Amr Hamzawy, Andrew Leber, Marwan Muasher, and Sarah Yerkes
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Below, four Carnegie scholars react to Israel’s strikes on Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, and the repercussions for specific countries and the region.
The Gulf States’ Limited Options
Israel’s air strike in Doha on Tuesday was a wakeup call for the Gulf states: There are few limits on Israel’s ability and willingness to use military force in the region.
Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani immediately received an outpouring of support from other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders—not only the usual phone calls of support but high-level visits from leaders such as the UAE’s President Mohammad bin Zayed (with more to follow).
Beyond the ever-harsher rhetoric of official statements, however, it is unclear what meaningful steps the Gulf states can or will take to respond.
Kuwaiti political scientist Bader Al-Saif urged Gulf leaders to use the “tools at their disposal”—chiefly diplomatic and financial pressure—to deter Israel, while Qatar’s prime minister called for a “collective response . . . from the region.” Yet with prominent Gulf commentators already noting that “there is no longer a force capable of threatening Israel,” Tuesday’s attack underscores the GCC states’ seemingly inability to dissuade or deter Israel from further aggression—even on these states’ own soil.
During the decade-and-a-half when Iran dominated Gulf security concerns, leaders in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could variously lean on the United States to take action against Iran (and affiliated groups) or defuse tensions with Tehran in pursuit of shared economic and security gains.
Neither option exists with respect to Israel.
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