Edwin Lyman
Since the successive Israeli and US air strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites in June, much of the fevered and highly politicized public debate has focused on whether the attacks have “obliterated” Tehran’s capability to build nuclear weapons or only set it back a few months or years. But one critical point continues to be largely and inexplicably overlooked: Iran’s stockpile of over 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU)—enriched to 60 percent uranium 235—is weapon usable.
This means that Iran’s HEU—which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in June as being unaccounted for following Israel’s initial air strikes and which may have been moved to secure locations before the attacks—could be used directly to make bombs without requiring further enrichment.
If Iran still has access to some of its HEU stockpile, then direct use of that material may suddenly appear to its leaders as the most attractive and fastest pathway to a bomb, especially if its ability to enrich uranium has indeed been significantly degraded. There may be other chokepoints along the road to weaponization, but access to bomb material would not be one of them.
Right now, whether Iran’s HEU stockpile survived the attacks is a major conundrum for Israel and the Trump administration. There is no plausible military option for destroying or seizing it without being able to pinpoint its location—which by now could be anywhere in Iran, and possibly spread over several sites. The most effective way for the international community to gain full confidence that the HEU has not been diverted for weapons use is therefore through a diplomatic agreement in which Israel and the United States would forswear further attacks, and Iran would provide the IAEA with all the information and access it needs to fully account for the fate of the stockpile and quickly reestablish an enduring verification regime.
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