The age of alliances is ending, with hedging the rule of order

Shameek Godara

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At a time when India’s alignment with the West seemed firm, developments this month underscore a more complex reality. Amid deepening military and economic ties with the United States and its Quad partners, New Delhi also moved to revive links with Beijing.

This contradictory posture is by design: hedging is now the operative logic of statecraft.

What is striking today is not that these behaviours exist – they never disappeared – but that they are more visible and decisive than ever. In an era of great-power competition, fractured supply chains, and technological disruption, states are prioritising flexibility over loyalty. The politics of convenience, long a feature of international life, has become the dominant lens through which middle powers navigate uncertainty.

India illustrates this well.

After years of tension with Beijing following the deadly border clash in 2020, New Delhi has recently reopened high-level engagement, with flights resuming and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi preparing to travel to China to meet President Xi Jinping.

Machiavelli warned that “it is much safer to be feared than loved” in a world where human beings are “ungrateful, fickle, liars and deceivers”.

At the same time, India remains firmly anchored in security cooperation with Washington, most recently testing its Agni-V missile, capable of reaching Chinese targets. The dual track may seem contradictory, but it reflects what External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has often described as a foreign policy of “multi-alignment”, working with competing powers simultaneously to maximise national advantage.

Critics see opportunism. India sees necessity. US trade threats and pressure over Russian oil have pushed New Delhi to broaden its options rather than narrow them.

Xi, Putin and Modi are grinning and smiling, but at whom?

Yuanyue Dang

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Three major world powers – China, India and Russia – all with various frictions with the United States, projected an image of solidarity on Monday in front of the international media during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin.

During his first visit to China in seven years, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi took the hands of his counterparts – Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping – and pulled them closer.

As the three leaders mingled, one interpreter translated Putin’s words, which began with “We three friends …”, before a broadcast signal provided by the summit press centre drowned out the rest of the translation.

Modi laughed several times during the conversation and clasped Putin’s hands a second time.

Earlier, Modi and Putin embraced on the red carpet and exchanged greetings before walking hand in hand towards a smiling Xi, who was waiting to greet them.

India’s relations with the US have deteriorated sharply following repeated claims by US President Donald Trump during the India-Pakistan conflict that he had brokered a ceasefire between the two nations.

Last week, Trump’s trade adviser, Peter Navarro, described India as “a massive refining hub and oil money laundromat for the Kremlin”, further upsetting Modi.

The moves have been seen as Trump’s “humiliation” of Modi, with whom he had previously enjoyed close ties.

India, which has been slapped with 50 per cent tariffs on goods exported to the US, is trying to mend ties with neighbouring China after a simmering border dispute turned deadly in 2020. Relations started to thaw at a summit in Kazan, Russia, last October and a partial patrol agreement was put in place with both sides pledging to maintain a “peaceful” border.

The U.S. Wooed India for 30 Years. Trump Blew That Up in a Few Months.

Kapil Komireddi

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For three decades, successive American presidents have invested enormous diplomatic capital to cultivate a friendship with India.

Bill Clinton, who laid the foundation of the modern U.S.-India partnership, called the two democracies “natural allies.” George W. Bush described them as “brothers in the cause of human liberty.” Barack Obama and Joe Biden cast the relationship as one of the defining global compacts of this century.

To Washington, India was a vast emerging market, a potential counterweight to China, a key partner in maintaining Indo-Pacific security and a rising power whose democratic identity would bolster a rules-based international order. For its part, India — mistrustful of the West after nearly a century of British colonial rule — shed its Cold War suspicion of Washington, which had armed and financed its archnemesis, Pakistan, for decades, and moved steadily closer to the United States.

It took Donald Trump one summer to obliterate these gains.

In May, he claimed credit for ending a brief military conflict between India and Pakistan. This incensed India, which regards its dispute with Pakistan as strictly bilateral, and humiliated Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who had boasted of his closeness to “my friend Donald Trump.” Mr. Trump proceeded to have lunch at the White House with Gen. Syed Asim Munir, the army chief of Pakistan and a former head of its spy agency, which the United States has accused of supporting international terrorist groups. Mr. Trump also called India’s economy “dead” and imposed punishing 50 percent tariffs on Indian imports to the United States.

This abrupt falling-out has profound implications. Mr. Trump’s insults have, to some degree, united India’s permanently clashing political parties — a striking development in a country where Mr. Modi’s divisive rule has left little political common ground. For the first time in decades, the United States is the common foe of almost every political faction in India.

Iron Man in the Himalayas? China’s PLA embraces exoskeletons

TYE GRAHAM and PETER W. SINGER
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Imagine powered exoskeletons that enable soldiers to operate in the world’s most austere regions. Accompanied by robotic dogs and cargo drones, the troops can move through snow, easily carrying over 100 pounds of gear.

This is no longer science fiction. Earlier this year, China’s People’s Liberation Army executed an "intelligent logistics devices” exercise on the far-western Karakoram Plateau of the Xinjiang Military District, part of a push to move such gear from demonstrations to deployment.

China has spent the last several years building a diverse exoskeleton research-and-development ecosystem: In 2019, the PLA hosted a “Super Warrior” contest in which 50-plus prototypes from 25 developers competed in categories such as lightweight mobility, heavy-load marching, and munitions handling. This broad base suggests China’s exoskeleton R&D is not limited to one program, but is spread among state-supported primes, private venture players, and universities, each tackling aspects like materials, power systems, and artificial intelligence for gait assistance.

In 2020, state-owned defense conglomerate Norinco delivered a passive, backpack‑style frame to troops on the Tibet border. Their positive feedback triggered a follow‑on contract one month later. Separately, engineers at state-owned aerospace firm CASIC developed a powered frame with an electric‑motor drive and a swappable battery pack, unveiled in 2021 as the ‘Portable Ammunition Support Assist’ suit. This version adds roughly 44 pounds of lift, records usage data on a tablet, and straps on in under 40 seconds. PLA testers report the suit off‑loads more than 50 percent of the weight burden and lets one soldier haul a 110-pound ammo box “without much effort.”

A lighter, knee-only brace surfaced at the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow. Built by Beijing Precision Mechatronics, the device injects 55 pounds of torque during ascent, but weighs only a few pounds. Though marketed for military special operations work, exhibitors noted the knee brace is small enough for tourist or industrial markets—a perfect example of China’s military-civil fusion ecosystem.

China: Indian perspectives on China’s politics, economy, and foreign relations

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Is China a neighbour to be feared, a friend to be wooed, or a stranger to be kept at arm’s length? Is China’s rise as a superpower a result of a unique political model? Is it an intangible civilisational feature?

This collection of essays aims to demystify China and answer these questions. It is not an “India-China” book (of which there is no shortage) but a volume that aims to fill the knowledge gap, offering original Indian perspectives on China and the future of relations between the two nations.

What’s Inside?

This book features contributions from 12 outstanding Indian scholars and experts. It is a unique volume that provides an in-depth look at China through four main sections:

Politics: This section offers a comprehensive and nuanced examination of the Chinese Communist Party’s operations and the political trends of the Xi Jinping era.

Economy: Analysing China’s economic rise and its changing technology landscape, this section also examines the factors behind its slowing economy and the implications for India.

China & India: From evolving bilateral ties to military modernisation and the boundary question, this section examines different facets of China’s relations with India.

China & the World: This section features essays on China’s perspective on its place in the world, India’s role within that vision, and its expanding relations with the Global South. The final chapter focuses on Chinese society and its evolving relationship with the State.

The US Disaster With India Has Reached The Grovelling Stage

Phillips P. OBrien

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Well that did not take long. It has only been a five days since the US got all tough on India and tried to humiliate the Indians into bowing to US greatness. Then, the Trump Administration imposed what were clearly punitive tariffs on India, expecting, it seems, the Indians to come grovelling to Trump and ask what they needed to do to make things better.

And guess what? It is already the US which is grovelling as the Indians treat the move by the Trump Administration with the disdain that it deserves. Let me screenshot two things for you. This happened yesterday:

Indian Prime Minister Modi with Chinese President XI and Vladimir Putin, sharing a laugh (probably at the USA) in Beijing on August 31, 2025.

And this “I’m so sorry” tweet was just sent out a few minutes ago by the US State Department.

The US decision to decimate the US-Indian relationship never made sense in any rational universe where states act with their self-interest at heart. I sent this piece out about this act of geopolitical self-harm three weeks ago.

What the Trump Administration was doing in singling out India for punitive tariffs was not just self-destructive, it was also profoundly illogical. The publicly stated idea that the move was because India was buying lots of Russian oil was, ipso facto, ridiculous. China buys even more Russian oil than India and Turkey buys almost as much—and Trump is desperately trying to keep both of these states onboard. And, as I warned in that piece, the move would more than likely help Putin by pushing India closer to Russia and China—which is exactly what happened.

So, if the move had nothing to do with helping Ukraine, it might be asked why it happened? Well, what has emerged in the last few days is that the reason for the blow-up was even more venal than most people could have predicted.

Support AUKUS: It’s China’s Worst Nightmare

Joe Courtney

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The Department of Defense should continue to embrace AUKUS as a bulwark of Indo-Pacific security.

On June 11, 2025, the news broke that US Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby would lead a Pentagon review of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States security agreement (AUKUS). The Department of Defense has since articulated that this effort will be “an empirical and clear-eyed assessment of the initiative.” If that standard is applied, the assessment must conclude, as a similar 2025 review in London did, that AUKUS is the strongest, most effective plan for the United States to deter China’s malign behavior in the Indo-Pacific.

China certainly knows that AUKUS’ promise to accelerate the deployment of advanced defense technology by the three participating nations, including the sale of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, will counter the growing strength of its PLA Navy and missile forces in the Indo-Pacific.

China has repeatedly complained about AUKUS in public and in private diplomatic channels, which should speak volumes about its value to Under Secretary Colby as he conducts his investigation. AUKUS, in a nutshell, will blunt China’s regional advantage that threatens the 80-year success of the free and open Pacific.

Much of the AUKUS skepticism in the United States is premised on the misguided notion that the technology being shared and sold among the three allies will create an unacceptable drain on the US military. Since AUKUS is not a binding treaty that commits Australia and the UK to every imaginable conflict in which the United States could be engaged, skeptics argue that the cost and risks of sharing too much are unacceptable.

Under Secretary Colby himself publicly questioned the planned sale of three Virginia-class submarines to Australia last year, before re-entering the Pentagon in 2024, citing concerns that the US Navy cannot afford it. This part of the plan, developed in 2022–23 by the leadership of all three countries as part of the AUKUS “Optimal Pathway,” is essential.

China’s Victory Day Message Points to Struggle Ahead

Vincent K. L. Chang

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In September 2015, the People’s Republic of China held its first major military parade to mark victory in World War II.

On September 3, 2025, President Xi Jinping is scheduled once again to host world leaders in Beijing for the commemoration of Victory Day in what is formally known in China as the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.”

At first glance, Beijing’s messaging appears similar to 10 years ago. But a closer look indicates increased uncertainty about what lies ahead.

Anticipating Great Victory

In 2015, China appeared ready to realize its long-anticipated rise as a global superpower – a goal officially branded as “national rejuvenation.”

During a milestone meeting in June 2013, Xi and then-U.S. President Barack Obama agreed to establish a new model of great power relations, emphasizing pragmatic cooperation and the constructive management of differences.

Earlier that year in Moscow, Xi established the foundation for a personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin and what would later be described as a “limitless” strategic partnership between their countries.

Closer to home, Xi conducted “landmark” and “ice-breaking” meetings with his Indian and Japanese counterparts in 2014. These coincided with a period of notable warmth in cross-strait relations, culminating in an unprecedented face-to-face summit between Xi and Taiwan’s president in November 2015.

These diplomatic successes, along with expectations of continued rapid economic growth, influenced Beijing’s evolving perspective on its position in the current global order as well as official accounts of the nation’s past.

Beijing’s Dangerous Game in Tibet

Tenzin Dorjee and Gyal Lo

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In early July, thousands of Tibetans, Buddhists, and other well-wishers gathered in the northern Indian hill town of Dharamsala, the seat of the Tibetan government in exile, to mark the 90th birthday of Tenzin Gyatso—better known as the 14th Dalai Lama. The de facto pope of Tibetan Buddhism announced that, when he passes away, Tibetan Buddhists will start the traditional process of finding and anointing a reincarnated successor, ensuring that the centuries-old institution of the Dalai Lama will continue. Just months earlier, in a new memoir, the Dalai Lama made clear that any search for a successor must take place in the “free world”—that is, outside China.

These landmark statements made Beijing bristle. The Chinese Communist Party opposes Tibetans choosing their own Dalai Lama and considers the matter an affront to the sovereignty of Beijing, which has ruled Tibet since 1950. Since 2011, the last time the Dalai Lama issued a major statement on the question of succession and reaffirmed his authority to determine whether he will be reincarnated, Beijing has repeatedly publicized its intentions to install a rival Dalai Lama when the current one dies. Before his July birthday announcement, Beijing’s interference had even prompted speculation that the Dalai Lama might consider terminating his lineage to prevent China from hijacking the institution and making it bow to the CCP’s will.

Devotees of the current Dalai Lama celebrated his recent decision. Chinese leaders, as expected, rejected the announcement and insisted that Beijing holds the power to choose and approve who will be Tibet’s next spiritual leader. The CCP assumes that the Dalai Lama’s passing will end the Tibetan resistance—or that “the Tibet issue,” as Chinese leaders often phrase it, will be forever resolved in Beijing’s favor. The government’s logic is simple. For more than six decades, the Dalai Lama—a charismatic and widely revered Nobel laureate—has unified the Tibetan exile community and boosted the Tibetan cause around the world. It is unlikely that future Tibetan leaders will be able to bring the same level of global credibility and internal cohesiveness.

China ramps up push for more UN jobs

Colum Lynch

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The United Nations has proposed cutting 20% of the secretariat’s 33,000-strong workforce, as it faces the prospect of unprecedented funding cuts from the organization’s largest financial contributor: the United States. But the U.N.’s second-largest financial contributor, China, has been stepping up demands for more jobs, at least for Chinese nationals.

In recent months, Chinese diplomats have demanded the U.N. find more jobs, at least for its own nationals, and consider shrinking the American workforce at the U.N. to reflect its dwindling financial contributions to the world body, according to several U.N. officials and diplomats. Any job cuts undertaken in response to the withdrawal of U.S. funding should fall heaviest on American nationals, China has argued.

“They are approaching about senior posts,” one U.N. staffer, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Devex in a phone interview. “And they have been quite candid about saying ‘we are the second largest contributor and we pay our bills in full and on time.’” China does pay its bills in full, but it has recently begun a practice of paying late in the year, contributing to the U.N. cash crisis. “For what it’s worth,” the official added, “they are not doing much different from

China's support for multilateralism is vital, says UN's Guterre

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TIANJIN, China: China's role in upholding multilateralism is fundamental, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres told Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of a security forum meeting on Saturday (Aug 30).

Xi in turn said China would always be a "reliable partner" to the UN and continue to provide "stability and certainty".

Guterres is in China's northern port city of Tianjin for a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where Russian President Vladimir Putin and leaders from Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East will gather with Xi in a powerful show of Global South solidarity.

"In this moment in which multilateralism is under fire, the support of China ... is an extremely important element to preserve," he said, according to a media pool report.

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"We see new forms of policy that are sometimes difficult to understand, that sometimes look more like a show than the serious diplomatic efforts and in which business and politics seem sometimes also mixed," Guterres said.

"The role of the People's Republic of China as a fundamental pillar of the multilateral system is extremely important and we are extremely appreciative and grateful for that," he added.

Xi promised China's support.

"China is willing to deepen cooperation with the United Nations, supports its central role in international affairs, and jointly shoulder its responsibilities in maintaining world peace and promoting development and prosperity," Xi told Guterres.

B-52 upgrades aim to revive bomber China fears the mo

Gabriel Honrada

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The US is banking on a long-delayed radar overhaul to give its venerable B-52 bomber sharper eyes and longer reach, a modernization hailed as essential for keeping the Cold War giant relevant in the Pacific. At the same time, questions swirl around spiraling costs, mounting delays and uncertain survivability against China’s growing reach.

This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that the US Air Force is preparing to begin long-delayed flight testing of the AN/APQ-188 radar system for its fleet of 76 B-52H bombers, following years of cost overruns and schedule slips. The cost overruns represent a Nunn-McCurdy breach, which requires mandatory congressional notification and may lead to potential program review or termination.

The radar, developed by defense contractor Raytheon and based on the AN/APG-79 used in US Navy F/A-18s, is a key component of the B-52 Radar Modernization Program (RMP), which aims to extend the aircraft’s operational life to 2050.

Lieutenant General Andrew Gebara, speaking at a Mitchell Institute event this month, said the radar is expected to arrive at Edwards Air Force Base “very soon” for testing. However, no firm delivery date was given.

Initially slated for Fiscal Year 2024, flight testing was postponed to Fiscal Year 2026 due to challenges in environmental qualification, parts procurement and software integration.

The radar’s installation has also faced physical integration issues, according to reports from the US Department of Defense (DOD) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The US Air Force has reviewed the radar’s capabilities to reduce costs, prioritizing mission-essential functions over full feature sets.

Once upgraded with new engines and systems, the aircraft will be redesignated B-52J. The operational deployment of the radar is now expected between FY2028 and FY2030.

Can TV Help Prepare for Invasion?

Elisabeth Braw

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Imagine a fleet of Chinese ships suddenly appearing in the Taiwan Strait, tasked with inspecting all vessels traveling through the busy thoroughfare—including on the Taiwanese side. Or a Chinese fighter jet crashing off the Taiwanese coast and Chinese warships blockading the island to look for it.

One of these events actually happened, the other is part of a new Taiwanese television show, but the events feel equally real. “A Chinese Y-8 reconnaissance aircraft entered the South China Sea at 10 a.m. today and crashed into the Pacific, right off Taiwan’s east coast. In the name of search and rescue, the Chinese army deployed its navy and air force. … Taiwan is now under a de facto blockade,” a news anchor announces on Taiwanese TV.

The Path to a Good-Enough Iran Deal

Robert Einhorn

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It is not clear whether the recent Israeli and U.S. military strikes have decreased or increased the likelihood of a nuclear-armed Iran. The attacks have certainly inflicted major damage to the country’s nuclear program. But they have not extinguished the Islamic Republic’s interest in nuclear weapons. They have amplified uncertainty about the quantity, location, and current condition of critical elements of Iran’s nuclear program. And they have failed to block Iran’s pathways to building a bomb, including by using its surviving equipment, materials, and expertise in a small, covert operation.

Tokyo’s Leadership Vacuum

Mireya Solís

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Over the past decade, as much of the world has become more chaotic and succumbed to nationalism, protectionism, and illiberalism, Japan has been a force for maintaining the stability of the international order. Tokyo has shored up its rules-based economic partnerships; intensified security cooperation with like-minded countries, such as Australia, India, and the Philippines; and “de-risked” from China while maintaining its commitment to global trade. Japan has been able to play this stabilizing role because it has enjoyed internal social and political cohesion and benefited from strong leadership, most notably during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s second term, which lasted from 2012 to 2020.

Japan’s political center, however, seems to be weakening. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has governed Japan for nearly seven uninterrupted decades, suffered bruising losses in the most recent elections for both chambers of the national legislature—the Lower House last fall and the Upper House this summer—as did its coalition partner, Komeito. For the first time, Japan’s ruling coalition is clinging to minority positions in both chambers. And a populist far-right party, Sanseito, won 14 seats in the Upper House elections—up from one in 2022—on an anti-foreigner platform.

The retreat of the political establishment and surging support for an antiglobalist party are symptoms of an even more pressing domestic problem in Japan: the failure of mainstream parties to generate strong leaders. Power is fragmented because the LDP is internally divided, its coalition partner is losing ground, and the opposition is too disjointed to mount an effective challenge. This lack of leadership is making it harder for Japan to respond to the tectonic geopolitical realignments it faces, none more pressing than the United States’ extractive approach to the global economy and its alliances.

TROUBLE ADJUSTING

Targeting Iran’s Leaders, Israel Found a Weak Link: Their Bodyguards

Farnaz Fassihi, Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti

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The meeting was so secret that only the attendees, a handful of top Iranian government officials and military commanders, knew the time and location.

It was June 16, the fourth day of Iran’s war with Israel, and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council gathered for an emergency meeting in a bunker 100 feet below a mountain slope in the western part of Tehran. For days, a relentless Israeli bombing campaign had destroyed military, government and nuclear sites around Iran, and had decimated the top echelon of Iran’s military commanders and nuclear scientists.

The officials, who included President Masoud Pezeshkian, the heads of the judiciary and the intelligence ministry and senior military commanders, arrived in separate cars. None of them carried mobile phones, knowing that Israeli intelligence could track them.

Despite all the precautions, Israeli jets dropped six bombs on top of the bunker soon after the meeting began, targeting the two entrance and exit doors. Remarkably, nobody in the bunker was killed. When the leaders later made their way out of the bunker, they found the bodies of a few guards, killed by the blasts.

The attack threw Iran’s intelligence apparatus into a tailspin, and soon enough Iranian officials discovered a devastating security lapse: The Israelis had been led to the meeting by hacking the phones of bodyguards who had accompanied the Iranian leaders to the site and waited outside.

Israel’s tracking of the guards has not been previously reported. It was one part of a larger effort to penetrate the most tightly guarded circles of Iran’s security and intelligence apparatus that has had officials in Tehran chasing shadows for two months.

Warnings From Weimar

Daniel Ziblatt

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On March 23, 1933, inside a dimly lit chamber filled with the stale scent of cigar smoke, Ludwig Kaas tried to convince himself he was making the right decision. A Catholic priest and the leader of Germany’s establishment Center Party, he stood at a crossroads. For several years, his party had sought to block Adolf Hitler’s rise. But in 1932, Hitler’s National Socialists (Nazis) became the largest force in parliament, and in January 1933, Hitler became chancellor. As he moved to consolidate power, the Center Party had become the last remaining obstacle to his bid for total control over Germany.

Trump’s Collision Course With Brazil

Hussein Kalou

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In April, when Donald Trump announced his “Liberation Day” tariffs on dozens of countries, Brazil emerged largely unscathed. Brazilian exports to the United States became subject to ten percent levies, the baseline rate, escaping the debilitating tariffs applied to the goods of some U.S. allies. In late July, however, Trump declared that Brazilian exports would now face tariffs of 50 percent, one of the highest rates Washington has imposed anywhere in the world. The announcement has raised the prospect of a trade war between the United States and Latin America’s largest economy. It also indicates Trump’s willingness to use tariffs not only to force more beneficial trade deals or balance trade deficits but also as a tool to influence the domestic politics of a foreign country.

Announcing the new rate, the White House stated that “Brazil’s politically motivated persecution, intimidation, harassment, censorship, and prosecution of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro”—a Trump ally on trial for staging an insurrection after his failed reelection bid in 2022—amounts to “serious human rights abuses that have undermined the rule of law in Brazil.” The United States has revoked the visas of eight of Brazil’s 11 Supreme Federal Court justices and imposed economic sanctions, under the Global Magnitsky Act, against the justice Alexandre de Moraes, who is overseeing Bolsonaro’s case. (The former president’s trial begins on Tuesday.) These measures come in response to the court’s central role in prosecuting Bolsonaro and his supporters for their involvement in an attempted post-election coup. They constitute very public attacks on the legitimacy of Brazil’s democratic institutions. The Brazilian government has perceived these actions, coupled with the new tariffs, as egregious violations of its sovereignty and as deliberate attempts to weaken the position of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who defeated Bolsonaro, ahead of planned elections in October 2026.

Measuring the loss of VOA around the world

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Before March 15, VOA was reaching 361 million people around the world each week and producing content across media platforms — radio, television and digital — in 49 languages.

Now, VOA is producing minimal content in four languages: Farsi, Mandarin, Dari and Pashto.

A federal district judge said Wednesday that the evidence suggests the Trump administration is ignoring statutory mandates from Congress about VOA, which he said had been “whittled down to a paucity of coverage.”

District Judge Royce Lamberth in Washington ordered the Trump administration to provide a plan for how it will comply with his order to restore VOA programming to fulfill its statutory mandate that VOA “serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news.”

“Without more explanation, the Court is left to conclude that the defendants are simply trying to run out the clock on the fiscal year, without putting the money Congress appropriated toward the purposes Congress intended,” he wrote in an order giving the administration until August 13 to make its plans clear.

VOA articles published online per week

Opponents of the U.S. have cheered the virtual shutdown of VOA, while former U.S. military leaders, diplomats and policy experts have sounded the alarm, arguing that the closure of U.S. international media will likely help foreign governments to undermine U.S. policy.

The abandonment of VOA affiliate agreements with broadcast, online and mobile partners around the world has led U.S. adversaries, including China and Russia, to move to take over the media space that VOA is leaving behind.

Here is a look at how the output at VOA has declined since the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s senior adviser, Kari Lake, set out to shut down the organization beginning in mid-March, and the impact that VOA’s absence is having around the world.

The Real Limits of Ukrainian Power

Nataliya Gumenyuk

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It should not have been a surprise that the August 15 summit in Alaska between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump failed to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. It had long been clear that Putin was not prepared to offer any terms that would allow a credible peace to take hold and that a meeting thousands of miles from the conflict that did not include Ukraine had little chance of yielding a meaningful outcome. Above all, it had almost no relation to what is happening in Ukraine itself.

Precision and Peril: The Strategy and Consequences of Targeted Killings

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When a U.S. drone strike killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020, it propelled the practice of targeted killings into the global spotlight. Praised by some as a necessary blow against a dangerous adversary, the operation also ignited debate over its legality, morality, and ethical ramifications. In contemporary conflicts, targeted killing has become a core counterterrorism strategy. When executed with precision and governed by transparency, accountability, and adherence to international law, targeted strikes can neutralize imminent threats with minimal damage while maintaining the legitimacy of the states that use them. 

This analysis considers their strategic value and technological precision, examines the legal and moral controversies they provoke, and evaluates the potential unintended consequences. With robust frameworks in place, the benefits of targeted killings can outweigh their costs, ensuring a balance between security, legality, and legitimacy. The Strategic Value In the post-9/11 era, the United States and its allies adopted targeted strikes as a centerpiece of counterterrorism, using drones and special forces to engage leaders of groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Israel, for its part, has a long history of “decapitation” strikes against hostile militants, regularly eliminating key leaders of organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah to preempt attacks on its citizens. Proponents argue that these focused operations offer distinct tactical and strategic advantages: they can decapitate terrorist networks by removing their brain trust and disrupt planning and communications—and do so with far less bloodshed and escalation than full-scale warfare. 

Therefore, targeted killings are often framed as a high-precision alternative to protracted military campaigns, aligning with the modern warfare tendencies to minimize collateral damage, avoid largescale troop deployments, and swiftly degrade enemy capabilities. Empirical evidence from recent conflicts underscores the effectiveness of leadership targeting. U.S. special forces’ 2011 elimination of Osama bin Laden 2011 dealt al-Qaeda an enduring blow. In the years after bin Laden’s death, no figure of his stature emerged to unify the fractured jihadist movement, leaving al-Qaeda’s remnants struggling with internal discord. Declassified documents and expert analyses indicate that bin Laden’s absence led to leadership struggles and weakened coordination among al-Qaeda’s global affiliates. More recently, the U.S. drone strike that killed Ayman al-Zawahiri (bin Laden’s successor) in Kabul in 2022 removed yet another figurehead from the group, further illustrating how strikes can erode a terrorist organization’s cohesion. Other high-profile missions similarly highlight the strategic value of targeted strikes. 

Palantir is mapping government data. What it means for governance

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When the U.S. government signs contracts with private technology companies, the fine print rarely reaches the public. Palantir Technologies, however, has attracted more and more attention over the past decade because of the size and scope of its contracts with the government.

Palantir’s two main platforms are Foundry and Gotham. Each does different things. Foundry is used by corporations in the private sector to help with global operations. Gotham is marketed as an “operating system for global decision making” and is primarily used by governments.

I am a researcher who studies the intersection of data governance, digital technologies, and the U.S. federal government. I’m observing how the government is increasingly pulling together data from various sources, and the political and social consequences of combining those data sources. Palantir’s work with the federal government using the Gotham platform is amplifying this process.

Gotham is an investigative platform built for police, national security agencies, public health departments, and other state clients. Its purpose is deceptively simple: take whatever data an agency already has, break it down into its smallest components, and then connect the dots. Gotham is not simply a database. It takes fragmented data, scattered across various agencies and stored in different formats, and transforms it into a unified, searchable web.

The stakes are high with Palantir’s Gotham platform. The software enables law enforcement and government analysts to connect vast, disparate datasets, build intelligence profiles, and search for individuals based on characteristics as granular as a tattoo or an immigration status. It transforms historically static records—think department of motor vehicles files, police reports, and subpoenaed social media data like location history and private messages—into a fluid web of intelligence and surveillance.

These departments and agencies use Palantir’s platform to assemble detailed profiles of individuals, mapping their social networks, tracking their movements, identifying their physical characteristics, and reviewing their criminal history. This can involve mapping a suspected gang member’s network using arrest logs and license plate reader data, or flagging individuals in a specific region with a particular immigration status.

Ex-US Army Colonel Says Ukraine War On The Cusp Of An AI Revolution

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This article was originally published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and is reprinted with permission.

Frank Sobchak, a retired US Army colonel and professor at the US Naval War College, says the use of drones in the Ukraine war has created a stalemate reminiscent of World War I.

RFE/RL: Let’s start with your take on the ongoing Russian offensive, which seems to be faring better than many expected. What is the reality on the battlefield?

Frank Sobchak: I think this really plays into the broader question of where the conflict stands. In many ways, it resembles a World War I-style static war: Russia making tiny, incremental gains –sometimes just a square kilometer a day. According to the Institute for the Study of War, if Russia continues advancing at this rate, it would take them 300 years to occupy Ukraine.

RFE/RL: But the tempo has increased in recent weeks. The situation became extremely dire near Pokrovsk and Kupyansk, where the Russians achieved a tactical breakthrough and then were pushed back by Ukrainian forces. What’s your assessment of the current situation?

Sobchak: I’d look at this more strategically than tactically. Tactically, what we see is two boxers in a ring trading blows. The strategic question is: Who tires first? Who folds and goes down? That ties into two things — the defense industrial base and willpower. On willpower, both sides remain extraordinarily strong. There’s nothing from Russia suggesting they’ve abandoned their maximalist war aims. Ukraine’s determination is also intact. Yes, there are fissures and cracks on both sides, but nothing decisive.

At the tactical level we see World War I-level stasis. Part of this is caused by that war of wills, the two boxers who are still trading blows. The other major factor causing a static front is drones. In World War I, it was caused by machine guns, artillery, and poison gas; today it boils down to drones. Their impact is twofold. First, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: Each side now has a far clearer picture of what’s happening behind enemy lines than in almost any past conflict.

3 Ways Cognitive Warfare Exposes Character And What To Do About It

Mary Crossan,

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In a 2023 post, NATO's Strategic Warfare Development Command unpacked a relatively new concept known as cognitive warfare. At its core, according to NATO, cognitive warfare is the manipulation of stories, information, and ideas to "gain an advantage." It is not warfare in the traditional sense of the word in that we aren't seeing soldiers exchanging fire on a battlefield. Instead, information is being manipulated to create stories and influence ideas that then circulate among the populations of a target country. These ideas then erode the norms and values that hold the country together, opening opportunities that an adversary can exploit. Indeed, we are regularly being targeted with cognitive warfare by our adversaries.

Artificial Intelligence (AI), with its far-reaching influence, has heightened the threat and underscored the need for solutions. Every day, we consume a diet of unhealthy and toxic information that nudges behavior, often without us understanding how or knowing the difference between fact and fiction. Plenty has been written about the systems required to detect and thwart these unwanted attacks, including cybersecurity and combating fake news; however, there has been little attention to how cognitive warfare exposes and undermines individual character, and how strengthening character should be a strategic priority to counter its effects. Identifying how cognitive warfare exposes character and what to do about it should prompt educators and organizations to consider character development as a strategic investment that not only achieves the aims of strengthening human flourishing and sustained excellence but is a cornerstone of strengthening democracy. Like anything that provides a sustainable competitive advantage, understanding, developing, and embedding character in organizations is complex; however, there are three key pillars to consider.

1. Understand Character As Vulnerability And Strength

The command and control of modern air operations

Malcolm Davis

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With a contract to information technology company Leidos for sustaining a command-and-control system, Australia has made an important step towards ensuring it can deploy its armed forces to greatest operational effect.

The contract covers support for the Air Component Command and Control Capability System (AC-C2CS), the cornerstone of the Australian Defence Force’s command and control of the air (air C2).

In considering the future of the Royal Australian Air Force’s air capabilities, there’s an understandable tendency for the debate to move straight to discussing aircraft. In particular, the discussion quickly focuses on the roles of F-35A Lightnings in air combat operations, alongside F/A-18F Super Hornets, E/A-18G Growlers and, in the future, uncrewed aircraft such as the Boeing MQ-28A Ghost Bat.

But air C2 is also a vital element of the ADF’s ability to gain and maintain control of the air, conduct strikes, support coalition forces and ensure situational awareness. As part of a broader multi-domain joint and integrated command and control system, it is the brains and nervous system of a complex operational capability to coordinate and direct air operations effectively. Without air C2, the RAAF’s combat effectiveness, including its advanced air combat platforms, would be vastly diminished, with no ability to coordinate complex and fast-moving operations in a highly contested operational environment.

The AC-C2CS is a suite of software that assists in the planning, preparation, execution, management and reporting of ADF air operations. The system provides air operations command and control as well as intelligence, targeting and situational awareness. The contract won by Leidos is valued at $35.4 million and will run for four years with an option to extend by six years. Under the contract, the company will provide in-service support to Defence’s Joint Command, Control, Communications and Computers Systems Branch. This will include engineering and maintenance as well as training.