Indian Strategic Studies: 08/10/25

10 August 2025

Bangladesh Is a South Asian Time Bomb

Many hoped that the overthrow of long-time leader Sheikh Hasina last year would open the way for Bangladesh to revitalize its democracy after an authoritarian lurch under the country's "iron lady." Instead, the country has faced proliferating human-rights abuses, intensifying repression, and widespread Islamist violence. NEW DELHI – In the year since the violent, military-backed overthrow of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government, Bangladesh has descended into chaos. The economy is reeling, radical Islamist forces are gaining ground, young people are becoming increasingly radicalized, lawlessness is taking hold.

Many had hoped that Hasina’s ouster would open the way for Bangladesh to transition to democracy following an authoritarian lurch under the “iron lady.” After all, they reasoned, it was a student-led uprising that toppled her regime. But this narrative downplayed the decisive role of the powerful military, which had long chafed under Hasina’s attempts to curb its influence and ultimately forced her into exile in India. Similarly, Islamist forces – who provided much of the muscle behind the student protests – viewed her overthrow as an opportunity to end the marginalization they faced under her secular rule.

The illusory promise of Hasina’s overthrow was further enhanced by the installation of Muhammad Yunus – the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize laureate celebrated as a savior of the poor for pioneering microcredit through his Grameen Bank – as the nominal head of the interim government. But, again, the headline misrepresents reality. In fact, the Nobel Committee’s choice was less about the Grameen Bank’s actual impact than it was about geopolitical signaling. In presenting the award, the Committee chair invoked Yunus as a symbolic bridge between Islam and the West, expressing hope that his selection would counter the “widespread tendency to demonize Islam” that had taken hold in the West after the US terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Go beyond the headlines to understand the issues, forces, and trends shaping the US presidential election – and the likely implications of its outcome.As the leader of Bangladesh’s interim government, Yunus has promised sweeping reforms and democratic elections. But elections have been repeatedly postponed. Meanwhile, despite lacking constitutional legitimacy, the interim government has launched sweeping purges of independent institutions, ousting the chief justice and the next five most-senior Supreme Court justices, and outlawing Hasina’s Awami League, the country’s oldest and largest political party, which led Bangladesh to independence.

In Outreach To Africa, India Prioritizes Maritime Security Collaboration

As India builds greater ties with Africa, the Indian Navy is playing a significant role in establishing maritime security partnerships. It works to combat Somali piracy, as well as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, drug trafficking, and other sea crimes in the western Indian Ocean region, including the Gulf of Aden, Mozambique Channel and the Red Sea. As part of its “Security and Growth for All in the Region” (SAGAR) policy, India has trained African maritime and military personnel at Indian institutes and enhanced information-sharing to develop maritime domain awareness through regional information fusion centers and maritime coordination centers.

These efforts and others “demonstrate India’s commitment to serving as a net-security provider in the Indian Ocean and a preferred partner for African nations seeking to safeguard their maritime interests,” analyst Aritra Banerjee wrote in Eurasia Review. Last year, the Indian Navy rescued the Malta-flagged commercial ship MV Ruen about three months after it was hijacked by Somali pirates, who were later arrested and brought to India for prosecution. In Madagascar and the Agaléga islands off Mauritius, India has developed listening stations, which monitor and intercept radio communications,

while another one is proposed in Assumption Island off Seychelles, according to Abhishek Mishra of New Delhi’s Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.In 2023, India built a major airstrip and jetty on Agaléga’s larger northern island. The airstrip is staffed by Indian Navy officers and guards and can handle Boeing P-8I surveillance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft of the Indian Armed Forces. The Agaléga facilities also enable maritime patrols over the Mozambique Channel, and its staging point will let the Indian Navy observe shipping routes around southern Africa.

a research officer at the Australian National University’s National Security College, wrote for The Lowy Institute.India also has conducted hydrographic surveys for African countries and developed the Coastal Radar Surveillance network in Mauritius and Seychelles. India has recognized the varying priorities of African countries and has fine-tuned its own ways of maritime security cooperation in order to effectively respond to the emerging challenges,” Mishra wrote for the Center for International Maritime Security. In April, India and 10 African countries completed a first-of-its-kind naval exercise in the Indian Ocean, known as the Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement, or Aikeyme. They conducted the exercise.

Bangladesh Interim Government’s Weakened Counterterrorism Approach

Iftekharul Bashar

A year after the fall of the Awami League (AL) government in Bangladesh, the interim administration led by Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus finds itself at a critical juncture. While the government has focused on political and economic reforms, a concerning shift has occurred in its approach to counterterrorism (CT). The proactive and zero-tolerance stance of the previous administration has been replaced by what many insiders describe as a “too soft approach,” creating a vacuum that militants are reportedly exploiting to reorganize and re-establish their networks. Radical preaching and propaganda activities continue unabated in both online and on-the-ground spaces, something that, many observers feel.

might lead to mass radicalization, especially of youth. One of the key trends observed over the past year is the merging of traditional religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh with a more hardline ideology propagated by a new generation of urban and tech-savvy extremists with mainstream academic backgrounds. These new actors leverage their educational credentials and digital expertise to portray violent ideologies as intellectually and morally sound, which resonates with a younger, urban, and educated demographic.

The trend has intensified since the August 2024 regime change in Dhaka, which allowed previously isolated extremist groups to forge alliances on common platforms to organize public events in the major cities of Bangladesh.The current problem stems from a major policy shift by the interim government, which has not only publicly downplayed the threat of terrorism and extremism but has also actively disempowered the very agencies meant to combat it. Although the culture of denial is not new, what is new is the crippling of the security agencies by deliberately diverting them from counterterrorism.

Experienced counterterrorism professionals have been sidelined, dismissed, or transferred to insignificant posts. Others have faced intimidation through police cases. This has created an internal crisis that has severely limited these agencies’ ability to proactively respond to threats. According to multiple security and intelligence sources who spoke to this writer on condition of anonymity, there are significant concerns that Bangladesh’s security agencies have become “toothless tigers,” unable to operate effectively without the government’s backing — a backing that is conspicuously absent.

One Year After Sheikh Hasina’s Fall: How Is Bangladesh Holding Up?

Saqlain Rizve

On August 5, 2024, as the clock struck noon, news spread rapidly that Bangladesh Army General Waker-Uz-Zaman was set to address the nation. Across the country, people sensed the bloody mass uprising that had been raging for over a month was about to reach its climax. Many believed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year-long autocratic rule was finally coming to an end. Just moments later, Hasina resigned and fled the country, seeking refuge in India. By that time, protesters and ordinary citizens had already stormed state landmarks like the Prime Minister’s Office, Ganabhaban (the prime minister’s residence) and Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban (the national parliament building).

engaging in widespread vandalism and destruction. Simultaneously, attacks on police stations broke out in Dhaka and across other regions. The protests that summer originally focused on a single limited issue: reforms to the quota system in government jobs. But the brutality shown by law enforcement during the protests – allegedly under Hasina’s direct orders – sparked unprecedented public outrage. According to United Nations estimates, around 1,400 people were killed, while thousands were injured during the protests. From late July through early August 2024, calls mounted for Hasina to resign.

This was not Bangladesh’s first mass uprising. Since its independence in 1971, the country has experienced frequent political upheavals. But this was the first time in history that a sitting prime minister was forced to flee.The last major uprising occurred in 1990, leading to the fall of military ruler Hussain Muhammad Ershad and a democratic transition. Within two decades, Bangladesh had made progress in consolidating democracy. However, in 2007-2008, another major disruption occurred known as the 1/11 period when an army-backed caretaker government took power.

Both Hasina and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader Khaleda Zia were arrested, Zia’s son Tarique Rahman was exiled under a no-politics condition, and new political forces were introduced – but failed to gain traction. Hasina and her Awami League (AL) returned to power in 2008 through elections under the caretaker government, raising hopes for democratic revival. Yet, over time, Hasina’s government systematically suppressed opposition, the media, civil society, and state institutions. Through legal amendments and the abolition of the caretaker government system in 2011, the AL ensured its dominance of the 2014, 2018, and 2024 elections.

Is the Taliban’s Afghanistan a Safe Haven for Terrorist Organizations?

Muhammad Murad

On July 24, the United Nations Security Council’s Monitoring Committee released its 36th report on the Islamic State (ISIS), also known as Daesh, as well as al-Qaida and associated groups. The report indicates that the threat from ISIS, al-Qaida, and their affiliates remains “diverse and dynamic.” In Asia, the report focused only on two regions – South Asia and Southeast Asia – and it was clear the former was the larger concern. In particular, the report underscored “growing concerns about the threat from foreign terrorist fighters” in South Asia – and especially in Afghanistan.

The de facto authorities in Afghanistan continued to maintain a permissive environment for a range of terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida and its affiliates, posing a serious threat to the security of Central Asian and other countries,” the report stated. The Monitoring Committee said that al-Qaida’s presence in Afghanistan – which mainly consists of fighters of Arab origin who had fought alongside the Taliban in the past – “had been drastically downsized” and thus “did not present an immediate threat for regional States.” According to the report, al-Qaida’s presence was limited to just six provinces of Afghanistan.

Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, Uruzgan and Zabul. However, the report also noted al-Qaida’s stated ambition “to reactivate cells in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya and Europe.” The report also identified three new training sites, although “likely to be small and rudimentary,” for fighters belonging to both al-Qaida and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – an anti-Pakistani terrorist group operating mainly from Afghan soil. Pakistan’s government has repeatedly accused the Taliban regime in Afghanistan of providing safe haven to the TTP, which has stepped up its attacks on Pakistani targets. The Taliban have consistently denied such claims, but the U.N.

report found that the TTP “continued to receive substantial logistical and operational support from the de facto authorities” in Afghanistan (i.e. the Taliban government). Besides al-Qaida and its affiliates, ISIS, with its local affiliate Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), also maintains its presence and is active in Afghanistan, which seems to be of major concern not only to the international community but also to the Taliban. The report identified ISKP as “the most serious threat, both regionally and internationally” of any terrorist group in South Asia. The group is actively recruiting both within Afghanistan as well as abroad, “including among Central Asian States and the Russian North Caucasus.

Beyond the Second Island Chain: It’s Time to Mitigate Strategic Risk in Oceania

The lens of US-China strategic competition is most typically focused on geographic areas of friction like the South China Sea and potential flashpoints like Taiwan, locations inside the first island chain. Occasionally, it zooms out to the second island chain. Too rarely, however, does the aperture widen even further to the Pacific Islands. But these islands are not a backwater. They are the front line. Oceania spans more than three hundred thousand square miles and sits astride some of the world’s most important sea lanes and beneath vital air corridors. From the second through the third island chains, the region plays a pivotal role in Indo-Pacific security and would certainly do so in any future military contingency involving China.

Though these island nations are often small and remote, their strategic value is undeniable. Geography remains destiny, and in the case of Oceania, whoever controls access to the region holds a powerful advantage. China understands this. The United States must act accordingly and urgently. China has spent the last two decades executing a comprehensive strategy of influence across Oceania. This campaign reflects a model of unrestricted warfare: economic enticement, diplomatic charm offensives, elite capture, media manipulation, and the deployment of state-owned enterprises that serve both commercial and military

functions. Beijing-backed companies now operate critical infrastructure including ports, airports, undersea cables, and telecommunications networks across the region. In many cases, these services are monopolistic by necessity; most Pacific island countries are too small to support multiple competitors. This creates single points of failure and vulnerability. Chinese infrastructure is not just dual-use in theory. In a future conflict, these assets will support early warning operations or integrate into a kill chain for the People’s Liberation Army targeting US and allied forces. Even in peacetime, their presence enables surveillance.

coercion, and disinformation, all of which align with Beijing’s larger effort to reshape the regional order and cast the United States as an unreliable or even malign actor. Mitigating strategic risk in Oceania requires a nuanced understanding of several interlocking dynamics. First and foremost is the intensifying geopolitical competition between China, the United States, and regional partners like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. These islands offer critical nodes for access, basing, and overflight. Political recognition of Taiwan remains a flashpoint, and China’s ability to pressure island nations into switching allegiance reveals the transactional nature of Beijing’s diplomacy.

Incentives for U.S.-China Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation Across Artificial General Intelligence’s Five Hard National Security Problems

In a relationship marked by strategic rivalry and mutual suspicion, the prospect of either the United States or the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—or both—achieving artificial general intelligence (AGI) is likely to heighten tensions and could even increase the risk of competition spiraling into conflict.[1] This is unsurprising, as AGI could reshape the global balance of power or yield “wonder weapons” capable of overwhelming intelligence systems, information ecosystems, and cyber defenses (Mitre and Predd, 2025). Yet the emergence of AGI could also create incentives for risk reduction and cooperation. We argue that both will not only be possible but essential.

The United States and China will both want to avoid miscalculation and misunderstandings that could lead to an unwanted war. Neither will be able to manage alone the risks of AGI misuse—whether from rogue actors developing novel weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), autonomous agents triggering crises, or cascading disruptions that exceed state capacity. But such progress on risk reduction or on cooperation will not emerge organically. It will require a deliberate and carefully calibrated diplomatic effort to make it viable. In this paper, we offer some ideas for where to start, building on existing yet underdeveloped platforms and avenues for dialogue.

The PRC’s choices will be a principal factor in shaping the risks and opportunities that U.S. policymakers will face on the path to AGI, and, likewise, Chinese officials will likely view the United States as the most consequential external actor shaping AGI outcomes. At first glance, it might seem that the intensifying friction between Washington and Beijing over security, economic, and technology issues, along with each side’s extremely negative views of the other’s intentions, will drive relations between them in areas related to AGI.

However, the potential for the two countries to cooperate to reduce AI-related risks is illustrated by a November 2024 leader-level agreement that humans, not AI, should make decisions about using nuclear weapons (U.S. Embassy and Consulates in China, 2024). That agreement, though modest in scope, could serve as a foundation for future discussions about potential areas of mutual restraint related to the development and employment of AGI or other advanced AI capabilities. And so, the reality is likely to be much more complex, with choices between conflict, competition, and cooperation possible across this spectrum.

We must loosen China’s chokehold on battery supply chains

A ceasefire in the U.S.-China trade war doesn’t change the fact that Americans are subject to Beijing’s whims when it comes to critical supplies of everything from magnets to minerals. This is not an accident but the result of decades of Beijing’s deliberate practices to build monopolies, dominate supply chains, stifle competition, and foster resource dependencies. But the U.S. and its allies can break China’s stranglehold on the battery supply chain, if they work together now to build the components and mine the minerals that go into advanced batteries, while fighting back against China’s market manipulation.

In our new report, Unplugging Beijing: A Playbook to Reclaim America’s Advanced Battery Supply Chains, we lay out the scale and scope of China’s non-market practices in battery supply chains — dumping, price manipulation, intellectual property theft, monopolies, and forced technology transfers — and, more importantly, say what America can do about it. One key way in which China controls the battery market is through intentional overproduction — making too much of everything — driving prices below profitability in ways that push out competition.

For 2025, Chinese analysts are projecting that China will make twice as many electric cars as the entire global demand from last year. While enormous subsidies and state support cushion Chinese companies, American companies cannot sustain unprofitable production. China’s decision to dump cheap batteries and underlying minerals on global markets sustains their monopolies but harms free markets and open competition. Beijing may finally be acknowledging that its massive overproduction of just about everything is fueling a race to the bottom. But as the central government frets about what Xi Jinping has labeled “disorderly price competition,” local governments in China are still backing absurd strategies to juice production.

such as state-sponsored programs to sell brand new cars as “zero-mileage” used cars — sold at a loss and dumped on foreign markets, but allowing companies to inflate sales numbers to justify factories operating at full tilt. While Beijing deploys a suite of non-market tactics at scale, its price manipulation is especially damaging. Advanced batteries depend on a host of refined minerals — lithium, nickel, cobalt, and graphite — that are responsible for most of the cost of the resulting battery. China’s intervention in nickel markets, for instance, has saddled Western producers with unsustainable costs. In lithium, Beijing has driven prices up or down at will, undermining competing U.S. projects.

China fears Nvidia chips could track, trace and shut down its AIs

Jeff Pao

Beijing has asked Nvidia to explain whether its H20 artificial intelligence chips have backdoors that could allow the United States to position and remotely shut them down. Chinese pundits said similar probes could be extended to other American-made chips. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) stated on July 31 that it summoned US tech giant Nvidia over security risks related to its H20 AI chip, which had been sold to China. Nvidia’s AI chips have been alleged to pose serious security risks, and some US lawmakers have called for advanced chips exported abroad to be equipped with ‘tracking and positioning’ functions,” said the CAC.

The CAC said in a press release that American AI experts have confirmed that the “tracking and positioning” and “remote shutdown” technologies of Nvidia chips have matured. It requested that Nvidia explain and submit relevant proof materials regarding this issue. On the same day, Nvidia said its chips do not contain backdoors that would allow anyone to access or remotely control them. It said cybersecurity is critically important to the company. Beijing’s summoning of Nvidia came after Reuters reported on July 29 that Nvidia had placed orders for 300,000 H20 chipsets (worth about US$3.6 billion) with the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) a week earlier.

In April, the US government stopped Nvidia from shipping its H20 products to China. When Republican US Senator Tom Cotton introduced the “Chip Security Act” on May 9, the bill received little to no significant media attention at the time. The bill requires AI chips to be subject to export regulations and mandates that products containing these chips be equipped with location-tracking systems to aid in detecting diversion, smuggling or other unauthorized use. It received support from bipartisan lawmakers in the House of Representatives.

“As Congress’s chip designer, AI programmer and PhD physicist, I know we have the technical tools to prevent powerful AI technology from getting into the wrong hands,” said Congressman Bill Foster. “With advanced AI chips being smuggled into China and posing a national security risk, Congress must act.” Following meetings between US and Chinese officials in London on June 9, China agreed to resume shipments of rare earth minerals to the US. In return, the US agreed to allow Chinese firms to use its electronic design automation (EDA) software and resume the shipment of H20 chips and C919 flight engine parts to China.

Could Putin Take the Baltics?

Ted Vician

Lawrence Freedman quotes this statement from Putin, taken from an article in the Daily Telegraph, in his 2014 Survival article. This assessment was confirmed for Riga, Vilnius, and Tallinn (the capitals of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, respectively, collectively known as the Baltic States) by wargames conducted by RAND in 2014 and 2015. The Wargame estimated it would take no more than 60 hours to reach one or more of the Baltic States’ capitals with a large combined-arms mechanized invasion force. However, that should be re-evaluated given the Russian Army’s poor performance in Ukraine since 2022. Russia’s full-scale combined arms invasion has spent three years mostly bogged down in eastern Ukraine.

Even so, the Russians did successfully seize Crimea in 2014 and continue to hold it (as of 2025), though they have not been able to take most of Ukraine, including Kyiv. The major difference is that Crimea is small and easily isolated, and Ukraine is large (more than 20 times larger in both land area and population) and connected to the rest of Europe. The seizure of Crimea was done by Russian special forces and proxies through a combination of infiltration, isolation, and information.

not by a large military invasion. This is a threat that the Baltic States need to be concerned with, perhaps more so than an invasion (though Shlapak and Johnson’s RAND study indicates the importance of that threat and makes recommendations to reduce it). Since those nations are NATO allies, it should be a concern for the United States of America (USA) as well. Analysis The three Baltic States are small nations that border Russia – Latvia and Lithuania also border on Belarus, Russia’s ally. They are NATO members, so a military invasion could trigger NATO’s Article V defense clause.

But what about an internal uprising? How would NATO allies react to protests from Russian-speaking citizens within those countries, possibly including violent ones? This would parallel the Russian efforts in Crimea and other parts of eastern Ukraine. Based on the data, each Baltic state is closer in size and population to Crimea than to Ukraine as a whole or Poland (presented for comparison due to its proximity to the Baltics and similarity in size and population with Ukraine). In particular, Estonia and Latvia have large Russian speaking minorities while Lithuania’s is smaller but sizable. Protecting such groups is a pretense that the Russian government has used in Ukraine, Georgia in 2008.

Netanyahu to propose full reoccupation of Gaza, Israeli media report

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is to propose fully reoccupying the Gaza Strip when he meets his security cabinet, Israeli media say. The die has been cast. We're going for the full conquest of the Gaza Strip – and defeating Hamas," local journalists quote a senior official as saying. Responding to reports that the army chief and other military leaders oppose the plan, the unnamed official said: "If that doesn't work for the chief of staff, he should resign." The families of hostages fear such plans could endanger their loved ones, with 20 out of 50 believed to be alive in Gaza, while polls suggest three in four Israelis instead favour a ceasefire deal to return them.

Many of Israel's close allies would also condemn such a move as they push for an end to the war and action to alleviate a humanitarian crisis. Within Israel, hundreds of retired Israeli security officials, including former heads of intelligence agencies, issued a joint letter to US President Donald Trump on Monday, calling for him to pressure Netanyahu to end the war. One of the signatories, ex-domestic intelligence agency chief Ami Ayalon, told the BBC that further military action would be futile. From the military point of view, [Hamas] is totally destroyed. On the other hand, as an ideology it is getting more and more power among the Palestinian people, within the Arab street around us, and also in the world of Islam.

"So the only way to defeat Hamas's ideology is to present a better future." The latest developments come after indirect talks with Hamas on a ceasefire and hostage deal broke down and Palestinian armed groups released three videos of two Israeli hostages looking weak and emaciated. The footage of Rom Blaslavski and Evyatar David, both kidnapped from the Nova music festival on 7 October 2023, has shocked and appalled Israelis. David is shown digging what he says is his own grave in an underground tunnel. There has been some speculation that the latest media announcements are a pressure tactic to try to force Hamas into a new deal.

Israel's military says it already has operational control of 75% of Gaza. But under the proposed plan it would occupy the entire territory – moving into areas where more than two million Palestinians are now concentrated.It is unclear what that would mean for civilians and for the operations of the UN and other aid groups. About 90% of Gaza's 2.1 million people have been displaced, some repeatedly, and are living in overcrowded and dire conditions. Humanitarian groups and UN officials say many are starving, accusing Israel of impeding the distribution of crucial aid. Israel meanwhile, says it will allow local businesspeople in Gaza to restart the entry of some goods as part of efforts to improve conditions there.

Responding to President Trump's Recent Executive Orders on Drones

Daniel M. Gerstein

President Donald Trump's June 6, 2025 Executive Order (EO) “Unleashing American Drone Dominance” notes that Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) or drones “enhance United States productivity, create high-skilled jobs, and are reshaping the future of aviation.” Its ambitions include “transforming industries from logistics and infrastructure inspection to precision agriculture, emergency response, and public safety.” The EO provides a comprehensive challenge to government and industry to become the global leader in UAS technologies. Its three pillars are integrating UAS into the national airspace system through risk-based rulemaking,

domestic commercialization of UAS at scale, and strengthening the domestic drone industrial base. The EO calls for the rapid maturing of technologies such as beyond visual line of sight or BVLOS operations, increasingly autonomous UAS operations, electric vertical takeoff and landing pilot program, and delivering low-cost, high-performing drones to the nation's warfighters. The EO also highlights the need to address “the growing threats from criminal, terrorist, and foreign misuse of drones inside U.S. airspace,” often called the dual-use challenge.

Given the rapid advances and increasing ubiquity of drone technology, addressing the growing UAS threats in the homeland could prove to be a significant challenge. It requires balancing the EO's goal of the proliferation of technology that is inherently dual-use with the need to identify UAS technologies operating in U.S. airspace and implement defenses and countermeasures to protect the United States, its critical infrastructure, and individuals from actors looking to take advantage of the dual-use nature of drone technology.

Recent events have highlighted the growing concerns associated with proliferation of UAS technologies. A 2024 U.S. Government Accountability Offices report identified the major concerns for the three million drones operating in U.S. airspace as operations near airports and challenges with identifying the drones in flight. Yet in late 2024, alleged “drone sightings” over several East Coast states and sensitive sites caused great consternation—the flights had been occurring over a period of months with little information provided other than assurances from federal government and state leaders that there was no threat to the public and that investigations into the drone sightings were continuing.

Israel’s Forever War

Donald Trump has already claimed that his promotion of ceasefires in Africa and Asia makes him fully deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize, but if he really wants to be recognised as a top peacemaker, then he needs to do something about the Middle East. This is the big test that has been set for generations of would-be peacemakers, ever since Israel first gained its independence in 1948, and it is particularly urgent now. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin shared the prize in 1983 for agreeing a treaty, urged on by US President Jimmy Carter. This treaty lasted, although Sadat was assassinated for his troubles in 1981. But to get Begin to agree Sadat had to set the Palestinian issue aside.

Sorting out the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip then became the main challenge. There was an apparent breakthrough in the early 1990s, based on the Oslo peace accords, leading in 1994 to another peace prize. It was shared by Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin for agreeing a road map to a two-state solution in 1994. The next year Rabin was assassinated, and the prospects never looked quite so bright again, although Bill Clinton put a substantial effort into coming up with a comprehensive solution at the dog end of his presidency in 2000. Finding a way for Israelis and Palestinians to co-exist that have led to failure.

Meanwhile, the effort to forge relations between Israel and Arab states that for decades refused to acknowledge its existence has been more successful. Trump believed that his success in getting a number to sign up to peace treaties with Israel in 2020 – the Abraham Accords – was another good reason for him to get the Peace Prize. Saudi Arabia is the most important country yet to sign up, and that is conditional on progress on the Palestinian issue. Another reason why it could seem timely to address this issue is that over the past twelve months,

Israel has also seen its most deadly enemies of recent years – Iran and Hezbollah – knocked back and an old enemy – Syria – under new management. Its security environment in principle is more benign than ever before.This assessment could even be extended to Gaza, where Hamas as a military force is a shadow of its former self. If Benjamin Netanyahu had chosen to cash in his winnings he could have offered Israel a more hopeful, and more peaceful, future. But he has spent his political career doing his best to thwart such a deal, and he is now in coalition with extremists whose ‘solution’ to this problem would be to see Palestinians expelled from all the occupied territories to make room for more settlers. isolation.

The geopolitics of the Gulf states’ push for critical minerals

Critical minerals have emerged as a new arena of geopolitical competition. As the world shifts to electric vehicles (EVs), renewable power and high-tech manufacturing, demand for lithium, cobalt, copper, nickel, rare-earth elements and other critical minerals is soaring. Production and processing, however, are highly concentrated: the US Geological Survey defines 44 critical minerals and identifies China as the leading worldwide producer of 30 of these, leaving supply chains bottlenecked and vulnerable to disruption and geopolitical risk. Sensing an opening, the Gulf states are leveraging their mineral resources, financial capital and geographic location to compete with established players and capture market share.

Looming supply gaps – the International Energy Agency warns of deficits of 30% for copper and 40% for lithium by 2035 – enhance that leverage, creating space for new entrants to reassure markets and diversify access. Although they remain marginal producers, Gulf states are scaling up their critical-mineral ambitions through a mix of overseas acquisitions, domestic initiatives and strategic partnerships. Domestically, this has included greater investment in domestic EV and battery production – setting up integrated supply chains and processing plants – to secure strategic raw-material access.

Internationally, the Gulf states are hoping to offset China’s dominance by positioning themselves as reliable alternative partners to Western consumers. Economic security at home The Gulf states view growing investments in critical minerals as vital for their long-term economic security and industrial success. To achieve their industrial ambitions in EVs and the batteries-manufacturing sector, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will require stable and uninterrupted access to critical minerals, notably lithium, as well as copper, nickel and rare-earth elements. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund has obtained major stakes in EV ventures – including creating Ceer, the first homegrown EV brand.

and acquiring majority ownership of United States-based EV manufacturer Lucid Motors – with an aim to produce 500,000 EVs annually by 2030. To support this, Saudi Arabia has designated the ‘King Salman Automotive Cluster’ at King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC) as the official automotive-manufacturing hub, where it intends to foster a full domestic EV value chain, having opened the first Lucid Motors international factory in KAEC in 2023. The UAE is establishing an EV assembly plant in Abu Dhabi in partnership with NWTN, and expects EVs to comprise half of vehicles in the country by 2050. Oman has signed a US$150 million investment deal to establish an EV- and battery-production hub in Duqm.

The United States Is Losing India

Sana Hashmi

In 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump stood alongside Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the “Howdy Modi” rally in Houston. The atmosphere was electric. Indian Americans cheered, and New Delhi appeared fully invested in the Trump presidency. Trump’s popularity in India eclipsed that of his successor Joe Biden and even Biden’s vice president, Kamala Harris, who is herself of Indian ancestry. Trump’s re-election in 2024 thus seemed like the beginning of a new, stronger chapter in India-U.S. relations.

That chapter is now closing fast. India is beginning to question the value of its strategic alignment with Washington. And the United States is handing it every reason to do so. On July 25, when U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar in Washington to discuss trade and critical minerals, New Delhi took notice. This was not the first time a high-level engagement with Pakistan had stirred unease in India. But the timing, messaging, and broader context made this moment impossible to ignore.

Why, many in New Delhi asked, would Washington deepen ties with a country that actively undermines India’s security, especially after decades of painstaking work to build India-U.S. relations? Worse still, Trump’s renewed talk of mediating between India and Pakistan, including on the Kashmir dispute, has reopened old wounds. India has long maintained that Kashmir and other sensitive issues must be handled bilaterally. Any interference, no matter how well-intentioned, is seen as a breach of sovereignty.

Trump’s talk of mediation thus sends a clear message to India that its core concerns are negotiable. If Washington is serious about deepening ties with India, such comments are at best a diplomatic misstep and at worst strategic self-sabotage on a grand scale. Pakistan’s sponsorship of cross-border terrorism is a direct national security threat for India Any United States administration that ignores this point is guilty of diplomatic negligence. India does not ask for unconditional alignment, only consistency and respect for its core interests from the United States.

How the Trump-Musk Feud Could Reshape Space Policy and Rein in SpaceX

Savar Suri and Robert Mason

President Donald Trump’s feud with Elon Musk might enhance US national security interests, and more specifically, Space Force policy, by removing Musk’s monopoly over SpaceX decision-making. Elon Musk, once Trump’s biggest ally who donated over $250 million to the President’s re-election campaign, is now publicly condemning him, primarily over the “Big Beautiful Bill.” Additionally, Musk is launching his own “America” political party, with a stated goal of unseating Republican lawmakers who voted for Trump’s bill. As a result of the feud, podcaster and former Trump advisor Steve Bannon has suggested nationalizing SpaceX and deporting Elon Musk.

SpaceX’s Power Extends Far Beyond Space Tourism SpaceX isn’t just a space tourism company that indulges Musk’s dreams of colonizing Mars. It has multibillion-dollar agreements with the US government and, in 2024, accounted for 95 percent of America’s space launches (through working with both NASA and private companies). Starlink, its satellite network, provides essential internet connectivity for a range of customers, including the Ukrainian military. Hospitals in Gaza use Starlink for online medical consultations. Almost two-thirds of all operational satellites today are controlled by SpaceX through the Starlink constellation.

Many Starlink satellites have now been adapted to form Starshield, which provides new military capabilities to the United States. However, SpaceX remains a private company, and Musk controls 79 percent of the voting rights. He can, and has reportedly, exploited his control of Starlink. In February, he denied claims that Starlink access was leveraged to get a US-Ukraine minerals deal across the line. In 2022, he refused Ukraine’s emergency request for Starlink access in Crimea. China has reportedly requested, via Russian intermediaries, that Musk not activate Starlink over Taiwan.

Meanwhile, violent extremists in the Sahel have reportedly been using Starlink devices, acquired through the black market, which allows them to evade detection and boost their operational effectiveness.Few competitors to Starlink exist, and the ones that do are not close to matching its capacity, speed, and efficiency. SpaceX isn’t slowing down either. They broke records for their launch frequency in 2024, and are scheduled to break them again in 2025. Musk’s monopoly on the industry seems unbreakable. Yet, decisions that could have such a profound impact on global security are not meant for civilian decision-makers in the private sector.

One Nation with Artificial Intelligence

Sam Raus

The rise of artificial intelligence is reshaping American life. Tools like ChatGPT and Grok are moving from novelty to necessity, as more people begin using them at work, in school, and at home. AI is speeding up productivity, unlocking new ideas, and changing how we function. This shift is not just technical. It is economic, cultural, and political. Like the arrival of electricity or the internet, AI could transform how the US grows and competes for centuries to come.

The Trump Administration Moves to Secure US Leadership Thankfully, the Trump administration realizes the pivotal moment we live in for this technology. After months of careful assessment, the president signed an extensive executive order aimed at ensuring America’s global dominance over AI development and deployment. Coinciding with the White House’s broader deregulatory and manufacturing goals, the order includes provisions to streamline the permitting process for data centers and prioritize AI skills in workforce development funding.

States Are Racing Ahead With Restrictive AI Laws State lawmakers from Sacramento to Albany are rushing to regulate AI technology in a panic. While the Trump administration seeks to unleash the growth of AI in America, thousands of state-level AI bills have been introduced in legislatures across the country, targeting cutting-edge frontier models like OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google’s Gemini with endless safety requirements and audits. The country faces a choice: a nationwide technological renaissance or a politicized battle between the states and Washington.

Much of this political anxiety comes from widespread fears about how AI might be misused or disrupt daily life. Already, the potential dangers of deep fake images spurred Congress to introduce the NO FAKES Act. Worries over so-called “misinformation” and job displacement continue. But while some concern is justified, quickly adopting such sweeping regulations risks shutting down innovation before it is fully understood. We should be fostering experimentation, not freezing progress. Overregulation Threatens Innovation and Open Source Development

Israel Is at a Strategic Dead End

Shai Feldman

Israel’s war in Gaza has reached a strategic dead end. In recent months, Israel has had phenomenal success in setting back Iran’s nuclear program by up to two years (with significant American help) and demolishing the threat posed by Hezbollah from Lebanon. By contrast, the results of Israel’s 22-month fight in Gaza are abysmal even by the stated objectives of the Israeli government. There are no signs of an imminent Hamas collapse; on the contrary, although the IDF is said to have gained control of 75 percent of Gaza’s territory, a recent INSS assessment asserts that half of Gaza’s population is currently concentrated in areas still controlled by Hamas.

The same assessment also asserts that Hamas continues to hijack “most” of the humanitarian aid entering Gaza. Moreover, the limited success that Israel has had so far in Gaza was associated with horrific death and destruction, with Palestinian casualties (estimated by Hamas’ Ministry of Health) reaching some 60,000 dead and at least that number wounded. The magnitude of the physical damage caused is also unimaginable, with entire towns such as Rafah and Khan Junis flattened, producing scenes reminiscent of Russia’s destruction of Chechnya.

By late July, numerous Western media channels reported deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Gaza, including considerable hunger. Finally, in separate reports, two Israeli human rights NGOs and David Grossman, one of Israel’s most gifted writers, have recently described Israel’s conduct in Gaza as genocide.The effect of these developments on Israel’s standing in international public opinion and the reaction of various governments to the changes in public mood—including in countries with long-standing records of supporting the Jewish state—has been devastating.

This is especially the case within the European Union, some of whose members have considered suspending Israel’s participation in its flagship Horizon Europe grant program, a key source of funding for scientific research and technological innovation. In addition, by the third week of July, a growing number of European governments, led by France, have threatened to recognize Palestinian statehood unilaterally and thus unconditionally. These developments have had two very serious negative implications for Israel’s confrontation with Hamas: First, Israel’s attempts to coerce Hamas to accept a ceasefire and hostage release deal on its terms by threatening to extract additional heavy costs from Gaza’s population have been ineffective.

Attack of the Drones

Marine Corps training schools are now familiarising Marines and small-unit leaders with the handling and tactical use of small drones. One training course run by the 1st Marine Division’s schoolhouse is building basic skills and tactical savvy that infantry forces will need using their drones against multiple threats in a ground fight. The Small UAS and Counter-SUAS Integration Course at Camp Pendleton focuses both on employing their unit’s portable Class 1 drones – including those bearing munitions – in the offensive attack and in neutralising enemy systems that could jam electronic signals, attack or surveil Marines’ positions.

The course teaches them how these systems, including counter-UAS or attack drones, and “first-person view” goggles or monitor systems, can support their units’ existing arsenal. By the end of this year, we’re going to have all kinds of tools for encountering small drones. What the students get here is a chance to get their hands on some of that equipment before it gets fielded,” said Lt. Col. Nick Freeman, Division Schools director and former infantry battalion commander. “We have it in small numbers, and then it’s going to expand by the end of this year.”

“By the end of this year, we are going to have thousands of small drones across all the operational units, and what’s great is that they don’t cost that much,” Freeman said. “We will be increasing the number of students here in this course, and we will be training them to fly these in much greater numbers.” About 400 students will do the SUAS/CSUAS Integration Course, which runs 10 training days, over six classes scheduled for 2025. The latest class ran June 2-13, and the next one begins July 21.

Through the course, students can get familiar with systems that might not yet be fully integrated into formal programs of instruction at operational units or formal schools. “This is the new model we’re constantly updating based off of where specific technology – but more importantly the techniques and tactics to integrate that technology – are going,” Freeman said. The instruction isn’t just about the drones and counter-drone systems but “how to integrate it with everything else and incorporate it into your overall tactical plan,” he said. By doing so, “they are not depending overly on any one piece of tech but are learning how to fight against an adaptive enemy.”

America’s Munitions Crisis Is Real

Mackenzie Eaglen

Key Point and Summary – After decades of neglect left its stockpiles “far too shallow,” the United States is undertaking a massive revitalization of its munitions industrial base. Spurred by the demands of supporting allies like Ukraine and Israel, Congress is pouring billions into the effort. New, modern factories for 155mm artillery shells are opening for the first time since World War II, and domestic production of critical materials like TNT, which ended in 1986, is being re-established. This foundational effort, backed by a new Pentagon “munitions war room,” aims to restock America’s military arsenals for an era of great power competition. America Is Building a New Ammo Plant for the First Time Since 1940

The United States Army’s ammunition boss told Congress he recently visited the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant in Independence, Missouri. He asked the team there, “When’s the last time we built anything new at Lake City?” President Harry S. Truman’s library shows a photo of then-Senator Truman with his fedora and trench coat putting a shovel in the ground when the last new facility opened in Lake City. Congress has been pouring money into the armed forces’ organic and defense industrial bases (the former is government-owned and the latter is contractor-led).

Those investments are starting to pay off. And still more is to come , thanks to the One Big Beautiful Bill Act for defense. As realization sinks in across the Defense Department that America’s military magazine depth is far too shallow, actions are underway to reverse course and increase the “health of the shelf” of the nation’s munitions production levels. Army leaders told Congress they’ve “invested $4.9 billion to build new [munitions] production lines and add new capacity and resiliency to our supply chains across the country.”

In parallel, the Army is “expanding and modernizing existing facilities to increase speed, flexibility and capacity.” The goal is to implement “21st-century production capabilities that can generate the ammunition stockpiles necessary to sustain our national defense” during a long war. As the US Army officially reached its goal of quadrupling production rates of 155 projectiles this past month, it has also sought to expand surge capacity by “moving shell production from a single facility to four separate facilities this year.” Just a few weeks ago, a new fully automated 155mm artillery shell production factory called UNION Technologies opened outside of Dallas.

The Marines now have an official drone-fighting handbook

Hope Hodge Seck

On the heels of fielding the military’s first attack drone team, the U.S. Marine Corps added another weapon to their drone-fighting arsenal: a 90-page handbook all about employing small, unmanned aerial systems against the enemy and integrating them into formations. The 1st Marine Division Schools’ Small UAS/Counter-small UAS Integration Handbook was published in June and approved for public release. It’s intended to support the 10-day sUAS/C-sUAS Integration Course recently launched at Camp Pendleton, which expects to see a throughput of about 400 students by the end of the year, according to a report from USNI News.

A foreword to the handbook is signed by Lt. Col. Nick Freeman, director of 1st Marine Division Schools, and co-signed by two first lieutenants leading the drone integration and signature management courses. It emphasizes that the handbook will be updated and rewritten often to keep up with evolving capabilities and practices.The book “is not a general reference on broader aspects of sUAS-related equipping, organisation, and training. Instead, it synthesizes lessons learned and best practices from across the 1st Marine Division and elsewhere to provide basic considerations and ‘how to.

“In doing so, this guide also develops and seeks to standardize common sUAS procedures for the infantry, fires, reconnaissance, and aviation units that will operate together with this capability.” The manual’s publication comes amid a clear shift in defense priorities to favor drone warfare and emphasize, in particular, proficiency with “first-person view” or “one-way attack” small drones designed to pack a lethal punch. In addition to the fielding of the Marine Corps’ Attack Drone Team, a small group of troops who will develop ways to employ these kinds of drones and integrate them into formations,

the Pentagon in July announced a slate of changes to drone acquisition designed to “establish UAS dominance” by 2027. The Marines’ new Attack Drone Team is tackling the challenge of turning drones into weapons. And they want to get more personnel in on the action By Hope Hodge Seck It’s a marked pivot from previous years, in which the services largely emphasized surveillance and logistics as the role of friendly, small drones in warfare and lacked a definitive approach to defending against hostile attack drones. In 2020, a small group of infantry Marines crowdsourced an unofficial standard operating procedure for camouflaging small units from drone surveillance, underscoring the ad-hoc nature of efforts to account for this threat.

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