14 August 2025

How to Keep Hezbollah Away from Power

Delaney Soliday, and Adam Koussih

While Lebanese president Joseph Aoun’s election in January 2025 dealt a severe blow to Hezbollah, the most significant source of the group’s popularity and legitimacy has been left unchecked. Hezbollah’s military wing frequently makes headlines, but the foundation of its support among ordinary Lebanese people is its social services wing. Multiple organizations, including the Jihad al-Binaa Development Group, Islamic Health Organization, and the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts, provide a range of public services such as basic infrastructure, education, healthcare, and paramilitary training for teenagers.

Hezbollah’s ability to supply public goods and social welfare to Lebanon’s poor and rural communities continues to pay off at the polls today, despite the results of the recent presidential election. In the May 2025 municipal elections, the Hezbollah-Amal joint ballot won most of its traditional strongholds in Beirut and southern Lebanon, winning 109 of 272 municipalities in the Nabatiyeh and South Governorates in addition to other contested seats. Ahead of next year’s 2026 legislative elections, Aoun’s government must regain control of the country’s social services if it wants to continue drawing support away from Hezbollah.

Moreover, instead of waiting for the perfect conditions to provide aid, finance reconstruction efforts, and fund programs that will allow the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to degrade Hezbollah in the long term, Washington and its Gulf partners should instead take proactive steps to build on existing momentum and partner with Beirut to support Aoun’s efforts to reassert Lebanese sovereignty.

AI: The Road to Utopia or Dystopia?

Robert A. Manning, and Ferial Ara Saeed

The development of artificial intelligence cannot be stopped. Yet, that doesn’t mean it cannot be realigned with human-centered priorities. The Red Cell series is published in collaboration with the Stimson Center. Drawing upon the legacy of the CIA’s Red Cell—established following the September 11 attacks to avoid similar analytic failures in the future—the project works to challenge assumptions, misperceptions, and groupthink with a view to encouraging alternative approaches to America’s foreign and national security policy challenges. For more information about the Stimson Center’s Red Cell Project, see here.

The belief in the inevitability of artificial intelligence (AI), the promise of boundless benefits, and the fear of losing to China or each other are driving American AI industry rivals into a furious race for AI dominance. This race is accelerating with insufficient regard for the risks, many of which even AI creators and corporate leaders have warned about themselves. Concerns about safety, human impact, and the inability to prevent catastrophic outcomes have been downplayed in the pursuit of speed and supremacy. The challenge is not to stop the train or even slow it down—rather, it is to shift direction to ensure that innovation remains aligned with human objectives.

“We are building a brain for the world,” explains OpenAI CEO Sam Altman in a blog post about artificial superintelligence, defined as AI that exceeds human intelligence. Robots could one day run entire supply chains by extracting raw materials, driving trucks, and operating factories. Even more remarkably, certain robots can manufacture additional robots to construct chip fabrication plants, data centers, and other infrastructure. Machines will not just power the future; they will build it—indefinitely.

The Guardian view on Israel’s Gaza takeover plan: a destructive act that must be stopped


Israel’s planned takeover of Gaza would be an act of destructive futility. It would solve absolutely nothing. It will merely pile fresh military, humanitarian and political problems on to the mounds of those already created in the conflict. It will make every human's agony worse, not better. Governments around the world must do whatever they can – the US above all – to stop it.

There is still time. The plan announced on Friday is for an operation to take military control of Gaza City, home to a million displaced Palestinians. They will be forcibly evacuated, yet again, to the southern Gaza Strip over the coming weeks. Aid distribution is certain to be a secondary consideration, logistically challenging and woefully inadequate for a population where malnutrition is already severe. The threat to life in Gaza, including to the remaining Israeli hostages captured on 7 October 2023, will get much worse.

Friday’s announcement leaves open the question of whether the operation will be extended later to the entire Gaza Strip. Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has said this is his wish. The current decision to limit the takeover seems to reflect objections from Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chiefs. But there is no guarantee that an even larger takeover will not then follow. Mr Netanyahu always ratchets up. The sum of his choices amounts to perpetual war.

Ukraine built a drone wall to stop Russia—then fiber cables made it useless

Source Link

Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has produced many surprises, least of which is the defiant resistance Kyiv has mounted for years now. But the war has also sparked a wave of technological innovation, one of the most important being the mass adoption of cheap drones. While artificial intelligence has played a growing role on the battlefield, over the past year, fiber-optic drones have taken on a more central role.

“This isn’t a traditional war. It’s a war of drones,” said Vladyslav, an electronic warfare specialist serving in the 141st Separate Mechanized Brigade. He added that it’s “a war of technology.” Ukraine has leveraged this technological edge masterfully, holding Russia at bay for several years. It has built a “drone wall” – a defensive network of drones that Russia continues to hurl wave after wave of soldiers into, suffering heavy losses in relentless meatgrinder assaults.

By mid-2024, Russia began deploying fiber-optic drones on the battlefield, beginning the process of eroding Kyiv’s technological edge. These drones are connected to operators by fiber-optic cables, making them both unjammable and undetectable to conventional electronic warfare systems. Fiber-optic drones played a key role in Russia’s successes in the Kursk offensive. The same tactics are now being replicated across the front:launching rapid motorcycle-borne assaults

Armenia and Azerbaijan Agree on Next Steps at White House Summit

Onnik James Krikorian

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and U.S. President Donald Trump signed a seven-point joint pledge declaring their intention to pursue peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia during an August 8 meeting at the White House. During the same trip, the countries’ foreign ministers initialed the Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations, a draft of a peace deal which would require a controversial amendment to Armenia’s constitution before being signed or ratified.

In the seven-point joint declaration signed by both leaders, Armenia and Azerbaijan committed to work on a framework for granting development rights to the United States for the newly dubbed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport route from Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenia previously known as the Zangezur Corridor. The seven-point declaration and peace agreement draft are widely considered to be an important step toward a final agreement to normalize relations between the two countries, a path that is likely to take at least a year.

Armenia and Azerbaijan edged closer to peace on Friday, August 8, after an unprecedented meeting at the White House between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and U.S. President Donald Trump. Journalists first reported the meeting just days before, and it was unclear if anything substantive would result. Press reports referred to a memorandum of understanding to work toward peace (Middle East Eye, August 4).

Yes, ISIS Is Still A Problem

Ava Grainger-Williams

In January 2025, a pro-ISIS gunman opened fire at a Mardi Gras parade in New Orleans, sparking renewed headlines about an ISIS “resurgence.” While the group’s territorial caliphate collapsed years ago, ISIS itself did not. Instead, it adapted, splintering into decentralized offshoots that embedded themselves across regions from the Sahel to South Asia. This evolving threat demands adaptive responses from governments worldwide, not just conventional counterterrorism organs. The tools that helped dismantle the caliphate are no longer sufficient. Drone strikes, targeted killings, and military campaigns are ill-suited to confront a decentralized network sustained by ideology. These approaches can do little to disrupt the digital ecosystems, transnational links, and local grievances that continue to fuel radicalization.

Instead, a long-term approach focused on building local resilience is necessary. This entails support for regional counterinsurgency efforts, enhanced intelligence sharing, and investments in initiatives that strengthen governance and legitimacy in vulnerable areas. Emerging cooperation between Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq offers a promising model of what pragmatic, regionally driven coordination can look like. This approach is needed most urgently in Africa, where the Islamic State has found the space to regroup and expand. ISIS affiliates have entrenched themselves in fragile states and conflict zones, exploiting porous borders and weak governance.

In Nigeria, ISIS-West Africa Province (ISWAP) has grown increasingly sophisticated, using roadside bombs and ambushes to target military convoys in the Borno and Adamawa states. These attacks have killed dozens since early 2025. Further south, in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, ISIS-linked militants such as the ADF have escalated their violence: massacring villagers, burning homes, and attacking schools.

For China, the Ukraine War Is a Laboratory

David Petraeus and Clara Kaluderovic

The debate in Washington over America’s posture toward Russia, however it is resolved, often overlooks a vital strategic dimension of the war in Ukraine: its role as a laboratory for America’s foremost global competitor, the People’s Republic of China. While Washington sees Russia, a legacy foe, battling in Ukraine, Beijing sees an invaluable opportunity to observe and learn from a high-intensity war fought with the kinds of weapons that will dominate future conflicts.

By serving as the essential economic and industrial enabler for Russia, China has gained a unique vantage point. It can assess how the components of military systems it is providing in huge numbers perform in combat, gather intelligence on the effectiveness of Ukrainian and Western weapons, and refine the concepts it will use to guide its own weapons development, military training, and organizational structures. All of these efforts will serve to ready the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) should it one day engage in a conflict with the United States.

Beijing’s role has evolved far beyond mere economic support; it now functions as the logistical backbone of Russia’s military-industrial complex. This arrangement allows China to test its industrial capacity to support a partner in a sustained, high-intensity conflict—and to understand the implications for supporting its own forces in combat—all while maintaining a veneer of plausible deniability. This strategic priority was laid bare in a July 2025 discussion where, according to an official briefed on the talks, Foreign Minister Wang Yi told a top EU diplomat that Beijing could not accept a Russian defeat, as it would risk allowing the United States to turn its full attention to China.

From the Front Lines of Ukraine: A Soldier’s Warning to America

Suzanne Kelly

Editor’s Note: As President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin talk about meeting face-to-face in Alaska later this week to discuss an end to the war in Ukraine, The Cipher Brief is publishing this raw and unfiltered personal account of today’s war through the eyes of a former U.S. Special Forces operator, who is fighting alongside Ukrainian soldiers. We have granted his request for anonymity for personal security reasons. You can read more from the author on his X account.

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE -- I wrote this report on the night of 22nd-23rd July 2025 in the space of two and a half hours, after midnight, and after having not done any writing in years; and thus, I can be forgiven, I hope, for my idiosyncrasies and informality. I'm a soldier. I go by the callsign ‘Xen’ and I currently work under a Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF or “SSO” in Ukraine) regiment. My team leader and I are both former U.S. Special Operations personnel. Without wasting time on the details, I’ll say that we are “true believers” who supported Ukraine long before we left the U.S. military and long before the full-scale Russian invasion.

My reasons for coming to Ukraine as a soldier-volunteer were so intensely personal. I was motivated by ethnicity, history, philosophy, and a deep intuition of where all signs in my life were pointing. I mostly spun my wheels my first year in Ukraine – it was more Jarhead than Band of Brothers. I am now actively participating in combat operations – in particular, rotary and fixed wing drone strike operations. We train (and these days are trained by…), advise, assist, accompany, and enable Ukrainian SOF; and in such capacity, have near-total freedom of movement, granting us a breadth and depth of understanding across the conflict.

Trump Just Handed China the Tools to Beat America in AI

Matt Pottinger and Liza Tobin

President Donald Trump’s team just gave China’s rulers the technology they need to beat us in the artificial intelligence race. If he doesn’t reverse this decision, it may be remembered as the moment when America surrendered the technological advantage needed to bring manufacturing home and keep our nation secure.

His advisers, including Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, persuaded him to lift his ban on exporting Nvidia’s powerful H20 chips to China, which desperately needs these chips to make its AI smarter. The president should have stuck with his gut.

In exchange, the U.S. government has apparently become a financial beneficiary in AI chip sales to China: Press reports indicate that Nvidia and AMD (another chipmaker) have agreed to turn over 15% of their China chip revenues as a condition for obtaining export licenses, an arrangement that effectively monetizes what was supposed to be a national security restriction.

Don’t believe the claims that these chips aren’t very advanced. Before Trump banned them from export to China in April, H20s were instrumental in China’s DeepSeek AI model that shocked the world in January. DeepSeek’s CEO publicly admitted that United States “bans on shipments of advanced chips” are his company’s biggest challenge. In May, a senior executive at Chinese tech giant Tencent said he expected the ban on the H20 to “widen the gap” the U.S. enjoys over China in AI.

Updating the After-Action Review: JPMRC’s Data Assessment Tool and the Next Generation of Data-Driven Lethality

Daniel K. Bourke

It’s an essential building block of the way the Army trains and operates: the after-action review. A unit, from the squad level to echelons above brigade, completes a training exercise, or even a real-world operation, and turns to this mechanism to identify what went well, where there are opportunities for improvement, and what changes can be implemented next time. It’s how we keep our swords at their sharpest, our readiness and lethality maximized. But in a period of accelerating change in the character of warfare—faster and more digital than ever—are the mechanisms by which units conduct this fundamental activity fit for purpose?

If not, what are the components necessary for a meaningful after-action review (AAR), specifically in today’s digital landscape. And do we have actually to wait until after the action to do it? This question has remained front of mind for me since becoming a task force senior for the Joint Multinational Training Center (JPMRC), the Army’s newest combat training center (CTC). Army Leaders are well versed in the doctrinal standards of AARs from Field Manual 7-0 and the Leaders Guide to Unit and Training Management but struggle to quantify the metrics that drive improves and sustains, those elements of the action that need work and those that were accomplished successfully.

How many of us have sat through an AAR where events are blurred, challenges to existing processes are ignored, and opinions on performance drive the conversation? The training audience’s attention is quickly lost and valuable lessons learned are not internalized. To avoid this, the shared observations of observer controller / trainers (OC/Ts) must be linked to the unit’s performance using data in real time. At JPMRC we often refer to a training unit’s data as its “fantasy football stats.” Anyone who has played fantasy football knows that nobody wants to wait until after the game to see the stats. The same holds true for training. Why wait until after an event when data is available during the training? This is where the Data Assessment Tool developed at JPMRC comes into play.

A Loss of Confidence

Michael Furay

It is difficult to rise to command in the United States Navy. The military remains, by and large, a meritocracy aimed at ensuring that only the best attain “command at sea” of the nation’s submarines, aircraft squadrons, and ships. Of all officers commissioned as ensigns in 1983, only 3% attained that goal. The road they travelled was intensely competitive, difficult, and littered with the thousands who failed to meet the Navy’s given standard of “sustained superior performance at sea,” further defined as “performance exemplified by a consistent record of exceeding expectations while demonstrating leadership and expertise at sea.”

As for the promotion system used to winnow the field, it features annual, ranked assessment of fitness in the performance of duty, along with rigorous multiple administrative and statutory boards. For those who do successfully attain and succeed in their first, or O5 command, only a relative few will subsequently be selected for a second, or O6 command, more commonly known as “major command.” “Major,” which is an even larger combatant command, is the last gate through which a few of these officers will pass prior to selection to flag rank. The entire aim of this system is to ensure that not only do the most qualified get to command the Navy’s combat units, but that the best of the best are prepared to become admirals.

The Dawn of Automated Warfare

Eric Schmidt and Greg Grant

When Russia first launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict drew comparisons to wars of the twentieth century. Tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery dominated the battlefield, and both sides’ infantry were dug into trenches. We witnessed this old-school style of war when we made our first visit to Ukraine in September 2022. Since then, we have made regular trips to Ukraine, affording us firsthand insight into a monumental transformation: the beginning of a new kind of warfare.

In summer 2023, the commander of Ukraine’s Third Assault Brigade’s Drone Unit, whom we’ll call Fil (not his real name), told us that a new weapon had begun to change the conflict: first-person-view drones. These small, cheap, maneuverable quadcopters transmit real-time footage to their operators and detonate kamikaze-style on their targets. That year, Ukraine flooded the field with thousands of them and Russia soon followed suit. Today, hundreds of thousands of these drones fill the Ukrainian skies.

What began as a war with drones has become a war of drones. Indeed, two years ago, a Ukrainian brigade’s strength was judged mostly by its inventory of Western-supplied tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. Since 2023, however, drones have become the most important weapon on the battlefield. Because of their low cost, speed, and precision, drones have now largely supplanted traditional weaponry, including antitank missiles, mortars, tanks, and even artillery and aircraft. Today, a unit’s power and resilience are dictated by its number of skilled drone operators and its ability to deploy drones at scale. (One of us, Schmidt, has been a longtime investor in defense technology companies, and is currently an investor in companies supplying drones to Ukraine.)

Why Peak China may finally have arrived

George Magnus

Proclamations about the inevitability of China’s dominance of the global economic system, or the so-called Chinese century, were made long before Donald Trump’s attempts to stymie its trade with the US. Common concerns about coercive politics and human rights aside, some notions of China as an unstoppable economic, technological and military behemoth sit alongside others focused more on an increasingly sclerotic, over- centralised political economy, that depends on wasteful economic stimulus, and features poor governance and institutions. The fusion of these notions suggests that we may already have reached “peak China”.

At the time of the 2008 financial crisis, China’s official, and probably exaggerated, GDP was about $14tn (£10.4tn), or about a third of that of the US. By 2021, it had risen to three-quarters of America’s $23.7tn, and there was widespread talk about in which year of the 2020s China would overtake the US. By 2024, however, China’s $18tn economy had fallen back to just over 62% of the almost $30tn of the US. In GDP per head terms, China is still no more than 20% of the US.

A rising China uniquely lifted its share of global GDP between 2000 and 2021 from 3.5% to 18.5%, but since then it has slipped back to about 16.5%. There is no question that China’s rise is at least stalling. The working age and total population are now in relentless decline. The urbanisation rate, just over 60%, is flattening out. Productivity growth has stalled.

The US-Russia summit is a symptom of geopolitical failure

Edward Lucas

Speculation swirls around the US-Russia meeting in Anchorage planned for Friday. Will Ukraine be at the table, or on the menu? What leverage (if any) will the US apply to Russia to extract concessions and reward compliance? Will the Europeans’ belated, frantic efforts to get their point of view across bear fruit? Anything could happen, from a walkout to a sellout.

But the winners and losers are already clear. First and foremost, the Chinese Communist Party: not invited, but on everyone’s mind. Decision-makers in Beijing did not like Russia’s reckless illegal war, but they liked even less the idea of it losing. So the CCP helped the Putin regime keep fighting. It also kept the brakes on his nuclear sabre-rattling. The CCP has not only established unshakeable dominance in the Sino-Russian relationship. China is now a power-broker across the Eurasian landmass in a way that would have been unimaginable only 10 years ago: a foretaste of the influence the CCP will exercise on other continents too.

Second, the Kremlin’s decade-old pariah status is over. Far from being arrested for child abduction and other crimes arising from his murderous war on Ukraine, the Russian leader will be treated as a VIP when he lands on American soil. We are almost back to the era of the “reset”, when President Barack Obama took the supposedly liberal new Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, to his favourite cheeseburger joint.

Vietnam and Afghanistan – Shared Failure

Joe Swiecki

Picture from the fall of Saigon marking the end of the Vietnam war (L). A helicopter above USA's embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan (R). | FIle Photo (L)/ AFP (R). Abstract: As conflict looms throughout the world, the United States must again learn lessons from its failed conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Both conflicts featured blurry battle lines, nebulous objectives, undefinable victories, and inhospitable terrain that nullified the U.S. airpower and physically punished its ground forces. For a Presidential administration deciding if or when to intervene in a foreign country, the failures of Vietnam and Afghanistan should be a crucial influence in whatever foreign policy decision the administration makes.

As a possible conflict in the Middle East looms, it is a prescient time to look back at America’s two longest wars and the lessons learned in blood. In the almost fifty years since the fall of South Vietnam and five years since the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan, it has become clear that the outcomes of both conflicts had one comparable result: failure. But what lessons can be learned from the parallels and differences in the two conflicts, and can those lessons give policymakers a greater understanding of future challenges? To compare America’s two longest wars and create lessons learned, this article will look at four variables: policy objectives, popular support, tactics and terrain, and government partners. The comparisons between the conflicts are not limited to these variables, but this article will restrict the scope of the analysis to these four critical topics.

Decoding Intent in Irregular Warfare: Lessons from Venezuela, Iran, and the Strategic Use of Ambiguity

Ron MacCammon 

The nature of warfare in the 21st century has changed. Open confrontations have been replaced by unconventional pressure and blurred authority. State actors increasingly rely on proxies, criminal networks, disinformation, and technological asymmetries to weaken adversaries—undermining political stability, social cohesion, and institutional trust—without triggering conventional responses. The result is a battlespace defined less by geography and more by narrative, influence, and legitimacy.

In this context, intent has become a central—but often overlooked—signal in irregular warfare. Unlike conventional conflict, where capabilities and declarations often precede action, irregular warfare demands that analysts and policymakers infer intent from patterns, alignments, and behaviors that rarely announce themselves clearly. But when viewed over time, these acts form a coherent strategy.

This article argues that intent in irregular warfare can be identified through an analytical triad: repeated behaviors, alignment with strategic outcomes, and the systematic use of irregular means. It draws from operational practice and doctrinal sources, including the Pentagon’s Irregular Warfare Annex and the work of David Kilcullen. This framework is then applied to Venezuela and its alignment with Iran, whose shared use of proxies, criminal networks, and information warfare illustrates how states weaponize ambiguity to advance their agendas without triggering traditional conflict thresholds.

Why Is the US Punishing India – But Not China – for Buying Russian Oil?

Jianli Yang

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin shake hands at a meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit at Kazan, Russia, Oct. 22, 2024.Credit: X/Narendra Modi

When Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine on February 22, 2022, the world was confronted not only with a brutal war of aggression but also with a dramatic reshaping of global oil flows. As Washington and its allies implemented sweeping sanctions aimed at crippling Moscow’s war chest, two Asian economic powerhouses – India and China – emerged as vital lifelines for Russia’s energy exports. What happened next has become one of the more puzzling episodes in recent U.S. foreign policy: the Trump administration has sharply penalized India for its expanding purchases of Russian crude – culminating in a 50 percent tariff on select exports – while allowing China – an even greater consumer of that very oil – to escape similar direct punishment.

The disparity is so marked that it demands examination. It cannot be explained by reference to oil volumes alone, nor is it a simple matter of how international law is applied. Instead, it reflects a confluence of cold political calculation, relative economic leverage, and the subtle but consequential difference between how U.S. policymakers view India and China. What makes this story more complex still is the Trump administration’s belief – one that shapes much of its strategic posture – that China might play a decisive role in brokering an end to the Ukraine war.

Is Pakistan’s Second Chance in the Tribal Areas Slipping Away?

Sadia Younas

The president of Pakistan enacted the 25th Amendment to the constitution on May 31, 2018, signalling a watershed moment in the country’s constitutional landscape with expansive socio-political corollaries for the frontline populations of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). Eight clauses of Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution were modified by the 25th Amendment to reflect this legal change. FATAs’ pre-existing “discriminatory status” as a constitutionally suspended zone was abolished (Art. 1), leading to its territorial merger with the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), while PATAs were incorporated into the provincial governments of Balochistan and KP (Art. 246).

Over seven decades after Pakistan’s independence, the 25th Amendment finally upgraded the status of FATA community members from “subjects” to that of “real citizens,” noted Muhammad Zubair. To counteract the longstanding dominance of oppressive colonialism under the tutelage of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), this legislation promised historically disadvantaged indigenous groups newly acquired constitutional rights and meaningful democratic influence in both the provincial legislature of KP and the National Assembly.

Yet, the observable reality has fallen far short of the spirit of the changes. What we see in the merged districts (MDs) is a shallow governance architecture without grounding. Despite its redesignation and the semblance of a unified structure and leadership, there are limited substantive reforms, a lack of state accountability and inadequate strategic thinking – all of which hinder prospects for sustainable performance.

Climate Security Is Energy Security

GERNOT WAGNER

If political conditions in the United States and elsewhere require a rebranding of technologies formerly known as “climate tech,” so be it. The larger economic, technological, and geopolitical forces propelling everyone toward cleaner energy remain as strong as ever. NEW YORK – For all the uncertainties generated by Donald Trump’s administration over the past six months, one thing is clear: “climate” technologies are out, and “energy” technologies are in. But while going along with this rhetorical shift may appease some, it should be recognized for what it is: a change in wording. The fundamental economic and technological forces that are pushing the world away from oil, coal, and gas and toward low-carbon, high-efficiency technologies have not abated.

Over the past two decades, climate change has been a leading item on the global agenda, driving efforts to deploy technologies that will reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Those efforts are now facing headwinds, and not just in the United States. Geopolitical developments elsewhere, like Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have called attention to the importance of energy affordability and security over other considerations.

Policymakers in the US, Europe, and elsewhere initially responded to the war by doubling down on the shift from fossil fuels, and for good reason. Oil, coal, and gas are commodities whose prices will always be linked to geopolitical vagaries (that goes for not only global oil markets but also regional gas markets, which are increasingly linked by trade in liquefied natural gas).

India Is Winning the Fight Against Poverty

SHAMIKA RAVI

India has managed to lift 302 million people out of poverty over the past 12 years, thanks to rapid economic growth and targeted welfare policies. The sharpest declines in poverty rates have been among Muslims and other marginalized communities, suggesting that the benefits of growth have been broadly shared.

NEW DELHI – Contrary to popular belief, democracy is about far more than holding elections or ensuring the peaceful transfer of political power. At its core lies the duty of elected representatives to respond to the fundamental needs of all citizens – especially the marginalized and vulnerable – regardless of their political or religious affiliations. Reducing poverty and fostering inclusive development are critical to fulfilling this democratic responsibility.

The Duty to Protect the Climate

ANTARA HALDAR

A recent ruling from the world’s highest court confirms that climate justice is evolving from a slogan into a legal standard, helping to usher in a genuinely global legal system. Equally remarkable, the case was brought by 27 Pacific Islands law students who had to defy long odds to see it through. LOS ANGELES – Although the International Court of Justice turned 80 this year, there is a sense in which it has never felt younger. In a David-versus-Goliath moment, the tiny Pacific Island state of Vanuatu recently changed international law forever by bringing the world’s most important issue before its highest court. The result is an ICJ advisory opinion on “the legal obligations of states in respect of climate change,” as requested – at Vanuatu’s urging – by the United Nations General Assembly (with 132 states co-sponsoring the resolution).

Where Is the Global Resistance to Trump?
DANI RODRIK thinks most countries have failed to capitalize on the crisis that Donald Trump has created. The questions posed to the ICJ were as simple as they were seismic: What obligations, under international law, do states have to tackle climate change? And what are the legal consequences if they fail to do so?

The ICJ’s answer was unequivocal. States have a duty to protect their citizens from climate change – a duty rooted not only in treaties like the Paris climate agreement, but also in environmental law, human-rights law, and customary international law. “Climate change,” said the court’s president, Yuji Iwasawa, speaking from the Peace Palace in The Hague, “is an urgent and existential threat of planetary proportions.” “The science is clear,” notes John Silk, the Marshall Islands’ representative to the UN, “and now the law is, too.”

The Promise and Peril of Bangladesh’s “Youthquake”

M. NIAZ ASADULLAH

In the year since the overthrow of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, what began as a protest against corruption and job quotas has grown into a broader youth-driven push to reshape Bangladesh’s political system. But without meaningful reform, the country risks sliding back into violence and repression. DHAKA – The past year has been marked by a series of revolutions and political shocks as young people across Asia and Africa have taken to the streets, demanding accountable governments, fairer societies, and economic opportunities – a wave of resistance that Binaifer Nowrojee has aptly termed “youthquakes.”

Where Is the Global Resistance to Trump?
DANI RODRIK thinks most countries have failed to capitalize on the crisis that Donald Trump has created. The most dramatic upheaval took place in Bangladesh, where anger over politicized public-sector job quotas escalated into a nationwide movement to topple Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian government, leading to the fall of Asia’s “Iron Lady.”

While some celebrated Hasina’s ouster as a brave stand against authoritarianism, many international observers viewed it as the beginning of a turbulent and uncertain period. Some raised concerns about the threat of Islamist violence and heightened geopolitical tensions. Others attributed the uprising to public frustration with neoliberal reforms promoted by the International Monetary Fund. Economist Jeffrey Sachs went further, dismissing the revolution as US‑backed regime change.

Trump Wields Tariffs as a Force in Diplomacy, to Questionable Effect

Edward Wong and Zolan Kanno-Youngs

As President Trump pushes to end the war in Ukraine, he is using tariffs to try to persuade Russia to agree to a cease-fire that would halt its invasion. Mr. Trump said last month that Russia’s trading partners could face “very severe tariffs,” in what would be a roundabout way of trying to hurt Moscow. To show that he means business, Mr. Trump raised tariffs on Wednesday on imports from India to an extraordinary 50 percent, saying he was punishing the country for buying Russian oil. The taxes would be paid by American companies importing goods and would result in higher costs for consumers in the United States.

An Aug. 8 deadline for Russia to agree to a cease-fire came and went, and Mr. Trump did not impose new tariffs on its trading partners. Instead, he announced plans to meet with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Alaska on Friday. For Mr. Trump, tariffs are not just about raising revenue for the government or protecting American industries from foreign competition. They are a cudgel to try to get other countries to do as he wishes on matters that are entirely separate from trade, and to punish them when they do not. He has used or threatened them on everything from armed conflict to deportations to legal proceedings tied to his political grievances.

Late last month, Mr. Trump raised tariffs on Brazilian goods to 50 percent, with a few exceptions, largely because of a coup-plot case in the country’s Supreme Court against Jair Bolsonaro, the former right-wing president, whom Mr. Trump sees as an ally.Around that time, Mr. Trump threatened to impose 36 percent tariffs on Thailand and Cambodia if they did not halt their border war.

The U.S. Army's Answer to Drone Swarms: 'Fry' Them With Lasers

Brent M. Eastwood

The war in Ukraine has proven the urgent need for advanced air defense, and top U.S. Army officials say now is the time to field battlefield lasers. With drones and missiles dominating modern combat, traditional interceptors are insufficient. U.S. Army Spc. Harry Santiago IV, assigned to the Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), launches a Skydio X2D drone on Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, Romania, July 09, 2025. V Corps provides essential support to multinational training and exercises of robust and evolving complexity, scope, scale, rigor, and operational conditions and provides targeted security force assistance alongside national and multinational corps and divisions. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Breanna Bradford)

-Directed energy weapons offer a “non-kinetic” solution with a virtually unlimited supply of firepower. -While challenges with heat and weight remain for mobile platforms, the Army believes the technology is “pretty mature” and is pushing programs to get 20- to 300-kilowatt laser systems onto its vehicles to counter the growing threat of drone swarms.
Now Is the Time for Lasers On the Battlefield for the U.S. Army

The U.S. Army’s Air Defense Artillery is always in demand. Commanding officers want a protective shield over their troops at all times, and soldiers who work in air defense are usually busy, whether during training exercises or real engagements with an enemy. The war in Ukraine has shown the importance of drones and missiles. Whichever side in a conflict can figure out how to keep munitions from falling on friendly troops and armored vehicles is far likelier to win on the battlefield.

South Africa and China set up a quantum communication link: How we did it and why it's historic

Yaseera Ismail,
Lisa Lock, Andrew Zinin

A major breakthrough in quantum technology was achieved in October 2024: the first-ever quantum satellite communication link between China and South Africa. The connection spanned a remarkable 12,900 km: the longest intercontinental quantum communication link established to date. The longest before this was 7,600 km and within the northern hemisphere only. It was achieved with quantum key distribution, a method for a sender and receiver to share a secure key that they can use to safely send messages.

Any interception during transmission leaves traces that can be detected. It involves sending single photons (tiny particles of light). If someone tries to intercept the photons, the photons get disturbed because of quantum physics. Quantum physics is the study of matter and energy at the most fundamental level. Sender and receiver use only undisturbed photons, making the key to the message ultra secure. 

The key can be sent via optical fiber or free-space, including satellites.Quantum communication can be used to send data in many sectors such as the government, military and financial sectors. I'm part of the group of quantum physics researchers who created a secure, real-time quantum link between Beijing in China and Stellenbosch University in South Africa. It's the first quantum satellite link in the southern hemisphere. It's also the first secure quantum communication between the northern and southern hemispheres.