Nikki Haley: To Counter China, Rebuild U.S.-India Relationship | Opinion

Nikki Haley and Bill Drexel

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In July 1982, President Ronald Reagan welcomed Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to a state dinner at the White House. Toasting the friendship between our "two proud, free peoples," he said: "although our countries may travel separate paths from time to time, our destination remains the same."

Four decades later, the U.S.-India relationship is at a troubling inflection point. To achieve the Trump administration's foreign policy goals—outcompeting China and achieving peace through strength—few objectives are more critical than getting U.S.-India relations back on track.

The last few weeks have seen an explosive series of events. The Trump administration has threatened India with 25 percent tariffs for purchasing Russian oil, on top of the 25 percent President Donald Trump already slapped on Indian goods. These developments followed months of rising tension, including over the U.S. role in India-Pakistan ceasefire negotiations.

Trump is right to target India's massive Russian oil purchases, which are helping to fund Vladimir Putin's brutal war against Ukraine. India has also traditionally been among the most protectionist economies in the world, with an average tariff rate more than five times the U.S. average in 2023.

But India must be treated like the prized free and democratic partner that it is—not an adversary like China, which has thus far avoided sanctions for its Russian oil purchases, despite being one of Moscow's largest customers. If that disparity does not demand a closer look at U.S.-India relations, the realities of hard power should. Scuttling 25 years of momentum with the only country that can serve as a counterweight to Chinese dominance in Asia would be a strategic disaster.

India-China Economic Ties: Determinants and Possibilities

Santosh Pai

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This program studies contemporary developments in India’s political economy, with a view towards understanding and informing India’s developmental choices. Scholars in the program analyze economic and regulatory policies, design and working of public institutions, interfaces between politics and the economy, and performance of key sectors of the economy such as finance and land.Learn More

This publication is part of Carnegie India's Practitioner Paper Series, which highlights the experiences of professionals from the world of politics, public administration, and business.

This paper examines the evolution of India-China economic ties from 2005 to 2025. It explores the impact of global events, bilateral political ties, and domestic policies on distinct spheres of the economic relationship. The analysis is structured around four individual components: trade; investments, both foreign direct investments (FDI) and foreign portfolio investments (FPI); public procurement, including engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) projects and goods; and the digital economy, covering venture capital investments and internet applications. Given the paradoxical nature of India-China ties, this paper analyzes the effectiveness of retaliatory measures taken by India in response to Chinese incursions in the Galwan Valley during May 2020. Lastly, it suggests potential opportunities to develop a more calibrated range of policy options to de-risk and rebalance India’s economic relationship with China.

Laying the Foundation

From Jihad to Jirga: How the TTP Is Rebranding Itself as Defender of the Pashtun Nation

Amira Jadoon, Saif Tahir, and Joey Moran

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In the first half of 2025, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed more than a thousand attacks, with over 300 attacks in July alone, as it intensified operations across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and southern Punjab, Pakistan. Yet beyond the rising body count, a more subtle evolution is underway. Once defined as a religious militant organization fighting to impose Islamic law or Shariah, the TTP now frames its struggle as a broader political and ethnic battle against the Pakistani state, deploying a coordinated a propaganda campaign to position itself as the guardian of the Pashtun nation, invoking tribal honor, civilian suffering, and ethnic identity.

The Narrative Shift: From Religious Vanguard to Tribal Guardian

The TTP emerged in 2007 from a coalition of militant factions in Pakistan’s tribal areas, combining a hardline Deobandi ideology with alliances to al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban. It rapidly became one of Pakistan’s most lethal insurgent groups. Framing its campaign as defensive jihad, the TTP embedded Islamist goals at the core of its insurgency, carrying out attacks against security forces, civilians, and minorities.

From 2014, however, sustained Pakistani military operations, U.S. drone strikes, and internal divisions severely weakened the group, reducing its attacks to a historic low by 2018. Beginning in 2019, signs of the TTP’s revival began to emerge through an increased attack tempo, merger announcements with other militant factions, and intensified propaganda. This slow revival accelerated into a violent resurgence post-2021, enabled by a more regionally permissive environment linked to the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan.

Historically, the TTP’s propaganda leaned heavily into religious justifications of its goals and operations, with the group’s founding charter in 2007 explicitly stating three central missions: enforcement of Shariah, establishing a unified front against U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, and conducting defensive jihad against Pakistani security forces. This religious militancy manifested in concrete actions, such as a 29-page fatwa issued against Pakistani media in 2014.

Iran’s Taliban Tightrope

Giorgio Cafiero, and Fatemeh Aman

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Russia’s formal recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in early July has stirred cautious optimism in Kabul, where Taliban officials hope it signals a shift in international attitudes, even as broader engagement remains unlikely. With the Islamic Emirate demonstrating a durable grip on power, that optimism may be well-founded.

Some non-Western states with close ties to Moscow may eventually follow Russia’s lead in recognizing the Taliban. Among them, Iran is an interesting case to consider. Given Tehran and Kabul’s overlapping interests, particularly in fighting certain extremist groups as common enemies, whether and when Iran might eventually follow suit in recognizing the Taliban is a question worth exploring.

It is reasonable to suggest that Russia’s recognition of the Taliban may increase the likelihood of Iran following suit. Yet, it is equally important to recognize the limits of the Iran-Russia relationship. Although Tehran and Moscow have grown closer—evidenced by Iranian drone support for Russia during the Ukraine war—it remains a partnership rooted in pragmatism rather than a formal alliance.

Iranian and Russian strategic interests do not always converge, and this divergence is particularly relevant when considering the question of Taliban recognition and geopolitical priorities. Russia’s decision to recognize the Taliban was driven by its own calculations regarding post-occupation Afghanistan. Should Iran choose to take a similar step, it would do so based on its unique national interests and geopolitical priorities.

Iran’s Uneasy Dance with the Taliban

The Real China Model

Dan Wang and Arthur Kroeber

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Adecade ago, planners in Beijing unveiled Made in China 2025, an ambitious scheme to take leadership of the industries of the future. The plan identified ten sectors for investment, including energy, semiconductors, industrial automation, and high-tech materials. It aimed to upgrade China’s manufacturing in these sectors and others, reduce the country’s dependence on imports and foreign firms, and improve the competitiveness of Chinese companies in global markets. The overarching goal was to transform China into a technological leader and turn China’s national champion firms into global ones. The government backed this vision with enormous financial support, spending one to two percent of GDP each year on direct and indirect subsidies, cheap credit, and tax breaks.

China has been wildly successful in these efforts. It not only leads the world in electric vehicles and clean technology power generation; it is also dominant in drones, industrial automation, and other electronics products. Its lock on rare-earth magnets produced a quick trade deal with U.S. President Donald Trump. Chinese firms are on track to master the more sophisticated technological goods produced by the United States, Europe, and other parts of Asia.

And yet China’s model still has many skeptics. Lavish funding, they point out, has led to waste and corruption. It has created industries in which dozens of competitors manufacture similar products and struggle to make a profit. The resulting deflation makes companies wary of hiring new staff or raising wages, leading to lower consumer confidence and weaker growth. China’s economy, which once looked poised to overtake the United States’ as the world’s biggest, is mired in a slowdown and may never match the American one in total output.

These problems are not trivial. But it is a serious error to think they are big enough to derail China’s technological momentum. Beijing’s industrial policy succeeded not simply because planners picked the right sectors and subsidized them. It worked because the state built out the deep infrastructure needed to become a resilient technological powerhouse. It created an innovation ecosystem centered on powerful electricity and digital networks, and it established a massive workforce with advanced manufacturing knowledge. Call it an all-of-the-above technology strategy. This approach has enabled China to develop new technologies and scale them up faster than any other country. Its model is unlikely to be pushed off course by sluggish economic growth or U.S. sanctions.

Why China’s Fear of Failure Will Keep It Behind in the AI Race

Derek Levine

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As China scrambles to catch up to Nvidia in the AI chip race, the United States must recognize the real reason it’s still ahead: not subsidies or sanctions, but a cultural embrace of failure as a stepping stone to innovation.

Nvidia just reached a market cap of about $5 trillion, cementing its role as the crown jewel of the AI revolution. Its GPUs power everything from ChatGPT-like models to autonomous vehicles and military applications. But behind Nvidia’s dominance is not just superior engineering; it’s a culture of risking-taking and learning from setbacks.

In contrast, China’s approach to innovation is often characterized as scaling existing technologies rather than fostering groundbreaking advancements. Despite massive government investments, China has not yet produced an AI chip that can rival Nvidia’s H100 or the newer B200. The gap is not due to a lack of talent or investment, but a deeply cultural aversion to failure.

In Chinese education, failure is frequently viewed as a source of shame, a concept known as “losing face” or mianzi. This cultural norm permeates classrooms, workplaces, and family life, discouraging the risk-taking necessary for true innovation.

Take Chinese schools, for example, Ms. Zhang, a high school teacher in Beijing, noted that there is a strong societal expectation that all students work diligently and perform well. Schools often rank students from 1 to 50. The top students sit in the front rows, while those deemed to be underperforming or unmotivated are relegated to the back. This seating arrangement publicly shames students, highlighting their perceived lack of work ethic and care. The embarrassment extends beyond the classroom, as students fear the consequences of their poor performance at home, where their failure could bring additional shame.

I also observed this firsthand during my time at Renmin University in Beijing. Students were often too intimidated to challenge their professors or question their statements. Even politely pointing out a mistake could result in public humiliation, as the student was seen as arrogant, disrespectful, and overstepping their role. In this system, professors are treated as near-infallible authorities, with their words regarded as unquestionable fact. This environment stifles critical thinking and discourages intellectual independence.

The Real China Model

Dan Wang and Arthur Kroeber

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Adecade ago, planners in Beijing unveiled Made in China 2025, an ambitious scheme to take leadership of the industries of the future. The plan identified ten sectors for investment, including energy, semiconductors, industrial automation, and high-tech materials. It aimed to upgrade China’s manufacturing in these sectors and others, reduce the country’s dependence on imports and foreign firms, and improve the competitiveness of Chinese companies in global markets. The overarching goal was to transform China into a technological leader and turn China’s national champion firms into global ones. The government backed this vision with enormous financial support, spending one to two percent of GDP each year on direct and indirect subsidies, cheap credit, and tax breaks.

China has been wildly successful in these efforts. It not only leads the world in electric vehicles and clean technology power generation; it is also dominant in drones, industrial automation, and other electronics products. Its lock on rare-earth magnets produced a quick trade deal with U.S. President Donald Trump. Chinese firms are on track to master the more sophisticated technological goods produced by the United States, Europe, and other parts of Asia.

And yet China’s model still has many skeptics. Lavish funding, they point out, has led to waste and corruption. It has created industries in which dozens of competitors manufacture similar products and struggle to make a profit. The resulting deflation makes companies wary of hiring new staff or raising wages, leading to lower consumer confidence and weaker growth. China’s economy, which once looked poised to overtake the United States’ as the world’s biggest, is mired in a slowdown and may never match the American one in total output.

These problems are not trivial. But it is a serious error to think they are big enough to derail China’s technological momentum. Beijing’s industrial policy succeeded not simply because planners picked the right sectors and subsidized them. It worked because the state built out the deep infrastructure needed to become a resilient technological powerhouse. It created an innovation ecosystem centered on powerful electricity and digital networks, and it established a massive workforce with advanced manufacturing knowledge. Call it an all-of-the-above technology strategy. This approach has enabled China to develop new technologies and scale them up faster than any other country. Its model is unlikely to be pushed off course by sluggish economic growth or U.S. sanctions.

Trump’s hidden goal in Alaska was to break the China-Russia axis

Brahma Chellaney

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The Alaska summit between President Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, was more than a high-stakes encounter over the Ukraine war. It signaled America’s recognition that its own missteps have helped drive Russia closer to China, fueling a de facto alliance that poses the gravest threat to U.S. global preeminence since the Cold War.

Washington’s miscalculations helped build the China-Russia partnership it now fears most.

In a world where the U.S., China and Russia are the three leading powers, the Alaska summit underscored Trump’s bid to redraw the great-power triangle before it hardens against America.

The president’s Alaska reset seeks to undo a policy that turned two natural rivals into close strategic collaborators, by prioritizing improved U.S.-Russia ties.

Trump’s signaling was unmistakable. In a Fox News interview immediately after the summit, he blasted his predecessor. “He [Biden] did something that was unthinkable,” Trump said. “He drove China and Russia together. That’s not good. If you are just a minor student of history, it’s the one thing you didn’t want to do.”

The remark captured the essence of America’s dilemma. Two powers that are historic rivals — one vast in land and resources, the other populous and expansionist — have been pushed into each other’s arms by Washington’s own punitive strategies.

For decades, the bedrock of U.S. grand strategy was to keep Moscow and Beijing apart. President Richard Nixon’s 1972 opening to Beijing was not about cozying up to Mao Zedong’s brutal regime, but about exploiting the Sino-Soviet split by coopting China in an informal alliance geared toward containing and rolling back Soviet influence and power.

That strategy helped the West win the Cold War, not militarily but geopolitically.

Beijing is speeding up plans to create systems it can monitor.

Zongyuan Zoe Liu

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The power to control access to money is no longer the exclusive privilege of the sovereign. Increasingly, the rules governing how money is created, moves, and is held are enforced not by governments alone but by code, online networks, and protocols beyond the authority of any single nation. The U.S. GENIUS Act—short for Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins—formalizes this transformation of money by creating a framework for regulated U.S. banks to issue dollar-backed stablecoins: digital tokens designed to reliably trade near their $1 par value because they are backed by real dollars or safe assets held in reserve.

These tokens can move instantly across the internet, often bypassing the traditional banking system and its know-your-customer rules. Many operate on decentralized blockchains where transactions are recorded on public ledgers maintained by distributed computer networks that span the globe—beyond the practical reach of any sovereign authority.

China, Smart Cities, and the Middle East

Howard J. Shatz, Lev Navarre Chao, Maggie Habib, Oluwatimilehin Sotubo

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The United States is engaged in a strategic competition with China over the nature of the global system, and the Middle East has emerged as a central site of great power competition: The United States, China, and Russia are all active there.

At the heart of this competition is technology. Middle Eastern countries have been developing strong technology links with China while maintaining their security and economic relations with the United States.

Smart cities present a valuable case study of this competition. A smart city is a city that addresses public issues with solutions based on information and communication technology–enabled use of large-scale data available from the Internet of Things.

China is involved in dozens of smart city projects in the Middle East. In that region, the need for improved urban environments is pressing. The region is well above the world average for percentage of population living in urban areas and for urban population growth.

Smart city infrastructure can be used to improve services, but it can also be used for population control, to limit public dissent, to violate privacy, and to strengthen authoritarian tendencies. This therefore makes smart cities a positive factor in improved services and greater connectivity but also a potential threat to civil society and personal and political freedom.

China’s involvement raises an additional issue: that of data security and the integrity of communications networks, especially those related to U.S. activities in the region. This paper addresses potential U.S. concerns related to these developments.

The US-China New Space Race Is Intensifying

Ryan Chan

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The space race between the United States and China is intensifying, with both countries conducting rocket activities in their contest for dominance outside Earth's atmosphere.

On August 12, the U.S. military carried out its first National Security Space Launch with a newly certified rocket. Three days later, China conducted the first static fire test of a new rocket intended for its manned lunar landing missions, which it plans to carry out before the end of the decade.

Why It Matters

Space, once seen as a peaceful domain, has again become part of the competition among great powers. The U.S. established the Space Force amid growing threats from Russia and China, which have been accused of militarizing space.

In addition to military developments in space, the U.S. and China are racing to be the first to return humans to the moon—a historic achievement that former NASA astronaut Colonel Terry Virts warned could determine whether the 21st century belongs to the U.S. or China.

What To Know

According to the U.S. Space Force, a Vulcan rocket launched from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida on its inaugural National Security Space Launch mission, delivering demonstrations and experiments, including a navigation satellite, into orbit for the Pentagon.

Rebuilding Combat Electromagnetic Warfare for U.S. Ground Forces

Conner Bender 

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From Ukraine to the South China Sea, the electromagnetic spectrum is no longer an ancillary support function. Russian forces in Ukraine deploy systems like Zhitel, Krasukha and Leer-3 to jam communications, spoof GPS, and locate command posts in near real time. These capabilities enable rapid precision fires and drone strikes within minutes. Meanwhile, the Chinese military has advanced electromagnetic capabilities that can detect, target, and disrupt U.S. and allied forces. Spectrum dominance is a shared priority among peer adversaries. Increasingly, these actors exploit the “gray zone” between peace and war, using electromagnetic effects to destabilize and disorient without provoking a full-scale response. Success hinges on integration across echelons and branches, where these systems are employed to shape the fight—not just in major combat but across the competition continuum.

U.S. or allied commanders preparing to fight in denied, degraded, and disrupted space operational environments (D3SOEs) should be alarmed by these prospects. As electronic sensors, autonomous systems, and digitally connected platforms proliferate across the battlefield, the spectrum is becoming congested, contested, and constrained. Overreliance on tactical radios and unencrypted GPS and other positioning, navigation, and timing satellite constellations introduces new vulnerabilities. The question is not whether electromagnetic warfare (EW) matters in the irregular fight, but whether U.S. ground forces are structured to employ it with precision, agility, and survivability. To succeed across the competition spectrum, the U.S. military must revitalize and modernize its tactical architecture for the electromagnetic spectrum.

To meet the challenges of modern irregular warfare, the U.S. Army must revitalize its electronic warfare capabilities through a modernized ‘CEWI 2.0’ concept: one that enables decentralized, forward-deployed EW teams to operate effectively across the competition continuum and in denied, degraded, and disrupted environments.

What Happened to Ground Combat EW?

Understanding Russia’s Endgame

CARL BILDT

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STOCKHOLM – Many gasped when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov landed in Anchorage, Alaska, for the Trump-Putin summit wearing a sweater with the letters CCCP – the Cyrillic acronym for the Soviet Union. Obviously, this was no accident. But what was Lavrov hoping to convey?

His intended message, presumably, was that today’s Russia is as great and powerful as the USSR once was; that Vladimir Putin has restored his country’s status as a superpower deserving of global respect. Nostalgia for the Cold War era – when the Soviet Union and the United States were the world’s only two superpowers – has consumed the Kremlin ever since the Soviet empire crumbled.

Lavrov himself is very much a creature of the past. Though he is fluent in the language of multilateral diplomacy (owing to a previous posting at the United Nations in New York), his penchant for bullying has distinct Soviet roots. He seems sincere in his belief that things were better when the USSR existed. His frequent trips to Pyongyang (North Korea) in recent years cannot have been enjoyable. When a summit with the US president on what was once Russian territory presented itself, he made sure to pack his old sweater.

The message will not have been well received in countries that were once locked behind the Iron Curtain. The Russian foreign minister has confirmed the worst fears of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians about Putin’s true endgame, as well as causing disquiet across the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. These countries remember the Soviet Union not as a splendid empire, but as a prison.

In fact, it was discontent among non-Russians that finally triggered the USSR’s collapse. As political repression eased following Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts to reform the decaying Soviet system in the 1980s, it became impossible to reconcile these nationalities’ aspirations with the Kremlin-centric system. The Soviet Union had to end for its peoples to be free.

Trump Keeps Defending Russia

Tom Nichols

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Donald Trump loves to speak extemporaneously, and usually, he makes very little sense. (Sharks? The Unabomber? What?) Trying to turn his ramblings into a coherent message is like trying, as an old European saying goes, to turn fish soup back into an aquarium. But he is the president of the United States and holds the codes to some 2,000 nuclear weapons. When he speaks, his statements are both policy and a peek into the worldview currently governing the planet’s sole superpower.

This morning, the commander in chief made clear that he does not understand the largest war in Europe, what started it, or why it continues. Worse, insofar as he does understand anything about Russia’s attempted conquest of Ukraine, he seems to have internalized old pro-Moscow talking points that even the Kremlin doesn’t bother with anymore.

The setting, as it so often is when Trump piles into a car with his thoughts and then goes full Thelma & Louise off a rhetorical cliff, was Fox & Friends. The Fox hosts, although predictably fawning, did their best to keep the president from the ledge, but when Trump pushes the accelerator, everyone goes along for the ride.

The subject, ostensibly, was Trump’s supposed diplomatic triumph at yesterday’s White House meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and seven European leaders. The Fox hosts, of course, congratulated Trump—for what, no one could say—but that is part of the drill. A Trump interview on conservative media is something like a liturgy, with its predictable chants, its call-and-response moments, and its paternosters. Trump ran through the usual items: The war was Joe Biden’s fault; the “Russia, Russia, Russia hoax”; the war never would have happened if Trump had been president. Unto ages of ages, amen.

But when the hosts asked specifically about making peace, the president of America sounded a lot like the president of Russia.

Europe has no real solutions on security guarantees for Ukraine

Chris Lunday, Jacopo Barigazzi and Dan Bloom

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Despite pressure from Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is clear his country will only agree to a peace deal with Russia if it's backed by iron-clad security guarantees.

Trump personally told Zelenskyy and European leaders during their Monday meeting that Ukraine will have “Article 5-like” NATO protections, but omitted any specifics.

On Tuesday, the "coalition of the willing" of Kyiv's allies tackled the issue, while U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is leading a commission with Ukrainian and European officials to hammer out security guarantees.

Planning teams are meeting "in the coming days to further strengthen plans to deliver robust security guarantees and prepare for the deployment of a reassurance force if the hostilities ended," said a Tuesday statement from U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

It's a massive problem — and one that Kyiv's allies have taken on numerous times over the last three years without ever coming up with an answer.

The most obvious solution — and the one that Kyiv really wants — is to allow Ukraine to join NATO, where it would be protected by the alliance's Article 5 common defense pact. But the United States (backed quietly by some European countries) has ruled that out.

Israel Defence Minister approves plan to conquer Gaza City

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While mediator Qatar had expressed guarded optimism over the latest proposal, a senior Israeli official said the government stood firm on its call for the release of all hostages in any agreement.

The framework that Hamas had approved proposes an initial 60-day truce, a staggered hostage release, the freeing of some Palestinian prisoners and provisions allowing for the entry of aid into Gaza.

Israel and Hamas have held on-and-off indirect negotiations throughout the war, resulting in two short truces during which Israeli hostages were released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.

The latest truce proposal came after Israel's security cabinet approved plans to conquer Gaza City, despite fears it will worsen the already catastrophic humanitarian crisis.

Qatar and Egypt, backed by the United States, have mediated the frequent rounds of shuttle diplomacy.

Qatar said the latest proposal was "almost identical" to an earlier version agreed by Israel, while Egypt said Monday (August 18, 2025) that "the ball is now in its (Israel's) court".

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has yet to publicly comment on the plan but said last week that his country would accept "an agreement in which all the hostages are released at once and according to our conditions for ending the war".

Senior Hamas official Mahmoud Mardawi said on social media that his group had "opened the door wide to the possibility of reaching an agreement, but the question remains whether Netanyahu will once again close it, as he has done in the past".

‘White gold’

Ukraine Exposes Russia’s AI-Powered Hacking: A Glimpse Into the Future of Cyber Conflict

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This summer, hackers linked to Russian intelligence introduced a disturbing new tactic in their cyber operations against Ukraine: phishing emails embedded with an artificial intelligence program. The malicious attachment, if installed, would automatically comb through victims’ computers, extract sensitive files, and send them back to Moscow.

According to technical reports released in July by Ukraine’s cybersecurity agencies and independent firms, this is the first known instance of Russian state-backed hackers deploying large language models (LLMs) — the same underlying technology behind popular chatbots — to build malicious code.

AI Becomes the New Weapon in Cyber Offense

The Russian campaign is part of a broader trend: hackers of all stripes — state actors, cybercriminals, and even researchers — are increasingly integrating AI into their operations. While LLMs remain imperfect and prone to errors, their speed and ability to process and generate code have made skilled hackers faster and more efficient.

Scammers and social engineers have been using AI to draft more convincing phishing emails since at least 2024. Now, the technology is moving beyond text manipulation to direct exploitation of vulnerabilities. Security experts warn that the field is entering what they call “the beginning of the beginning” of AI-driven cyberwarfare.

Cyber Defenders Fight Back With AI

Cybersecurity professionals are not sitting idle. Google’s security team, led by Heather Adkins, has used its Gemini LLM to identify overlooked vulnerabilities in widely used software before criminals could exploit them. Since 2024, the project has flagged at least 20 critical bugs, which were subsequently patched by vendors.

CrowdStrike, a global cybersecurity firm, also reports using AI to assist clients during breaches while monitoring increasing evidence of adversaries — from China, Russia, Iran, and criminal syndicates — deploying AI-driven tools to enhance their attacks.

Israel approves plan to conquer Gaza City, call up around 60,000 reservists

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Israel's defence minister on Wednesday approved plans to conquer Gaza city and call up around 60,000 reservists. The new plans come as international mediators are piling pressure on Israel to respond to a ceasefire deal that has been accepted by Hamas.

Israel's defence minister has approved a plan for the conquest of Gaza City and authorised the call-up of around 60,000 reservists to carry it out, his ministry confirmed on Wednesday.

Defence Minister Israel Katz's move, confirmed to AFP by a spokesperson, piled pressure on Hamas as mediators pushing for a ceasefire in the nearly two-year war in Gaza awaited an official Israeli response on their latest proposal.

While mediator Qatar had expressed guarded optimism over the latest proposal, a senior Israeli official said the government stood firm on its call for the release of all hostages in any agreement.

The framework that Hamas had approved proposes an initial 60-day truce, a staggered hostage release, the freeing of some Palestinian prisoners and provisions allowing for the entry of aid into Gaza.

Israel and Hamas have held on-and-off indirect negotiations throughout the war, resulting in two short truces during which Israeli hostages were released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.

The latest truce proposal came after Israel's security cabinet approved plans to conquer Gaza City, despite fears it will worsen the already catastrophic humanitarian crisis.

Qatar and Egypt, backed by the United States, have mediated the frequent rounds of shuttle diplomacy.

Qatar said the latest proposal was "almost identical" to an earlier version agreed by Israel, while Egypt said Monday that "the ball is now in its (Israel's) court".

Trump Has No Idea How to Do Diplomacy

Stephen M. Walt

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Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and US President Donald Trump walk through the Cross Hall to the East Room on their way to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders at the White House in Washington, DC, on August 18, 2025.Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and US President Donald Trump walk through the Cross Hall to the East Room on their way to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders at the White House in Washington.

The combination of that weird summit in Alaska with Vladimir Putin and the only slightly less bizarre gathering of NATO leaders in Washington, was the latest reminder that U.S. President Donald Trump is a terrible negotiator, a true master of the “art of the giveaway.” He doesn’t prepare, doesn’t have subordinates lay the groundwork beforehand, and arrives at each meeting not knowing what he wants or where his red lines are. He has no strategy and isn’t interested in the details, so he just wings it.

As we learned during his first term, when he wasted time on those irrelevant reality-show meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, all Trump really craves is attention, coupled with dramatic visuals that suggest he is in charge. The substance of any deal he might make is secondary if not irrelevant, which is why some of the trade agreements he’s recently announced are less favorable for the United States than he claims.

Translating Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific Theatre

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The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, originating with the Russian invasion in 2014 and escalating significantly following the full-scale invasion in February 2022, has exerted a profound influence on global security dynamics as well as on the future direction of war. While the likelihood of achieving a peaceful resolution by 2025 remains remote, the war has offered invaluable insights into contemporary warfare, specifically in the areas of advanced technological applications, strategies for deterrence, and the mobilisation of national resources.

Countries such as Japan, Taiwan and the United States have demonstrated a proactive approach by integrating lessons derived from Ukraine into their security policies and procurement strategies. In contrast, Australia’s National Defence Strategy (NDS) of 2024[1] and its implementation has demonstrated insufficient adaptation to these lessons, particularly in the areas of uncrewed systems, counter-UAV technologies and long-range strike.

This paper posits that most conceivable military scenarios in the Pacific involving Australia and its allies could benefit from the insights obtained from Ukraine. However, at the same time, these lessons must be contextualised given the distinct political, geographic and strategic characteristics of the Pacific theatre.

The document explores key trends in the Ukraine conflict, highlighting the unprecedented visibility provided by open-source sensors, social media platforms, and media access to battlefield operations. While this visibility has contributed to a broader understanding of the conflict’s trajectory and the employment of innovative technologies, the inherent ‘fog of war’ continues to obscure numerous aspects. It is anticipated that certain elements of this conflict may remain unknown or shrouded in ambiguity for years to come.

The paper concludes by presenting recommendations aimed at translating the lessons learned from Ukraine into strategies tailored to the Pacific context. By identifying the specific factors that differentiate the Pacific theatre from eastern Europe, it is argued that military institutions, including the Australian Defence Force (ADF), can more effectively adapt these lessons to enhance deterrence capabilities and the operational effectiveness of military forces amid escalating Chinese military activities—along with those of its Russian and North Korean partners—within the Pacific region.

What security guarantees for Ukraine would actually mean

Frank Gardner

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In the wake of this week's historic White House meetings, President Volodymyr Zelensky says Ukraine and its allies are "already working on the concrete content of the security guarantees".

Sir Keir Starmer has been chairing a virtual meeting of those nations prepared to help secure Ukraine after a peace deal - the so-called "coalition of the willing".

And Britain has dispatched its Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, to Washington to work out how the US can help. The cogs are clearly turning.

But what do "security guarantees" actually mean in practice?

There is a wide spectrum here, ranging from the much overused "boots on the ground" to the threat of crippling economic sanctions on Russia's oil exports.

Let's start with what Ukraine wants, and isn't going to get, at least not for the foreseeable future, and that's membership of Nato.

US President Donald Trump has ruled that out but there are plenty of other Nato members who also quietly oppose it, such as Slovakia, mainly on the grounds it would dramatically raise the chances of the transatlantic alliance getting dragged into a shooting war with Russia.

Clearly Ukraine will need strong security guarantees after a peace agreement is reached, to prevent Russia from coming back and taking a second, or third, bite.

This is why Sir Keir and President Emmanuel Macron of France have been putting together the 30-plus nation "coalition of the willing" with the aim of providing Ukraine with some international reassurance after a peace deal is signed.

Policing Ukraine's airspace is one likely option. This could be done by basing planes at existing airbases in neighbouring Poland or Romania, with US participation.

Critical Followership: Thinking, Failing, and Leading – Expanded Analysis

Siamak Naficy 

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Critical thinking is widely acknowledged as an essential skill for military leadership, yet its counterpart—critical followership—remains underexplored. Effective military operations depend not only on decisive leadership but also on subordinates capable of critical assessment, adaptation, and constructive feedback. And military leaders do not emerge in a vacuum; they are shaped by their experiences as subordinates.

Critical followership is the ability of subordinates to think independently while remaining aligned with organizational goals. It involves questioning assumptions, providing informed feedback, and executing orders with an awareness of their broader strategic implications. Unlike passive obedience, critical followership fosters adaptability and resilience, especially in dynamic operational environments.

Understanding that followership and leadership are roles within the broader framework of leadership itself is essential. The natural relationship between leaders and followers is shaped by self-concept, trust, and the ability to adapt to evolving missions. When followers engage in critical thinking and constructive dialogue, they contribute to mission success rather than merely complying with directives. This paper examines the role of critical followership within hierarchical military structures, emphasizing its importance in mission command and decentralized decision-making.

A comprehensive approach to developing a cyber mindset

Sonie Rathbun

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U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY, Colo. – The U.S. Air Force Academy integrates cyber concepts into its curriculum to ensure every cadet develops a cyber mindset before commissioning. This comprehensive approach prepares future military leaders to navigate a world where digital threats are as significant as physical ones.

“General Allvin’s (Chief of Staff of the Air Force) vision of reoptimizing for Great Power Competition is our guiding principle,” said Lt. Col. James Maher, acting department head of Computer and Cyber Sciences. “We are training the next generation of warrior-leaders to master the digital domain, integrating real-world cyber and artificial intelligence to ensure the Air Force and Space Force are ready for modern and future warfare challenges.”

Foundational knowledge and specialized pathways

The Academy starts building a cyber mindset with a mandatory course for all four-degree cadets called “Introduction to Computing and Cyber Operations,” which provides a baseline understanding of cyber risks.

This foundational class is key to developing a cyber mindset from the start. Cadets can then pursue more advanced courses and cyber-focused majors and minors.

“Every cadet, regardless of their major, must understand the fundamentals of cyberspace,” Maher said. “Our goal is not just to produce cyber operators, but to ensure that every Air Force and Space Force officer is equipped to operate in the cyber domain and include that domain in all military operations.”

Cadet 1st Class Emile Olivier, a cyber science major, emphasized the real-world connection.

“The cyber opportunities at the Academy are truly unique,” said Olivier. “From our classes to the hands-on experience in labs and operations centers, we can see a direct connection between our daily coursework, hands-on learning and national defense.”

Competitive advantage through cybersecurity: A board-level perspective

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Five leading cybersecurity executives and public company directors discuss how chief information security officers and boards can work together to grow and protect their organizations.

The era when cybersecurity was a separate, isolated function at organizations is over. Today’s threats, fueled by AI, require organizations to infuse “air to ground coverage”—from the boardroom down—across the institution. No one is more aware of these threats and the scale of the necessary response than an organization’s chief information security officer (CISO).

At a recent panel discussion, McKinsey and the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) gathered five top CISOs and board directors to discuss how cybersecurity is changing, how organizations must shift their approach, and how CISOs and directors are uniquely positioned to co-lead the effort to keep institutions safe while benefiting from new technologies.

Moderated by McKinsey alumnus Justin Greis, the panel included Katie Jenkins, CISO at Liberty Mutual; Marco Maiurano, CISO at First Citizens Bank; Matt Rogers, independent director for Exelon; Noopur Davis, chief product and information security officer for Comcast and board member at Regions Bank and Entrust; and Nora Denzel, an NACD director, lead independent director at AMD, and a board member at Gen Digital and Sony Group.

This Q&A has been edited for clarity and length.

Why the Defense Industrial Base Is So Hard to Fix

Daniel Bob

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Supply chain and raw material uncertainty as well as a declining workforce are at the root of America’s defense industrial base woes.

America’s ability to defend itself and deter conflict rests not only on the sophistication of its weapons systems, but on the capacity to produce and sustain them. For decades, the United States held a commanding lead in both military technology and the industrial might behind it. That edge is now eroding—not because of technological stagnation, but because of brittle supply chains, aging infrastructure, and growing dependence on foreign—sometimes adversarial—sources for critical materials and components.

The US defense industrial base—the layered network of manufacturers, foundries, suppliers, and skilled workers that builds our military—needs major improvements. Raw material costs are rising. Many contractors rely on sole-source suppliers. And nearly all are constrained by labor shortages and limited surge capacity. These weaknesses are emerging at a time of rising global tension, particularly amid intensifying strategic competition with China.

From a foreign policy and trade perspective, this trend is troubling. For too long, national security planning has underestimated the impact of economic leverage, production capacity, and supply chain control on shaping geopolitical power. As the boundaries between commerce and conflict continue to blur, industrial resilience must be understood as a core element of US strategy.

Successive US administrations prioritized efficiency in supply chains over redundancy, partly based on the assumption that global economic interdependence would outlast the political rivalry. However, China has methodically positioned itself to exploit strategic chokepoints, controlling over 70 percent of global rare earth processing and leading in the production of gallium, tungsten, and neodymium.