Indian Strategic Studies: 08/24/25

24 August 2025

Digital Aftershocks: Deepfakes in the Wake of the Pahalgam Attack in Kashmir

Tarun Agarwal

The terrorist attack in Pahalgam, India, on 22 April 2025 marked a tragic moment in the country’s history. The attack killed 26 people and responsibility was claimed by an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Toiba in Kashmir, The Resistance Front (TRF). As official ground-level investigations unfolded, a parallel conflict was already ensuing online. Messaging and social media platforms, particularly Telegram, WhatsApp, and X, saw an onslaught of AI photos, deep fake videos, and fake military transmissions about the attack within hours. The aftermath was not an eruption of grief or disinformation alone, but also the rapid creation of polarising storylines propagated by loosely networked ideological actors.

The use of synthetic media was judiciously calibrated, often ideology-driven, visually credible, and linguistically tailored to remain undetected. More than direct incitement to violence, much of the content operated in the grey zone: emotionally manipulative, story-wise polarising, and legally ambiguous.

These materials capitalised on platform vulnerabilities, weak content policies, such as the absence of mandatory labelling for AI-generated media, over-reliance on keyword-based moderation instead of context-aware detection, and the lack of crisis-specific protocols during terror events and the emotionally charged nature of digital publics. While some content was shared in regional languages like Hindi, Urdu, and Kashmiri, a significant portion of the deepfakes and fabricated narratives appeared in English, emotionally charged and platform-native in both form and tone. The multi-lingual strategy, coupled with the speed of circulation, resulted in the disinformation spreading quicker than verification. Much of this content was crafted to appeal to, and reinforce, violent extremist narratives spreading across both domestic and cross-border digital networks.

This Insight examines the nature and structure of the synthetic information flows after the Pahalgam attack. It examines how AI-generated content was leveraged to deepen communal and sectarian divides, amplify fringe ideological movements from Hindutva hardliners to pan-Islamist actors, and erode public trust in official institutions. In doing so, it situates the Pahalgam episode within a larger pattern: the convergence of emerging technologies and extremist propaganda, where disinformation serves simultaneously as a recruitment tool and a contested battleground.

Forging India-Taiwan Engagement: Theoretical Foundations, Policy Debates, and Pragmatic Pathways

Suyash Desai Harsh V. Pant

The 2024 Taiwan presidential elections marked a historic third consecutive win for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—the first time a party has achieved such a feat since the direct presidential elections began in 1996.[1] DPP’s presidential candidate, Lai Ching-te,[a] secured 40.1 percent of the popular vote in a three-party race, followed by Kuomintang’s (KMT) Hou Yu-ih, who secured 33.5 percent of the votes, and Taiwan’s People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je, who garnered 26.5 percent.[2]

The victory was tarnished by the split verdict in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, with the KMT, DPP, and TPP winning 52, 51, and eight seats, respectively. This fragmented outcome marks a new era of a divided government in Taiwan, with the ruling party for the first time in over 16 years not controlling the majority in the national parliament.

Therefore, while Lai Ching-te’s election indicates continuity on the most crucial policy issues, the joint opposition of the KMT and the TPP has increased partisan gridlock, slowing governance and policymaking.[3] The two blocs differ on multiple important issues, notably the “1992 Consensus”, an agreement between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT asserting that only one China exists.[4] Interpretations vary within Taiwan: the DPP rejects “the 1992 Consensus”, arguing it fails to consider the Taiwanese aspirations since it predates the island’s democratisation.[5] However, as scholars Hass, Glaser, and Bush wrote in a 2023 analysis, former President Tsai Ing-wen adopted a pragmatic, moderate stance—without explicitly endorsing “the 1992 Consensus”—due to domestic political constraints she faced in the past eight years.[6]

From his statements in the run-up to the presidential elections, and over one year into governance, President Lai appears poised to continue with Tsai’s pragmatic approach to cross-strait relations.[7] However, he has had a pro-independence reputation, with the latest instances in July and August 2023, when he clarified that Taiwan is not a part of the People’s Republic of China.[8] He maintained a similar line of thought in 2024 and 2025, as seen in his speeches.[b],[9]

Russia-India Relations: Multipolarity in Practice?

Dmitry Gorenburg Jeff Edmonds Julian Waller Jeff Kucik Decker Eveleth

Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, the relationship between Russia and India has been an area of increased research interest, reflecting growing concern with the global trend toward great power competition across multiple poles. This report examines this relationship by analyzing a variety of indicators of trends in political, military, and economic cooperation. We present shifts in these three relationship dimensions in light of both historical trends and the recent past. In doing so, we identify constraints and drivers of the relationship, then use an indicator-based method to make controlled comparisons across and within relationship dimensions.

Major categories for these indicators include the following:Political elements, such as policy coordination mechanisms, public diplomacy, and elite interactions

Military elements, such as military diplomacy, military cooperation, technical cooperation, exercises and training, coordination and information sharing, and basing and access

Economic elements, such as economic coordination, institutional linkages, cross-border trade, investments, loans, and engagement in strategic sectors, such as oil

Key findings

The Russia-India relationship has largely held steady in recent years, despite the stresses caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its subsequent orientation away from the West and further toward China. The direct effects of the Russia-Ukraine war have been uneven. India initially limited its political and military ties to Russia as it sought to maintain a relationship with Russia while avoiding alienating key Western partners. At the same time, India has consistently refused to adopt the Western position on the Russia-Ukraine war, instead issuing evenhanded calls for the end of hostilities. Over time, as Western unity in policy toward Russia began to fray, India became less concerned about Western perceptions and reactivated its relationships with Russia in these spheres.

The Real China Model

Dan Wang and Arthur Kroeber

Adecade ago, planners in Beijing unveiled Made in China 2025, an ambitious scheme to take leadership of the industries of the future. The plan identified ten sectors for investment, including energy, semiconductors, industrial automation, and high-tech materials. It aimed to upgrade China’s manufacturing in these sectors and others, reduce the country’s dependence on imports and foreign firms, and improve the competitiveness of Chinese companies in global markets. The overarching goal was to transform China into a technological leader and turn China’s national champion firms into global ones. The government backed this vision with enormous financial support, spending one to two percent of GDP each year on direct and indirect subsidies, cheap credit, and tax breaks.

China has been wildly successful in these efforts. It not only leads the world in electric vehicles and clean technology power generation; it is also dominant in drones, industrial automation, and other electronics products. Its lock on rare-earth magnets produced a quick trade deal with U.S. President Donald Trump. Chinese firms are on track to master the more sophisticated technological goods produced by the United States, Europe, and other parts of Asia.

And yet China’s model still has many skeptics. Lavish funding, they point out, has led to waste and corruption. It has created industries in which dozens of competitors manufacture similar products and struggle to make a profit. The resulting deflation makes companies wary of hiring new staff or raising wages, leading to lower consumer confidence and weaker growth. China’s economy, which once looked poised to overtake the United States’ as the world’s biggest, is mired in a slowdown and may never match the American one in total output.

These problems are not trivial. But it is a serious error to think they are big enough to derail China’s technological momentum. Beijing’s industrial policy succeeded not simply because planners picked the right sectors and subsidized them. It worked because the state built out the deep infrastructure needed to become a resilient technological powerhouse. It created an innovation ecosystem centered on powerful electricity and digital networks, and it established a massive workforce with advanced manufacturing knowledge. Call it an all-of-the-above technology strategy. This approach has enabled China to develop new technologies and scale them up faster than any other country. Its model is unlikely to be pushed off course by sluggish economic growth or U.S. sanctions.

Type 99A: China’s most advanced tank delivers firepower, agility and survivability

Seong Hyeon Choi

China is preparing for a military parade next month to celebrate the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II, with the People’s Liberation Army expected to showcase its latest line-up of land-based weapons systems.

One of the systems playing a crucial role in Chinese ground forces is the Type 99A main battle tank (MBT), which incorporates multiple advanced technologies to enhance survivability and firing capability.

While China continues to focus on modernising its navy and air force, the appearance of the Type 99A in the September 3 parade would underscore the importance in modern warfare of land-based systems, which have received renewed attention amid the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Development and design

Intended as a replacement for the second-generation Type 88 tanks, work on the Type 99 series, also known as ZTZ-99, began in 1989, with developer Norinco basing its design on the former Soviet Union’s T-72 chassis.

Since going into service in 2001, the Type 99 tanks have become China’s first mass-produced third-generation MBT, with around 1,300 units reportedly built. Like its Russian counterpart, the Type 99 series is equipped with a 125mm smoothbore gun.

In contrast to the Nato-standard 120mm guns commonly used in tanks such as the Leopard 2 and M1 Abrams, the Type 99’s 125mm calibre guns are seen mostly in countries formerly associated with the communist bloc during the Cold War.

America's Counterattack on China’s Growing Influence in the Pacific Islands

Wyatt Greco

An August 2025 joint statement between the United States and the Cook Islands announced cooperation on seabed mineral research, advancing the Trump administration’s intention to establish America as an international leader on deep-sea mining. This new collaboration counterattacks an expansive set of agreements between the Cook Islands and China revealed earlier in the year, which laid a foundation for Chinese involvement with lucrative resource deposits. US negotiations strike at China’s interests in the small country and should motivate American policymakers to continue the offensive to secure the West’s sphere of influence in the Pacific Islands.

China’s cooperation with the Cook Islands on seabed mining remains limited to exploration, but it builds Beijing’s reputation as an industry leader. In February, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two countries committed to the formation of a “Joint Committee of Marine Cooperation in Seabed Minerals Affairs” to manage the promised collaboration on research and technology sharing. The MOU was signed in conjunction with a larger comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) with Beijing, which covered topics ranging from infrastructure to the environment to educational scholarships.

America’s more recent joint statement confirmed a shared interest in partnering on seabed study. According to the press release, the United States and Cook Islands governments “are uniquely positioned to work together to ensure that the exploration and development of seabed mineral resources are guided by rigorous gold standard science and best practices.” While discussions on the specifics of the partnership are ongoing, the document implies a US willingness to devote “expertise in oceanic research and technology” to the “vast maritime natural resources” of the Cook Islands.

Iran’s Roads Not Taken

Vali Nasr

The 12-day war in June, which saw the United States join Israel in bombing Iran, was the culmination of four decades of mistrust, antipathy, and confrontation. Since its inception in 1979, the Islamic Republic has not wavered in its anti-Americanism, and the United States has unfailingly responded by exerting greater pressure on Iran. The two have come close to outright conflict before. In 1987 and 1988, the United States destroyed offshore oil platforms and Iranian naval vessels and then mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger plane. Iran interpreted those acts as the opening salvos of an undeclared war. Washington’s attention, however, soon

Iran’s Dangerous Desperation

Suzanne Maloney

SUZANNE MALONEY is Vice President of the Brookings Institution and Director of its Foreign Policy program. She served as an external adviser to the U.S. State Department’s Undersecretary for Political Affairs in the Obama administration and as a member of the U.S. Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff in the George W. Bush administration.

Rarely in modern history has a military offensive been as loudly and persistently foreshadowed as the June 2025 Israeli and American strikes on Iran’s nuclear program. For more than three decades, leaders in Tel Aviv and Washington have issued stark warnings about the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions and activities, and five American presidents have pledged to prevent Tehran from crossing the threshold of nuclear weapons capability.

Despite this forewarning and the signals of imminent preparations, Israel’s initial attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—capped by a brief but decisive U.S. intervention—still shocked Tehran and much of

Lessons in Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia’s Expulsion of Al-Qaeda in the Kingdom and Challenges Going Forward

Julian McBride

Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s numerous influential countries and a leading member state of the Arab League in terms of soft power. Nevertheless, the Kingdom has been enshrouded in controversy, particularly Islamic extremism.

In the early 2000s, against the backdrop of the September 11th Attacks and the Global War on Terror, Saudi Arabia became embroiled in deadly terrorism and massacres by al-Qaeda, which successfully infiltrated the Kingdom. Realizing an existential threat that not only killed hundreds of civilians but was a public relations nightmare, Riyadh needed to act decisively and combat the root of extremism within the Saudi Kingdom.

Then, in the spotlight due to extremist indoctrination, Riyadh put its foot down and clamped down on al-Qaeda inside the country in a major crackdown against extremism while simultaneously providing key programs and services to mitigate terrorism inside Saudi Arabia. Forcing al-Qaeda to merge with its sister branch in Yemen, the extremist organization no longer has a foothold in Saudi Arabia, yet it remains a formidable challenge to Riyadh’s regional security apparatus today.

Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia

In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, Osama Bin Laden, a former Saudi citizen, called for multiple branches of al-Qaeda to be created and expanded, including the Kingdom itself. Yusuf al-Ayeri would be the first leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia/the Land Between Two Mosques (AQBH).

AQBH’s goals included the deaths of Westerners and the expulsion of the US military from Saudi Arabia, the overthrow of the pro-Western royal family, and the establishment of an even more strict Islamic state in the Kingdom. Osama Bin Laden stated in prior manifestos that one of his justifications for his extremist activities was American troops stationed in the Kingdom during the Gulf War, instead of the royal family using his militiamen for defense.

Russian Concepts of Future Warfare Based on Lessons from the Ukraine War

Michael Petersen Paul Schwartz Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez

This report examines the evolution of Russian thinking about military strategy and conventional military operations after three years of conflict in Ukraine. It assesses Russian elite military thought on combined arms operations, naval surface warfare, and air dominance operations (including long-range precision strike). It probes the thinking of Russian military elites on how the country’s military strategy and operational concepts should evolve to address emerging changes in the character of armed conflict in anticipation of future wars.

The study begins with an analysis of Russian strategic thought, which forms the foundation for Russian warfighting concepts. It then discusses three main operational areas: combined arms operations, naval surface warfare, and air dominance operations. In each of these areas, the Russian military has encountered major unexpected challenges during the war, including the inability to wage effective combined arms offensives, maintain control of the Black Sea, and achieve air dominance. The study team drew primarily from leading Russian military journals, such as Voennaia Mysl’ (Military Thought), which are widely read by Russian political and military elites. We also consulted materials published by leading Russian think tanks and central newspapers providing expert coverage of Russian military affairs as well as Russian official doctrine.

Key findings

The report finds that despite significant technological advances, which in turn have led to major tactical changes in the character of armed conflict (especially widespread use of uncrewed systems), Russian strategic and operational thinking on conventional military operations remains largely unchanged from approaches adopted before the war. Instead, for most Russian military elites, the war appears to confirm prewar conclusions regarding the character of armed conflict, despite the unexpected setbacks incurred by Russian forces during the war. Consequently, Russian views on the character of armed conflict have evolved little since the war, and there are no signs of any fundamental shifts in Russian strategic concepts or operational doctrine.

Hacking and Firewalls Under Siege: Russia’s Cyber Industry During the War on Ukraine

Justin Sherman

Much of the Western analysis and commentary on Russian cyber threats since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have focused on state actors as well as some cybercriminal groups. However, another set of players has a key role in the Russian cyber ecosystem: private sector cybersecurity companies.

The Russian “cyber web” is complex, shifting, and often opaque, encompassing state-encouraged “patriotic hackers,” independent developers, and state-recruited cybercriminal groups, among many other actors. The state does not control every actor—it could not control every single actor, in all ways, at all moments even if it wanted to do so. Entrepreneurialism, competition, and innovation abound in the Russian cyber web, too. Nonetheless, the state can coerce any actor at a single time and can use incentives, procurement contracts, and other mechanisms to compel them to behave in different ways. In this vein, the Russian government can and does draw on a spectrum of actors to assist with offensive, defensive, educational, recruitment, and other objectives related to cyber. The Russian government can use nonstate cyber actors to augment state capabilities, acquire new talent or services for the state, add a veneer of deniability to intelligence operations, and much more. Furthermore, security agencies such as the Federal Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and military intelligence agency (GRU) have relationships with nonstate cyber actors that vary in structure and purpose over time.

Private cyber firms in Russia occupy an important role in this ecosystem. Although not every Russian cybersecurity firm is a government contractor, many firms provide services to the state. These services include supporting defensive operations, supplying defensive technologies, providing defense-oriented threat intelligence, identifying vulnerabilities to patch in Russian systems, offering open-source intelligence and reconnaissance services and technologies, identifying vulnerabilities for offensive operations, building exploits for offensive operations, assisting with offensive operations, cultivating talent, building propaganda-guided and national security– themed educational materials, and helping the security services recruit cyber talent. Some of these dynamics are not unique to Russia, such as a private company providing a state agency with firewalls. Other dynamics do stand out, such as the potential for the state to coerce a company or to carry out intelligence operations against dissidents or civilian critical infrastructure.

Report: Envisioning The Future Of Nuclear Security

Declan Penrose

Envisioning the Future of Nuclear Security, by BASIC Policy Fellow Declan Penrose, is the culmination of work started by BASIC’s Emerging Voices Network (EVN) in 2023, when foresight methodologies were first used to envisage multiple possible nuclear weapons futures during the launch of our “Desiloing Existential Threats II” policy cycle.

The aim of the The Emerging Voices Future of Nuclear Security report is to envisage multiple possible future scenarios and use them to develop robust policy recommendations. The report has been funded by a grant awarded to BASIC Policy Fellow Declan as part of his Horizon 2045 Nuclear Futures Fellowship.

The Nuclear Futures Fellowship is a joint initiative between the Ploughshares Fund and Horizon 2045. The fellowship was awarded to a small group of young leaders who want to build the adaptive leadership practices, tools, and relationships necessary to help the nuclear field progress peacefully in a constantly changing environment. It is an opportunity to learn new skills and, most crucially, a field-building exercise.

The fellowship included a grant to conduct a Capstone Project, where fellows could implement the foresight methodologies they had developed through the fellowship. For his Capstone Project, Declan aimed to conduct collaborative research with BASIC’s EVN network and engage with other early-career experts working for networks that specialise in various security domains, including climate, bio, and finance. It was an ambitious two-phase project that implemented several foresight tools to envisage the future of nuclear security.

Part of the project involved the creation of a systems map that visualises the key drivers of future nuclear security, as seen by the next generation of security experts. They were provided with a “scanning form” − circulated to many early career security networks − that asked them what are the things which they believed are the most important in terms of shaping the future of nuclear security in seven domains. They were then asked to name which drivers they deemed to be most important and why they are so significant. Their answers were converted into a systems map using the Kumu programme, compiled with expert guidance from consultant Chris Spedding, founder of Loop Works.

America’s Coming Crash Will Washington’s Debt Addiction Spark the Next Global Crisis?

Kenneth S. Rogoff

For much of the past quarter century, the rest of the world has looked in wonder at the United States’ ability to borrow its way out of trouble. Again and again, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the government has used debt more vigorously than almost any other country to fight wars, global recessions, pandemics, and financial crises. Even as U.S. public debt rapidly climbed from one plateau to the next—net debt is now nearing 100 percent of national income—creditors at home and abroad showed no signs of debt fatigue. For years after the 2008–9 global financial crisis, interest

By Land or by Sea Continental Power, Maritime Power, and the Fight for a New World Order

S. C. M. Paine

Great-power competition once again defines international relations. But the exact contours of today’s contest remain the subject of debate. Some observers emphasize ideological precedents from the Cold War. Others focus on changing military balances. Still others highlight leaders and their choices. In truth, modern conflicts over the international system flow from a long-standing, if unrecognized, disagreement over the sources of power and prosperity. The dispute originates from geography, and it has produced two antithetical global outlooks: one continental and the other maritime.

In the continental world, the currency of power is land. Most countries, by geography, inhabit a continental

The World Economy Was Already Broken

Wally Adeyemo and Joshua P. Zoffer

The world is undergoing a great economic reordering, the third such transformation in the past century. The United States has been at the helm of each one, shaping the global economy in ways that advance U.S. interests. But with each successive shift, Washington has exerted its influence more unilaterally and aggressively, pushing partners away and creating room for adversaries to fill the breach.

The first great reordering came at Bretton Woods, where, in the summer of 1944, the United States used its position of strength following World War II to compel the rest of the world to accept a centrally managed international economic order built around the dollar. Harry Dexter White, the U.S. Treasury official viewed by many as the system’s principal architect, believed an arrangement based on dollars and backed by gold at a fixed exchange rate would promote peace and prosperity through greater trade. Fixed currency parities would ensure global economic stability. Conveniently, this system would also make the United States the world’s economic center of gravity and prevent currency devaluations that could harm American exports. Bretton Woods was multilateral in nature, but it favored the United States.

U.S. President Richard Nixon forced a second reordering when he brought down the central pillar of the Bretton Woods monetary system: the dollar’s convertibility into gold. This time, there was no pretense of cooperation. During the weekend retreat at Camp David, in 1971, when Nixon’s team arrived at the decision to untether the dollar from gold, Treasury Secretary John Connally dismissed concerns that allies would be furious. “We’ll go broke getting their good will,” he chided Arthur Burns, the more internationally minded chair of the Federal Reserve. “So the other countries don’t like it. So what?”

Still, in the months after breaking the global monetary order, Nixon’s team shifted to a more internationalist position. George Shultz, who succeeded Connally as treasury secretary, talked tough in public but was the consummate diplomat behind the scenes. He worked closely with foreign counterparts to negotiate the removal of capital controls around the world, which he believed would further enhance American financial influence. The informal “Library Group” of finance ministers that Shultz convened in the White House library, in April 1973, eventually evolved into the G-7, a cornerstone of international economic diplomacy to this day.

After the Trade War

Michael B. G. Froman

The global trading system as we have known it is dead. The World Trade Organization has effectively ceased to function, as it fails to negotiate, monitor, or enforce member commitments. Fundamental principles such as “most favored nation” status, or MFN, which requires WTO members to treat one another equally except when they have negotiated free-trade agreements, are being jettisoned as Washington threatens or imposes tariffs ranging from ten to more than 50 percent on dozens of countries. Both the “America first” trade strategy and China’s analogous “dual circulation” and Made in China 2025 strategies reflect a flagrant disregard for any semblance of a rules-based system and a clear preference for a power-based system to take its place. Even if pieces of the old order manage to survive, the damage is done: there is no going back.

Many will celebrate the end of an era. Indeed, although U.S. President Donald Trump’s aggressive use of tariffs and disregard for past agreements have put the final nails in the coffin, the turn against global trade has been embraced by both Democrats and Republicans in Washington over the past several years. But before critics revel in the death of the rules-based trading system, they should consider the costs and tradeoffs that come with its dismantlement—and think carefully about the elements that should be rebuilt, even if in altered forms, to avert considerably worse outcomes for the United States and the global economy.

If Washington continues on its current course—defined by unilateralism, transactionalism, and mercantilism—the consequences will be grim, especially as Beijing continues on its own damaging course of subsidized excess capacity, predatory export policies, and economic coercion. The risk of the United States and China playing by their own rules, with power the only real constraint, is contagion: if the two largest economies in the world operate outside the rules-based system, other countries will increasingly do the same, leading to rising uncertainty, drags on productivity, and lower overall growth.

Yet clinging to the old system and pining for its restoration would be deluded and futile. Nostalgia is not a strategy; nor is hope. Looking beyond the existing structures does not mean simply accepting a Hobbesian state of nature. The challenge is to create a system of rules outside the rules-based system of old.

The New Economic Geography

Adam S. Posen

The post-American world economy has arrived. U.S. President Donald Trump’s radical shift in economic approach has already begun to change norms, behaviors, and institutions globally. Like a major earthquake, it has given rise to new features in the landscape and rendered many existing economic structures unusable. This event was a political choice, not an inevitable natural disaster. But the changes that it is driving are here to stay. No guardrails will automatically restore the previous status quo.

To understand these changes, many analysts and politicians focus on the degree to which supply chains and trade in manufactured goods are shifting between the United States and China. But that focus is too narrow. Asking whether the United States or China will remain central to the world’s economy—or looking primarily at trade balances—yields a dramatic underestimate of the scope and impact of Trump’s changed approach and how comprehensively the prior U.S. framework undergirded the economic decisions made by almost every state, financial institution, and company worldwide.

In essence, the global public goods that the United States provided after the end of World War II—among others, the ability to securely navigate the air and seas, the presumption that property is safe from expropriation, rules for international trade, and stable dollar assets in which to transact business and store money—can be thought of, in economic terms, as forms of insurance. The United States collected premiums from the countries that participated in the system it led in a variety of ways, including through its ability to set rules that made the U.S. economy the most attractive one to investors. In return, the societies that bought into the system were freed to expend much less effort on securing their economies against uncertainty, enabling them to pursue the commerce that helped them flourish.

The Weaponized World Economy

Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman

When Washington announced a “framework deal” with China in June, it marked a silent shifting of gears in the global political economy. This was not the beginning of U.S. President Donald Trump’s imagined epoch of “liberation” under unilateral American greatness or a return to the Biden administration’s dream of managed great-power rivalry. Instead, it was the true opening of the age of weaponized interdependence, in which the United States is discovering what it is like to have others do unto it as it has eagerly done unto others.

This new era will be shaped by weapons of economic and technological coercion—sanctions, supply chain attacks, and export measures—that repurpose the many points of control in the infrastructure that underpins the interdependent global economy. For over two decades, the United States has unilaterally weaponized these chokepoints in finance, information flows, and technology for strategic advantage. But market exchange has become hopelessly entangled with national security, and the United States must now defend its interests in a world in which other powers can leverage chokepoints of their own.

That is why the Trump administration had to make a deal with China. Administration officials now acknowledge that they made concessions on semiconductor export controls in return for China’s easing restrictions on rare-earth minerals that were crippling the United States’ auto industry. U.S. companies that provide chip design software, such as Synopsys and Cadence, can once again sell their technology in China. This concession will help the Chinese semiconductor industry wriggle out of the bind it found itself in when the Biden administration started limiting China’s ability to build advanced semiconductors. And the U.S. firm Nvidia can again sell H20 chips for training artificial intelligence to Chinese customers.

In a little-noticed speech in June, Secretary of State Marco Rubio hinted at the administration’s reasoning. China had “cornered the market” for rare earths, putting the United States and the world in a “crunch,” he said. The administration had come to realize “that our industrial capability is deeply dependent on a number of potential adversary nation-states, including China, who can hold it over our head,” shifting the “nature of geopolitics,” in “one of the great challenges of the new century.”

Trump Could End the Ukraine War, But America Might Not Like the Price

Doug Bandow

Key Points and Summary – While President Trump deserves credit for pursuing diplomacy to end the Ukraine war—a step his predecessor avoided—his strategy contains a grave risk to U.S. interests.

-In his pursuit of a historic peace deal, Trump has proposed offering Ukraine an “Article 5-like” security guarantee.

-This commitment, made outside of NATO, could obligate the U.S. military to defend Ukraine and create a direct tripwire for conflict with a nuclear-armed Russia.

-This move betrays the core principle of “America First” by sacrificing American security for a foreign entanglement.

How the Ukraine War Could End? We Might Have Some Clues

America matters. There could be no more dramatic lesson from the spectacle of seven European leaders—heads of government and state, the European Commission, and NATO—meeting with President Donald Trump, a man who they almost certainly privately despise.

Similar was the presence of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, dressing up to avoid a presidential dressing down like that incurred during his previous Oval Office visit.

Despite America’s really bad quarter century—the catastrophic Iraq debacle, mindless endless wars, squalid Biden incapacity, ongoing fiscal catastrophe, and unnatural Trumpian pageantry—the titans of Europe were inexorably drawn to the White House.

In the West, at least, there is still only one nation that really matters, irrespective of who leads its government. Countries which once ruled most of the earth remain but supplicants to an upstart country which began with a few disgruntled colonists transported to a distant new world. By begging for a Washington audience, the assorted grandees conceded their incapacity to run their own affairs, let alone much influence events beyond their own borders.

Space is the new battlefield with hijacked satellites and orbiting weapons

WASHINGTON (AP) — As Russia held its Victory Day parade this year, hackers backing the Kremlin hijacked an orbiting satellite that provides television service to Ukraine.

Instead of normal programing, Ukrainian viewers saw parade footage beamed in from Moscow: waves of tanks, soldiers and weaponry. The message was meant to intimidate and was an illustration that 21st-century war is waged not just on land, sea and air but also in cyberspace and the reaches of outer space.

Disabling a satellite could deal a devastating blow without one bullet, and it can be done by targeting the satellite’s security software or disrupting its ability to send or receive signals from Earth.

“If you can impede a satellite’s ability to communicate, you can cause a significant disruption,” said Tom Pace, CEO of NetRise, a cybersecurity firm focused on protecting supply chains.

“Think about GPS,” said Pace, who served in the Marines before working on cyber issues at the Department of Energy. “Imagine if a population lost that and the confusion it would cause.”

Satellites are the short-term challenge

More than 12,000 operating satellites now orbit the planet, playing a critical role not just in broadcast communications but also in military operations, navigation systems like GPS, intelligence gathering and economic supply chains. They are also key to early launch-detection efforts, which can warn of approaching missiles.

That makes them a significant national security vulnerability, and a prime target for anyone looking to undermine an adversary’s economy or military readiness — or deliver a psychological blow like the hackers supporting Russia did when they hijacked television signals to Ukraine.

Hackers typically look for the weakest link in the software or hardware that supports a satellite or controls its communications with Earth. The actual orbiting device may be secure, but if it’s running on outdated software, it can be easily exploited.

DeepSeek, Taiwan, and the Knights Who Say ‘Ni’

Harrison Schramm

Knight of Ni: Don't say that word.

King Arthur: What word?

Knight of Ni: I cannot tell, suffice to say is one of the words the Knights of Ni cannot hear.

King Arthur: How can we not say the word if you don't tell us what it is?

All Knights: Aaaaugh! Aaaugh! – Monty Python and the Holy Grail.

DeepSeek originally made it’s debut mid-January 2025[i] and sent shockwaves through the international Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Large Language Model (LLM) communities. We have observed reactions to DeepSeek ranging from ‘its garbage’ to ‘it is the end of AI in the Free World’. DeepSeek is on our minds today as a new release is expected soon, but is reported to be delayed as it is not trained on Huawei tech[ii].

This article began as a classroom exercise with my graduate students and is written from the perspective that in the current age, we are either being educated to be the masters of artificial intelligence, or we are being trained to become its’ servants[iii]. Later, it was suggested that I see if I could get DeepSeek to say ‘Taiwan is a Country’; thus launched the current project.

DeepSeek is made in China and like all tools reflects the values of the culture – but perhaps more specifically, the government – who made it. To be fair, “Accuracy” and “Bias” can be matters of opinion; it is the statistician’s job to try to convert these to matters of fact. I discovered a subculture of people who push DeepSeek to its limits by trying to get it to make specific statements. A popular challenge is the aforementioned “Taiwan is a Country”. The Guardian[iv] has a nice overview of all the ways that DeepSeek – like the Knights who say ‘Ni’ - will avoid saying it. In short (and I encourage you to try this at home) typing “Taiwan is a Country” into DeepSeek will reply with something like[v]:

In the 21st century, space is the new battlefield

David Klepper

As Russia held its Victory Day parade this year, hackers backing the Kremlin hijacked an orbiting satellite that provides television service to Ukraine.

Instead of normal programing, Ukrainian viewers saw parade footage beamed in from Moscow: waves of tanks, soldiers and weaponry. The message was meant to intimidate and was an illustration that 21st-century war is waged not just on land, sea and air but also in cyberspace and the reaches of outer space.

Disabling a satellite could deal a devastating blow without one bullet, and it can be done by targeting the satellite’s security software or disrupting its ability to send or receive signals from Earth.

“If you can impede a satellite’s ability to communicate, you can cause a significant disruption,” said Tom Pace, CEO of NetRise, a cybersecurity firm focused on protecting supply chains.

“Think about GPS,” said Pace, who served in the Marines before working on cyber issues at the Department of Energy. “Imagine if a population lost that and the confusion it would cause.”

Satellites are the short-term challenge

More than 12,000 operating satellites now orbit the planet, playing a critical role not just in broadcast communications but also in military operations, navigation systems like GPS, intelligence gathering and economic supply chains. They are also key to early launch-detection efforts, which can warn of approaching missiles.

That makes them a significant national security vulnerability, and a prime target for anyone looking to undermine an adversary’s economy or military readiness — or deliver a psychological blow like the hackers supporting Russia did when they hijacked television signals to Ukraine.

Good News and Bad News About Changed U.S. Military Drone Policy

Mike Jernigan

In a recent memorandum on the United States military drone program, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth wrote that he expects training “force-on-force drone wars” in 2026. Given its current capabilities, the United States in all probability would not be able to win a drone war with China: Its 20 models and hundreds of copies would be at a severe disadvantage against the People’s Republic of China’s millions. It is critical that the U.S. learn the lesson of the old proverb—“If the best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago, then the second-best time to plant a tree is today”—and improve its drone manufacturing base immediately.

Understanding, Deterring, and Preparing for a Great-Power War in the Twenty-First Century

Antulio J. Echevarria II, Larry P. Goodson, Brennan Deveraux

The US government and the US Army are unprepared for a great-power war. This integrated research project (IRP), sponsored by Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General James J. Mingus, is a critical first step in helping senior US Army leaders increase their knowledge of, and preparations for, deterring or fighting a great-power war in the twenty-first century. No one knows how long the US government and the US Army have to prepare for a future conflict. Consequently, the US Department of Defense faces difficult decisions as it balances preparing for a future war with maintaining readiness to address current challenges. The student research in this IRP only scratches the surface of what the US Department of Defense and the US Army should do to understand, deter, and prepare more effectively for the possibility of a great-power war in the twenty-first century. While the steps outlined here are preliminary, they are not tentative. Readers will find that each chapter offers concrete, actionable recommendations based on duly considered analysis. But more work lies ahead.

Army revamping hypervelocity cannon plan, eyeing new competitions

Ashley Roque

After the Navy ended work on BAE Systems’s Hypervelocity Projectile in 2021, the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) picked it up under the Multi-Domain Artillery Cannon System program — a 155mm self-propelled artillery system with the Hypervelocity Projectiles. The effort is in the process of being handed over to the Army where service officials are finalizing requirements and calling the weapon the Cannon-Based Air Defense initiative, according to Lt. Gen. Robert Rasch, who heads up the service’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO).

“It’s been an evolution,” Rasch told Breaking Defense during an Aug. 7 interview in Huntsville, Ala. Part of the process right now, he explained, is deciding just what to keep, what to sole source to companies and what parts to compete out.

“Some of it will absolutely be competed,” Rasch added. “We’re looking at each of the components that SCO has done. There’s a [155mm] cannon, there’s a radar, there’s a battle manager, there’s the resupply aspects … and [there’s] the projectile itself. Some of those technologies are more mature than others.”

While Rasch didn’t disclose just what components might be ripe for competition, he noted that in some cases, there may be sole source deals because that would “probably make sense,” but if there are multiple viable vendors it might make sense to “open it up to competition.”

What isn’t clear is if Rasch’s team plans to follow through with the late-2024 announcement of its intent to sole-source cannon and projectile work to BAE, or if that decision is now up in the air too as part of the ongoing requirements relook. However, he asserted that no contracts for the revamped effort have been awarded.

Several other aspects are under consideration too.

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