose for travelling to the US. In some cases, their visas are cancelled and they are denied entry, citing so-called national security concerns.”

Mao said China had lodged immediate representations after each incident and urged Washington to “thoroughly investigate and correct its mistakes”.

“We urge the US to face this issue directly, take China’s concerns seriously and implement the statements made by US leaders welcoming Chinese students to study in the US,” she added.

Nvidia Readies New China Chip as Washington Debates A.I. Exports

Tripp Mickle and Lily Kuo

Weeks after Nvidia struck a deal with the Trump administration to pay for clearance to ship semiconductors to China, the company has started winding down production of a chip designed for Chinese companies and begun work on its more powerful successor.

Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s chief executive, said on Friday in Taipei, Taiwan, that the company was offering a “new product for A.I. data centers,” which would be a version of its most cutting-edge chips that would be modified to reduce some of its performance, as required by the United States. He said he was seeking the Trump administration’s approval to sell the chip.

“It’s up to, of course, the United States government,” Mr. Huang said. “And we’re in dialogue with them, but it’s too soon to know.”

Mr. Huang’s comments came as Nvidia asked suppliers to wind down production of its current chip designed for China, the H20, said two people familiar with the company’s strategy. Beijing has discouraged Chinese companies from buying the H20 chips, with administrators warning that the chips could have “backdoor security risks.”

“We constantly manage our supply chain to address market conditions,” said Mylene Mangalindan, an Nvidia spokeswoman.

The Information previously reported on Nvidia’s winding down production of its H20 chip.

JD Vance’s Tour in Iraq Taught Him His Government Lies

Ian Ward

In August 2005, a 21-year-old Marine named James David Hamel arrived at Al-Asad Airbase in western Iraq. Hamel was a combat correspondent, and he had been deployed to Al-Asad as part of a public affairs team from the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing. His job for the next six months was to embed with soldiers at the base, documenting their missions in short articles for military publications and local papers back in the U.S. During assignments that took him “outside the wire,” as the troops called the areas beyond the boundaries of the base, he would carry a notebook, a camera and a rifle, just in case.

A few years earlier, this assignment would have thrilled Hamel, a bookish teenager from southwestern Ohio who had enlisted in the Marines with dreams of “heading to the Middle East to kill terrorists,” as he would later write. But now, two years into his enlistment, his faith in the American mission was flagging. During a stopover at a military base in Kuwait en route to Iraq, Hamel and a fellow public affairs Marine had overheard a conversation in the base’s chow hall between a group of lieutenants. After two and a half years of fighting in Iraq, one of the lieutenants said, the mission on the ground was stalling out. As soon as American troops cleared Iraqi insurgents from one region, those same insurgents would retake the same area.

Hamel completed his deployment in March 2006 and returned to the U.S., where he finished his enlistment at an airbase in North Carolina. But the feeling of disillusionment that took hold during his time in Iraq stayed with him. Fourteen years later, after graduating from the Ohio State University, earning a law degree at Yale Law School, publishing a best-selling memoir and landing a lucrative job at a private equity firm, Hamel — who by then had taken his grandmother’s last name of Vance — described the change that his six months in Iraq had wrought on his political outlook: “I left for Iraq in 2005, a young idealist committed to spreading democracy and liberalism to the backward nations of the world,” Vance wrote in the Catholic literary journal The Lamp in 2020, just months before launching a bid for a U.S. Senate seat in Ohio. “I returned in 2006, skeptical of the war and the ideology that underpinned it.”

True or False: ‘Russia Has Won the War in Ukraine’

Stephen Silver

Key Points and Summary – As peace talks gain momentum, this analysis tackles the provocative question of whether Russia has already won the war in Ukraine, a claim recently made by Hungary’s Prime Minister.

-While Russia failed in its maximalist goals of capturing Kyiv and overthrowing the government, it has succeeded mainly in its more limited, revised objectives.

-Russia now controls roughly a fifth of Ukrainian territory and has effectively blocked Ukraine’s path to NATO membership. If a final peace deal solidifies the current front lines, it could be widely interpreted as a de facto victory for Vladimir Putin.

Has Russia Already Won the War in Ukraine

With the leaders of Russia and Ukraine both meeting with President Donald Trump in the last week, with the stated reason for the meetings being the idea of bringing the war to a close after more than three years, the question should be asked of whether Russia has already “won” the war, or if it will be seen that way should the war ultimately be settled based on the current battle lines.

Last week, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban declared that Russia has already won the war.

Per Reuters, the comments came after Orban was the only leader of a European Union nation to decline to sign on to a statement that Ukraine should be allowed to determine its own future. Orban has been a rare European leader to tilt towards Russia since the invasion in 2022.

“We are talking now as if this were an open-ended war situation, but it is not. The Ukrainians have lost the war. Russia has won this war,” Orban said in an interview with the “Patriot” YouTube channel.

“The only question is when and under what circumstances will the West, who are behind the Ukrainians, admit that this has happened and what will result from all this.”

Europe Is Finally Saying No to the F-35

Andrew Latham

Key Points and Summary: The recent decisions by Spain and Switzerland to turn away from the F-35 signal a deeper European reckoning with the costs of military dependence on the United States.

-Beyond price disputes, nations are balking at the F-35’s “sustainment monopoly,” where the U.S. controls all future upgrades, software, and operational data.

U.S. Air Force Maj. Melanie “Mach” Kluesner, pilot of the F-35A Demonstration Team, performs aerial maneuvers during the Southernmost Airshow Spectacular at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida, on March 30, 2025. The team’s mission is to inspire, engage, and recruit the next generation of Airmen by showcasing the capabilities of the Air Force’s premier fifth-generation fighter. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Nicholas Rupiper)

-This creates a strategic risk in an era of fraying alliances, forcing a choice between short-term capability and long-term autonomy.

-However, this pivot to European solutions is doomed to fail unless Europe overcomes its own chronic industrial fragmentation.

The F-35 Breakup in Europe

Spain shocked Europe with a decision to scrap its plans to purchase the F-35, and public opinion in Switzerland has begun to turn against that country’s planned acquisition.

Madrid had long been expected to select the F-35B to replace its Harrier force aboard the Juan Carlos I and augment its short- and medium-air-support capabilities. It has chosen instead to purchase 25 new Eurofighter Typhoons and double down on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). Switzerland, where a referendum only three years ago greenlighted the acquisition of 36 F-35As for 6 billion Swiss Francs, is reconsidering after Washington’s refusal to lock in prices, and its decision to impose new tariffs on Swiss exports.

Pentagon terminating JCIDS process as part of larger acquisition reform: Memo

Ashley Roque, Theresa Hitchens and Valerie Insinna

WASHINGTON — As part of Pentagon leaders’ quest to rapidly field new weapons, they are revamping how requirements are validated and bidding adieu to the controversial Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process.

In an Aug. 20 memo titled “Reforming the Joint Requirements Process to Accelerate Fielding of Warfighting Capabilities,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and his deputy, Steve Feinberg, lay out a roadmap aimed at fielding “new technology and capabilities faster.”

The objective, they note, is threefold: to streamline and accelerate the joint force needs, work with industry earlier in the process, and better integrate requirements determination and resource prioritization to make better budgeting decisions.

While the memo lays out multiple changes, a key provision is the “disestablishment” of JCIDS — a joint staff process for pinpointing gaps in military capabilities, and identifying and validating joint requirements. In turn, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which oversees that process, will stop validating component-level requirement documents.

The JROC comprises the vice chiefs of each military service, and is chaired by the vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The memo, first published [PDF] by NewSpace Nexus earlier this week and confirmed to Breaking Defense by a senior service official, also sets up a Requirements and Resourcing Alignment Board (RRAB) that will be co-chaired by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the deputy defense secretary.

“Each budget cycle, the RRAB shall select topics from the top-ranked KOP [key operational problems] and nominations from the co-chairs to perform analysis, issue programming guidance, and recommend allocation of funding from the Joint Acceleration Reserve (JAR),” the memo said. “By exception, the RRAB may identify a Component-specific requirement or activity for modification or termination.”

N.S.A.’s Acting Director Tried to Save Top Scientist From Purge

Julian E. Barnes

The acting director of the National Security Agency tried to protect one of his top scientists from losing his security clearance as Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, prepared to announce the move this week, according to officials briefed on the matter.

The effort failed. Ms. Gabbard, on orders from President Trump, fired the scientist, who was a leading government expert on artificial intelligence, cryptology and advanced mathematics.

The scientist, Vinh Nguyen, was one of 37 current and former national security officials whose security clearances were revoked on Tuesday. Many, though not all, had tangential connections to the intelligence agencies’ review of Russian efforts to influence and meddle in the 2016 election.

Ms. Gabbard has released documents about that intelligence inquiry and accused Obama administration officials of related crimes, an effort Mr. Trump has praised.

Lt. Gen. William J. Hartman, the acting N.S.A. director, called Ms. Gabbard in the days before the revocation and asked to see the evidence that Mr. Nguyen, the agency’s chief data scientist, had done anything that merited the revocation of his security clearance.

Ms. Gabbard rebuffed the request, the officials said. The list of people losing their clearance began to circulate Tuesday morning and was made public in the afternoon.

Why Green Berets want to join conventional combat discussion

Michael Peck

A new U.S. Army special operations forces manual has a mission: to convince the regular Army that the Green Berets have value for conventional combat operations.

It’s a signal that the days of cowboy special operators are over. As the U.S. military switches from small-unit counterinsurgency to big-unit mechanized warfare, ARSOF wants to show that it can contribute to the joint fight.

The focus now is, “How do we show our value to the Army, and how do we help the Army show its value for the Joint Force?” Kimberly Jackson, a researcher at the RAND Corp. think tank, told Defense News.

“You have to prove your relevance,” said Jackson, a former Navy Reserve officer with a background in Naval Special Warfare. “You do that by showing your operational abilities. And that is something that has had to shift a little bit for the special operations community.”

The new FM 3-05: Army Special Operations manual makes clear that the Army’s special forces need to evolve for a world of high-tech, multidomain warfare.

“Our doctrine must describe how ARSOF contribute across the competition continuum — remaining threat informed, strategically driven, operationally focused, and tactically prepared,” wrote Lt. Gen. Jonathan Braga, commander of U.S. Army Special Operations Command, in the foreword to the manual.

Braga describes Army Special Forces as one of the legs of the “SOF-Space-Cyber Triad,” an irregular warfare concept modeled after the strategic nuclear triad. These very dissimilar forces would target enemy command and control, computing, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting capabilities, or C5ISRT.

FM 3-05 describes what Army Special Forces can bring to conventional combat operations, such as when friendly forces bypass enemy cities and units, leaving stragglers and potential guerrillas behind.

Reconstitution Under Fire: Insights from the 1973 Yom Kippur War

Nathan Jennings

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War confronted Israel’s military with a sudden and existential crisis. Initiated by simultaneous Syrian and Egyptian offensives from the north and south, the bitter conflict demonstrated the value of operational endurance as each side sustained unexpected attrition. Within hours, Israeli assumptions about intelligence overmatch, maneuver superiority, and air dominance collapsed under the weight of the Arab assaults. Responding to significant losses in men and materiel, Israel subsequently initiated a painful process of battlefield regeneration to recreate combat power and establish conditions for large-scale counteroffensives that could end the war on favorable terms. While combatants on both sides demonstrated courage and commitment in the face of daunting challenges, the Israeli capacity to persevere ultimately paid the highest dividends and yielded a conditional strategic victory.

How did the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) achieve, albeit at a tremendous societal cost, this systemic regeneration across both ground and air services while continuously engaged on multiple active fronts? The Israelis’ desperate response to simultaneous crises in the Sinai and the Golan Heights—which derailed prewar plans for synchronized air-ground maneuver designed to achieve rapid decision—combined important aspects of veteran leadership, logistical resiliency, and strategic adaptation with critical functions of tactical recovery and tiered mobilization to achieve formation reconstitution at echelon. Characterized, as US Army General Donn Starry described it, by “enormous equipment losses in a relatively short time” and “lethality at extended ranges,” the conflict now underscores the enduring imperative for military institutions to avoid the quicksand of wishful thinking and instead prepare to fight, and win, in the bitter crucible of attritional combat.

Recovery, Regeneration, and Reconstitution

Quantum Leap for the Alliance: Europe’s Tech Drive Strengthens Transatlantic Security

Ian Murphy, Marceli Hązła

The global technological landscape is in a state of continuous and rapid evolution, with emerging technologies like quantum computing poised to fundamentally reshape economic, military, and geopolitical power dynamics. This dynamic environment necessitates a comprehensive re-evaluation of traditional alliances and an intensified emphasis on collective technological resilience. The growing geopolitical tensions observed across the world compel major economic centers, including the United States, China, and the European Union, to enhance the resilience of their value chains, aiming to mitigate geopolitical risks. This strategic imperative forms the broader context for the critical importance of technological sovereignty and international cooperation.

In this new era, the strength of the transatlantic alliance increasingly hinges not solely on military cooperation but, significantly, on shared technological advancement and the diversification of critical supply chains. Quantum technology presents an unparalleled opportunity to deepen this partnership. Its computational capabilities, which exceed current systems by several tens of orders of magnitude, promise revolutionary applications across various sectors. This would make access to this technology a key national and cybersecurity issue in the coming years.

This article aims to reframe Europe’s strategic pursuit of quantum technological leadership. Rather than being seen as a response to perceived past grievances or a move towards isolation on either side of the Atlantic, this endeavor is presented as a foundational element for a stronger, more resilient transatlantic alliance. It demonstrates how European autonomy and leadership in this critical domain directly serve the collective security interests of both Europe and the United States.

Europe’s Quantum Ambition: A Foundation for Strategic Autonomy and Global Leadership

Drones Drive Battlefield Motorcycle Tactical Shift

Darragh McGovern

Motorcycles have long had a presence in irregular and guerrilla warfare, particularly among non-state actors in regions such as Africa. However, their use by modern, professional state militaries has traditionally been limited – typically confined to reconnaissance or light logistics roles. This changed dramatically in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), especially first-person view (FPV) drones, has reshaped battlefield tactics.

A recent study by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) estimated that drones were responsible for 60–70% of damaged or destroyed Russian military systems. In this environment, traditional armoured vehicles – once central to manoeuvre warfare – have become highly vulnerable. This has led both Russian and Ukrainian forces to adapt, increasingly turning to motorcycles and All-Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) for their mobility, speed and expendability. These vehicles are now being used not just for assault but also for logistics, medical evacuation, reconnaissance and electronic warfare support, particularly in terrain where heavy armour is ineffective or too easily targeted.

Mechanised Warfare Adapting to Drone Dominance

This shift represents a tactical evolution – an adaptation to drone-dominated terrain that blurs the line between infantry and cavalry. As one Ukrainian soldier from the 3rd Assault Brigade put it in an interview with El País, such units resemble a form of ‘rapid assault cavalry.’ He described a successful Russian penetration of Ukrainian lines near Pokrovsk in April 2024 using ATVs. This was no isolated incident: Russian motorcycle and ATV units were being formally integrated into operations by mid-2024, with the Ministry of Defence publicly acknowledging their role in offensive efforts and frontline supply operations.

The Ukrainian military, too, has embraced the concept. The 425th Separate Assault Regiment announced its first motorcycle assault unit in May 2024 after ‘hundreds of hours’ of training, reporting its first successful mission – a night-time incursion into the Kursk region – later that month. These developments reflect not a desperate improvisation by either side but rather a deliberate response to the rapidly evolving threat environment on the modern battlefield.

Army to develop new modular, interoperable EW kit amid Army Transformation Initiative

Carley Welch

TECHNET AUGUSTA 2025 — The Army is planning to tinker with prototypes of a new electronic warfare kit in the next fiscal year that, if all goes well, eventually will be interoperable with just about any platform across the service, officials said this week.

The idea behind the Modular Mission Payload is that as the Army pursues a dramatic shake-up in the weapons, platforms and software it buys as part of the wider Army Transformation Initiative, the service could use a single capability that can plug-and-play with just about anything.

Col. Scott Shaffer, project manager for EW and cyber within the Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors, told Breaking Defense that it is still in the early days of development.

“I probably don’t have a lot of information on the production quantities and demand, because part of the prototyping process, which we’re going to dig really deep into next fiscal year, is understanding, how many do we need? And then where do they fit in the formations?” he said during an interview earlier this week.

The Army is expanding the number of soldiers devoted to EW operations, after deciding to establish 18 EW companies across the service’s divisions, said David May, the senior cyber intelligence advisor at the Army’s Cyber Center of Excellence. That could change the calculous on how many EW kits the Army eventually needs.

But one aspect about the MMP that is known, according to Shaffer, is that it needs to be a commercial off the shelf (COTS) or government off the shelf (GOTS) product.

“A heavy lift going into next year is more COTS- or GOTS-based systems, where the challenge is really built into the integration thereof,” Shaffer said. “If we’re only hitting 60 percent of the requirements, that’s okay because we’re at least, we’re getting something out there and and it can be fielded very soon.

New Army PCA wants more AI-enabled cyber at the edge for offensive, defensive ops

Carley Welch

TECHNET AUGUSTA 2025 — The Army’s new principal cyber advisor came into his role ready to align with the service’s overarching transformation initiative, and as part of this he’s set on enabling artificial intelligence for defensive and offensive cyber operations, he told Breaking Defense in an interview Wednesday.

Brandon Pugh, an Army reservist who formerly served as the director and a resident senior fellow for the R Street Institute’s Cybersecurity and Emerging Threats team, started in his role as PCA about eight weeks ago. The top advisor to the Army’s secretary and chief of staff on all things cyber, Pugh is the third person to serve in this congressionally mandated role, following Michael Sulmeyer who left his post in March 2024 to become the assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy in the Pentagon. Pugh is also the first in his role to be appointed by the president. Previously, those who held this role were appointed by officials within the service.

After meeting with various leaders across the service and the joint force, Pugh said what he’s come to realize is that the service needs to better leverage AI for cyber at the operational level instead of just at the enterprise level like the Pentagon and the services have been doing for a few years now.

“I think our CIO [chief information officer] is doing an exceptional job when it comes to AI at the enterprise level. Where I’m passionate about is, how do we leverage AI for cyber defense and offense? And in fairness, that is happening, Cyber Command is doing some of that. ARCYBER [Army Cyber Command] is doing some of that,” Pugh said. “But how do we take what they’re doing now and amplify that and continue to invest in it. I think that’s key, especially as threats continue to evolve.

“I think where the narrative and the conversation needs to go is if there is an operational use of AI, like bringing it to the warfighter, that’s where I think we should be,” he later added. But he emphasized that he doesn’t want this happening at the expense of utilizing AI at the service’s enterprise level.

AI ready to upend centuries-old military command structure

Benjamin Jensen

This US Army command post, seen from a drone, is loaded with modern technology but uses a centuries-old structure. Image: Colonel Scott Woodward, US Army via The Conversation

Despite two centuries of evolution, the structure of a modern military staff would be recognizable to Napoleon. At the same time, military organizations have struggled to incorporate new technologies as they adapt to new domains – air, space and information – in modern war.

The sizes of military headquarters have grown to accommodate the expanded information flows and decision points of these new facets of warfare. The result is diminishing marginal returns and a coordination nightmare – too many cooks in the kitchen – that risks jeopardizing mission command.

AI agents – autonomous, goal-oriented software powered by large language models – can automate routine staff tasks, compress decision timelines and enable smaller, more resilient command posts. They can shrink the staff while also making it more effective.

As an international relations scholar and reserve officer in the US Army who studies military strategy, I see both the opportunity afforded by the technology and the acute need for change.

That need stems from the reality that today’s command structures still mirror Napoleon’s field headquarters in both form and function – industrial-age architectures built for massed armies.

Over time, these staffs have ballooned in size, making coordination cumbersome. They also result in sprawling command posts that modern precision artillery, missiles and drones can target effectively and electronic warfare can readily disrupt.

Russia’s so-called “Graveyard of Command Posts” in Ukraine vividly illustrates how static headquarters where opponents can mass precision artillery, missiles and drones become liabilities on a modern battlefield.

ARCYBER chief’s advice to industry: Make interoperable tech and start at the edge

Carley Welch

TECHNET AUGUSTA 2025 — As the Army embarks on its modernization journey in line with the service’s recent transformation initiative, its cyber leader made clear that the service is seeking interoperable, off-the-shelf capabilities from industry to replace more bespoke, rigid offerings.

“The biggest opportunities that I see are from a modularity and platform independence standpoint. I think our approach is to use shared frameworks and APIs [application programming interfaces] in order to have cyber and EW [electronic warfare] effects be able to talk to each other,” Lt. Gen. Maria Barrett, the commanding general of Army Cyber Command, said Tuesday during a fireside chat here in Augusta.

Army leaders have said that such interoperable capabilities will be vital in working with its sprawling Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) initiative — the service’s plan to combine intelligence, C2 and fires all in one system so commanders can have information more readily available.

“If you’re a commander on the battlefield, I think that just means, you know, bottom line, it’s tactical flexibility. It’s the ability to take an effect and put it against any platform,” Barrett said. “If you’re able to do that, you’re able to really buy down some of the training that you might have to do because you’re able to reuse these effects and just plug them onto the platform according to the target that you want to prosecute.”

Another benefit to buying interoperable capabilities, she said, is that it will over time help decrease the Pentagon’s mounting technical debt, something the department has grappled with for some time.

“If you nail this modularity piece really well, as you continue with that experimentation, and you learn things and you modify what you’re doing, you’re going to be able to future-proof whatever it is that you’re doing because of this aspect,” Barrett said. “You’re not going to be stuck with some sort of engineering tech debt that you have that has to be completely redone.”

DARPA: Closing the Open Source Security Gap With AI

Alexander Culafi

Open source components continue to cause huge problems for security practitioners, and AIxCC was created to determine whether automation could help close the gap.

At DEF CON 33, DARPA announced the winners of its AI Cyber Challenge (AIxCC), a two-year program in which teams were tasked with using AI technology to secure the open source technology underlying critical infrastructure. Teams developed "cyber reasoning systems" (CRSes) to remediate vulnerabilities during a series of challenges.

In the Final Competition, teams were tasked with using their CRSes to identify and generate patches for synthetic vulnerabilities across 54 million lines of code. CRSes discovered 54 unique synthetic vulnerabilities in the final challenges of the competition, patching 43. And because the code was based on real software, teams discovered 18 additional real, non-synthetic vulnerabilities that were disclosed to open source project maintainers. Teams provided 11 patches for real vulnerabilities during the competition.

According to a press release announcing the winners, competition tasks cost an average of $152, compared to the hundreds or thousands of dollars bug bounties can cost.

The winners were graded based on a system that rated CRS performance based on discovery speed, bug report analysis, patch generation speed, and patch quality. The winners were Team Atlanta, Trail of Bits, and Theori; the teams will receive $4 million, $3 million, and $1.5 million respectively.

Electronic warfare receiving more senior level attention within the Army

Mark Pomerleau

AUGUSTA, Ga. — Electronic warfare is now getting more senior level recognition within the Army.

“The [chief of staff of the Army] in one of his recent briefs actually touched on the fact that electromagnetic warfare is a core competency,” Col. Leslie Gorman, Army capability manager for electromagnetic warfare, said during a presentation Tuesday at the TechNet Augusta conference. “The bottom line is EW is a cross-cutting function that we are observing actively every day, across every warfighting function.”

Other officials across the service have noted that the Army is placing more emphasis on the significance of electromagnetic warfare in modern conflict.

“I think it’s been pretty well known that the Army has, after facing 20 years of GWOT, or global war on terror, that we needed to retool our focus, as the chief has been doing with several of his initiatives, most recently, the Army Transformation Initiative,” Maj. Gen. Jake Kwon, director of the Department of the Army’s Management Office for Strategic Operations, said in an interview Aug. 14. “The direction that we were headed where we had these long lead-time programs of record, we had an electronic warfare enterprise that had been shaped by the global war on terror and the counterinsurgency, and that was incompatible for what we’re going to face in the future with large-scale combat operations.”

The service has been on a years-long journey to reinvigorate and reinvest in advanced EW capabilities, after having divested much of its arsenal after the Cold War. Adversaries, in that time, have recognized the importance of the spectrum and developed new capabilities, techniques and doctrine.

Russia’s incursion into Ukraine in 2014 served as a bit of a wakeup call for the Army as it observed the Russian military’s tactics. Since then, it has sought to invest in capabilities and elevate the discipline — to include jamming techniques and signature management of friendly forces — to the highest levels of the service given if units are discovered in the spectrum based on their emissions, they can be fired upon in minutes.

Army looking to inject more cyber capabilities into formations at the division level

Mark Pomerleau

AUGUSTA, Ga. — As the Army is reintroducing electronic warfare capability to formations, it’s looking to give them more cyber weapons as well.

Particularly, with divisions as the main units of action going forward, the service is aiming to add cyber tools at that echelon in the next two years.

While the Army has been on a path to introduce certain capabilities, largely through Radio Frequency-enabled cyber, it is building out new forces to provide cyber power for commanders on the battlefield.

“When we think about it today, we recognize that there needs to be something at division level, because your ability to understand the IP space, understand the networks that you’re operating within, while you’re defending your own and finding potential to work against an adversary’s, there needs to be something within the tactical formations,” Maj. Gen. Ryan Janovic, commander of the Cyber Center of Excellence, said in an interview this week at the TechNet Augusta conference. “We have the cyber mission force, but its ability to focus that level is challenged by the demand that’s put upon it for other priorities, serving geographic combatant commands.”

The cyber mission force includes the 147 teams that the military services provide to U.S. Cyber Command to conduct operations. They are largely aimed at the strategic level and have historically focused on Internet Protocol-based targets, conducting operations from remote locations.

Increasingly, there are targets that either aren’t reachable through IP networks or remote access might not be possible, necessitating the need for more expeditionary cyber capabilities and units. Additionally, maneuver commanders may need certain digital tools on the ground to support their activities.

The Sword and the Book

Eliot A. Cohen

If Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has some notions about strategy, he has been reticent in sharing them. But he does trumpet his commitment to restoring Confederate names to bases and their statues to national military cemeteries, which is absurd and vile. And we know that he thinks civilian academics have little if any place in military education, which is wrong and even more damaging.

Forty years ago, I turned down promotion from assistant to associate professor at Harvard to join the strategy department of the U.S. Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island. My academic mentors were baffled and dismayed by such a self-willed fall from grace, but in retrospect it was one of the best professional decisions of my life.

The Naval War College, not to be confused with the Naval Academy, was established in 1884 to prepare senior officers for the higher-level problems of warfare. For a service that, like the Royal Navy, believed in learning on the job rather than in classrooms, creating such a school was a remarkable thing to do. The War College immediately brought in as faculty members not only Alfred Thayer Mahan, a Navy captain who became the most prominent naval historian and naval publicist of his time, but a U.S. Army colonel, Tasker Bliss, to provide instruction beyond the maritime realm.

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