Euan Graham
For all the talk about the South China Sea’s complexity as a security issue, its geopolitical significance to China is simple: China wants to condition Southeast Asian states to subordinate status. Southeast Asian countries would do well to consider this when assessing Beijing’s motivations and behaviour.
I was in Singapore earlier this month to participate in the International Maritime Security Conference, organised by the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies. The conference was part of IMDEX Asia 2025, a biennial congregation of sailors and warships from around the region, hosted by Singapore’s navy. This edition included senior representatives from Australia, Britain, Canada, China, India, France, Japan, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, the United States, and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
It’s common for speakers at regional conferences to present the maritime environment in terms of complex, cross-cutting transnational security challenges, such as illegal fishing, critical seabed infrastructure, marine pollution, cyber, climate, autonomy, energy exploration and others. (The list expands continually.)
The importance of cooperation and adherence to international law remains a staple theme of such gatherings. Yet advocates of regional maritime cooperation struggle to name new initiatives. The widely referenced Malacca Strait Patrol, for example, is two decades old. It is also telling that the lexicon of power and competition has gradually crept back into session titles. Phrases such as ‘geopolitical implications’ and ‘armed conflict’ were an uncommon sight at maritime conference agendas 15 years ago. This is no longer the case.
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