Indian Strategic Studies: September 2025

2 September 2025

China’s Wakhan Corridor Dilemma: Economic Development or Security?

Situation Reports

On August 21, the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi landed in Kabul, after visiting India and Pakistan. The visit to Afghanistan holds significance as it comes after a gap of three years, the last being in March 2022. But far more consequential was the actual itinerary of the visit, notably a tripartite meeting with Pakistan and Afghanistan intended to address Chinese security concerns related to a narrow piece of land connecting China and Afghanistan, called the Wakhan Corridor. The Wakhan Corridor is a 350-km narrow piece of land, ranging from 10 to 50 km in width, which connects China’s Xinjiang Autonomous region and Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province in the northeast and is sandwiched between Tajikistan on its western side and Khyber Paktunwa, Gilgit Baltistan to the east.

While it is a fact that the Chinese have been investing in Afghanistan and have not shied away from the country since the Taliban takeover in 2021, Beijing has been cautious in its approach in dealing with the Taliban given that early investments have not been as lucrative as they hoped. According to a report published by the Stimson Center, Chinese investments have more or less remained at the same level since 2021, with imports from Afghanistan not growing in any substantial way. The same report claims that the Chinese investments in the Mes Aynak copper mine have not taken off, nor have investments in the Amu Darya oil fields. Despite these hurdles, the Taliban and Beijing are moving ahead on a plan to build a road through the Wakhan Corridor, connecting China and Afghanistan. According to Al Emarah English, which is the official mouthpiece of the Taliban government, the Wakhan Corridor road will be constructed in two stages, the first running 50 km from Bazai Gonbad in Little Pamir to the zero-point border with China, of which preliminary groundwork is complete with 60% of construction work currently underway as of March 2025. The second stage will cover 71 km, which is to be completed by the end of this year. Experts believe that once this road is complete, it will give China access to new markets in Europe through Afghanistan and at the same time, provide landlocked Afghanistan a new corridor to export and import goods directly with China.

Risk Factors along the Wakhan Corridor

Guns of September: What a Parade May Reveal About China’s Military Modernization

John S. Van Oudenaren

Executive Summary:The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) upcoming military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII will serve as both a symbolic display and an operational exercise, highlighting the PLA’s advancements in new combat domains—such as unmanned systems, directed energy, and electronic warfare—while also revealing improvements in command structure and organizational capacity. The parade aims to underscore loyalty to Xi Jinping as central to combat readiness, even as recent purges expose deep institutional instability and a persistent “trust deficit” between the CCP and the PLA. These tensions underscore the regime’s challenge in balancing political control with genuine military professionalization.

The PLA will use the parade to demonstrate its growing joint capabilities, showcasing an integrated “Four Services + Four Arms” model and the role of new branches like the Aerospace and Cyberspace Forces. The involvement of militia units and strategic strike formations further emphasizes the whole-of-force approach underpinning China’s military modernization trajectory

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is finalizing plans for its massive 80th anniversary commemoration of victory in the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression” (中国人民抗日战争) and “World Anti-Fascist War” (世界反法西斯战争) (People’s Daily, June 25). The event, to be held in Beijing on September 3, will feature a troop review and speech by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping. Global attention will likely fixate on the long columns of entirely domestically produced armored vehicles, missiles, and warplanes rolling through Tiananmen Square, highlighting the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing firepower (China Daily, June 24; Xinhua, June 25). The parade will also contain important indications about PLA command structure, organizational capacity, and operational readiness.

New Combat Forces on Display

PLA Declares World-Class Ambitions with ‘Strongest Army’ Benchmark

W.Y. Kwok

For the first time, an official PRC publication explicitly defines its goal to “establish a world-class army” (建设世界一流军队) standards as equivalent to the “world’s strongest military”(实力最强的军队), marking a direct competitive framework with the United States and other leading powers.

Released weeks before the Victory Day parade commemorating Japan’s defeat and following the PLA founding anniversary, the commentary leverages historical symbolism to declare CCP’s readiness to compete with, and potentially challenge, the existing global military order.

President Xi Jinping has expedited its “Three-Step” (三步走) modernization schedule since 2017, moving basic military modernization from mid-century to 2035 while targeting a critical 2027 centenary milestone, despite acknowledging ongoing “inadequate capabilities” and “significant gaps” compared to advanced global militaries. The commentary also heavily emphasizes CCP “absolute leadership” over the PLA, signaling Xi’s effort to reinforce military control while questions persist about his authority over the armed forces.

One week after “Army Day” (八一建军节), the August 1 anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Daily published a commentary titled “Deeply Understand the Significant Original Contributions to Building a World-Class Military in All Respects” (深刻把握全面建成世界一流军队的重大原创性贡献) (People’s Daily, August 7). The piece, written by a professor at the National University of Defense Technology, traces national defense and military strategy development since 1997 and emphasizes Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping’s 2016 goal of “building a world-class army” (建设世界一流军队).

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Deterring a Taiwan Invasion Lessons from Imperial Japan

Nicholas Welch

Last year, ChinaTalk covered Operation Causeway — the WWII-era US military plan to invade Japan-occupied Taiwan and use the island as a launching base for an assault against Japan. As US Army LTC Kevin McKittrick explained, Causeway was ultimately scrapped because, “the enemy always has a vote.”

Today, we’re exploring how Imperial Japan fended off Operation Causeway — in the form of its own large-scale Taiwan-Okinawa defensive plan, dubbed Operation Sho-2Go 捷2号作戦 (“Operation Victory No. 2”). Executed along side Operation Sho-1Go (Philippines), Operation Sho-3Go (Japan mainland), and Operation Sho-4Go (Hokkaido), Sho-2Go involved rapidly fortifying Taiwan with five divisions — approximately 165,600 troops — and employing a strategy of “vertical resilience” by constructing extensive underground tunnel networks and fortifications to leverage Taiwan’s mountainous terrain. Sho-2Go’s key innovation was to thoroughly disperse and conceal air and naval forces in protected positions, preserving them from initial US attacks, and then concentrate these forces in asymmetric kamikaze strikes against US landing fleets at the critical moment of invasion. Sho-2Go’s successful deterrence of a Taiwan invasion led American troops to target Okinawa instead.

This article is the product of fantastic archival research — using Japanese-language source materials — conducted by Japan Air Self-Defense Force Colonel Hirokazu Honda, who just finished a year-long stint at the Air War College (AWC) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Colonel Honda earned his commission upon graduating from the National Defense Academy of Japan 防衛大学校 in 2004; he also has a master’s degree in aerospace engineering. He has served as A6, A5, and A1 staff for the Air Staff Office; Commander of the 36th Air Control and Warning Squadron; and defense strategy planner at the Joint Staff Office (J5). Colonel Honda was advised by AWC professor and US Air Force Colonel Jared D. Paslay.1

From Shield to Spear: How Golden Dome Points the Way toward Breaking China’s Kill Web

Matthew Smokovitz

If the United States fights China on China’s terms, it may risk collapse in the opening hours. Such a war would not begin with a slow exchange of fire—it would be a race between the two sides to sever the other’s ability to think and act as a single, coordinated force. Beijing has spent decades forging its warfighting system into a tightly integrated brain and nervous system. Theater commanders fuse data from satellites, over-the-horizon radars, airborne sensors, and undersea arrays into a shared real-time picture. From this picture, precisely timed orders flow to air, sea, and missile forces. That operational coherence—seeing, deciding, and striking as one—is what turns scattered operational assets into a lethal, synchronized kill web.

That coherence is China’s greatest strength and its most brittle hinge. When missile salvos arrive just as bombers spring in from their launch points, when submarines maneuver without orders because their neural network tells them the enemy’s retreat path—this is operational synchronization in action. But when data flows stall, when timing errors creep in, that neural network misfires. Missiles still launch, radars still receive—but the system fights as a collection of disjointed parts. Strikes fizzle. Orders lag. Reflexes fail.

Traditionally, the United States has attacked such integrated systems by methodically rolling them back—destroying radars, missile batteries, and command centers one by one. In Desert Storm, in the Balkans, that worked. But against China’s kill web? It is a slow, costly path to disaster. Mobile launchers reposition before they are struck. Redundant sensors light back up. Alternate comms routes reroute data. The brain and nervous system remain intact even as its limbs are wounded.

This is where Golden Dome enters the discussion. Conceived as a homeland missile shield, Golden Dome envisions a multilayered architecture—with one layer even space-based—using both sensors and interceptors in orbit. This space layer is vital for defense—it is a vantage point above the battlefield no terrestrial platform can match. But as the concept takes shape, it makes clear that such a layer will possibly be necessary to countering China’s kill web. Space-based interceptors are not just tools to strike incoming missiles targeting the US homeland and its interests; they can also hold the enemy’s neural infrastructure at risk.

America Must Rediscover Political Warfare: The Pen Dictates the Sword

Jack Barry and Daniel Elkins.

The United States is overdependent on the Department of Defense (DoD) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) to counter threats that are political in nature.

In U.S. national security discussions, terms like “unconventional warfare” and “political warfare” are often used interchangeably to describe the murky space between peace and war where an increasing amount of global conflict is levied. The imprecision and conflation of these terms is symptomatic of a broader, more concerning trend of being slow and unilateral in reacting to adversaries who contest American interest and shape the battlefield without firing a bullet. The overall lack of understanding of political warfare causes strategic misalignment in how we should operate in and respond to an increasingly complex global order. If we do not make a deliberate shift toward a whole-of-government political warfare framework in which military operations support integrated diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts, we will continue to lose ground to nations who have mastered the art of full spectrum political warfare.

The distinction of political warfare and unconventional warfare is significant, and it would pay well to understand them completely. George Kennan, the architect of U.S. Cold War strategy, defined political warfare in 1948 as, “The employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives… from overt actions such as political alliances, economic measures, and ‘white’ propaganda to covert operations such as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare, and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.”

Unconventional warfare (UW), by contrast has a much narrower definition. According to the 2014 edition of Joint Publication 3-05, UW consists of activities that enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power, usually by operating through underground or guerrilla forces in denied areas.

In other words, political warfare describes the full spectrum of available means of influence; unconventional warfare is one option. Yet, in Washington, “unconventional warfare” has become a catch-all label for almost any irregular, non-kinetic activity, which convolutes the policy discussion and triggers military-first responses to problems that require an interagency campaign. In contrast to Washington’s current state, Russia and China understand political warfare and apply it effectively.

Why China has not acted on Western warnings to “disentangle” conventional and nuclear missile capabilities

Nathan McQuarrie

For more than a decade, Western nuclear analysts have sounded the alarm over a particularly dangerous characteristic of China’s nuclear forces: They often overlap with China’s conventional forces. Should the United States and China ever go to war, a conventional US attack on an overlapping, or “entangled,” Chinese system could be misinterpreted by Chinese decision-makers as an attack on their nuclear arsenal, drastically raising the risk that such a conflict could go nuclear.

That risk is particularly acute when it comes to China’s Dongfeng-26 (DF-26) intermediate-range ballistic missile, which is deployed on a road-mobile missile launcher and can carry either a nuclear or conventional warhead. While a nuclear-armed DF-26 would likely have different support vehicles in its vicinity than a conventionally armed one, efforts to conceal and obscure DF-26 deployments during a conflict could easily lead US military analysts to mistake the two on satellite imagery, potentially resulting in a US conventional strike that knocks out a Chinese nuclear weapon. Similarly, if DF-26 missiles were to be launched, US military analysts would likely struggle to discern whether China was conducting a nuclear strike.

For years, warnings about the DF-26 and other entangled systems did not seem to reach China’s nuclear community. But as the nuclear analyst Fiona Cunningham has recently written, China’s nuclear community is now well aware of the danger posed by nuclear-conventional entanglement.

And yet, as far as can be ascertained, the DF-26 still retains its nuclear mission in addition to its conventional role. To make matters worse, China appears to be developing the longer-range Dongfeng-27. Like the DF-26, it has both nuclear and conventional capabilities.

Why is China taking this risk? Previously, it appeared that Chinese nuclear experts were simply unaware of the risks they were courting. But if that is not true anymore, what can explain China’s risky behavior now?

Guns of September: What a Parade May Reveal About China’s Military Modernization

John S. Van Oudenaren

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) upcoming military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII will serve as both a symbolic display and an operational exercise, highlighting the PLA’s advancements in new combat domains—such as unmanned systems, directed energy, and electronic warfare—while also revealing improvements in command structure and organizational capacity. The parade aims to underscore loyalty to Xi Jinping as central to combat readiness, even as recent purges expose deep institutional instability and a persistent “trust deficit” between the CCP and the PLA. These tensions underscore the regime’s challenge in balancing political control with genuine military professionalization

The PLA will use the parade to demonstrate its growing joint capabilities, showcasing an integrated “Four Services + Four Arms” model and the role of new branches like the Aerospace and Cyberspace Forces. The involvement of militia units and strategic strike formations further emphasizes the whole-of-force approach underpinning China’s military modernization trajectory

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is finalizing plans for its massive 80th anniversary commemoration of victory in the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression” (中国人民抗日战争) and “World Anti-Fascist War” (世界反法西斯战争) (People’s Daily, June 25). The event, to be held in Beijing on September 3, will feature a troop review and speech by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping. Global attention will likely fixate on the long columns of entirely domestically produced armored vehicles, missiles, and warplanes rolling through Tiananmen Square, highlighting the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing firepower (China Daily, June 24; Xinhua, June 25). The parade will also contain important indications about PLA command structure, organizational capacity, and operational readiness.

New footage shows Israel struck Gaza's Nasser Hospital four times

Merlyn Thomas, Benedict Garman & Sebastian Vandermeersch

Israel struck Nasser Hospital at least four times during its deadly attack in southern Gaza on Monday, an analysis of new video footage by BBC Verify has found.

The attack, which has attracted international condemnation and widespread anger, reportedly killed at least 20 people, including five journalists.

Initial reports from Gaza said that Israel had struck the hospital twice, with the first blast followed nine minutes later by another which hit first responders and journalists who arrived at the scene.

But new analysis suggests the hospital was struck four times in total. BBC Verify and expert analysis found that two staircases were hit almost simultaneously in the first wave, and while what was thought to be a single later attack was in fact two separate strikes hitting the same place within a fraction of a second.

Israel does not allow international journalists to enter Gaza independently. BBC Verify identified the additional strikes by analysing dozens of videos provided by a freelancer on the ground and material filmed by eyewitnesses that circulated online.

In the first incident, an Israeli strike hit the exterior staircase on the hospital's eastern side at 10:08 local time (07:08 GMT), killing journalist Hussam Al-Masri who was operating a live TV feed for Reuters.

BBC Verify has now identified another previously unreported blast at a northern wing staircase at practically the same time, which was overshadowed by the "double-tap" strike on the eastern staircase.

New footage shows smoke rising and damage at both staircases, while emergency workers said the hospital's operating department was hit.

Pharmaceutical Blackout: The Hidden Threat to U.S. Security

Tim Ray & Stuart Glickman

Imagine a crisis where U.S. citizens are abruptly cut off from lifesaving medications. Pharmacy shelves are empty. And medicine cabinets lay bare. This isn’t a far-fetched dystopia. It’s a real and growing threat. Generic drugs, which make up nearly 90% of U.S. prescriptions, depend on Chinese and Indian manufacturing for active pharmaceutical ingredients (API), finished dosage forms, or both. In the event of a possible – if not probable – trade war or geopolitical rupture, these supply chains could be severed; leaving Americans vulnerable to “pharmacological blackouts.”

Senators in June reintroduced the bipartisan RAPID Reserve Act, a legislative lifeline designed to prevent a pharmacological blackout. And as Congress reconvenes in the coming weeks, policy makers should not only advance RAPID’s call to bring critical medicine manufacturing back to U.S. shores and build strategic reserves, they should go further.

Three decades of a combination of economic forces and strategic decisions hollowed out the domestic generic drug manufacturing base. First, the consolidation within the commercial channels (retailers, wholesalers, and pharmacy benefit managers) shifted market leverage heavily toward the buyers. Increased leverage allowed these buyers to aggressively negotiate lower prices for generic drugs and erode profit margins of drug manufacturers. At the same time, Indian and Chinese manufacturers – benefiting from significantly lower production costs – entered the market. Many Western companies followed suit, either building or acquiring manufacturing facilities in India to remain cost competitive. The influx of low-cost suppliers gave the buyers even greater leverage and pushed prices and manufacturer margins even lower. We now have a system where generic drugs make up 90% of prescriptions but account for just 10% of drug revenue – leaving little financial incentive to manufacture them onshore or invest in supply chain resilience.

Market forces have created unsustainable economics and a reliance on offshore manufacturing. These market forces will not solve the very problem that they created. An active, strategic federal response is required to restore domestic manufacturing capacity and protect the public.

Can Syria’s New Leaders and U.S.-Backed Forces Unite to Defeat ISIS?

Seth Frantzman

U.S. Navy Aviation Boatswain’s Mate Aircraft Handling 2nd Class Kyle Darmanin, from Mooresville, North Carolina, assigned to air department’s flight deck crash and salvage division, signals an F/A-18E Super Hornet, attached to Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 27, on the flight deck of Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) while underway in the Timor Sea in support of Talisman Sabre 2025, July 14, 2025. Talisman Sabre is the largest bilateral military exercise between Australia and the United States advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific by strengthening relationships and interoperability among key allies and partners, while enhancing our collective capabilities to respond to a wide array of potential security concerns. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Tyler Crowley)

US Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), the Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, led a delegation to Syria that met with Syria’s transitional President, Ahmed al-Shara’a, on August 25. She was accompanied by US Congressman Joe Wilson (R-SC). She also met with Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, during the trip.

The Great Syria Rethink for America

The trip comes as the US continues to do outreach to Syria and support its new government. Shaheen’s trip was symbolic because it involved meetings with Shara’a and Abdi, two key leaders in Syria who will need to work together if the country is to proceed with unification. In addition, they will need to coordinate against extremist threats, such as ISIS.

“A Syria that can stand on its own after ridding itself of the Assad regime will be a cornerstone for regional stability in the Middle East. America is ready to be a partner to a new Syria that moves in the right direction,” Shaheen said.

On August 19, US forces carried out a raid targeting an ISIS leader who was hiding out in Atmeh in northwest Syria. US Central Command said that the ISIS member was a key financier and was killed in the raid.

Peace deal dead, new war drums beating for Ukraine

Stephen Bryen

There is growing evidence that not only have the Ukraine peace talks stalled, but NATO has won over Washington to not only continue the war but to expand it.

While Russian President Vladimir Putin has flown off to meet with his two buddies, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, in China on an unprecedented four-day jaunt, NATO, with full US backing, is stepping up its effort to hand the Russian army a major defeat and, following that, introducing NATO troops to “stabilize” Ukraine.

What is the evidence? First and very noticeable is the US decision to ship 3,350 missiles to Ukraine, ostensibly to be paid for (someday?) by the Europeans (which ones are not defined). These are known as Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAM), a type of air-launched cruise missile.

The Aviationist reports that “Ukrainian Air Force’s F-16s, Mirage 2000s and its fleet of Russian-origin MiG-29s, Su-25s and Su-27s would be able to operate it. This new weapon would be an addition to the AASM Hammer and GBU-39 SDB already employed by Ukrainian fighters.”

According to open source intelligence, ERAMs have a range of 250 miles (402 kilometers). However, that is the range once launched by an aircraft. Washington says it opposes Ukrainian missile attacks on Russian territory, and while it is restricting the use of long-range HIMARS, it is not restricting the use of ERAM.

ERAM reportedly carried a 500-pound (227-kilogram) warhead, far larger than any Ukrainian UAV and more than double any of the different HIMARS missiles (M31 Utility Warhead, ATACMS warhead). It may be that ERAMs can be fielded with cluster munitions, although much about the ERAM is uncertain.

Ukraine has also introduced a new cruise missile called Flamingo (FP-5). Developed by a Ukrainian company called Fire Point, the missile has a range of 3,000 kilometers and carries a massive one-ton warhead.

The Guardian view on Russia’s strike on Kyiv: Putin is testing Trump’s will and Europe’s resolve

Wednesday night brought a grim return to Russia’s form: one of the heaviest air raids on Kyiv since the full-scale invasion began. Moscow eased off its strikes on major cities in the run-up to the Alaska summit, and it held off its attack on the Ukrainian capital until Keith Kellogg, the US special envoy, had finished his visit there. But within hours of his departure, at least 18 people, including several children, were dead in an attack on a residential block, and the European Union mission had been severely damaged.

Donald Trump periodically suggests that he is drawing a line for Vladimir Putin. Yet each time he appears to set a limit, the Russian president breezes through it. The Kyiv attack shows that it is Mr Putin who is testing the US president. Mr Trump threatened “severe consequences” if Moscow did not immediately agree to a ceasefire – but in Anchorage was quickly persuaded by Mr Putin that there was no need for one prior to a peace deal.

“I think in many ways he’s there,” Mr Trump told reporters on Tuesday. But Russia’s diplomatic stalling, allowing it to continue to grind away on the battlefield, is transparent. The lethal strike on civilians in Kyiv shows exactly what it thinks of peace talks. As Mr Trump also remarked: “Every conversation I have with [Mr Putin] is a good conversation. And then unfortunately, a bomb is loaded up into Kyiv or someplace, and then I get very angry about it.”

The US president appears unable to draw the obvious conclusion, and his anger has yet to convert into action. He continues to cast blame on Volodymyr Zelenskyy (“not exactly innocent either”) for Russia’s unprovoked invasion. Mr Trump floated the idea of sanctions again, but only when pressed. His one concrete move – doubling the tariff on most Indian goods to 50% – was billed as punishment for New Delhi’s Russian oil imports.

What to Do About “Mirror Life”?

Liyam Chitayat and Kate Adamala

For many years, researchers have been pursuing the development of what scientists have called “mirror life.” This evocative term refers to a fundamental property of biological life. All biological molecules have what is called chirality, a feature more colloquially understood as “handedness.” Just as left and right hands cannot be superimposed on each other, so, too, does biological matter function in this way. Natural life exhibits a striking molecular uniformity: proteins are constructed almost exclusively from “left-handed” amino acids, while DNA employs “right-handed” sugars. The creation of mirror life would entail a deliberate inversion of this biological paradigm, through the development in laboratories of synthetic organisms built from the opposite-handed versions of these essential molecular components. Such organisms would constitute living systems that are functionally equivalent to natural life but composed of molecules that are the complete chiral inverse of every living entity on Earth. That would, in effect, allow scientists to look at life through a biological mirror.

Mirror life remains a distant prospect: it could take researchers ten to 30 years to create a mirror cell that would be able to perform the hallmark activities of life. But this technology could have many uses. It could help scientists explore the origins of life, as reconstructing biochemistry on the “other side” would provide insights into how life evolved on Earth and could occur on other planets in the solar system. Mirror life could also find many potential applications in medicine and biomanufacturing. Human bodies, for instance, are not yet equipped to degrade mirror molecules, so therapeutics based on such molecules could prove to be more stable and durable than current ones.

Yet the very characteristics that would make mirror life so valuable for research and therapeutic applications—its resistance to natural degradation, its invisibility to evolved systems of immunological response and biological controls, and its independence from existing ecological constraints—are precisely what make it a potentially existential threat. A study released in July, co-authored by one of us (Adamala), suggests that mirror bacteria might be able, for instance, to evade existing immunological responses to bacteria and other germs. This could lead to untreatable infections that spread through human, animal, and plant populations. Mirror organisms could also act like the ultimate invasive species, thriving without natural predators or competitors while potentially displacing beneficial microbes that ecosystems depend on. Even more concerning, conventional antibiotics and antiviral treatments would likely be ineffective against mirror pathogens since these drugs target specific molecular structures that would be reversed in mirror life. Whether released accidentally or intentionally, mirror organisms could simultaneously bypass human biological defenses, resist medical treatments, and disrupt the ecological balance.

Why we still don’t know where COVID-19 came from. And why we need to find out.

Gustavo Palacios, Adolfo García-Sastre, David A. Relman

Five years after COVID-19 emerged, killing millions, costing trillions, and disrupting global life, we still don’t have a definitive answer as to the origins of the pandemic and the virus. This continued uncertainty is not due to scientific limitations but the withholding of critical information, particularly by China.

In June 2025, the WHO’s Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens (SAGO), a panel of 27 international experts, published its most thorough analysis to date. What SAGO said is clear: Without China providing fundamental data, definitive conclusions remain impossible.

SAGO explicitly called for detailed records from several countries, especially China, but also Germany and the United States. While we can reasonably assume that the United States and Germany withheld portions of the requested intelligence to protect sources, methods, or collection practices, China withheld information that in most countries is treated as publicly available health information, such as early viral genome sequences, laboratory safety documentation, and detailed environmental samples from animal markets. We recognize that some of these data may be politically sensitive, as it relates to wildlife trade regulations or national biosecurity programs. Nonetheless, during a pandemic, China’s obligations under the International Health Regulations must take precedence.

As stated in the legally binding International Health Regulations (2005), each country must “notify WHO … within 24 hours” of assessing a potential public health emergency of international concern (Article 6) and must also respond to WHO requests to “verify” outbreaks, even when identified through unofficial sources (Article 9). China’s governmental response—issued on April 25, 2025 in its official white paper, “COVID-19 Prevention, Control and Origins Tracing: China’s Actions and Stance”—declared the investigation “finished.” Rather than suggesting that SARS-CoV-2 emerged from bats or susceptible animals, China insists, instead, that the virus was imported on frozen food.

Golden Dome and arms control: impediment or opportunity?

Pranay Vaddi, John K. Warden

President Donald Trump entered office with a series of national security-related proclamations, many of which have initiated a sharp turn in US foreign policy. But when it comes to nuclear arms control, the president has outlined a view that in many ways aligns with that of the previous administration and traditional US objectives. Speaking to reporters on February 13, President Trump expressed disquiet at the amount of money the United States, Russia, and China are spending on nuclear weapons, stating “there’s no reason for us to be building brand new nuclear weapons, we already have so many” and “here we are building new nuclear weapons, and they’re building nuclear weapons,” referring to Russia and China (Miller and Price 2025). He then indicated that one of the first meetings he would like to have would be with Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping to discuss nuclear arms and “cut our military budget in half.” (Miller and Price 2025). Given that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia expires in February 2026 and Russia and China are expanding their nuclear arsenals, the prompt attention by the Trump administration to strategic arms control is a welcome sign.

However, President Trump’s interest in new arms control talks may be complicated by one of his other priorities: an expanded national missile defense. On January 27, 2025, within a week of being inaugurated for his second term in office, President Trump issued an executive order entitled “The Iron Dome for America”—later renamed “Golden Dome” by Trump—complete with sweeping directives to the Defense Department to develop proposals for a comprehensive anti-missile and air defense system for the United States (The White House 2025). In May, he confirmed plans to complete the project in his second term, calling Golden Dome “an architecture for the state-of-the-art system that will deploy next generation technologies across the land, sea, and space, including space-based sensors and interceptors” (Trump 2025). Russia and China oppose the expansion of US missile defenses; each views the yet-to-be-realized technological potential of US missile interceptors as a threat to its assured second-strike capability.

Exclusive: Electromagnetic weapon zaps drone swarm in seconds

Colin Demarest

Waves of drones tumbled out of the sky above Camp Atterbury, Indiana, on Tuesday, their mechanical death throes punctuating what was otherwise a quiet morning.

Why it matters: Drone swarms are a nightmare for security officials all over the world, whether they're overwhelming a Russian air base or hovering near an American airport.

How it happened: Defense contractor Epirus this week demonstrated its drone-frying Leonidas to observers from various U.S. military services and foreign countries, including some in the Indo-Pacific.Axios was the only media on hand for the Atterbury tests, about 45 minutes south of downtown Indianapolis.

In the climax of the two-hour show, Leonidas went up against 49 quadcopters, the largest grouping it's ever faced. The "forcefield system," which weaponizes electromagnetic interference, crippled all of them at once. No pricey projectiles. No fireballs.

Epirus CEO Andy Lowery was understandably bullish, telling Axios: "I call this a singularity event."

The urgent need to procure more THAAD interceptors

Bradley Bowman and Ryan Brobst

The U.S. Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense “Talon” interceptor inventory is unacceptably low, potentially leaving U.S. forces vulnerable in a future conflict. The service reportedly consumed nearly a quarter of its interceptors during the 12-Day War between Israel and Iran in June, and absent aggressive congressional intervention, it will take too long to replenish and expand stocks.

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency awarded a $2.06 billion contract modification to produce Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, “Talon” interceptors late last month. That step is laudable but insufficient. Congress needs to help by approving the administration’s request to shift money between programs to purchase more interceptors, providing enough funding to procure the maximum number of interceptors industry can produce next fiscal year and pushing the Pentagon and industry to expand production capacity as quickly as possible, among other steps.

THAAD is a U.S.-produced, land-based missile defense system that uses hit-to-kill interceptors to destroy short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles both inside and outside of the atmosphere. Currently, the U.S. Army possesses eight THAAD batteries, with six launchers per battery and eight interceptors per launcher for a total of 48 interceptors loaded per battery. THAAD forms the upper layer of the Army’s land-based theater ballistic missile defenses, with Patriot comprising the lower layer and both complementing naval interceptors, such as the SM-3 and SM-6.

During June’s 12-Day War, Iran reportedly fired over 500 ballistic missiles at Israel during the conflict and around a dozen at a U.S. airbase in Qatar, destroying a geodesic dome. The United States assisted Israel in shooting down many of the ballistic missiles, including with the multiple THAAD batteries deployed to the Middle East during the war, demonstrating interoperability within a larger architecture.

Steel and Silicon: The Case for Teaming Armored Formations with UAVs

Charlie Phelps

Dawn broke over the rolling hills of Eastern Europe as Task Force Loki, a combined arms battalion, prepared to breach a fortified enemy defensive belt. Intelligence reports confirmed that an enemy motorized rifle regiment had emplaced antitank ditches, minefields, and dismounted infantry armed with antitank guided missiles and supported by artillery. Instead of pushing scouts blindly into the kill zone, the battalion launched a swarm of rotary-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from the turrets of the lead tanks and fixed-wing drones from the battalion’s organic multidomain reconnaissance element. Within minutes, overhead feeds revealed camouflaged fighting positions, artillery hides, and an unseen second belt of defense two kilometers to the rear.

One drone, a loitering munition linked to the battalion’s AI-enabled targeting system, locked onto a thermal signature of personnel in a tree line confirming the presence of a fighting position. A second drone armed with advanced imagining systems and pattern recognition software queued and confirmed the presence of a wire-guided antitank weapon system. Seconds later, the enemy antitank team was gone. This process was rapidly repeated over a dozen times in a matter of minutes as surveillance UAVs communicated targeting information in real time to additional loitering munitions. Another UAV dropped decoy electronic emitters mimicking armored formations maneuvering to a breach point, drawing enemy artillery onto empty ground. As enemy sensors fixated on the deception point, the true breach force moved up under cover of smoke and UAV overwatch. Thermobaric munitions impacted enemy bunkers and pillboxes just prior to direct fire suppression from Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Combat engineers, guided by real-time drone feeds, cleared a safe lane through the obstacle belt. An M1A2 platoon surged forward, supported by dismounted infantry and Apache attack helicopters conducting synchronized fires on vehicle positions identified by UAVs. The vulnerability of the attack helicopters was reduced through the employment of cheap, small UAVs whose purpose was to serve as targets for enemy air defense systems.

Build–Broadcast–Bolster: A Strategic Framework for Middle Power Influence

Elizabeth Boyett

Military mass and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) size no longer define influence in today’s security environment. States without superpower arsenals shape coalition decisions, deter aggression, and extract alliance-wide concessions. They do this not by coercion, but by converting specialized strengths into strategic leverage. These middle powers lack coercive leverage to impose their preferences unilaterally, but possess the vision, credibility, and tactical acumen to turn narrow capabilities into tools of wide influence.

Lawrence Freedman notes that strategy is the art of converting resources into power, while Joseph Nye reminds us that credibility and narrative shape outcomes as much as raw force. The Build–Broadcast–Bolster (BBB) framework builds on these insights, showing how middle powers transform niche capacities into sustainable influence through three reinforcing mechanisms:Build: Developing niche capabilities or chokepoints, such as advanced manufacturing, control of critical minerals, strategic geography, or technological leadership, on which others depend.

Broadcast: Framing and signaling capabilities as indispensable to allies and adversaries.

Bolster: Locking in gains through institutions, governance, and durable credibility to ensure resilience and longevity.

Taken together, BBB mechanisms show how smaller states convert narrow strengths into an outsized influence. This is not an academic point for coalition planners and commanders; recognizing where partners bring leverage in contingency planning, wargaming, and alliance management can matter as much as counting battalions. Properly understood and integrated middle-power influence can shape operational outcomes well beyond traditional measures of force.

Conceptual Framework

Will the next world war begin in orbit? Jonathan McDowell on strategic competition in space

Dan Drollette Jr

He’s been called the “go-to expert for all things spaceflight” by the New York Times, and “the archivist of world spaceflight knowledge” by New Scientist.

Jonathan McDowell is a British-American astronomer and astrophysicist who works at the Harvard–Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics’s Chandra X-ray Center, where he was part of the group that operates this noted space telescope for the past 26 years. (Though he is in the process of moving.)

In his free time, McDowell conducts research into the history of spaceflight, and since 1989 has written and edited Jonathan’s Space Report,[1] a free internet newsletter documenting technical details on satellite launches.

So, McDowell seemed to be the perfect person to ask about strategic competition in space: Could the proliferation of players, and the increasing commercialization of space, lead to more competition, more accidents (both ones that are real and those serving as cover for aggressive behavior in the heavens), and more instability? In this interview with me, McDowell describes some of the myriad ways in which international friction—and even war—could begin in orbit. And he offers some urgent solutions.

Dan Drollette Jr: It sounds I caught you just before you leave the United States. You’ll be moving soon?

Jonathan McDowell: Yes, I’ll be moving to the UK in a few weeks, with about 1,500 square feet of bookcases containing an archive of the history of space exploration, satellites, and astronomy, from the era of the first V-2 rockets onwards—so, everything from the 1940s to today.

And finding the square footage to put all that in, at an affordable price, has been a challenge. I found a basement that I can convert into office space, and I’m going to buy a flat above it. But it’s a big process; it’s going to cost $50,000 just to ship the stuff from the Boston area to the UK.

How AI and surveillance capitalism are undermining democracy

Suresh Venkatasubramanian

On March 6, 2025, Axios reported that the State Department had launched a new social media surveillance program called “Catch and Revoke.” The intended goal of this program was to use artificial intelligence to assist in reviewing “tens of thousands of student visa holders’ social media footprints” to find “evidence of alleged terrorist sympathies expressed after Hamas’ attack on Israel.”

Whether you find this a horrifying development, an exciting application of AI, a flagrant violation of First Amendment rights, or even just a headscratcher, this incident captures the dynamics of how artificial intelligence, surveillance, and threats to democracy all come together. In a nutshell: AI’s promise of behavior prediction and control fuels a vicious cycle of surveillance which inevitably triggers abuses of power.

Throughout history, humans have always searched for ways to predict (and control) behavior, whether this constituted consulting an oracle, throwing bones, reading tea leaves, or even examining the shape of a person’s face and body to determine personality traits (which seems awfully contemporary if you start diving into the literature on “emotion AI”). As people became more adept at collecting data of various kinds, the field of statistics emerged to aid them in using data for prediction. (One of the amusing facts about AI research is that virtually every debate one encounters about the appropriate use of artificial intelligence in some social setting has parallels in history, often much earlier, which make it clear that efforts to predict and control behavior was never about AI at all.)

The problem with using data to make predictions is that the process can be used as a weapon against society, threatening democratic values. As the lines between private and public data are blurred in modern society, many won’t realize that their private lives are becoming data points used to make decisions about them. AI has supercharged these capabilities, smoothing out people’s individuality and instead placing each person into a group that’s deemed to behave a certain way. And while data and AI can be used for good, the only way these beneficial outcomes can be achieved is with restrictive, well-designed controls to prevent damage to democracy, much like humans did with nuclear energy.

Redefining Military Readiness in an Age of Perpetual Competition

Robbin Laird

The concept of the “fight tonight force” has undergone a fundamental transformation that extends far beyond traditional measures of military readiness.

While conventional thinking has long focused on the trinity of force readiness, sustainability, and logistics support, contemporary military challenges demand an expanded understanding that incorporates rapid learning, continuous adaptation, and the ability to leverage uncertainty as a strategic advantage.

This evolution reflects more than tactical modernization or technological advancement. It represents a paradigm shift from static preparedness to dynamic adaptability, from crisis management to what might be termed “chaos management” or the deliberate cultivation of capabilities that can thrive within complex, unpredictable operational environments.

The traditional fight tonight force model emerged from Cold War assumptions about discrete military crises that could be resolved through the rapid application of superior force. Today’s security environment, characterized by persistent strategic competition with peer adversaries, technological acceleration, and ambiguous operational spaces, renders this model insufficient.

Modern military forces must maintain immediate combat effectiveness while simultaneously evolving their capabilities faster than adversaries can develop countermeasures.

The Obsolescence of Traditional Readiness Models

The classical approach to military readiness presumed that effectiveness could be achieved through predetermined planning, standardized procedures, and centralized command structures. This model worked adequately in an international system characterized by relatively stable major power relationships, clear geographical boundaries, and conventional military threats. Forces could deploy with detailed operational plans, execute established procedures, and achieve decisive results through superior training and equipment.

FUNCTIONAL FITNESS: IMPROVING RETENTION AND FIGHTING “BRAIN DRAIN”

Paul Kearney, Dennis Halleran

In fact, this article shows that the core tension isn’t between basic branches and functional areas, but between functional areas and leaving the Army.

The contemporary U.S. Army faces significant challenges in retaining high-quality officer talent. Studies indicate that only 47% of company-grade officers continue service beyond their initial active-duty service obligation), with particularly acute losses among West Point graduates and ROTC scholarship recipients—precisely those officers in whom the army has invested most heavily. The reserve components have long had a retention crisis, particularly for command billets. The retention crisis has prompted re-examination of the factors driving talented officers to pursue civilian careers, compensation differentials, limited career autonomy, family strain, and misalignment between individual talents and organizational assignments frequently cited as primary concerns.

Against this backdrop, critics have raised concerns about the Army’s functional area specialization program. Some, like David Barno have suggested it creates “brain drain” from basic combat arms branches like infantry, armor, and field artillery with the best officers from basic branches. Others like R.D. Hooker Jr. suggest that officers who go to functional areas are marginal performers, those who want to avoid the “hard” jobs in combat arms to coast with minimal effort, or both. These opposing viewpoints are asserted without empirical evidence. This article tests both assertions. Recent pilot surveys suggest that rather than depleting talent or providing safe haven for “quiet quitters,” functional areas serve as a critical retention mechanism that preserves institutional knowledge and maintains the army’s competitive advantage for both the service at large and for the basic branches. In fact, this article shows that the core tension isn’t between basic branches and functional areas, but between functional areas and leaving the Army.

OPMS and the Origin of Functional Areas

Army bids adieu to ISR Task Force, stands up Strategy and Transformation Directorate

Ashley Roque

WASHINGTON — The Army is standing up the Directorate for Strategy and Transformation inside its intelligence shop as part of a larger shake up that involves dissolving the ISR Task Force, according to a senior official helping lead the charge.

“This institutionalizes this role of transformation that we’ve been doing in the ISR Task Force, makes it more permanent, and also combines it with the important role of strategy and strategy formulation for the Army Intel Corps,” said Andrew Evans, who headed up the former task force before being tapped as the new director for the Strategy & Transformation Office inside the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence shop (G-2).

Stood up during the first Trump administration, the ISR Task Force was charged with modernizing the service’s airborne ISR fleet at a time when the larger department focus was pivoting from terrorism towards large-scale contingency planning in the Indo-Pacific. The task force’s work included shepherding in several high-profile, Greek mythology-themed development and acquisition programs like the Athena-Sensor, centered around two converted Global 6500s, another pair of converted Global 6500s dubbed the Athena-Radar initiative, and the High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES).

“We [also] expanded beyond sensing, and looked at what it meant to modernize training in new ways and make it more accessible for soldiers,” Evans told Breaking Defense on Friday. “We did a lot with pilots … and a lot of coordination with units.

“What we discovered along the way is that transformation is not a one and done thing,” he added. “You don’t transform to achieve some end state and say, ‘I’m done transforming’ in the world where threats continuously change, you also must continuously transform.”

Evans has worked to sunset that office, but its work will now be carried out by a transformation division inside the G-2. And above that new division is now the Directorate for Strategy and Transformation, with Evans at the helm.

“I have executive oversight of that as one division, but also strategy engagements and the performance acceleration and business transformation,” he explained.

1 September 2025

Donald Trump’s Price Tag on the US-India Relationship

Muhib Rahman, and Nazmus Sakib

Donald Trump’s tariffs on India signal that Washington, far from abandoning New Delhi, wants to see more effort and less hedging.

When the State Department finally placed the “Foreign Terrorist Organization” label on the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its suicide outfit, the Majeed Brigade, on August 11, most observers filed it under routine counterterrorism. BLA militants have spent years in violent struggle with the Pakistani state. Their actions have included the murder of Chinese teachers in Karachi, hijacking Pakistan’s Jaffar Express, and turning Gwadar—the centerpiece of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor—into a terror zone. The US move thus can be seen as a long-overdue legal housekeeping.

However, the terror tag was rolled out the same week the White House doubled tariffs on Indian exports and tied any relief to New Delhi’s procurement of cheap Russian oil. This is hardly a coincidence, especially because Pakistani Authorities have long been claiming India’s backing of BLA terrorist activities in Pakistan.

The FTO designation, therefore, marks the opening chord of a new American play in South Asia. The United States is no longer treating India as a privileged partner exempt from cost, nor Pakistan as a mere appendage to Afghan policy. Instead, it is introducing conditionality as the organizing principle of its regional strategy.

Pakistan’s Narrow Window of Opportunity

The FTO designation establishes a more transparent, pragmatic channel for US-Pakistan cooperation, including force protection near foreign projects and intelligence sharing on insurgent financing. It also comes as US officials and businesses eye Balochistan’s buried riches—copper, lithium, and the rare-earth elements that power green tech and precision missiles.

India-Pakistan missile race heats up, but China in crosshairs, too

Abid Hussain

Islamabad, Pakistan – India on August 20 announced that it had successfully test-fired Agni-V, its intermediate-range ballistic missile, from a test range in Odisha on its eastern Bay of Bengal coast.

The Agni-V, meaning “fire” in Sanskrit, is 17.5 metres long, weighs 50,000kg, and can carry more than 1,000kg of nuclear or conventional payload. Capable of travelling more than 5,000km at hypersonic speeds of nearly 30,000km per hour, it is among the fastest ballistic missiles in the world.

The Agni test came exactly a week after Pakistan announced the formation of a new Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC), aimed, say experts, at plugging holes in its defensive posture exposed by India during the four-day conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbours in May.

But experts say the latest Indian test might be a message less for Pakistan and more for another neighbour that New Delhi is cautiously warming up to again: China.

The Agni’s range puts most of Asia, including China’s northern regions, and parts of Europe within reach. This was the missile’s 10th test since 2012 and its first since March last year, but its timing, say analysts, was significant.

It came just ahead of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trip to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, amid a thaw in ties – after years of tension over their disputed border – that has been accelerated by United States President Donald Trump’s tariff war against India. On Wednesday, the US tariffs on Indian goods doubled to 50 percent amid tensions over New Delhi’s oil purchases from Russia.

Yet despite that shift in ties with Beijing, India continues to view China as its primary threat in the neighbourhood, say experts, underscoring the complex relationship between the world’s two most populous nations. And it’s at China that India’s development of medium and long-range missiles is primarily aimed, they say.

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