Declassified documents reveal scope of Defense Department’s cyber strategy

The Pentagon has declassified several confidential documents that reveal a lack of authority in Cyber Command that experts say may hamper the nascent cyber force.
By Jack Detsch, Staff writer January 22, 2016
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2016/0122/Declassified-documents-reveal-scope-of-Defense-Department-s-cyber-strategy?cmpid=ema:nws:Weekly%2520Newsletter%2520%2801-23-2016%29&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20160123_Newsletter:%20Weekender&utm_term=Weekend_Best_of_Web

More than two dozen declassified Pentagon documents revealed details about the role of Cyber Command, the Defense Department's still-forming unit tasked with defending the country's digital domain.
Though initially established to consolidate the military's digital operations, Cyber Command does not serve as a full-scale Defense Department command. Positioned under the wing of US Strategic Command, tasked with minding the US military’s nuclear arsenal, Cyber Command appears to have little authority to execute its mission without oversight from other command units.
In fact, several experts who have reviewed the documents say Cyber Command's lower rank compared to other units such as Central Command, which oversees operations in the Middle East, could actually undermine the country's ability to confront growing threats in cyberspace.
Recommended: Podcast: Intel's Chris Young on why the US needs a Cyber National Guard
"[Cyber Command] has far too many layers of bureaucracy and management to ever truly leverage cyber capabilities effectively," said Robert M. Lee, chief executive officer Dragos Security, and a former US Air Force cyber officer. “If you go look in the org chart, there’s about 16 layers between the actual person doing the operation and any given level of improvement."
Specifically, Mr. Lee said Cyber Command relies too heavily on the National Security Agency. Its director, Adm. Michael Rogers, also leads Cyber Command.

"Everything that Cyber Command wants to be able to do right now, a significant portion of it is enabled by the operations that the NSA does," said Lee, adding that Cyber Command depends upon the NSA for most of its intelligence collection. "The direct tie creates a culture where Cyber Command can ultimately underperform."
Since its formation in 2010, Cyber Command has faced numerous setbacks. It fell far short of its goal to recruit 6,000 people by 2016, adding just 1,000 information security experts from a base of 2,000 by last spring. In the Defense Department's budget for fiscal year 2016, Cyber Command's budget fell by 7 percent, from $509 million to $463 million. That budget is dwarfed by even the smallest US military service – the Marines – given just over $25 billion to conduct their operations last year.

Stranger Than Truth: NSA Is Pro Strong Encryption, FBI Is Not

NSA Chief Stakes Out Pro-Encryption Position, in Contrast to FBI
Jenna McLaughlin, The Intercept, January 21, 2016
National Security Agency Director Adm. Mike Rogers said Thursday that “encryption is foundational to the future,” and arguing about it is a waste of time.
Speaking to the Atlantic Council, a Washington, D.C., think tank, Rogers stressed that the cybersecurity battles the U.S. is destined to fight call for more widespread use of encryption, not less. “What you saw at OPM, you’re going to see a whole lot more of,” he said, referring to the massive hack of the Office of Personnel Management involving the personal data about 20 million people who have gotten background checks.
“So spending time arguing about ‘hey, encryption is bad and we ought to do away with it’ … that’s a waste of time to me,” he said, shaking his head.
“So what we’ve got to ask ourselves is, with that foundation, what’s the best way for us to deal with it? And how do we meet those very legitimate concerns from multiple perspectives?”
Other government officials — most notably FBI Director James Comey — have been crusading for a way that law enforcement can get access to encrypted data.

But technologists pretty much universally agree that creating some sort of special third-party access would weaken encryption to the point that it would threaten every internet transaction we make, from online banking to filling out our health records to emailing our friends and significant others. A hole in encryption for special FBI access would be a hole that criminals could sneak through, too.
While there’s been a lot of talk about giving up some privacy for security, Rogers said both are paramount.
“Concerns about privacy have never been higher. Trying to get all those things right, to realize that — it isn’t about one or the other,” he said. He does not think that “security is the imperative and that ought to drive everything.” Nor should privacy, he continued. “We’ve got to meet these two imperatives. We’ve got some challenging times ahead of us, folks.”

Australia's cyberwar defences 'badly lagging': ADFA

One of Australia's leading military scholars has called for a 'rapid catch-up' in the nation's cyber defence capability.
By Stilgherrian for The Full Tilt | January 20, 2016
Imagine if Australia's banking and finance systems were suddenly shut down, just as happened in Estonia in 2007. Simultaneously, key communications satellites are destroyed, and our island nation's handful of key undersea fibre optic cables are cut.
Electricity grids are shut down too, like the US did in Yugoslavia in 1999. False data is inserted into some military systems, while others are disabled in an attack like the one against Saudi Aramco in 2012 that disabled 30,000 computers. More malware, apparently planted well in advance, causes further disruption, from opening floodgates on dams to interfering with logistics systems.
Nothing in that scenario is novel. Only the combination is new. It's just one potential scenario canvassed at an international conference on cybersecurity held in Canberra in November.
But even though such scenarios have been hypothesised for years, Australia is "badly lagging" in its preparation for such a medium intensity cyber-enabled war, according to a new report by Professor Greg Austin.
"As of 1 January 2016, Australia had not embraced the idea of 'information dominance' (largely a cyber space strategy), preferring a less enthusiastic embrace of the revolution in military affairs [RMA] by having a doctrine on 'information activities' shaped largely on the old-fashioned concept of political influencing through propaganda, psychological operations, or disinformation," Austin writes.
"Australia has also been reluctant to acknowledge the US doctrine of 'prompt global strike', a cyber-enabled military strategy."
Meanwhile, and to pick just one example, China is surging ahead.
"In September 2014, [Chinese President] Xi told the country it needed a new cyber military strategy. In December 2014, the government introduced new regulations for cybersecurity intended to help promote the rapid growth of China's domestic cybersecurity industry. In May 2015, the country issued a new Military Strategy in which the government declared for the first time in such a document the idea that 'Outer space and cyber space have become new commanding heights in strategic competition among all parties'," Austin writes.

Sponsor Content Expert Q: Mapping a New Strategy for Boots on the Ground

http://www.defenseone.com/sponsored/2016/01/expert-q-mapping-new-strategy-boots-ground/125075/?oref=NL

January 12, 2016 DRS Technologies
How the very nature of the U.S. ground force game is changing.
Brought to you by DRS Technologies
A resurgent Russia, a chaotic Middle East, the rise of ISIS and global terror — these are just a few of the threats that the U.S. military is up against when it comes to potential conflict, war, and boots on the ground operations.
And now, a new report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) says that the military needs to do more to adopt a mindset of agility if it wants to win in wars of the future.
“Modern war is changing for our military leaders and troops,” says Paul Scharre, the report’s author and a Senior Fellow at CNAS. “It requires a level of agility, which means that your troops can adapt to changing events, understand the strategic ramifications of their actions, and be best equipped with the right tools for each mission.”
To better understand how the U.S. military’s ground game is changing, Scharre explained some of the biggest challenges still ahead for troops.
Q: What has modern ground warfare looked like, and where is it headed?
We went through a long period where our troops played a role in large scale counterinsurgencies both in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the end of these two long wars, the ground forces are moving from sustained large-scale counterinsurgencies and preparing for future conflicts. And, the shape of that future is far from certain.
There are a number of evolving security threats worth watching, including a resurgent Russia, a chaotic Middle East, a rising China. Any number of conflicts could involve U.S. ground troops, potentially in large numbers and for operations that could be far different from the counterinsurgency wars.

Q: So how has the ground force strategy changed?
There has really been a technology shift, a democratization of information technology that now connects and empowers civilian populations. Civilians have access to things like smartphones which mean real-time information at their fingertips. In the future, U.S. ground forces will probably be in an environment where their location is known and where every action is reported. So the ground force strategy has to change and must be mindful of important ways in which the operating environment is changing.
There is increasingly a momentum for human interactions, the democratization of war, and increasing lethality in ground combat. Even in a conventional war against a nation state with an organized military, engaging in the human element of war — the spread of information — will still be important to ending the conflict. It’s about winning the minds of people. The social and human dynamics of war still matter today even if warfare has grown in complexity and risk.

Marine Commandant Announces New Promotion, Cyber Warfare Opportunities

http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/01/19/marine-commandant-announces-promotion-cyber-warfare-opportunity.html
Jan 19, 2016 | by Hope Hodge Seck
A new directive from Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Robert Neller announces dramatic changes to the service set to take place by the end of next year.
Neller, who took command of the Corps in September, released a 13-page "fragmentation order" Tuesday that builds on guidance set forth by his predecessor, Gen. Joseph Dunford, but also includes a handful of brand-new initiatives. Among these: a process that will offer more promotion looks for lance corporals and corporals, the installation of company-level unit fitness instructors to create stronger Marines, and an expansion of Marine Corps cyber, electronic warfare and information operations career fields.
In his FRAGO, titled "advance to contact," Neller said the order builds on feedback he has received from Marines, sailors and support staff across the fleet. While not formally at war, Neller said, the Marine Corps finds itself facing a high operational tempo and constant global threats not consistent with an interwar period. The Corps, he said, must stay ready and become more modern while continuing a host of ongoing operations.
"This will require pragmatic institutional choices and a clear-eyed vision of where we intend to be in 10-20 years," Neller wrote. 

 

Structure changes and promotions

The commandant promised to carry on Dunford's work of reviewing total Marine Corps force structure, setting a fall 2017 deadline to complete a comprehensive review that emphasizes the Marine air-ground task force, air elements, logistics, and support units to ensure that the service has the right number of jobs and proper rank structure in each field to take on future challenges. Neller said the Corps would make structure changes as necessary to meet the requirements of the future force, and suggested the service would be willing to pare down some units significantly in order to become more modern and capable.
"We will be willing to accept risk in the size and organization of our units in order to create the capabilities we need for the future," he wrote.

US Interests In Eastern Mediterranean: Geopolitics Trump Control Of Energy Resources – Analysis

http://www.eurasiareview.com/19012016-us-interests-in-eastern-mediterranean-geopolitics-trump-control-of-energy-resources-analysis/

Levant Basin in Eastern Mediterranean. 

By JTW January 19, 2016 

By Matthew Bryza*

The United States has important national interests at stake in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is the region where the U.S.’ two most serious national security threats converge – ISIS and a revanchist Russia. It is also where two of Washington’s most important allies, Turkey and Israel, once enjoyed a strategic partnership, which may now be rising again after collapsing 5 years ago. Additionally, while four decades of political conflict in Cyprus have aggravated tensions between NATO members Greece and Turkey and obstructed military cooperation between NATO and the EU, Cyprus settlement talks may be approaching a breakthrough. Finally, two of the world’s largest natural gas discoveries in the past 15 years are located in the Eastern Mediterranean: the Leviathan field in Israel and the Zohr field in Egypt.

While many observers worry that Turkey’s shooting down of the Russian air force fighter on November 24 threatens to engulf the region in a war between Russia and NATO, in reality, Russia’s response has been restrained. Moscow’s sanctions against Ankara have been relatively mild, while President Putin has never termed Turkey’s action an “act of war,” calling it, instead, a “stab in the back” and a “hostile action.” Futher, despite crude language accusing Ankara of doing Washington’s bidding, President Putin received U.S. Secretary of State Kerry on December 15 in search of cooperation on Syria issues.

President Putin knows his case against Turkey is weak. Ankara repeatedly warned Moscow to stop its violations against both Turkish airspace and its bombing of ethnic Turkomen in northern Syria. The Russian President realizes he cannot object too much to Ankara’s claimed right to protect these ethnic Turks who found themselves on the Syrian side of the border after the Ottoman Empire collapsed, lest he risk undermining his own justification for invading eastern Ukraine and annexing Crimea, namely, to protect Ukraine’s Russian minority.

A Framework for Developing Military Strategists

https://www.infinityjournal.com/article/157/A_Framework_for_Developing_Military_Strategists/

Francis Park, 

Article 2 | Volume 5, Issue 1

Read Digital Edition Download PDF

Frankly, I am troubled when I observe aparently competent officers who apply the tools of our trade inappropriately in operational situations, or who fail to scrutinize rather basic but critical assumptions underlying our plans, or who substitute program guidance in situations which clearly demand military judgment.

General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (1979-1983)[i]

The topic of identifying strategic thinkers in the ranks has been a topic of no small interest as the United States emerges from its longest period of combat operations in over a century. One catalyst for the inquiries on strategic thinkers and how to make them has been hindsight from errors of strategy and campaigning in Afghanistan and Iraq. Another has been the difficulties that military leaders experienced attempting to reconcile strategy with the policy goals set out for the military instrument of national power. One observation that emerged from those conflicts is that a singular focus on tactics is simply not enough to achieve more than localized success in engagements and battles. Conflict termination, on the other hand, highlighted the broader role of the military instrument of national power at the strategic level, where success in combat operations is only a transition to establishing a more stable set of conditions after combat nominally ends.

Strategists who are trained, educated, and experienced in the competencies of thinking, visualizing, and acting at the strategic level are an important part of the conduct of military strategy in both operational and institutional settings. Those military strategists provide a capability for their organizations and nations that officers trained in tactical methods alone cannot provide. The U.S. Army has formally designated officers by career field for such duties, but those officers do not command organizations as a matter of institutional policy.[ii] Thus, its future commanders will also need development as strategists, even if not to the same degree as their staff officer counterparts. This article offers a framework for preparing commanders and staff officers over a career for duties roles in military strategy and its related disciplines and tasks, using the U.S. Army’s experience as a case study.

Why Military Strategists?

The efforts to create military strategists have included empowering generalists to conduct strategy duties, and creating a body of general staff officers dedicated to the conduct of strategy and its related disciplines. The literature that has guided those efforts has been largely constant since the mid-1990s.

Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. Army has had an additional skill identifier (coded “6Z” in its personnel system) to recognize military officers of any basic branch or specialty who were “qualified for high-level staff positions requiring an understanding of the international environment and the ability to analyze strategic problems.”[iii] Several programs conferred that identifier, but the pressures of maintaining proficiency in traditional military skills in a limited career timeline eroded the expertise that it connoted—making the credential effectively unequal to the task. One of the attempts to address the capability shortfalls of military strategists in public debate remains relevant today.

An assessment of Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces

http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2016/01/an-assessment-of-indian-and-pakistani-nuclear-forces/

by Pranay Kotasthane — January 6, 2016 

The possibility of a nuclear flashpoint between India and Pakistan appears in virtually every discussion on international relations in the Indian subcontinent. In recent times, the thunder has been stolen by Pakistan’s claim that it has developed tactical nukes to counter India’s conventional force advantage. This has in turn triggered discussions on whether the current Indian nuclear doctrine is credible enough to deter Pakistan.

While we try to figure out responses to the nuclear challenge, it would make sense to look at the current levels of India and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. The compilation by Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is of great help in this regard. This article visualises and explains the data presented in their articles Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015 andIndian nuclear forces, 2015.

The first data point is the amount of fissionable material available with both countries.

Figure 1: Stockpile of fissionable materials with India and Pakistan

While Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme relies largely on highly enriched uranium, India’s nuclear arsenal depends on weapons grade plutonium. This difference in approach is because India opted for a three-stage nuclear fuel cycle, which produces plutonium-239, otherwise naturally absent, as one of the outputs.

Though the aggregate fissionable material available with Pakistan looks much larger than that of India, the difference in the number of nuclear weapons is not necessarily proportional, as Figure 2 shows.

Figure 2: Number of nuclear weapons with India and Pakistan

The current nuclear weapon stockpiles closely match each other. This is because considerably lessplutonium in comparison to uranium, is required to make a simple fission weapon.

Moreover, as Kristensen and Norris remind us, “how much plutonium or uranium is needed for a nuclear warhead depends on many variables, but three are particularly important: warhead design, desired yield, and the technical capabilities of the scientists and engineers.”

Compare these numbers with the number of nuclear weapons that US and Russia have — 7100 and 7700 respectively. This comparison immediately clarifies why the word Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) does not apply to the India—Pakistan conflict. Rather, the deterrence relationship is better explained by the metaphor Mutually Unacceptable Damage (MUD).

What is the nature of the nuclear weapons of both states?

Capability and intent are two factors that determine the level of deterrence. Capability is further determined by factor such as nature of nuclear warhead delivery systems and the geographical reach of nuclear delivery systems. How do India and Pakistan compare on these fronts?

Gravity bombs delivered by air squadrons constitute a large chunk of nuclear weapons delivery systems of both states. Though this method of delivery gives the two states a range of up to 2000 kilometres, the effectiveness is dampened by the fact that ground forces of the adversary can easily target such aircrafts.

Land based ballistic missiles are the most preferred delivery system by both states. Pakistan has also nuclear tipped cruise missiles while India’s BrahMos cruise missiles do not have any reported nuclear capabilities. Cruise Missiles suffer from shorter ranges and smaller payloads when compared to their ballistic counterparts. India is also in the process of developing sea based ballistic missile systems.

Figure 3: Delivery system types of India and Pakistan

Another factor for assessing the capability of nuclear deterrence is the range of nuclear weapons. Figure 4 shows the classification of nuclear delivery systems according to their ranges.

Pakistan having an India focused nuclear deterrence, has not invested in systems with a range greater than 3000km. At the same time, it has invested in short-range, small-yield weapons, which it prefers to market as ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons.

India on the other hand has a nuclear deterrence that focuses on both Pakistan and China. Hence, India has invested on delivery systems with ranges higher than 3000km.

In summary, the nuclear capabilities of both states have not reached maturity. They are still evolving, though in different directions. India’s perspective has been that any nuclear exchange will result in horrendous consequences to both countries, and the eventuality that Pakistan may suffer much more damage than India will, is no consolation. Considering that any such nuclear exchange will be a big dent in India’s larger growth narrative, it has been India’s approach to keep pushing its nuclear threshold higher.

On the other hand, Pakistan is attempting to push its nuclear threshold down through the threat of employing low-yield nuclear weapons.

Figure 4: Delivery systems classified by rangess

Pranay Kotasthane heads the geostrategy programme at the Takshashila Institution.

The road from Pathankot

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/m-k-narayanan-on-indiapakistan-relations-the-road-from-pathankot/article8135754.ece?homepage=true

M. K. NARAYANAN

The Pakistani deep state’s complicity in the Pathankot attack established, ‘yo-yo diplomacy’ will yield no tangible outcomes for India. The government must focus on building military capacity along the border and wait it out before returning to a step-by-step normalisation process

Weeks after a fidayeen attack on the Pathankot airbase, several key questions are yet to be answered. Among these are: if indeed there was good intelligence, why was the airbase so poorly guarded, and the intelligence not acted upon? How does one explain the gaping holes in the security architecture of a military installation situated so close to the border? Why was there no unified command and control once the attack commenced?

Also, when the Indian and Pakistani National Security Advisers (NSAs) met in Bangkok, did they, or did they not, envisage the possibility of a terror attack to try and disrupt the Foreign Secretary-level talks? If they did, what were the contingency plans in place? The biggest question of all, however, is over what Pathankot presages. Is there a message that the Pakistani deep state is sending to the Indian interlocutors? Has the Indian side missed this, or are they still deciphering it?

Pattern too familiar

The pattern — first, the announcement of holding talks; next, the collapse of the initiative; and third, renewal of the initiative after an interregnum — has been all too frequent not to realise that there is more to it than mere caprice. Nawaz Sharif’s presence at Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s swearing-in ceremony in May 2014 and subsequent developments were expected to break this cycle. Hopes were dashed when the Foreign Secretary-level talks were called off in August.

Between November 2014, when the two Prime Ministers shook hands at the closing ceremony of the SAARC summit in Kathmandu, and their meeting on the sidelines of the Climate Change Conference in Paris a year later in November 2015, there were two ‘false starts’. The latest round commenced with a meeting of the two NSAs in Bangkok. The visit of External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj, to Islamabad followed. The next step was Mr. Modi “dropping in” in Lahore to wish Mr. Sharif on his birthday — all in the same month. Prospects seemed bright, till the Pathankot incident occurred.

Globalization for the little guy

Digitization has opened the door for emerging economies, small businesses, and individuals to participate directly in globalization.January 2016

More than 20,000 independent designers and artists showcase their work on Pinkoi, a Taiwan-based online marketplace. The company has connected with customers in more than 47 countries, using Facebook to expand its reach throughout the Asia–Pacific region.

The Estonian start-up coModule has created technology that brings the Internet of Things to electric bikes and scooters. The prototype was unveiled in Barcelona, seed funding came from Germany, and components are sourced in China. The company is scaling up production and eyeing user markets across Europe and Asia.

Dr. Chibuzo Anaso has developed an app that helps diabetes patients take charge of their condition. As the product took off in his home market of South Africa, patients in Nigeria and Kenya learned about it through Facebook and Twitter—and today two-thirds of its subscribers come from across the broader African continent and the Middle East.

Globalization was once driven almost exclusively by the world’s governments, large multinational corporations, and major financial institutions. But now—thanks to digital platforms with global reach—artisans, entrepreneurs, app developers, freelancers, small businesses, and even individuals can participate directly. New research from the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) uses novel data to analyze the extent of the connections and their economic impact.

The biggest of these online platforms have grown to a scale never before seen (Exhibit 1), and their users are increasingly international. Individuals from Canada to Cameroon can forge their own global connections, whether for business, personal ties, entertainment, education, or simple curiosity about the world beyond their own borders. MGI analysis of international ties on Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and WeChat shows that some 900 million people have at least one international connection on social-media platforms (even adjusting for overlap between their users). More than 12 percent of Facebook friendships are between people living in different countries, and half of active Facebook users have at least one cross-border friend—a threefold increase from 2014.

Exhibit 1

Enlarge

Furthermore, MGI finds that social media plays an increasingly important role in connecting people in emerging economies to the developed world, thereby opening new opportunities for work, learning, and personal connections. The share of Facebook users with cross-border friendships is higher in emerging countries than in developed ones (54 versus 44 percent)—and it is growing rapidly, having posted a 3.6 times increase from 2014.

The return of the Naxals

http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/mumbai/news/the-return-of-the-naxals/article8132726.ece?homepage=true?w=homemumbai

January 21, 2016 , SHARAD VYAS

Maoist extremists have brought in units of Company-10, trained to kill with precision; 37 people are known to be on their hit list.

Contrary to the Maharashtra government’s recent claim that left-wing extremism is on the wane, the State faces a rejuvenated red cadre that has vowed to eliminate 37 senior police officers and informants in 2016.

The latest hit list has been issued by Naxals in response to the State’s lucrative surrender policy, which, the government claims, has taken off in a big way resulting in a substantial drop in violence.

But the latest data show that this claim could be exaggerated. Intelligence inputs have revealed that to execute the hit list, the extremists have brought in several units of Company-10 from Chhattisgarh, each with a strength of 30 men trained to kill with precision.

“This (the latest hit list) is a matter of serious concern for the State, even as inputs show new strategies are being adopted to attract youth with fresh vigour,” an intelligence note in the possession of The Hindu reads.

Counter-strategy

As part of the Naxal revival policy, documents recovered recently by Gadchiroli Police show that plans are afoot to win the surrendered cadre back to the Maoist fold or eliminate them.

The counter-strategy was launched by the CPI-Maoist’s Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC) in villages around Gadchiroli where most of the surrendered cadre lives. Dandakaranya stretches over 92,000 sq km across five States — Chhattisgarh, Telangana, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Andhra Pradesh. — and is a significant holding area for Maoists.

“Left wing extremists adopted a similar strategy in 2009-2010 in Bastar and now, cornered by police action and a spate of surrenders, the outfit is desperate to retain its hold in the red bastion,” reads an intelligence report of the Anti-Naxal Operation Unit of Maharashtra Police.

The State government has claimed that thanks to its latest policy – a Rs 5 lakh cash reward and rehabilitation – as many as 51 extremists surrendered in 2015. Violence, too, has ebbed, the government claims. However, there is another side to the story.

In 2015, 18 tribal informants were killed, and 15 murders connected to red extremism were reported as against 14 the previous year, 66 policemen injured as opposed to 43 in 2014, 18 civilians were killed as opposed to six the previous year. Naxals also killed 10 police informants in 2015 as opposed to 8 in 2014. Data also show only two extremists were killed in 2015 as against 13 the previous year. Property worth Rs 1.76 crore was destroyed in 2015 as against Rs 1.49 cr the previous year. Two policemen were killed in 2015, while the number was 11 the previous year. This spate of violence and destruction took place despite the government making the Special Director General (Nagpur) accountable for protecting surrendered Maoists under the new surrender policy.

Senior officials told The Hindu that a minor drop in violence could be attributed to the joint operations carried out in 2015. Another internal note revealed that surrenders were on account of various factors in addition to the state policy, such as ‘health problems, love affairs, internal rifts, sexual exploitation,’ because of which ‘guns were dropped’. Before the new policy came into effect, 40 extremists had surrendered in 2014, and 48 in 2013, showing there has not been a substantial decrease in either violence or number of persons surrendering since the new policy was introduced in end-2014.

Maharashtra first launched a Naxal surrender policy on August 29, 2005, and has claimed that 502 extremists have given up arms in the last 10 years since then in violence-hit regions.

“The 2015 scenario indicates that the government’s new approach has ensured a retreat of Maoists and advancement of our forces. But we must move with caution,” a senior official said.

India’s Changing Geopolitical Environment : A lecture by Shiv Shankar Menon

http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=pers&nid=15321

Updated:Jan 20, 2016 

Society for Policy Studies in collaboration with India Habitat Centre held a lecture in Changing Asia Series 

Speaker: Shiv Shankar Menon, former National Security Adviser

Date: January 20, 2016, Venue: India Habitat Centre, New Delhi 

Commander Uday Bhaskar,

Shri Rakesh Kakkar, Director IHC,

Ladies and Gentlemen.

Why did we choose this topic? Because things are changing in a fundamental way around us. And they affect our chance to transform India into a modern developed country in which each Indian could achieve their full potential. So I thought I should speak about those changes and how we might respond to them, using them to promote our national interests.

Let us first consider the changes that we see around us in our immediate neighbourhood, the Indian sub-continent, then at our extended neighbourhood, east and west, and finally at the world order as a whole.

I. The Indian sub-continent

The first decade and a bit of this century were probably thebest decade in the subcontinent’s history in terms of economic growth, democratisation, connectivity and intra-regional cooperation — with one major exception, Pakistan, and, possibly, the Maldives whose future is unclear at present. For all the other countries in the sub-continent from Afghanistan to Myanmar this has been a period of unprecedented and sustained economic growth, of growing connectivity with each other, of settling internal conflicts and democratisation, and of cooperative relations with India. This is true of Sri Lanka (with the end of the civil war, restoration of democratic norms), Nepal, (where the 12 year insurgency ended, Maoists mainstreamed and democracy brought in), Bangladesh (which is coming to a reckoning with its past, fighting extremism, growing faster than ever,and working closely with India), Bhutan (which was ahead of the curve in driving change herself), Afghanistan (compared to an abysmal earlier condition), and Myanmar (where predictions of doom have been belied). This is not to say that all their problems have been solved. Each of us, India included, has major internal political issues and is in need of structural adjustment of their economies to cope with the new global and regional economic situation. But overall, the base has been laid, if we choose to build upon it, to continue progress towards integrating the subcontinent, building connectivity and habits of cooperation and making the institutions we established in this period, like SAFTA, the South Asia University, and others, work much better.

The exception, as I said, is Pakistan, not just because she is on the cusp between West and South Asia, and suffers the ailments of both, but as a matter of conscious choice by the Pakistani establishment of the kind of state and society they are building, of their instruments, such as political Islam and jehadi tanzeems and terrorists, and of the calculated use of tension in their relationship with their immediate neighbours, India, Afghanistan and Iran. Pakistan today exhibits many of the same features as are causing turmoil in West Asia — weak state structures, religion in politics and over politics, building nationalism on ancient or manufactured animosities, sectarian violence, an outsized military (in terms of its political role, its claim on national resources, and relative to the real security threats the country faces), a lack of popular participation and belief in the political system, weak economic prospects, and so on. At the same time Pakistan is trying to tap into the economic vitality and consolidation of East Asia, led by China. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, from Gwadar port through the Karakoram mountains to Xinjiang is one such an attempt. But it needs the promise of a specially raised division of the Pakistan Army to defend it and those who try to build it.

*** ‘The EU Is on the Verge of Collapse’—An Interview George Soros and Gregor Peter Schmitz

George Soros and Gregor Peter Schmitz

February 11, 2016 Issue

The following is a revised version of an interview between George Soros and Gregor Peter Schmitz of the German magazine WirtschaftsWoche.

Gregor Peter Schmitz: When Time put German Chancellor Angela Merkel on its cover, it called her the “Chancellor of the Free World.” Do you think that is justified?

George Soros: Yes. As you know, I have been critical of the chancellor in the past and I remain very critical of her austerity policy. But after Russian President Vladimir Putin attacked Ukraine, she became the leader of the European Union and therefore, indirectly, of the Free World. Until then, she was a gifted politician who could read the mood of the public and cater to it. But in resisting Russian aggression, she became a leader who stuck her neck out in opposition to prevailing opinion.

She was perhaps even more farsighted when she recognized that the migration crisis had the potential to destroy the European Union, first by causing a breakdown of the Schengen system of open borders and, eventually, by undermining the common market. She took a bold initiative to change the attitude of the public. Unfortunately, the plan was not properly prepared. The crisis is far from resolved and her leadership position—not only in Europe but also in Germany and even in her own party—is under attack.

Schmitz: Merkel used to be very cautious and deliberate. People could trust her. But in the migration crisis, she acted impulsively and took a big risk. Her leadership style has changed and that makes people nervous.

Soros: That’s true, but I welcome the change. There is plenty to be nervous about. As she correctly predicted, the EU is on the verge of collapse. The Greek crisis taught the European authorities the art of muddling through one crisis after another. This practice is popularly known as kicking the can down the road, although it would be more accurate to describe it as kicking a ball uphill so that it keeps rolling back down. The EU now is confronted with not one but five or six crises at the same time.

Schmitz: To be specific, are you referring to Greece, Russia, Ukraine, the coming British referendum, and the migration crisis?

Soros: Yes. And you haven’t even mentioned the root cause of the migration crisis: the conflict in Syria. Nor have you mentioned the unfortunate effect that the terrorist attacks in Paris and elsewhere have had on European public opinion.

Merkel correctly foresaw the potential of the migration crisis to destroy the European Union. What was a prediction has become the reality. The European Union badly needs fixing. This is a fact but it is not irreversible. And the people who can stop Merkel’s dire prediction from coming true are actually the German people. I think the Germans, under the leadership of Merkel, have achieved a position of hegemony. But they achieved it very cheaply. Normally hegemons have to look out not only for their own interests, but also for the interests of those who are under their protection. Now it’s time for Germans to decide: Do they want to accept the responsibilities and the liabilities involved in being the dominant power in Europe?

Schmitz: Would you say that Merkel’s leadership in the refugee crisis is different from her leadership in the euro crisis? Do you think she’s more willing to become a benevolent hegemon?

Soros: That would be asking too much. I have no reason to change my critical views on her leadership in the euro crisis. Europe could have used the kind of leadership she is showing now much earlier. It is unfortunate that when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in 2008, she was not willing to allow the rescue of the European banking system to be guaranteed on a Europe-wide basis because she felt that the prevailing German public opinion would be opposed to it. If she had tried to change public opinion instead of following it, the tragedy of the European Union could have been avoided.

The stunning scope of the world’s refugee crisis, in charts

http://www.vox.com/2015/12/30/10684672/in-2015-one-of-122-persons-worldwide-was-a-refugee

Updated by Javier Zarracina on December 30, 2015, 

One out of every 122 people alive today is someone who, at some point, was forced to leave his or her home. If you totaled up all these people, they would have a greater population than all of South Africa — nearly as many people who live in all of the United Kingdom.

This is the stunning scope of the world's refugee crisis, which the United Nations expects will leave at least 60 million people displaced by the end of 2015. This is the highest level of displacement that the international body has ever recorded.

The global refugee total at this time last year was 19.5 million. By mid-2015, it passed 20 million.

The world doesn't just have a refugee crisis. It also has a displacement crisis.

The refugee crisis has commandeered headlines, especially in the United States, with dozens of governors declaring in November they would not allow Syrian refugees to settle in their states.

But the refugee crisis doesn't tell the entire story of displacement. There are even more internally displaced people living in the world right now: those forced out of their homes, but still in their home countries. The ranks of the internally displaced grew by 2 million in 2015, to hit 34 million in the middle of the year. Asylum applications also went up 78 percent.

There is no one common backstory to explain why displacement has surged in 2015. Instead, there are numerous, international conflicts that, collectively, began to fuel an epidemic. Vox's Max Fisher and Amanda Taub recently captured the issue well:

There's no single reason, because a number of the crises driving people from their homes are not connected. There's no real link, for example, between the war in Afghanistan and the persecution of the Rohingya minority in Myanmar, or between violence in Nigeria and violence in Honduras and El Salvador.

Not All Is Sunshine Inside the Afghan Taliban

Afghanistan: Taliban Troubled By Failure And Factionalism

strategypage.com, January 21, 2016

It has been a disappointing year for the Taliban. I n early 2015 the Taliban undertook a major military effort against the Afghan security forces now that that foreign troops were no longer doing any of the fighting. That role ended in late 2014. As a result the 350,000 personnel of the Afghan security forces (170,000 troops and 180,000 police) have suffered 27 percent more casualties in 2015 compared to 2014. Taliban losses have also been very high, but they have lower recruiting standards and can offer drugs as well as money for those young tribesmen willing to take a chance during the “fighting season” (the annual warm weather period between the time crops are planted and harvested). Going off to try and gain some glory and loot during the fighting season is an ancient tradition in Afghanistan, especially there is not much alternative employment available in the countryside and the Taliban pay well.

Being part of an organized army is s different matter. American advisors believe that losing nearly three percent of its strength a year to combat deaths or crippling wounds, as occurred in 2014, is not sustainable. While the Taliban suffer higher losses the Taliban are more flexible in how they operate. This is more in line with the traditional Afghan way of warfare, which is more about raiding and ambushes than it is in operating like soldiers. The army and police are often standing guard in exposed positions (checkpoints or in bases) or obliged to go after fleeing Taliban, who often pause long enough to ambush the troops then move off again. Afghan soldiers and police know they are more effective fighters than the tribal warriors, but that their job requires them to expose themselves to danger regularly in order to maintain control of territory. The Taliban are not tied down nearly as much and that makes a big difference in morale.

The drug gangs provide the enormous quantities of the cash the Taliban need to operate as they do. Nearly all the 30,000 or so Taliban are paid and the Taliban leaders are paid much more. Moreover the drug gangs provide enough cash so the Taliban can “compensate” the families of Taliban killed in action. The drug gangs also bribe, and then control lots of government officials (civilian, military and police) and even some tribal leaders. The bribed officials will do things for the Taliban as well as the drug gangs.

The Taliban need all the money they can get because their 2015 plan was to eliminate Afghan security forces in the south (mainly Helmand province, where most of the world’s heroin is produced), the east (where most of the Helmand heroin is moved out via Pakistan and the Pakistani port of Karachi to the rest of the world) and parts of the north where heroin is also moved, mainly via Kunduz province to Central Asia.

Afghan Envoy On Ties With India: ‘No Country Can Reverse This Friendly Relationship’

http://swarajyamag.com/world/afghan-envoy-on-ties-with-india-no-country-can-reverse-this-friendly-relationship/ 

Shitanshu Shekhar Shukla, The author is a senior journalist and columnist. 

21 Jan, 2016 

Shaida Mohammad Abdali, Afghanistan’s Ambassador to India, is a soldier for development. Needless to say, he is in the line of the Taliban’s fire. Recently, his elder brother Sardar Mohammad Khan was shot dead in a mosque in Kandhahar province. Shitanshu Shekhar Shukla tries to understand the future of strife-torn Afghanistan through him. Excerpts of the interview: 

What do you think of India-Afghanistan ties? 

First of all, I would like to highlight the depth of this relationship, especially strategic partnerships post-liberalisation between the two countries. We have had comprehensive dialogues between the two countries since 2001; however, the people of both countries have an old bond with each other. This bond has helped both the governments to transform that relationship into a more strategic dialogue after 2001 through a strategic partnership agreement in 2011, which included different areas. An understanding had been reached to have a constant dialogue between the countries in the areas of politics, economics, social, finance and security. After 2011, as mentioned in the agreement, subsequent participant council meetings are to be held on different issues, relationships, and activities such as education, science, politics, finance and others. 

The recent visit of the NSA (National Security Advisor) and the foreign minister was about operationalisation of the agreement. In the agreement, there are provisions where both the countries are bound to get together at a strategic, operational and objective level. At the strategic level, the foreign ministers and head of states are bound to meet from time to time and set working groups to sit further together. In the last two visits, the discussion was aimed at how to operationalise what is committed under the strategic agreement. The deputy foreign minister was here to engage at a foreign secretaries’ level to pave the ground for a dialogue at both the operational and strategic level. 

The Afghan government will host a participant agreement dialogue. One in Delhi, the other in Kabul. Sushma Swaraj will go to discuss all the issues about the Participative Discussion Agreement. That participative council meeting will set a complete comprehensive agenda for the upcoming visit of the Prime Minister to Kabul. So, we agreed on some steps during the visit of the NSA and deputy foreign minister to set a corrective agenda for both the visits. The last two visits set a roadmap for both the countries to move ahead and we are looking forward towards the two upcoming visits. 

Since the US and Iran have struck a nuclear deal, Afghanistan is bound to get some benefit from it. Is it possible that India, Iran and Afghanistan can explore some better role during the next South East Asia visit? 

Absolutely, we are very happy that the tension between the Iran and the US has been mitigated to a greater extent. The more the tension is diffused, the more dividends there will be for Afghanistan and countries around Afghanistan. We are happy that we are promised development on that front. Afghanistan, Iran and India can do a lot for their prosperity, development, peace and well-being mutually, and it can be shared in the entire region. India, Afghanistan and Iran can play their roles better as they have their strategic significance in the region. Afghanistan is, economically, playing a role of connectivity. India is on the edge of South East Asia whereas Iran connects us to central Asia. 

What’s Known About China’s Shadowy New ‘Combat’ Force

January 20, 2016 By Lincoln Davidson

On the last day of 2015, China overhauled the way its military was structured, creating a new force that's received very little attention in the foreign press. 

China’s military reforms, which have sped up since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, are making steady progress and the latest change in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was a big one. On December 31, 2015, the Central Military Commission formally overhauled the organizational structure of the PLA, establishing three new organizations: the Army Leading Organ, the Rocket Force, and the Strategic Support Force. The big takeaway: the Third Department of the PLA, the home of China’s cyber operations and commonly known as 3PLA, may be moving to a different command. 

The Army Leading Organ appears to be a centralized command hub, aiming to coordinate joint operations between different PLA branches, which has long been a goal of China’s military reforms. The Rocket Force, which has been covered extensively elsewhere, is an upgraded version of the PLA’s strategic nuclear missile force, the 2nd Artillery Corps, and seems to be an official recognition of the branch-level role the corps has long played. The new Strategic Support Force (SSF), on the other hand, has gotten scant attention in the foreign press, and is arguably the most interesting development in this round of reforms.

In his speech at the founding ceremony, Xi said that “the Strategic Support Force is a new-type combat force to maintain national security and an important growth point of the PLA’s combat capabilities.” Many news outlets have reported that the SSF is focused on cyber operations, but Chinese press reports suggest that the new force has a wider range of responsibilities.

A report by an official news outlet compared the SSF to the armed forces of the U.S., Russia, and “other developed countries,” saying that its organization is more advanced, because it involves operations that do not fit well into any existing military force, but touch on all of them. Another report emphasized that it’s “even ahead of the United States conceptually,” which still separates support functions among all the branches of the military so that “they are constantly fighting with each other for resources.” The SSF won’t be on the front lines of combat, but rather provide “information support and safeguards.” However, unlike other support forces such as logistics, it “can use its own power to damage the enemy.” According to the same report, the SSF’s responsibilities will include the “five domains” of intelligence, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, cyber offense and defense, and psychological warfare.

According to SSF Commander Gao Jin, a lieutenant general with an engineering background and three decades of service in the 2nd Artillery Corps, the SSF aims to help integrate all the other PLA branches and “raise up the ‘information umbrella’ for the whole PLA system.” It will work to integrate “planning, mechanisms, resources, programs, operations, and human resources,” run strategic research projects, and be the “cloud think tank” for the PLA. Chinese reports state that the SSF was created partially as a response to “space combat forces” of other nations, suggesting that this may also be part of its operations.

That’s about the extent of what we know right now about the SSF from publicly-available Chinese-language sources.

HOW CHINA’S NEW RUSSIAN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM COULD CHANGE ASIA

http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/how-chinas-new-russian-air-defense-system-could-change-asia/

TIMOTHY R. HEATH, JANUARY 21, 2016

The Russian S-400 TRIUMF (NATO designation SA-21) surface to air missile (SAM) entered the global media spotlight late in 2015 when Moscow deployed the system after Turkey’s shoot-down of a Russian Su-24 FENCER airplane near the Syria border on Thanksgiving Day. The Russian deployment compelled Turkey to pause its air operations and reportedly impacted the execution of U.S. and coalition air operations in the region, demonstrating the considerable reach and influence of this advanced air defense system.

This episode demonstrated the S-400’s potential as a weapon with strategic effects, a role that China, the first export recipient of the system, may seek to exploit in future crises. In April 2015, Russia announced the sale of four to six S-400 battalions to China. It remains unclear where China will deploy the assets. However, deployment of the system could influence the regional security order and dramatically impact the ability of the United States and its allies to respond to crises related to Taiwan, the Koreas, and the East and South China Seas.

What is the S-400?

The S-400 is the most dangerous operationally deployed modern long-range SAM in the world. Its maximumeffective range is up to 400km (215 nautical miles). The system reportedly can track 100 airborne targets and engage six of them simultaneously. The S-400 reportedly has the capability to counter low-observable aircraft andprecision-guided munitions, and is also reportedly extremely mobile.

The SAM is an excellent example of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) system. The idea of A2/AD is to prevent an opposing force from entering an area and limit an opposing force’s freedom of action in an operational area. As Robert Haddick recently emphasized at War on the Rocks, A2/AD systems pose a unique problem to U.S. power projection and the ability of the U.S. military to maintain its technological edge over adversaries.

Yet Russia’s deployment of the S-400 reveals that such systems can have even broader strategic effects. Though not the first SAM to threaten aircraft at hundreds of miles in range — SA-5, deployed since 1966, has a range of 150 nautical miles — the S-400’s capabilities render it far more dangerous than a traditional defense-oriented SAM system. It can engage a wide range of targets, including stealth aircraft and cruise missiles. Its range against aircraft operating at medium or high altitudes is so great that it can threaten aircraft in neighboring countries within their own air space. This capability alone raises the risk of operating such expensive aircraft anywhere near a deployed S-400 system.

Competing Visions for Syria and Iraq: The Myth of an Anti-ISIS Grand Coalition

Download the PDF

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute conducted an intensive multi-week planning exercise to frame, design, and evaluate potential courses of action that the United States could pursue to defeat the threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. ISW and CTP will publish the findings of this exercise in multiple reports. The first report examined America’s global grand strategic objectives as they relate to the threat from ISIS and al Qaeda.[1] This second report defines American strategic objectives in Iraq and Syria, identify the minimum necessary conditions for ending the conflicts there, and compare U.S. objectives with those of Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in order to understand actual convergences and divergences. The differences mean that the U.S. cannot rely heavily on international partners to achieve its objectives. Subsequent reports will provide a detailed assessment of the situation on the ground in Syria and present the planning group’s evaluation of several courses of action. 

The key findings of this second report are: 

The U.S. must accomplish four strategic objectives in Iraq and Syria to achieve vital national interests and secure its people: 1) destroy enemy groups; 2) end the communal, sectarian civil wars; 3) set conditions to prevent the reconstitution of enemy groups; and 4) extricate Iraq and Syria from regional and global conflicts. 

Any American strategy must take urgent measures to strengthen Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi and prepare contingency efforts for his fall. The collapse of the Abadi government and return of his predecessor Nuri al Maliki would be disastrous for the fight against ISIS. 

Ongoing international negotiations within the Vienna Framework are bypassing essential requirements for long-term success in Syria. Re-establishing a stable, unitary Syrian state that secures American interests requires the U.S. and its partners to 1) destroy ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra, and foreign Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria; 2) identify and strengthen interlocutors representing the Syrian opposition; 3) facilitate a negotiated settlement between the Syrian regime and opposition; 4) obtain regional acceptance of that settlement; 5) establish peace-enforcement mechanisms; and 6) reconstruct state institutions. 

The Salafi-jihadi militant base in Syria poses a threat to the U.S., but the U.S. must not simply attack it because that would put the U.S. at war with many Sunnis who must be incorporated into a future, post-Assad inclusive government. The U.S. must separate reconcilable from irreconcilable elements. These other Salafi-jihadi groups must meet the following conditions essential for core U.S. security objectives in order to participate: break with Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS; accept the principle of a future pluralistic and unitary Syrian state; reject violent jihad; commit to disarming to a policing and defensive level; and commit to the elimination of the current shari’a court system and the establishment of political institution-based governance. 

The superficial convergence of Iranian, Russian, Turkish, and Saudi strategic objectives with those of the U.S. on ISIS as a threat masks significant divergences that will undermine U.S. security requirements. Iran and Russia both seek to reduce and eliminate U.S. influence in the Middle East and are not pursuing strategies that will ultimately defeat al Qaeda and ISIS in Syria or Iraq. Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, some linked to al Qaeda, stem from the ruling party’s intent to reestablish itself as an independent, Muslim, regional power. Finally, Saudi Arabia’s objectives remain shaped by perceived existential threats from Iran and a growing succession crisis, causing key divergences, especially over support to Salafi-jihadi groups. The U.S. must lead efforts to resolve the crisis in Syria and cannot outsource them to partners. 

[1] The first report is, “Al Qaeda and ISIS: Existential Threats to the U.S. and Europe.” - See more at: http://post.understandingwar.org/report/competing-visions-syria-and-iraq-myth-anti-isis-grand-coalition#sthash.tBGyzqtO.dpuf

Two states, four paths for achieving them

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/01/15-two-states-four-paths-israeli-palestinian-yadlin?utm_campaign=Brookings+Brief&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=25413514&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8LlRWmQ7SHsVcL2HzRJvd6rQghyjBB2biebv_s2VEKDDLQ4N7xaggEI3stuFWHqx1fKQF9iusqSGIfOtGy1OHMJTF0tw&_hsmi=25413514

Amos Yadlin | January 15, 2016 

The greatest tragedy of the Israeli-Palestinian gridlock, aside from the many lives lost, is that the parameters of any future agreement are already known to all sides involved. These are the common parameters of then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s proposal at Camp David II in 2000, the Clinton Parameters of December of that year, and former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s initiative in 2008.

Broadly speaking, Israel would be required to forfeit the dream of a Greater Israel, to agree to the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with land swaps, and to accept some Palestinian presence in the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and in the Holy Basin. The Palestinians would have to agree to an end of conflict and an end of claims, a solution for the Palestinian refugee problem only within the borders of a future Palestinian state (not Israel), and limitations on their sovereignty due to security concerns. Unfortunately, national narratives and aspirations, religious beliefs, perceptions of historic justice, and the practical lessons each side learned in the recent past have all prevented the leaders of both sides from convincing their publics of the need for such concessions—which are necessary for an agreement.

Plans A and B

Reaching an agreement is harder today than it was in either 2000 or 2008. Even the moderates among the Palestinians are unwilling to concede a right of return, to acknowledge an “end of conflict and end of claims,” to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, or to allow basic security arrangements that will ease Israel’s justified concerns. It appears that in 2016, the Palestinians do not view a two-state solution, along the Clinton Parameters, as a preferred outcome. Instead, their discourse is rooted in a "return of rights" in historic Palestine as a whole (including Israel), in accordance with both the Hamas and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) charters. Indeed, the Palestinian positions have not budged much since Camp David II in 2000.

Instead, the Palestinians have an attractive (in their view) “Plan B,” which is to get the Israeli concessions in international decisions, without having to make their own concessions—all while denouncing Israel and delegitimizing it in international forums. Since 2008, there are strong indications that the international route was actually the Palestinian "Plan A"—hence their intransigence in entering the talks and in the negotiations themselves. 

A sustainable—but undesirable—status quo