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Germany has become the second-biggest contributor of military aid to Ukraine after the United States, but you wouldn’t know it by following the debate in Berlin. In a replay of Berlin’s long squeamishness over sending German Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine—first refusing before finally relenting in January—the government of Chancellor Olaf Scholz has been dragging out a decision to supply German-made Taurus cruise missiles. Scholz has not explained the reasons for his waffling; similar missiles have already been sent by Britain and France. This week, these Western-supplied cruise missiles may have been used to strike Russian naval facilities in occupied Sevastopol in Ukraine’s increasingly successful efforts to restrict Russian Navy operations in the Black Sea.
The Sevastopol attack shows that Ukraine certainly has good use for more missiles, and Germany should deliver the Taurus if it is serious about helping Ukraine liberate its territories. But the continued framing of these and other weapons as potential game-changers in the war confuses the debate and is harmful to Ukraine. The idea that there is a shortcut to victory raises expectations for a quick end to the carnage that Ukraine is unlikely to fulfill. After more than 18 months of grinding, attritional war, it should be obvious that there are no miracle weapons and that there are no alternatives to slowly and methodically reducing Russian forces in Ukraine.
It is time to bury the game-changing weapons narrative and embrace a more realistic understanding of what individual weapon systems can and cannot accomplish—while making sure that Ukraine gets what it needs to continue the fight.
There are numerous reasons why the idea of game-changing weapons is flawed and dangerous. For one, it risks undermining long-term military support by Western governments as their expectations for the effect of specific weapons are not fulfilled. Just think of the ongoing counteroffensive: The fact that Ukrainian soldiers quickly gained proficiency in handling the Leopard 2s and other fresh Western equipment led some commentators and policymakers to believe that this would automatically translate into battlefield success. They did not bother to ask whether just a few months of training on a limited number of vehicles would suffice to pull off a complex combined arms offensive across well-prepared Russian fortifications.
Disappointment can quickly create discord. Accusations fill the air, arguing that the weapons were not supplied fast enough or in sufficient numbers. If this criticism is voiced by Ukrainians, some Western policymakers feel that Kyiv is “ungrateful.” Focusing so much of the debate on single types of weapons thus contributes to diplomatic and military friction between Ukraine and its Western partners.
Long-range missiles such as the Taurus are especially prone to the game-changer narrative. Precision-guided munitions such as cruise missiles are seen as one of the chief components of various lopsided military campaigns by U.S. and other Western forces, including the 1990-91 Gulf War and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The focus on long-range missiles in the Western debate is further amplified by the almost mythical status of the U.S. military’s AirLand Battle doctrine, first developed in the 1970s as a means to defeat Soviet aggression in Europe. This doctrine, among other things, called for the use of long-range precision strikes to destroy Soviet forces, command-and-control nodes, and supply depots deep into the rear of the advancing forces.
The destruction or disruption of an enemy’s command and control and logistics far behind the front line is also known as deep battle, and it is often seen as the secret sauce to quick Western military success in recent decades. Little surprise, then, that many commentators—especially those who served in Western militaries in the 1980s and 1990s—have gone to pains to highlight Ukraine’s deep battle campaign. Consequently, precision-guided munitions such as the Taurus cruise missiles, as well as the Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) that Washington seems to be on the verge of delivering, are seen as critical assets for Ukraine.
None of this means that Ukraine should not get these missiles, but a healthy dose of realism as to what they can accomplish is required. There are two principal reasons why the Taurus and ATACMS will likely have a much more limited impact on the battlefield. First, Ukrainian forces have already been supplied with similar systems. Additional cruise missiles would thus replenish Ukraine’s arsenal, but they would not offer a significant additional capability to which Russian forces would need to adapt. Second, as I saw during field research in Ukraine over the summer, there may be a fundamental misunderstanding by some observers regarding what a deep battle campaign can accomplish. In short, conducting a deep battle campaign to systematically dismantle the Russian military system in the rear of the front line, including interdicting supply lines, is much harder than commentators think.
Taurus cruise missiles will certainly extend existing Ukrainian capabilities. The missile has an effective range of up to 500 kilometers and is designed to be used against hardened or buried targets—including command bunkers, ammunition depots, bridges, and other key transportation hubs. The missile reportedly has a slightly more powerful warhead than other precision-guided munitions in Ukraine’s arsenal, which could make it more effective in disabling bridges, such as those linking Crimea with mainland Ukraine. In reality, however, a lack of penetrative power has been less of an issue for Ukrainian missiles than accurate targeting and getting past Russian air and missile defense systems. Given the Germans’ likely restrictions on the missiles’ use (no targets in Russia, no attack on the Kerch Bridge linking Russia with Crimea), the missile’s one major advantage over similar weapons already used by Ukraine—its longer range—will be limited.
Another reason the Taurus will not be a game-changer for Ukraine is that Germany is unlikely to deliver enough of them to make a major difference. Based on published reports and my own assessments, Britain and France together supplied Ukraine with perhaps 250 to 400 cruise missiles since May, of which Ukraine has fired between 180 to 200. Germany could potentially replenish Ukraine’s arsenal with about 150 Taurus cruise missiles, which, according to one analysis, would offer Kyiv enough precision-guided munition extend its campaign against Russian targets in the rear of the front line by another two months. While this would be important for Ukraine, we should not expect it to have a major strategic impact.
Even larger quantities—whether of the Taurus alone or in combination with ATACMS—would not guarantee a game-changing impact. As Michael Kofman and Rob Lee pointed out, conducting a successful deep battle campaign is much harder than most commentators seem to think. It is very difficult to interdict supply lines, conduct dynamic targeting, or establish fire control in the deep rear without air superiority. To conduct a more systematic deep battle campaign, Ukraine would need persistent intelligence, as well as better surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities (such as satellites and uncrewed aerial vehicles) to identify and track Russian targets.
Given effective Russian countermeasures—such as electromagnetic jamming of drones, and Ukraine’s lack of high-end reconnaissance platforms and lack of control of the skies—persistent coverage of the Russian rear is a difficult proposition.
The hope that Taurus and ATACMS will be game-changers also seems to ignore systematic Russian adaptation ever since the introduction of HIMARS multiple rocket launchers in the summer of 2022. Russian forces have hardened command and control posts, diversified their supply network, and no longer rely on large, vulnerable ammunition depots close to the front line. Even if Ukraine were able to more systematically employ long-range missiles in larger quantities, it is unclear how effective such a strike campaign would be against a well-entrenched adversary with sophisticated air and missile defense and strong electronic warfare capabilities.
Finally, some commentators seem to overestimate the amount of supplies the Russians need to hold off or delay Ukrainian attacks on the front line. It is true that Russian logistics are under increasing pressure, as evidenced by reduced artillery fire rates as well as difficulties rotating troops to and from front-line positions. But Russian forces are still able to mount counterattacks, conduct counterbattery fire, and keep up relatively steady artillery barrages in the face of Ukrainian attacks.
In short, given missile availability and Russian adaptations, the expectations in what can be accomplished with long-range missiles in the Russians’ deep rear are far beyond what seems to be possible. We should not expect a sudden, disruptive impact on the war effort from additional precision-strike missiles, even if they are armed with a more powerful warhead and have an even longer range, such as ATACMS. Rather, these systems will be an additional asset to help Ukraine slowly attrit Russia’s capacity to wage this war.
The fact that Taurus cruise missiles or ATACMS are unlikely to be game-changers on the battlefield does not mean that they should not be sent. On the contrary: Western support for maintaining Ukraine’s precision-strike capability is an important component of the Ukrainian armed forces’ overall attrition strategy. One way to increase the missiles’ potential effectiveness would be to lift restrictions on their use—for example, by allowing Ukraine to target the Kerch Bridge.
As much as Ukraine needs German and U.S. missiles, however, it is critically important to have a more nuanced debate about what individual weapon systems can and cannot accomplish in this war. The bitter truth is that there are no shortcuts to victory using specific weapons or Western deep battle doctrine. The earlier that we acknowledge this simple fact, the less potential for disappointment and friction between Ukraine and its partners—and the greater likelihood that Kyiv can get the capabilities and resources it needs to confront Russian aggression in what is likely to be a long war.
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