The Right Division for the Fight: Force Design and Force Structure Lessons from the Cold War

Max J. Meinert 

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The US Army is undergoing a significant transformation. The Army of 2030 is conceptualized as a force optimized for new challenges and characterized by new capabilities. The multidomain operations operational concept shifts the service away from the contingency operations of Iraq and Afghanistan and toward large-scale combat operations. But an even more fundamental change, spanning and interacting with the full range of transformation—from technological to operational—is one of force design and structure. The Army is moving from the brigade-centric model adopted for the post-9/11 wars to a division-centric one. But what should those divisions actually look like?

While today’s operational environment presents different challenges, the Army has made similar adjustments before. During the Cold War, Army structure and design reflected a pendulum of national security policies and priorities. The Army oscillated between heavy, nuclear-capable forces to defeat Soviet armor in the Fulda Gap and light, rapidly deployable forces for contingencies along the periphery. As we shape the Army of tomorrow, it is important to reflect on the lessons of history.

Force design refers to the composition of a particular unit. Force structure refers to the number and type of units in the Army. The two have an interdependent relationship. Both are critically important to success on the battlefield and are constrained by budget and available manpower. For example, during World War II the Army designed smaller divisions so it could field the large force structure of eighty-nine divisions. Since then, an array of complex factors, both external and internal, combined to require the Army to adapt. A successful force design assigns commanders at echelon sufficient combat power to flexibly task organize within their span of control to conduct combined arms maneuver and defeat an adversary in combat.