Indian Strategic Studies: 09/14/25

14 September 2025

India's Indecisive Turn East

Rafiq Dossani

India has enjoyed a privileged relationship with the United States for more than 20 years. The sudden imposition of high tariffs by the United States—first in retaliation for India's long-standing high tariffs on U.S. exports and then for its continued purchase of Russian oil—thus came as a profound shock in New Delhi.

After a phase of denial and recrimination, India sent a surprising signal: a tentative tilt toward China. Prime Minister Narendra Modi used his appearance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit on August 31 and September 1 to underscore this possibility, staging photo opportunities alongside China's Xi Jinping and Russia's Vladimir Putin.

The Modi government's sense of betrayal stems from two sources. First, New Delhi believes it has always acted in good faith to accommodate Washington's interests. When President Trump denounced efforts by BRICS to create an alternative currency late last year, India, which was actively engaged in those discussions, quickly distanced itself; at the December BRICS foreign ministers' meeting, it declared that it had no interest in such plans. When Trump criticized high tariffs on Harley-Davidson motorcycles in January, India reduced them within weeks. In March, it abolished its digital services tax after Trump threatened to retaliate against countries that targeted U.S. tech firms.

If India wishes to restore trust, it must act with greater strategic clarity and take some calculated risks.

In return, India expected to land a preferential trade deal by early July, joining the United Kingdom and China as the only countries with such agreements. On July 8, Trump declared, “We're close to making a deal with India.”

That promise collapsed on July 31. India was instead hit with a 25 percent tariff, followed a week later by another 25 percent penalty over Russian oil purchases. India's frustration and sense of betrayal deepened when its justification of those purchases (citing Biden-era U.S. encouragement to “stabilize global energy markets”) was dismissed in Washington as profiteering. The argument also rang hollow domestically: Indian imports of Russian crude—averaging $50 billion annually since the Ukraine war—account for barely 3 percent of world oil trade, too little to support global price stability.

Putting US-India Trade Negotiations Back on Track

Aparna Pande & Bill Drexel

On April 2, 2025, which the White House dubbed “Liberation Day,” President Donald Trump announced broad, sweeping tariffs on over 90 countries. While the president’s announcement caused anxiety in foreign capitals, officials in New Delhi remained relatively calm. United States–India relations had been improving for more than two and a half decades, and the US had become India’s largest trading partner. By most accounts, President Trump respected Prime Minister Narendra Modi—even going so far as to refer to his Indian counterpart as his “good friend.”

Furthermore, during an official visit in February 2025, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi announced a series of trade targets suggesting that a wider trade deal was imminent. The two leaders pledged to pursue $500 billion in bilateral trade by 2030—more than double the current volume—and promised to deepen US arms sales to India, including by laying the groundwork for future acquisitions of F-35 fighter jets. Prime Minister Modi committed to increasing energy imports from the US and reducing tariffs on American goods. India, by most accounts, was eager to address the Trump administration’s concerns about trade imbalances, and the two sides set fall 2025 as a target for finalizing a bilateral trade agreement.

Meanwhile, due to strong messaging from the Trump team against production based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Apple announced plans to shift all assembly of its US-bound iPhones to India. Prime Minister Modi also spoke with Elon Musk to discuss providing Tesla with access to Indian markets. Vice President JD Vance even visited India in late April 2025, and lauded the country’s “sense of infinite possibility.”

So, officials in New Delhi had many reasons to believe their country would emerge unscathed from President Trump’s Liberation Day.

Yet roadblocks in negotiations have tempered that initial optimism. Reporting has suggested that Indian negotiators offered their US counterparts a series of concessions over five rounds of technical talks. These included zero tariffs on industrial goods, a phased reduction of tariffs on US automobile and alcohol imports, and fixed energy and defense purchases meant to narrow the trade deficit between the two countries. In July, Indian officials left negotiations with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer with the impression that the two sides had agreed to a deal in principle.

Nepal parliament set on fire after PM resigns over anti-corruption protests

Charlotte Scarr

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli has resigned amid Nepal's worst unrest in decades, as public anger mounts over the deaths of 19 anti-corruption protesters in clashes with police on Monday.

On Tuesday, crowds set fire to parliament in the capital Kathmandu, sending thick black smoke billowing into the sky. Government buildings and the houses of political leaders were attacked around the country.

Three more deaths were reported on Tuesday. Amid the chaos, jail officials said 900 inmates managed to escape from two prisons in Nepal's western districts.

The demonstrations were triggered by a ban on social media platforms. It was lifted on Monday - but by then protests had swelled into a mass movement.

Nepal's army chief issued a statement late on Tuesday accusing demonstrators of taking advantage of the current crisis by damaging, looting and setting fire to public and private property.

It said if unrest continued, "all security institutions, including the Nepal Army, are committed to taking control of the situation," effective from 22:00 local time (16:15 GMT; 17:15 BST), without detailing what this might entail.

Fire and smoke rise from the Singha Durbar palace, which houses government and parliament buildings, as protesters stormed the premises in Kathmandu

While the prime minister has stepped down, it's not clear who will replace him - or what happens next, with seemingly no-one in charge. Some leaders, including ministers, have reportedly taken refuge with the security forces.

So far, the protesters have not spelt out their demands apart from rallying under the broader anti-corruption call. The protests appear spontaneous, with no organised leadership.

Inside parliament, there were jubilant scenes as hundreds of protesters danced and chanted slogans around a fire at the entrance to the building, many holding Nepal's flag.

American Security Systems are Compromised by China

Russ Walker & Chet Love

Home and business security systems are supposed to keep Americans safe. Yet very often our cameras, routers, drones, smart locks, and more are compromised, opening the door to surveillance and security risks—often without consumers being any the wiser.

The biggest security threat comes from China. Millions of U.S. homes and businesses rely on electronics and security systems manufactured by companies with direct ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Many of these products are cheap, widely available, and deeply integrated into our daily lives. But the cost we save at checkout comes due later when our personal information and national infrastructure are at risk.

Take Hikvision and Dahua, two Chinese surveillance giants blacklisted by the U.S. government. Their products—used in schools, homes, and even municipal buildings—are capable of sending video data to foreign servers. DJI drones, popular with hobbyists and law enforcement alike, have been flagged by the Department of Defense for transmitting user data back to China. Meanwhile, Wi-Fi routers from Huawei and TP-Link have documented firmware vulnerabilities that make it easy for hackers to steal data, monitor activity, or disable connected security systems.

These vulnerabilities risk more than privacy —they’re a threat to national security. China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy explicitly encourages companies to aid the state in acquiring foreign technology and intelligence. Meanwhile, security systems installed in government offices, power grids, and defense facilities could be exploited to surveil sensitive operations or disrupt vital systems. As 5G and Internet of Things (IoT) devices proliferate, the scope of this threat only grows. Firms like Huawei, ZTE, and DJI don’t just make gadgets—they serve the geopolitical interests of an adversarial regime.

Compounding these risks is the inadequacy of domestic American data storage. You wouldn’t keep your car unlocked on a busy street. Nor would you leave your wallet on a counter in an airport. But Americans regularly—and often unknowingly—have their data housed in less secure overseas facilities unprotected by U.S. oversight.

China’s grand global plan on full display at SCO Summit

Brian YS Wong and Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa

The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin was by no means a game-changer, but it was a useful bellwether for close observers of China’s shifting foreign policy strategy.

Over the past decade, Beijing’s understanding and interaction with the so-called “global order” has undergone a significant transformation — from a historically deferential approach rooted in compliance with Western-led institutions, to now tentatively attempting to convene a coalition of the “aggrieved.”

For many SCO members, abstention costs more than participation. Central Asian states treat it as insurance against great power rivalry, while India stays engaged to prevent China from monopolizing regional leadership.

Belarus joined in 2024 less for benefits than to avoid isolation. Iran uses membership to counter diplomatic marginalization despite crippling sanctions. Whatever their motives, most members conclude that exclusion means forfeiting influence over conversations that will happen with or without them.

The recent summit confirmed this pattern across multiple domains. On security, the new Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats will not reconcile India and Pakistan, but it will extend the SCO’s reach.

On economics, Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted trade with SCO members that has surpassed US$500 billion and recast selective bilateral deals as signs of multilateral progress. Even the Belt and Road Initiative, still contested by India, folds easily into SCO bilateral discussions – giving Chinese projects Eurasian branding.

On governance, Beijing advanced its Global Governance Initiative, rejecting bloc politics and “Cold War mentality” while affirming loyalty to the UN and WTO – signaling opposition to US dominance without naming it. None of these commitments is enforceable, but their repetition may subtly shape, and eventually foster, new conceptions of legitimacy.

All the world’s a stage

Xi running ‘The Art of War’ circles around Trump

Linggong Kong

Donald Trump and the Republican Party like to cast themselves as hawks on China.

Yet in his second term, Trump’s approach has been more bluster than bite—often retreating after tough talk and increasingly looking like a paper tiger. Beijing, by contrast, has kept its cool and, time and again, seized the initiative on major issues.

“The Art of War“, Sun Tzu’s ancient Chinese manual on strategy and leadership, has shaped thinking on conflict and power for more than two millennia. Its lessons are as relevant in today’s geopolitical rivalry as they were on the battlefield.

Seen through this lens, Trump’s China strategy reveals a series of costly missteps.

Sun Tzu’s most enduring lesson is simple: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Strategy starts with a clear-eyed view of both sides’ strengths and weaknesses.

Trump ignored that advice. On the campaign trail, he boasted that steep tariffs would bring Beijing to its knees. But China had already learned from the first trade war and was ready for a rematch.

He misjudged Beijing’s resolve to strike back, overlooked how deeply US businesses and consumers depended on Chinese manufacturing, and failed to see rare earths coming as a pressure point.

The gamble quickly turned against Washington. The tariffs hurt the US economy, forcing Trump to call Xi Jinping to seek a truce—a move that burnished Xi’s global image and fueled nationalism at home, giving Beijing more leverage at the table.

China’s response followed another of Sun Tzu’s maxims: “Strike where they are unprepared.” Beijing targeted US farm exports and manufacturing hubs, hitting Trump’s political base directly.

Chasing Starlink, China Unicom one step closer to satellite communication services

Xinyi Wu

China has issued a satellite mobile communication business licence to a telecoms giant, in a concrete move that accelerates preparations for the large-scale commercial roll-out of its home-grown satellite services.

The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology announced on Monday that it had issued the licence to China Unicom, permitting the state-owned company to conduct services such as direct-to-phone satellite connectivity and expand its applications in emergency and maritime communications.

The move is expected to foster a moderately competitive market while making internet services more accessible to everyday users, the ministry said.

“Concurrently, coordination between telecoms enterprises and entities across the satellite mobile communications industry chain will tighten, which will be beneficial for driving industrial transformation and upgrading, as well as enhancing the resilience and security of supply chains,” it added.

This marks the first licence the ministry has issued since it released a guideline late last month urging telecoms operators to leverage low-orbit satellite internet to expand high-speed data services beyond voice and text messaging.

The announcement also comes on the heels of China Unicom’s launch of four low-orbit satellites near Shandong province’s Rizhao city in late August.

The launch included China’s first low-orbit satellite equipped with advanced narrowband Internet of Things (IoT) capabilities, which provide low-power connectivity to IoT devices, marking a step forward in the country’s development of low-orbit satellites.

Addressing The Dilemma Of One Million Satellites: A Chinese Solution To Alleviate Orbital Congestion In Space

The rapid deployment of mega-constellations such as Starlink has led to a surge in satellite numbers, with over 1 million satellites proposed globally. The space is facing an unprecedented “congestion crisis”. This congestion threatens space sustainability, increasing collision risks, space debris, and radio interference. The Nature and Science have continuously warned that according to the current development model, the number of space satellites in near-Earth orbit will exceed the limit of safe capacity, and the space environment will no longer be sustainable. More than 100 scientists wrote to the International Telecommunication Union, suggesting to stop the launch of the Starlink.

To tackle this problem, a team led by researchers from the National University of Defense Technology developed OSSMC, inspired by the Internet’s open-sharing model. The core innovation lies in two key aspects: (1) SNAI Architecture: Satellites are modularized into sensors, networks, and AI-driven computing units, enabling dynamic resource sharing across satellites. This openness eliminates redundancy, as resources are allocated on-demand rather than being fixed to single functions.

(2) CPT Paradigm: A global shared resource pool connects space cloud platforms, satellite pools, and user terminals. This allows cross-border collaboration, replacing redundant national constellations with a unified infrastructure—similar to the way the computing resources are shared over the Internet.

Experimental evaluations demonstrate that the OSSMC yields significant advancements in satellite efficiency, operational performance, and space sustainability. Notably, in terms of satellite quantity optimization, the OSSMC will stabilize at approximately 48,000 satellites by 2036, while still delivering customized, real-time services to a global population of 8 billion. In terms of operational performance gains, its task success rate exhibits a substantial increase from 26.21% to 45.73%, and its navigation accuracy quantified by GDOP, is enhanced by 51.07% relative to existing navigation enhancement systems such as Centispace. In terms of space sustainability, compared to traditional constellation systems, OSSMC reduces the probability of space volume collisions by 28.7% and the orbital impact score by 53.15%, effectively reducing the risks associated with space debris dispersion.

Studying China's Military Power: Analytical framework and methods

Oscar Almén, Johan Englund, Christopher Weidacher Hsiung, Frida Edvardsson Lampinen, Per Olsson

China is rapidly improving its military capabilities, transforming the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into an increasingly sophisticated and capable force. How China continues to develop its military power, how it thinks about the use of force, and how it seeks to employ military means to achieve broader political and strategic objectives will significantly shape global security and international politics in the decades to come. This report designs an analytical framework for studying and assessing military power in general and China's military power in particular. It provides a discussion of research methods and presents an overview of the existing field of research on China's military and the PLA. The report also includes a description of the PLA's force structure and equipment and China's defence-industrial base. The overarching aim of the report is to establish a conceptual and methodological foundation for future reports and recurring studies on China's military power.

A Year of Meming Dangerously: Iranian Influence Operations Targeting Israel Since October 7

Ari Ben Am

An Israeli florist delivered a funeral bouquet in April 2024 to the parents of Liri Albag, a 19-year-old hostage in Gaza. Albag was very much alive, but the note with the bouquet said, “May her memory be a blessing, we all know that the country is more important.” The customer who purchased the bouquet placed his order online and was never identified. The Israeli Security Agency (ISA), Israel’s domestic intelligence arm, said it suspected the order was an Iranian ruse intended to cause anguish to the Albag family and sow division among the Israeli public.1

The incident illustrates how the regime in Tehran, despite its setbacks on the battlefield, has escalated its efforts to influence Israelis by exploiting the internet in different ways. Sometimes, initiatives that begin online spill offline, often intentionally, such as the delivery of a funeral bouquet to the Albags. This cruel example exemplifies how the Islamic Republic of Iran, limited in its military options for harming Israel and its population, employs influence operations of all kinds in an attempt to shape Israeli perception. A deeper understanding of how Iran conducts these operations points toward multiple lessons for the United States and its own ability to succeed in nontraditional domains of conflict.

Despite the massacre of October 7 — an overwhelming success from the perspective of Tehran and its proxies, including Hamas — the clerical regime’s so-called “axis of resistance” has suffered pivotal setbacks in the war it started. With American assistance, Israel has destroyed much of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. A combination of covert operations and airstrikes eliminated Hezbollah’s leadership and left it paralyzed. In the absence of support from Hezbollah, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed. The Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen endured both U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. Hamas suffered terrible manpower losses in Gaza, although it continues to fight. What began as a catastrophe for the Jewish state increasingly seems like a strategic defeat for its adversaries.

Bowen: Diplomacy in ruins after Israel strikes Hamas leaders in Qatar

Almost exactly a year ago I interviewed the Hamas leader and chief negotiator Khalil al-Hayya in Doha. I met him in a house not far from the building that Israel attacked on Tuesday afternoon.

From the beginning of the war in Gaza, al-Hayya had been the chief Hamas negotiator, sending and receiving messages to the Israelis and Americans via Qatari and Egyptian intermediaries.

At moments where ceasefires were thought likely, al-Hayya, along with the men who were also targeted this afternoon, were only a short distance from the Israeli and American delegations. When they were attacked, al-Hayya and the other top Hamas leaders were discussing the latest American diplomatic proposals to end the war in Gaza and free the remaining Israeli hostages.

Israel's swift declaration of what it had done immediately fuelled speculation on social media that the latest American proposals were simply a ruse to get the Hamas leadership in one place where they could be targeted.

On 3rd October last year, as Khalil al-Hayya walked into the venue for our meeting in a modest, low-rise villa, I was surprised that he had so little security. We had to give up our phones, and a couple of bodyguards came with him into the house.

Outside plain clothes Qatari police sat smoking in an SUV. That was it. A hundred bodyguards could not have stopped an air strike, but al-Hayya and his people were relaxed and confident.

The point was that Qatar was supposed to be safe, and they felt secure enough to move around relatively openly.

A few months earlier, on 31 July 2024, Israel had assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas political leader in Tehran, where he was attending the inauguration of President Masoud Pezeshkian.

With the war in Gaza raging, I had wondered whether it might be dangerous to sit in the same room as Khalil al-Hayya. But like him, I thought Qatar was off limits.

As Indonesia’s Protests Roil On, Prabowo’s Crackdown Could Escalate Violence

Joshua Kurlantzick

For several weeks now, protests have roiled many parts of Indonesia. Demonstrators angry about the weak economy, high unemployment, inequality, and the amount of money made by lawmakers have organized protests in many cities, with several turning violent. Some demonstrators have set fire to Indonesian lawmakers’ homes and a regional parliament building, while others have attacked police and other security authorities. In response, the authorities have often cracked down hard, resulting in further bloodshed.

Already, at least ten people have died in the demonstrations, which are ongoing, and twenty more people have vanished. Protestors have announced that some of their twenty-five demands, which focus on removing the Indonesian army from civil matters inside Indonesia, reducing lawmakers’ high pay, conducting serious investigations into government corruption, and taking extensive measures to boost economic security, must be met by Friday, but this appears highly unlikely. The possibility, then, of broadening violence remains very high.

President Prabowo Subianto, a longtime army officer and former son-in-law of dictator Suharto, is known for his bluff, unrelenting style, and allegedly was involved in massive human rights abuses during the Suharto regime. Because of those alleged activities, he was denied a visa to the United States for years. His brutal style and strong desire to entrench the army again in domestic matters would make one think that he would give little ground to the protests.

For a brief period, Prabowo seemed to actually show flexibility and make concessions to the protestors, shocking observers, including myself. In late August, according to the New York Times, he made a speech saying he understood “the genuine aspirations of the public” and then said the government would reduce lawmakers’ overseas trips and cut allowances for lawmakers, who were getting about $3,000 per month in housing stipends plus their salaries in a country with a GDP per capita of around $4,900. He also claimed that political parties would get rid of lawmakers who mocked protestors.

Can America’s trust in its military survive the present moment? [Book excerpt]

Kori Schake

The following is an adapted excerpt from The State And The Soldier: A History Of Civil-military Relations In The United States, a new book from Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. You can purchase the book, which is out now in Europe and October 26th in the US, by clicking here.

How is it that a country founded in fear of a standing army would come to think of its military as a bulwark of democracy?

There is no other country in which the military is so proficient, so respected, so influential in policymaking without becoming a threat to civilian governance. Standard models of civil–military relations would predict a military so constituted to be tempted by coups or state capture. Yet, for over 250 years, there has never been an organized attempt to overthrow the US government by its military. It is a precious, anomalous history.

Why that is the case isn’t simple. It’s partly the political culture of the colonies that would become the United States devising a government of distributed and counterbalancing power. It’s partly the restraining example of an extraordinary individual during state formation, giving time for civilian institutions and military norms to form and strengthen. It’s partly structural factors such as geographic expanse, rival and dispersed urban and commercial centers, and a benign international security environment coupled with urgent domestic insecurity (the “insider threat” of conflict with Native Americans) resulting in a weak federal army and strong militia. It’s partly adroit politicians demonstrating the skills that make them successful and simply outplaying ambitious military aspirants.

Which is to say that the American experience has proven beneficial and durable — but difficult for other states to emulate.

US Air Force's first official autonomous combat drone takes to the air

David Szondy

One of the US Air Force's first official combat drones has taken to the air after only a year of building and development. General Atomics's YFQ-42A is currently undergoing flight testing in anticipation of a future fleet of 1,000 autonomous planes

The YFQ-42A Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) isn't the only autonomous combat drone in the world under development, but it is the first of two, along with the Anduril YFQ-44A, to be officially accepted as combat aircraft by a major air force. In this case, the designations stand for Y – Prototype, F – Fighter, Q – Unmanned Aircraft, design number 42 and 44, and A – series.

The idea is to create a fleet of autonomous jet-powered Loyal Wingman combat craft with the performance to operate alongside fifth- and sixth-generation fighters, including the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II. These aircraft would act as force multipliers that would cost less than crewed fighters, yet would have advanced machine learning for human-machine teaming. With this, the human pilot can concentrate on the mission while the drones fly themselves, even in combat scenarios.

Derived from the General Atomics "Gambit" family of uncrewed aerial vehicles, its development was sped up by means of model-based digital engineering as well as an autonomous avionics suite tested over five years using a jet-powered MQ-20 Avenger drone, formerly known as the Predator C, and the XQ-67A Off-Board Sensing Station (OBSS).

Because the YFQ-42A is still in the prototype stage, its specifications are still a bit fluid as well as largely under wraps, but it's estimated to have a range of over 700 nautical miles (805 miles, 1,300 km) and be capable of carrying two air-to-air missiles in its payload bay. In addition, the fuselage is designed for a low radar and infrared profile for better stealth. It may also be capable of aerial refueling.

"What a great moment for the U.S. Air Force and for GA-ASI," said GA-ASI President David R. Alexander. "It’s been our collaboration that enabled us to build and fly the YFQ-42A in just over a year. It’s an incredible achievement and I salute the Air Force for its vision and I salute our development team for delivering yet another historic first for our company."

Why the World Turned on NGOs

Suparna Chaudhry

A child walks across a dirt road carrying a canister of water.A child carries water in a village east of Aweil, South Sudan, on March 6. The community was photographed for a story about the effect of the withdrawal of the U.S. Agency for International Development and other support on the war-torn region. Malin Fezehai photo

In just nine months, the Trump administration has laid waste to the development landscape, dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and slashing nearly the entire U.S. foreign aid budget. This has posed a problem for nongovernmental organizations working on development the world over, derailing decades of work to increase access to health, food, education, and better governance. The impact is disproportionately felt across the global south, where these cuts will inevitably erode institutional knowledge and disrupt development trajectories.

But while the U.S. government’s actions have posed the biggest and most unexpected challenge for these groups, the reality is that the heyday of NGO influence was already long over. NGO revenue streams have dried up—and not just from the United States. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom had already begun their aid retreat before U.S. President Donald Trump took office a second time. In 2020, the U.K. effectively closed its equivalent of USAID, the Department for International Development, by merging it with the Foreign Office. Foreign aid dropped by about $6 billion after the merger, a decline expected to hit $11 billion by 2027.

The Wrong Way to Do Diplomacy With Russia

Celeste A. Wallander

Summits between heads of state are high-stakes gambles to achieve breakthrough solutions. Typically, they are judged on whether they help resolve an intractable international issue. But sometimes, their most consequential impact is on the domestic political standing of one or both of the summit’s participants. And U.S. President Donald Trump’s summit last month in Alaska with Russian President Vladimir Putin is of this mold: it strengthened Putin, and in doing so has prolonged both the war in Ukraine and his hold on power.

The meeting in Anchorage has parallels to the 1986 summit between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. Then, as now, an American leader and a Russian one met to resolve a major foreign policy challenge—in 1986, ending an arms race, and last month, ending the war in Ukraine. In both cases, they failed. The talks in Iceland collapsed when Reagan refused to scuttle his Strategic Defense Initiative, a proposed program that would neutralize Soviet nuclear missiles before they struck their targets. Alaska ended without a deal to end Russia’s invasion.

But there the parallels diverge. Both summits may have had profound consequences for the Kremlin, yet those consequences could not be more different. For Gorbachev, the Iceland summit hastened the end of his country. He returned to the Kremlin weakened from his failure to stop Reagan’s program, and his subsequent decisions paved the way for the collapse of the Soviet Union five years later. Putin, by contrast, has emerged triumphant. Trump rolled out the red carpet for the Russian leader in Anchorage and spoke gushingly of their “fantastic relationship.” Putin made no concessions, and Trump shifted the responsibility for ending the fighting to Ukraine: “Now it is really up to President Zelensky to get it done,” he said in an interview with Fox News.

Tanks Were Just Tanks, Until Drones Made Them Change

Marco Hernandez and Thomas Gibbons-Neff

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the two sides’ tank divisions looked much as they did during the Cold War.

Now, Russia’s and Ukraine’s Soviet-era tanks rumble across the battlefield covered in anti-drone nets and spikes, dangling chains and unwieldy cages.

The exterior transformations of these hulking vehicles are a testament to how quickly drones have changed the war in Ukraine in just over three years. Lethal drones have pushed traditional missiles and artillery to the sidelines.

The armor changes began early in the war after Ukrainian forces used U.S.-supplied anti-tank missiles to strike Russian tanks directly from above, piercing weaker points in vehicles’ armor.

To counter the explosive projectiles, Russian tank crews began mounting homemade cages above their turrets to cushion the tanks from blasts. Other Russian units already had cages on their tanks, anticipating strikes from above.

Since then, the battlefield has completely changed. It is now driven by small, cheap first-person-view (F.P.V.) drones that can be used like homing missiles.

In response, both Ukrainian and Russian tanks have undergone transformations to address their vulnerabilities. Here’s how it happened:

Earlier in the war, anti-tank missiles and drones that dropped grenades primarily threatened tanks from above

To protect the tanks from above, mechanics built structures on the tops. Then, soldiers began using F.P.V. drones to maneuver like homing projectiles into other vulnerable areas of the vehicles

Destroying Gaza City – OpEd

Binoy Kampmark

Destroying cultures and eradicating the legacies of a people is a game the parochial and the dim-witted delight in. While this should be shunned and punished in international law, a general discomfort of purpose seems to trouble the friends of Israel as the state goes about its business of ruining what vestiges of living might exist in the Gaza Strip. As Israel’s warriors of vengeful virtue go about demolishing one of the last parts of Gaza that has any infrastructure worth mentioning, the usual ceremony of impotent effusion and concern is registered across the networks of the world.

By the end of October 2024, Corey Scher and Jamon Van Den Hoek noted that the Gaza Strip had been subjected to “one of the most intense bombing campaigns of the twenty-first century, driving widespread urban damage.” With a focus on northern Gaza, the authors noted that 191,263 (three-fifths) of all buildings were either damaged or destroyed. In such outlets of sober discernment as Lawfare, we find the authors aghast that the operations in Gaza eclipse those of more recent operations of levelling mayhem, be it the destruction of Mariupol in Ukraine, where 32 percent of the buildings were destroyed or damaged, or the Syrian town of Aleppo, an ancient city victim to a war that saw damage to 40 percent of its buildings during three years of remorseless conflict.

In language so corrupted it conveys the opposite of what is intended, Israel has again used the term “humanitarian zone” in areas it repeatedly bombs, whose residents are being consistently killed. Leaflets dropped over Gaza City on September 7 made the bold and mendacious claim: “From this moment it is announced that the al-Mawasi area is a humanitarian zone and steps will be taken to provide better humanitarian services there”. (They were evidently not up to scratch before.) The Gaza Ministry of Interior could only capitalise on this in a statement. “We call on citizens in Gaza City to beware of the occupation’s deceitful claims about the existence of a humanitarian zone in the south of the Strip.”

SCO Summit 2025: Eurasia’s Laboratory Of Contradictions – Analysis

Ramesh Jaura

For more than two decades, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) lingered in the margins of Western coverage—a Eurasian acronym that sounded bureaucratic, not dramatic. But in September 2025, as leaders gathered in Tianjin to mark the group’s 25th anniversary, the world could no longer look away. What was once dismissed as a “talk shop” has become one of the most consequential laboratories of multipolarity, finance, and security—an institution whose contradictions may prove as influential as its ambitions.

A Club No One Took Seriously

When the SCO was founded in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, it looked unthreatening. The West had its NATO, its EU (European Union), its G7 (Group of 7). The SCO was Central Asian, niche, and—critics said—paralyzed by consensus. Even after India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Western coverage rarely went beyond clichés: a “photo-op forum,” a “bureaucratic shell,” or “China’s NATO in waiting.”

The dismissiveness missed the point. By geography and demography, the SCO is vast: today it stretches from Belarus to Beijing, Iran to India, covering 42 percent of humanity and a third of global output in purchasing power terms. More importantly, it offers members a political bargain Western institutions rarely did: no conditionality, no preaching, no litmus tests. That sovereignty-first ethic is precisely what has given it durability.

Scene in Tianjin

Tianjin, China’s bustling port city on the Bohai Gulf, is not Beijing’s political theatre or Shanghai’s commercial showcase. Yet in early September 2025, it briefly became both. Neon-lit skyscrapers framed the summit venues, cordoned streets carried motorcades past banners proclaiming “Shared Destiny, Shared Future,” and the air outside the main hall mixed the humidity of late summer with the sharp scent of fresh paint from hurried renovations.

Defense and Strategic Studies: A Brief History

Dr. Keith B. Payne

Introduction

The Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS) program started at the University of Southern California (USC) in Los Angeles. The exact year of its initiation is not entirely clear. I have seen 1969, 1971, and 1976 as the starting point from three different individuals close to the program. They may all be correct, each describing something a bit different in the development of DSS. I tend to accept the 1971 date as the beginning point; DSS was thriving, with several advanced Ph.D. students, by the time I arrived as a first-year graduate student in August 1976.

It is important to focus on the origins of DSS and its founder, Professor William R. Van Cleave, to understand the program’s uniqueness then, and now. Prof. Van Cleave entered USC as a young professor in 1967, founded DSS there, and led it until his retirement in 2005. His portrait, as a young Marine, hangs prominently in the DSS offices for those students who have wondered, “who is that?” Millions of people have used one of the ancestry services to find out about their family roots. I would like to provide an overview of DSS roots that continue to shape its curriculum and educational goals after more than five decades.

DSS Origins

At USC, DSS was not a separate academic department, but rather a selected concentration of courses within the university’s School of International Relations (SIR). It was an anomaly within the SIR for multiple reasons. For example, if Professor Van Cleave was to serve as the chair of a student’s Ph.D. committee, the student had to take several specific courses offered by Prof. Van Cleave (or “VC” as we students referred to him amongst ourselves), and additional courses in three other related concentrations, e.g., Russian, Chinese, and/or European studies, theory, political economy, inter alia.[1] The SIR required only three fields of concentration for the Ph.D.; Prof. Van Cleave required four. That additional concentration requirement may seem minimal. But when doctoral comprehensive exams loomed, having to take an exam in four areas of concentration vice three loomed large. In addition, the comprehensive Ph.D. exam given by Professor Van Cleave was known to be particularly challenging—a one-week take-home exam that, in my case, demanded a 55-page response.

Averting a Robot Catastrophe

Michael J. D. Vermeer, Timothy M. Bonds, Emily Lathrop, Gregory Smith

In this paper, the authors assess the convergence of trends in robotics and frontier artificial intelligence (AI) systems, particularly the exacerbated national security risk that results from the potential for the proliferation of robotic embodiments of artificial general intelligence (AGI). Although the benefits of advanced robotic capabilities are likely to outweigh their associated risks in many contexts, the authors explore how the combination of AGI with robots that feature high mobility and dexterous manipulation could introduce significant systemic vulnerabilities. Policymakers face challenges in balancing the need for safety and security with economic competitiveness because there are no straightforward regulatory options that effectively limit risky combinations of capabilities without hindering innovation. To conclude, the authors stress the urgent need to proactively address this issue now rather than waiting until the technologies are fully deployed to ensure responsible governance and risk management in the evolving landscape of robotics and AI.

This Robot Only Needs a Single AI Model to Master Humanlike Movements

Atlas, the humanoid robot famous for its parkour and dance routines, has recently begun demonstrating something altogether more subtle but also a lot more significant: It has learned to both walk and grab things using a single artificial intelligence model.

What is more, the robot’s single learning model is showing some tantalizingly “emergent” skills, like the ability to instinctively recover when it drops an item without having been trained to do so.

Boston Dynamics, the company that makes Atlas, together with the Toyota Research Institute (TRI), developed a generalist model that learns to control both arms and legs from a range of example actions. This is different from the norm: robots equipped with the ability to learn would usually rely on one model to walk and jump and another to grasp items.

“The feet are just like additional hands, in some sense, to the model,” says Russ Tedrake, a roboticist at the Toyota Research Institute and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who led the current work. “And it works, which is just awesome.” The co-lead on the research was Scott Kuindersma, VP of robotics research at Boston Dynamics.

Courtesy of Boston Dynamics

The single model used to control Atlas is fed images from the robot’s visual sensors, proprioception data from bodily sensors (which give it a continuous sense of its position and movement), and language prompts related to different actions. The model is shown examples of Atlas performing a range of tasks using a mix of teleoperation, simulation, and demonstration videos. The resulting large behavior model (LBM) controls the humanoid robot in a more natural-seeming way. When picking items out of a bin, for example, the robot will reposition its legs much like a person to rebalance when reaching low down. The LBM also exhibits some basic emergent behavior. When the robot drops an item, for instance, it demonstrates a new “recovery” skill by bending down to pick it up.

US Air Force's first official autonomous combat drone takes to the air

David Szondy

One of the US Air Force's first official combat drones has taken to the air after only a year of building and development. General Atomics's YFQ-42A is currently undergoing flight testing in anticipation of a future fleet of 1,000 autonomous planes

The YFQ-42A Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) isn't the only autonomous combat drone in the world under development, but it is the first of two, along with the Anduril YFQ-44A, to be officially accepted as combat aircraft by a major air force. In this case, the designations stand for Y – Prototype, F – Fighter, Q – Unmanned Aircraft, design number 42 and 44, and A – series.

The idea is to create a fleet of autonomous jet-powered Loyal Wingman combat craft with the performance to operate alongside fifth- and sixth-generation fighters, including the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II. These aircraft would act as force multipliers that would cost less than crewed fighters, yet would have advanced machine learning for human-machine teaming. With this, the human pilot can concentrate on the mission while the drones fly themselves, even in combat scenarios.

Derived from the General Atomics "Gambit" family of uncrewed aerial vehicles, its development was sped up by means of model-based digital engineering as well as an autonomous avionics suite tested over five years using a jet-powered MQ-20 Avenger drone, formerly known as the Predator C, and the XQ-67A Off-Board Sensing Station (OBSS).

Because the YFQ-42A is still in the prototype stage, its specifications are still a bit fluid as well as largely under wraps, but it's estimated to have a range of over 700 nautical miles (805 miles, 1,300 km) and be capable of carrying two air-to-air missiles in its payload bay. In addition, the fuselage is designed for a low radar and infrared profile for better stealth. It may also be capable of aerial refueling.

"What a great moment for the U.S. Air Force and for GA-ASI," said GA-ASI President David R. Alexander. "It’s been our collaboration that enabled us to build and fly the YFQ-42A in just over a year. It’s an incredible achievement and I salute the Air Force for its vision and I salute our development team for delivering yet another historic first for our company."

Bias in Military Artificial Intelligence and Compliance with International Humanitarian Law

Laura Bruun and Dr Marta Bo

States involved in policy debates on military artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly expressing concerns about bias in military AI systems. Yet, these concerns are rarely discussed in depth, much less from a legal lens.

Drawing from insights gained during an expert workshop convened by SIPRI, this report explores the implications of bias in military AI for compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). The report first unpacks what ‘bias in military AI’ refers to and what its causes are. Then, focusing on bias in AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems and AI-enabled decision support systems used for targeting, it examines the implications of bias for compliance with IHL, particularly the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. Then, it outlines technical, operational and institutional measures to address bias and strengthen IHL compliance. In closing, it outlines key findings and recommendations to states involved in military AI policy debates.

U.S. Army integrates counter-drone tactics into armored warfare during Operation Return of the Condor.

Operation Return of the Condor, held on August 27, 2025, at Fort Hood, Texas, has emerged as a pivotal milestone in the U.S. Army’s tactical adaptation to drone threats on the modern battlefield. Designed as a full-spectrum combat simulation, the exercise integrated small unmanned aircraft systems into live maneuver operations involving M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles. This effort marked a deliberate shift from passive drone defense to active, integrated countermeasures within armored formations.

A small unmanned aircraft system flies above a moving M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle during Operation Return of the Condor at Fort Hood, Texas, on August 27, 2025, as part of a live-force exercise focused on integrating counter-drone systems into U.S. Army armored warfare tactics. (Picture source: U.S. DoD)

The tactical focus of the Operation Return of the Condor centered on evaluating how drone surveillance and strike threats affect mechanized ground units during movement and in contact. The exercise introduced multiple layers of electronic warfare, including radio frequency detection, passive radar sensing, and jamming capabilities, directly embedded into operational formations. These systems were tested in real time as Bradleys maneuvered across varied terrain under simulated drone observation and engagement, replicating conditions now regularly encountered in modern conflicts.

Rather than isolating counter drone measures within air defense units, the exercise emphasized their integration into maneuver elements. The Bradleys operated as both offensive assets and mobile counter drone platforms, supported by sensor nodes positioned across the battlespace. This distributed detection network was designed to provide 360-degree coverage against low, slow, and small drone threats, while preserving freedom of maneuver and tactical momentum. Each detection asset was linked to digital command systems, enabling rapid decision-making and synchronized response across units.

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