Indian Strategic Studies: 09/28/25

28 September 2025

The Indian Army’s High-Altitude Drones

Usman Haider

Drones are gradually becoming central to routine military operations in South Asia, and the Indian military is at the forefront of this ongoing revolution. From surveillance missions to logistical support, the Indian military is currently employing drones from the high-altitude terrain of the Himalayas to the sea level near Jamnagar.

While combat-capable drones often attract the most attention, special focus should be given to the logistics drones the Indian army is operating along its northern frontiers. In these areas, mountainous terrain makes traditional transportation of supplies using conventional means expensive and sluggish. The drone operations at high altitudes reflect India’s broader military strategy to improve its capability to launch proactive operations along its disputed borders with Pakistan and China.

In his keynote address at a December 2018 seminar held by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies on “Changing Contours of Mountain Warfare,” then-Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat emphasized the procurement of logistics drones capable of operating in high-altitude regions. Following this, the army issued an open tender to procure such drones.

In its 2022 tender, the army devised two categories: standard and high-altitude drones, those capable of operating at altitudes of up to 12,000 feet and over 12,000 ft respectively. The systems were expected to operate day and night, withstand high altitude winds, have a minimum of 45 minutes endurance, and have a minimum of 10 kilometers of mission range. In addition, the drones must be capable of enduring at least 5,000 landings for the High-Altitude Version and at least 10,000 landings for the standard version.

The initial requirement was to acquire 163 high-altitude and 200 medium-altitude logistics drones, for a total of 363 logistics drones, in November 2022. Later, the army increased the order to 563 drones. In less than three years after the tender became public, the drones were designed, produced, tested, and deployed along the frontlines.

A recent report by Indian online media confirmed that the Indian Army has started deploying payloads through logistics drones at altitudes exceeding 12,000 ft. The Air Orca drone, manufactured by Odisha-based firm BonV Aero, is operational with the Indian Army, providing last-mile supply to the troops deployed along the Line of Control (LoC, the de facto border with Pakistan) and the Line of Actual Control (LAC, the de facto border with China). Other companies are also producing logistics drones for the Indian Army. Scandron recently claimed to deliver supplies even to soldiers deployed at around 18,000 ft via drones.

Cybersecurity in India: Adapting to the Age of AI

India’s digital ascent, from instant payments to smart factories, is rewriting the rules of growth. But sustaining this progress depends on something deeper: the security and resilience of the systems that power it.

In boardrooms across India, leaders are realising that in the age of real-time transactions, cloud-driven services, and AI-powered customer experiences, a data breach can erase years of progress overnight. Cybersecurity has shifted from being a checkbox to becoming an essential enabler of trust and resilience in business.

India’s Digital Boom, and the Risks That Follow

India’s digital economy is booming, making up about 13.42% of India’s GDP currently (2024-25), and is on track to reach 20% by 2029-30.

UPI alone processed more than 16.99 billion transactions in January 2025, and broadband subscribers now stand close to a billion. IT revenues stood at USD 283 billion in FY24–25, e-commerce platforms are surging, and digital public infrastructure like the Aadhaar and DigiLocker touch hundreds of millions of citizens daily.

But as growth accelerates, so do risks. More users, endpoints, and data create a sprawling attack surface. Traditional security models, built for a slower pace of change, are struggling to keep up.

Complexity: The New Enemy of Cybersecurity

Fragmentation is quietly becoming India’s biggest vulnerability. A sprawl of disconnected tools creates silos, slows detection, and introduces blind spots. The challenge is compounded by the shift to multi-cloud environments, the explosion of endpoints from IoT devices, and the speed at which AI is reshaping digital operations. What was once manageable has now become overwhelming, and attackers are quick to exploit these cracks.

The 2025 Fortinet-IDC Report on State of Cybersecurity in Asia-Pacific highlights the growing financial impact of cyber incidents, with one in five breaches costing organisations more than US$500,000 to recover. BFSI saw fraud cases quadruple, while insider threats and regulatory audits continue to expose weaknesses.

Semiconductor Clusters in the Making: India’s Push for Global Competitiveness

Sujai Shivakumar and Shruti Sharma

India’s semiconductor ambitions are entering a decisive phase. Backed by the ₹76,000 crore ($9.1 billion) India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) and a growing network of state-level incentive programs, the country is attempting to compress decades of ecosystem development into just a few years. Clusters are where economies of scale, supplier ecosystems, and advanced research and development (R&D) converge—turning isolated investments into sustainable industrial capacity and export-ready competitiveness. Emerging hubs in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka mirror the factors that have long driven the United States’ own semiconductor clusters in New York, Texas, Oregon, and California—state-backed incentives, university-industry partnerships, and targeted infrastructure investment.

This parallel evolution creates a basis for collaboration, with both nations seeking to diversify supply chains, expand skilled talent pools, and secure competitive positions in an increasingly contested global market. For Washington, deeper engagement with India offers a trusted production base outside East Asia, expanded access to engineering talent, and greater resilience in a sector where security now rivals cost as the primary driver of strategic decisions. For New Delhi, U.S. experience in building integrated manufacturing clusters and scaling advanced R&D offers a tested roadmap for moving from design strength toward full-spectrum competitiveness—encompassing both manufacturing leadership and continued design excellence.

Q1: Where are India’s semiconductor clusters emerging?

A1: The ISM provides up to 50 percent fiscal support for eligible fabrication, outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT), and compound semiconductor projects, with states adding their own incentives and infrastructure. Alongside this manufacturing push, the Design Linked Incentive Scheme promotes chip design and intellectual property (IP) creation through R&D, prototyping, and commercialization support, including access to explanatory data analysis (EDA) tools and fabrication services.

GreenCycles: A Framework for Designing Solar-Plus-Storage Tenders in Indian States

Shashwat Kumar, Ammu Susanna Jacob, and Nikit Abhyankar

India’s ambitious clean energy journey hinges on rapid and large-scale deployment of energy storage systems (ESS), and especially battery ESS, to enable reliable integration of variable renewables. India has struggled to gain traction despite ambitious targets: With 0.11 GW of operational BESS as of the end of 2024 against a projected requirement of more than 73.93 GW by FY 2031–32, the gap is stark. Internationally, pairing solar generation with battery energy storage has proven to be one of the most effective ways to accelerate storage deployment. Pairing solar with storage, through thoughtful tender design and market mechanisms, can unlock investment and operational efficiencies for power systems.

This report puts forward an actionable solar-plus-storage tendering playbook to address India’s deployment challenges and catalyze ESS growth. Drawing on international best practice and cost-optimal modeling, this report equips policymakers, utilities, and developers with practical, scalable tools to unlock investment and accelerate BESS deployment, ensuring that energy storage is no longer a bottleneck but a strategic enabler of India’s 500 GW clean energy ambition.

Rethinking Great Power Competition: The Rise of Central Asia as Middle Powers

Eric Rudenshiold

Foreign policy experts prefer continuity to change, stability to volatility, the familiar to the unknown. International relations scholarship reinforces this preference by clinging to established archetypes: balance of power, spheres of influence, and the seemingly self-evident axiom that small states are inevitably pawns in the struggles between great powers.

Few regions are so habitually pigeonholed as Central Asia. Since independence, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have been cast in Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing alike as vulnerable prizes in a “new Great Game,” more acted upon than acting.

Persisting in antiquated assumptions risks missing not only the newfound agency of the Central Asian states themselves, but also the opportunities their assertiveness creates for Western allies. These countries increasingly define themselves as “middle powers” – actors with enough weight, resources, and diplomatic creativity to resist Russian or Chinese domination, to negotiate with multiple players, and to pursue independent development strategies.

Nowhere is this more apparent than Central Asia’s reaction to Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine.

Not cowed into deference, Central Asia is instead accelerating a realignment that is diversifying the region away from the limitations of Soviet legacy infrastructure and Russia’s market stranglehold. Moscow’s border treaty abrogation and invasion of Ukraine compelled Central Asian leaders to reinvest in their self-styled concept of “multivectorism” by engaging simultaneously with multiple partners and not subordinating themselves to the interests of large neighbors.

This pursuit of sovereignty and regional integration is exemplified in the region’s organic creation of a “Middle Corridor” trade route that redirects freight away from Russian infrastructure and connects Central Asia to China in the east and Europe via the Caspian, the South Caucasus, and Turkiye to the west. Supporting this shift is not just an economic matter but a geopolitical imperative: it is the surest way to reduce Russia’s coercive tendencies, to blunt China’s monopolization of connectivity, and to secure a more prosperous and independent Eurasia.

The Two Southeast Asias

Susannah Patton

Policymakers and scholars in the West talk about Southeast Asia as a coherent region, but it has always been divided. The region’s 700 million people speak hundreds of languages and follow different religions, and its 11 countries vary in political system, size, geography, and level of economic development. Throughout the Cold War, Southeast Asia was divided between the five original founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that were aligned with the United States—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—and the three countries of Indochina—Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—that aligned with China or the Soviet Union.

After the Cold War ended, ASEAN expanded to include Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, as well as the tiny sultanate of Brunei, increasing the salience of Southeast Asia as a geopolitical entity. Yet despite ASEAN’s achievements in fostering cooperation between its members, a cohesive Southeast Asia remains more myth than reality.

The reality is of two regions, not one. According to the Lowy Institute’s Southeast Asia Influence Index, which maps the sway of foreign partners across the region, two distinct networks persist among countries in Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam form a continental group that leans toward China. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore make up a maritime group in which the countries are well connected to one another, work with a wider array of governments from outside the region, and hedge between the United States and China. The Philippines is an outlier. It lacks close friends among other ASEAN countries and relies on non-Asian partners, particularly the United States, more than any of its neighbors.

The gap between these two networks of Southeast Asian countries is set to grow in the decades ahead, leading to a de facto Chinese sphere of influence in continental Southeast Asia. To prevent Beijing from encroaching even further, the United States should deepen ties with the countries that straddle Southeast Asia’s two subregions: Thailand and Vietnam.

What China Doesn’t Want

David C. Kang, Jackie S. H. Wong, and Zenobia T. Chan

It is now considered common knowledge in Washington policymaking circles that China aims to replace the United States as the dominant global superpower and to aggressively expand its territory. Democrats and Republicans alike have embraced this consensus. Elbridge Colby, who advises the Pentagon as President Donald Trump’s undersecretary of defense for policy, has written that if China took control of Taiwan it would serve as a steppingstone to extending its reach into the Philippines and Vietnam. Rush Doshi, the deputy senior director for China and Taiwan on the National Security Council under President Joe Biden and one of the

Nobody Lost Taiwan

Philip H. Gordon and Ryan Hass

Over the past several years, few topics in international relations have gotten more attention than a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan. And for good reason: China has never given up its claim to the island; it is in the middle of one of the largest military buildups in history; it conducts regular incursions into Taiwan’s airspace and maritime zones; and its president, Xi Jinping, has directed his military leadership to develop the capacity to conquer Taiwan by 2027 should he give the order to do so, according to senior U.S. government officials. For anyone skeptical that such an attack could take place in the twenty-first century, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a sharp reminder that major war over territory is not a thing of the past. Russian President Vladimir Putin seized what he thought was an opportunity to take back what he considered a wayward territory that was slipping away. Sooner or later, Xi could very well try to do the same.

Other factors have also contributed to growing anxiety about Taiwan’s future. Few doubt that China would try to use force to seize Taiwan militarily if it felt all other options to prevent permanent separation had been exhausted, but Beijing’s strong preference would be to take it over peacefully—with the island’s economy, technology, and human capital still intact. To achieve that goal, China is using a combination of relentless propaganda, infiltration, and military pressure to undercut U.S. support for Taiwan and to persuade Taiwan’s residents that they have little choice but to accept a political accommodation that recognizes Taiwan as part of China’s sovereign territory.

The past two months have produced growing concerns that Beijing is making progress on this front. Taiwan’s politicians have inflamed partisan divisions with rhetoric accusing one another of undermining Taiwan’s security, Taiwan’s ruling party pushed a failed “recall” of opposition members that deeply divided the population, and President Lai Ching-te’s popularity is collapsing. Taiwan’s dealings with the United States, meanwhile, have become trickier. The Trump administration has refused Lai’s routine transit through the United States, postponed efforts to reach a trade deal with Taiwan, halted some planned arms deliveries, and expressed harsh criticism about Taiwan’s defense spending. Washington has also loosened high-tech export controls on China, which suggests that President Donald Trump puts a higher priority on reaching a trade deal and improving relations with Beijing than on steadfast support for Taiwan. The pessimism about Taiwan’s future was best exemplified in August, when an article by a former Trump administration official went viral in Taiwan. It was called “How Taiwan Lost Trump.”

Manned fighters still rule in US-China battle for air supremacy

Gabriel Honrada

With China rapidly expanding its J-20 stealth fleet and the US extending the life of its F-22 Raptors, both sides are doubling down on manned airpower, showing that despite advances in drone technology, pilots still rule the skies.

This month, multiple media sources reported that China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has reached a significant milestone by fielding at least 300 Chengdu J-20 stealth fighters, underscoring its accelerating buildup of fifth-generation combat aircraft.

The confirmation came as four J-20s, including the 300th production airframe identified by its construction number “CB10300,” arrived in Changchun, Jilin province, for an air show in mid-September.

Analysts noted the PLAAF has added at least 50 new aircraft since June 2024, reflecting a rapid delivery pace that places China second only to the US in operational stealth fleets.

The J-20 fleet now rivals the scale of the US Air Force’s 180 F-22 Raptors and more than 240 F-35As, though the US total remains larger when US Marine Corps and US Navy aircraft are included.

The J-20’s expansion illustrates China’s strategy of mass-producing modern platforms to contest US air dominance in Asia, with the program evolving from a developmental project less than a decade ago into the backbone of China’s airpower.

The US is not to be outdone. The War Zone (TWZ) reported this month that Lockheed Martin is urging the US Air Force to expand its F-22 Raptor upgrade program to include 35 older Block 20 jets currently used for training, aiming to bolster combat readiness amid uncertainty over the aircraft’s replacement timeline.

Skunk Works Vice President OJ Sanchez emphasized the strategic value of modernizing these sidelined aircraft at the recent Air, Space & Cyber Conference in Maryland. The push follows US Congressional pressure and operational concerns, as the US Air Force lacks a definitive successor to the F-22. Upgrades would extend viability into the 2040s, enhancing stealth, sensors and crewed-uncrewed teaming capabilities.

All is not lost for China in US TikTok deal

Jeff Pao

Beijing is signaling a green light to American investors’ takeover of TikTok’s operations in the United States, a rare opening in the grinding US-China tech standoff.

The breakthrough follows a September 19 call between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, during which the TikTok issue reportedly featured prominently.

The control of TikTok’s algorithm is being addressed through a workaround. Media reports said that, under the arrangement, ByteDance will lease its algorithm to the US-based TikTok entity. At the same time, Oracle Corp will retrain it and secure a US-specific version “from the ground up.”

US officials said the aim is to give American stakeholders full operational control over the recommendation engine, while ByteDance retains intellectual property rights.

“The Chinese government respects the wishes of the company in question, and would be happy to see productive commercial negotiations in keeping with market rules lead to a solution that complies with China’s laws and regulations and takes into account the interests of both sides,” Guo Jiakun, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said Monday.

“The US side needs to provide an open, fair and non-discriminatory environment for Chinese investors,” the spokesperson said.

Washington and Beijing reached a consensus on the sale of TikTok’s US businesses to American investors after US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng held six hours of trade-related talks in Spain on September 14. The meeting came after the US Commerce Department added 23 Chinese semiconductor firms to its “Entity List” on September 13.

A columnist using the pseudonym “Zhongsheng” (sound of bells) with the state-owned People’s Daily said in a commentary published on September 21 that “dialogue and consultation must be grounded in principles, and the atmosphere for cooperation requires joint effort to build and maintain.”

Soybean Diplomacy Between the US and China

Geopolitical Futures

Back in July, China slashed its soybean imports from the United States, continuing its gradual pivot toward Brazil to satisfy its substantial demand for the crop. Now, weeks into the new export season, data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture shows that China, the world’s top soybean importer, has not booked any shipments of U.S. soybeans, and it is speculated that Beijing does not intend to purchase any soybeans from the U.S. this year. This marks a significant shift, as the U.S. used to be China’s largest soybean supplier.

Soybeans are crucial for both Beijing and Washington: While they are one of the United States’ most important agricultural products, China also relies heavily on imports for its supply of soybeans, which above all are used as animal feed and cooking oil. With trade negotiations intensifying between the two sides, this agricultural product is taking center stage as a key bargaining chip for China. And the diversification efforts go well beyond just soybeans: China has also decreased purchases of American corn, wheat and sorghum, while continuing to buy from Brazil, Canada and Australia. This fits into Beijing’s larger-scale plan to decrease its dependency on U.S. agriculture – something it already intended to do before the trade conflict started.

The situation is not without risks for both sides. U.S. farmers are already feeling the financial stress of the lack of Chinese orders as prices have begun to fall. At the same time, Brazilian soybean prices have shot up, and if Brazil does not have a good harvest, China will have to turn to its own reserves. As long as the two do not reach a trade agreement, things are more than likely to remain uncertain in both nations’ agricultural sectors.

The Only Security Guarantee Ukraine Can Trust

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Ever since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House, officials across Europe have scrambled to craft a peace deal that could work for Ukraine. They know by now that, at the moment, Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in stopping his offensives, and they fear that shifting American priorities may leave Ukraine without a critical source of support. As a result, they are racing to find a way to provide Kyiv with security guarantees that could deter Russia and allow for an armistice.

In conversations about security guarantees, officials have tended to focus on a handful of measures: placing a small number of European troops in Ukraine to shore up the country’s defense (so-called reassurance forces), levying additional sanctions against Russia, and providing Ukraine with more weapons, including conventional ones. They have also mused about committing themselves, on paper, to Ukraine’s defense. Two of these actions—more weapons and sanctions—could take place before any cease-fire. The rest would go into effect only after the fighting ends.

These proposals have certain virtues. But by themselves, they are not enough to guarantee Ukraine’s security. Since the start of Russia’s invasion in 2022, Putin has been transparent about his objective—the destruction of Ukraine as an independent nation—and has subjected many people to almost unimaginable suffering in order to achieve it. He will not be deterred by words, a smattering of NATO troops, or by more agony (including if it affects Russians). In fact, he will not stop the war unless Russian troops literally cannot advance any further.

Right now, some U.S. and European analysts are pessimistic that Ukraine can completely halt Russia’s aggression, and understandably so. NATO countries, after all, have been arming Kyiv for years, and Moscow keeps making incremental gains. But Ukraine need not destroy every element of the Russian military to achieve strategic neutralization—stripping away the enemy of its ability to achieve its objectives. And the conflict has recently changed in ways that have made it easier to freeze. Today, the war is being fought less with traditional military equipment and more with newer, cheaper technologies that Ukraine helped pioneer. In fact, Ukraine has already done a great deal of what’s needed to deter Russia for good. But Europe must stop focusing on which traditional capabilities it should provide to Ukraine or on establishing written security guarantees. Instead, the continent should get serious about investing more in Ukraine’s war effort by flooding the country with more advanced technologies. It needs to invest heavily in the country’s sophisticated defense industry. It must cooperate more directly with Kyiv on matters of military manufacturing and on air defenses. Such measures will indeed be daunting, but not any more than NATO’s original effort to help Ukraine. And ultimately, Europe has little choice. They are the only way to bring peace.

Israel Can No Longer Wish Palestine Away

Shira Efron

On September 21 and 22, Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and six other countries recognized a Palestinian state. Israel has responded defiantly. Following Sunday’s recognitions, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared in a Hebrew-language video statement: “It will not happen. A Palestinian state will not be established west of the Jordan.” Although Netanyahu will only make a final decision on Israel’s full response when he returns to the region after meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, his coalition has repeatedly threatened to annex West Bank territory and collapse the Palestinian Authority entirely.

A Quick Analysis of Secretary Hegseth’s General Officers Meeting

Mark F. Cancian

On September 25, the Washington Post reported that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has called an in-person meeting of up to 800 flag and general officers (FOs/GOs, or officers of one to four stars). This will take place “early next week” at the Marine base in Quantico, Virginia. The Department of Defense has confirmed such a meeting.

There is tremendous uncertainty about why this meeting was called. There are frequent meetings of general officers for specific purposes. For example, the 11 four-star combatant commanders come to Washington every year to meet with the secretary, the chairman, and the president. Each service has a meeting of its flag and general officers and often its senior civilians as well. However, the reported scale of this meeting is unprecedented.

Although the announcement seems abrupt, the planning has apparently been going on in classified spaces for some time.

There is lots of speculation about what the meeting will concern. The flag and general officers are bringing their senior enlisted personnel, so it is unlikely that this will be some purge of general officers, as some have feared. One possible topic is a discussion of the National Defense Strategy, which the secretary is reportedly about to publish. It has been widely reported that this strategy will emphasize homeland security, and Hegseth may want to express that directly to his commanders. It would be a substantial change from recent strategies, which focused on China and Russia. It is also possible that he will announce consolidations of organizations. For example, there have been rumors of combining European Command and Africa Command as well as Southern Command and Northern Command. Finally, Hegseth may want to rally the troops and make a point—get onboard or leave—that is implied in much of his guidance.

There were inconsistencies in the Washington Post article, so the meeting may not be as large as reported. The article states that 800 general and flag officers would be coming, but that is nearly all the 838 such officers (as of June 2025). However, officers on staffs will be exempt. There are many such officers, which would bring the number substantially below 800. Wherever the number settles out, the meeting would still be unprecedented.

What Does Trump’s Sudden Shift Mean For Russia’s War On Ukraine? – Analysis

Steve Gutterman

In a sudden shift, US President Donald Trump said Ukraine could win back all of its Russian-occupied territory with the help of its European backers.

His remarks in a social media post on September 23, after talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, quickly made waves: In the past, Trump and other US officials have strongly suggested Ukraine would have to cede some land to Russia in any peace deal.

In a tense meeting at the White House in February, Trump told Zelenskyy that Ukraine doesn’t “have the cards” to win the war.

But the post raised crucial questions that it didn’t answer.

Will Trump walk away from his efforts to end the war? Are new US sanctions against Russia still on the table? Could the rhetorical shift change the Kremlin’s calculus when it comes to the war in Ukraine?

Here’s what to watch.

Are Sanctions Still On The Table?

“Putin and Russia are in BIG economic trouble,” Trump wrote in his Truth Social post, suggesting that the country’s money problems were one of the main reasons for his newly voiced confidence that Ukraine could restore control over its borders with “time, patience, and the financial support of Europe and, in particular, NATO.”

While he has threatened repeatedly to impose new sanctions on Russia and countries that help fuel its invasion of Ukraine, in order to further undermine Moscow’s capacity to fight, he made no mention of punitive measures in the post. Some observers read his remarks as a sign that no new US sanctions are in the offing.

Slicing The Sky: Russia’s Grey-Zone Gambit Against NATO – Analysis

Scott N. Romaniuk and László Csicsmann

Russian incursions into NATO airspace are neither random nor accidental—they are deliberate, calculated manoeuvres within a broader strategy of salami slicing.

Each flight, drone sortie, or radar probe serves multiple purposes: testing NATO’s political and military resolve, exposing fissures within the alliance, and incrementally reshaping Europe’s security landscape in Moscow’s favour. By staying below the threshold of war, Russia advances strategic objectives while minimising the risk of a coordinated or forceful Western response.

Airspace violations form a key component of Moscow’s broader hybrid warfare strategy, which also encompasses maritime harassment, cyber operations, and disinformation campaigns. The aerial domain is especially potent: highly visible, fast-moving, and capable of provoking immediate military responses. Russian aircraft routinely enter or skirt the airspace of NATO states on Europe’s eastern flank—including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, and Romania—often with transponders off and without notifying civilian air traffic control. These incursions endanger civilian aviation, trigger costly scramble operations, and send a deliberate signal that NATO’s limits are being tested.

Each flight functions as both a probe and a pressure point—a low-cost, high-impact tool advancing Moscow’s objectives while forcing the alliance to confront the challenges of deterrence, cohesion, and credible response. China mirrors these tactics in the Indo-Pacific, applying similarly incremental, assertive actions across air, sea, and information domains. Together, Moscow and Beijing are reshaping the rules of strategic competition, demonstrating how sustained, deniable pressure can shift norms without triggering full-scale war.

Airspace as a Weapon: Low-Cost, High-Impact Pressure

The pattern is clear. In 2025, NATO members across Northern and Eastern Europe reported a surge in Russian incursions. Norway has faced multiple short violations over the Barents Sea and Finnmark region in recent years, with a notable increase in 2025. Whether navigational errors or deliberate provocations, the sudden rise in flights rattled Oslo. Norwegian defence officials emphasised a broader pattern: Russian aircraft regularly trigger NATO intercepts, strain resources, and probe alliance readiness.

Tracking the Components of Missiles and UAVs Used by Russia in Ukraine: What Lessons for Control Regimes?

The analysis of battlefield debris from missiles and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) can reveal the origins of their components, providing insights into the strengths and weaknesses of international efforts to prevent unauthorised recipients from accessing lethal technologies. This IISS research report is based partly on field investigations conducted by Conflict Armament Research. It examines the technological make-up of Russian, Iranian and North Korean missile and UAV debris in Ukraine since 2022, traces the international procurement routes of foreign components, and discusses the failures of multilateral efforts to prevent such procurement. The report concludes by proposing a new framework for strengthening end-use controls to address the weaknesses of the current technology-control regime.

Despite international sanctions on Russian, Iranian and North Korean missile and UAV programmes, analysis of debris in Ukraine shows these weapons have relied heavily on foreign commercial components, including in the recent past. The report explains how this foreign technology found its way into the weapons programmes of these heavily sanctioned governments. Procurement networks exploited the complexity of global, distributor-centric supply chains and used intermediaries in countries with weak or absent enforcement. It is likely that many components were initially sold through legitimate channels before being diverted.

Geopolitical competition, the widespread use of dual-use and commercial/uncontrolled technologies, and the adaptability of procurement networks are all factors that undermine the effectiveness of traditional multilateral control regimes. The Missile Technology Control Regime has, by its very design, a limited scope. The Common High Priority List (CHPL) has improved commercial due diligence and government oversight for goods that have historically not been considered sensitive yet are crucial for the production of missiles and UAVs. However, the CHPL cannot meet all the challenges posed by globalised supply chains. Sanctions have disrupted some supply channels but also redirected procurement towards markets outside the Global Export Control Coalition. As a result, enforcement gaps remain. Strengthening end-use controls, enhancing distributor accountability and improving industry due diligence could mitigate future technological diversion.

Synchronizing MDO Effects: Putting the Commander Back in Control through Converged NLE and NKA Operations

Scott Hall

Modern battlefields are shaped by data saturation, multi-domain complexity, and the accelerating convergence of effects across physical, informational, and human dimensions. While advanced sensors and AI promise rapid decision-making, commanders often face fragmented data streams, stovepiped staff processes, and poorly integrated fires. This is more than a technical problem—it undermines mission command by limiting how leaders orchestrate tempo and capitalize on opportunities.

Synchronizing Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) with non-lethal effects (NLE) and non-kinetic activities (NKA) is therefore not just an innovation; it’s an operational necessity. Done right, this integration restores commanders’ decision space, creates information advantage (IA), and forces adversaries into dilemmas they cannot easily solve.

Reframing Command and Control: Beyond Firepower

U.S. formations—cavalry, armor, and combined arms teams—have long relied on mobility, firepower, and shock. But today’s adversaries challenge these strengths through layered denial strategies and continuous information campaigns. In Ukraine, Russian attempts to use cyberattacks and propaganda to shape the fight before kinetic blows largely failed against Ukrainian resilience and agile strategic messaging. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s operations in Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrated how synchronizing drones, electronic warfare (EW), deception, and narrative shaping can collapse defenses and will to fight through multi-dimensional pressure.

Maneuver alone is no longer sufficient. As operational studies have argued, true advantage comes from “baking in” information forces alongside maneuver—forcing adversaries to react to our timing, not theirs.

Synchronizing Across Domains: The COP as the Centerpiece

A fused, trusted Common Operational Picture (COP) lies at the heart of effective MDO. It must go beyond depicting friendly and enemy maneuver units to overlay electronic attacks, cyber campaigns, psychological operations (PSYOP) narratives, and anticipated adversary decision points. Only then can commanders visualize crucial convergence windows where synchronized effects deliver compounding impacts.

Mobilizing for the ‘invisible war’

Bryan Clark

EA-18G Growlers from the "Star Warriors" of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 209 simultaneously fire two AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) during a training exercise near Guam. (U.S. Navy photo by Cmdr. Peter Scheu)

In his recent confirmation hearing, Gen. Chris Mahoney, the nominee for vice chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, set electronic warfare as one of his top priorities if he is approved by the Senate. This was welcome news after more than a decade of dire assessments regarding the US military’s eroding proficiency and capacity for fighting in the spectrum.

But to turn bold statements into operational impact, the Pentagon will need to update its approach for the information age. Electronic warfare is no longer just jammers and decoys. It is a battle for sensemaking itself.

For Mahoney to make good on this opportunity will require more than replacing or updating aging EW aircraft like the EC-130 Compass Call, EA-18G Growler, or RC-135 Rivet Joint. Those are tactical improvements that might help once combat begins. The more important investments will be those that set the battlefield before the first shot — or prevent any shooting at all.

In 2025, intelligence sources are highly distributed, span military and commercial systems, and are of widely varying quality. Enemy forces can use publicly available data to target US troops, ships, or aircraft and exploit social media to gather intelligence on US servicemembers and operations. Paradoxically, disrupting, overwhelming, or deceiving this flood of information may be getting easier. Today nearly all information at some point moves through the airwaves, including to and from space. Electronic warfare and cyber operations are merging as the fastest way to get into an opponent’s network becomes an antenna.

With military and commercial sensors ubiquitous, an opponent like China can build a comprehensive picture during peacetime of US forces’ positions, identity, and habits, building a “pattern of life” akin to the approach used during counterinsurgency operations. When combat begins, People’s Liberation Army targeteers can quickly implement fire plans against US bases, ships, and ground units.

The Trump Administration Is Quietly Curbing the Flow of Disaster Funding

Jennifer DeCesaro and Sarah Labowitz

The Sustainability, Climate, and Geopolitics Program explores how climate change and the responses to it are changing international politics, global governance, and world security. Our work covers topics from the geopolitical implications of decarbonization and environmental breakdown to the challenge of building out clean energy supply chains, alternative protein options, and other challenges of a warming planet.Learn More

For months, states have been voicing frustration with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s sluggish pace of spending from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), the federal government’s main pot of money dedicated to disaster response and recovery. The current administration is deploying three different strategies to slow-walk the flow of disaster dollars to state and local governments: stalling disbursements, delaying FEMA’s emergency response function, and suspending mitigation funding.

The DRF is almost empty, and on Wednesday, state officials learned they may be waiting awhile longer for FEMA support: A proposed short-term budget in the House of Representatives punts on how much money would be appropriated for the DRF. Instead, it refers to the previous budget, adopted in March, that provided $22.5 billion for the DRF and allows continued spending “up to the rate for operations necessary to carry out response and recovery activities.”

If FEMA were operating under its typical procedures, this would be a noncontroversial provision, and spending would continue as usual for responses to major disaster events, as well as ongoing reimbursements to state and local governments for recovery efforts from past disasters. But this year, FEMA is deploying funds from the DRF in an unusual way, essentially operating as if it’s in Immediate Needs Funding (INF)—meaning that the agency prioritizes immediate, life-saving and life-sustaining response efforts instead of meeting other obligations, such as reimbursing jurisdictions for their recovery activities stemming from previous disasters—without telling the states.

From Hype To Reality: Building The True Foundation For AI Success – OpEd

Girish Linganna

Artificial intelligence (AI) will not save us. But people using AI might. Today, there is a lot of excitement around AI. Many see it as a new saviour. Some people call it the ultimate game-changer, while others fear it may bring disruption and doom.

One type of AI that is getting the most attention is Generative AI which is computer technology that can create new content like text, images, music, or videos by learning from existing examples. It’s like having a smart assistant that can write, draw, or compose original material based on what you ask for.

Because of this, the value of AI companies keeps rising, and many new trial projects are being started. Everyone wants to claim they have found the secret to making AI work best. But AI is like fire—it can be very useful by giving us light and warmth, or it can be dangerous if it burns out of control.

The truth is that AI by itself is only a tool. It cannot solve problems or make the world better on its own. The real change depends on how people use it. If used wisely, AI can solve problems, make work easier, and create new opportunities. But if used carelessly or selfishly, it can bring harm, confusion, and danger.

So, the message is simple: AI is not the saviour, people are. Its power depends on our choices, decisions, and responsibility.

Transformations take time. History shows that big technological changes don’t happen overnight. Electricity itself took more than 30 years to change how people lived and worked. This was because currents had to be made safe, buildings rewired, tools redesigned, and new systems created.

The Internet Boom and Bust

The internet followed the same path as earlier technologies. In the 1990s, people believed it would bring instant wealth through the so-called click economy. But by 2000, the dot-com bubble burst and wiped out trillions in value.

Next chapter in space defense: Satellites that never stop moving

Sandra Erwin

NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — U.S. companies in the emerging in-space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (ISAM) sector are working to better understand military needs as the U.S. Space Force prepares to rely on commercial firms for satellite refueling and other orbital services, industry officials said this week.

The push comes as military space operations evolve beyond traditional fixed-orbit satellites toward more agile spacecraft capable of sustained maneuvering to counter threats in space.

“When we start to talk about dynamic space operations, the ears of our U.S. Space Command and U.S. Space Force members perk up,” said Monty Greer, outreach coordinator for the COSMIC consortium at the Aerospace Corp., speaking Sept. 23 during a panel discussion at the Air Space & Cyber conference.

COSMIC, or Consortium for Space Mobility and ISAM Capabilities, is a national coalition working to facilitate the operational, technical and policy integration of ISAM capabilities now being developed by commercial space firms. The consortium includes representatives from government, academia and private industry.

Military terminology

Topics like “dynamic space operations” and “sustained space maneuver” are now part of regular conversations within the consortium, Greer said. These military phrases refer to the ability for satellites to conduct continuous or frequent maneuvering rather than remaining in fixed or highly predictable orbits, and to maneuver rapidly, unpredictably and frequently to counter adversary threats and enable responsive actions such as evasion and deception in orbit.

In consortium meetings, military officials stress that these capabilities go beyond simply extending satellite operational life by adding fuel, but would also enable satellites to survive threats and create challenges for adversaries, Greer explained.

Reimagining Army Divisions for Twenty-First-Century Warfare

Nathan Jennings

The character of war is evolving in ways that demand a dramatic reorganization of the US Army’s order of battle. Adversaries have developed antiaccess and area-denial systems, at depth and scale, that are explicitly designed to prevent US forces from deploying to, maneuvering in, and sustaining in expeditionary theaters. These architectures combine long-range fires, air defenses, electronic warfare, space denial, and cyber capabilities to construct integrated standoff defenses that can stymie American power projection. At the center of this array, an emerging panoply of drone platforms now saturates the environment, providing persistent reconnaissance, precision fires, and information warfare amplification. To prevail in these conditions, the Army must align organization, concept, and strategy with a reimagined divisional structure that can maximize emerging technologies to execute multidomain operations in the most challenging of scenarios.

To fulfill the vision of the Army Warfighting Concept, the service should move past dated armored, Stryker, infantry, and airborne categorizations to reorganize its combat forces into four divisional types according to logic of purpose: recon-strike divisions, assault divisions, consolidation divisions, and sustainment divisions. Each would be optimized for distinct roles within corps or joint force commands, providing reimagined ability to synchronize unmanned strike and protection systems in ways that empower increasingly vulnerable brigade combat teams to win in close combat. Adapting traditional maneuver theory to innovations in artificial intelligence, systemic automation, and adaptive thinking, it would enable the Army to defeat standoff networks and ensure freedom of maneuver across increasingly contested landscapes.

However, the unrealized potential of this reorganization must be balanced with enduring realities of continuity and change in warfare that will challenge planning assumptions and cultural biases. First, even as the Army modernizes to maintain land warfare primacy, it must recognize the reality that conflicts are often defined by attrition and battle damage that overwhelms preconflict notions of decisive operational maneuver. Second, the reorganization of divisions as the primary unit of action, according to tactical purpose, must include preparation to execute dynamic formation reconstitution while under enemy fire. As General Donn Starry argued after observing the destruction of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, multistar echelons must prepare to adopt “extraordinary measures” required to “quickly restore a depleted unit to an acceptable level of combat effectiveness” to ensure “timely regeneration of the force.”

Historical Precedent: German Blitzkrieg, 1940

Microsoft terminates services for Israeli military after investigation into mass surveillance of Palestinians

Oren Liebermann, Tal Shalev

Displaced Palestinians move with their belongings southwards on a road in the Nuseirat refugee camp area in the central Gaza Strip. Eyad Baba/AFP/Getty Images

Microsoft has terminated a set of services for the Israeli military after an investigation suggested Israel was using the company’s cloud computing technology for mass surveillance of Palestinians.

In a statement posted the company’s blog, Microsoft President Brad Smith said the company had “ceased and disabled a set of services to a unit within the Israel Ministry of Defense.” The move comes after an investigation by The Guardian and Israel’s +972 Magazine in early-August reported that Israel’s military intelligence unit, known as 8200, relied on Microsoft Azure to store millions of phone calls made by Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

Microsoft announced on August 15 that it had begun a review of the allegations. Smith said Microsoft does not provide technology “to facilitate mass surveillance of civilians,” a principle it has applied “in every country around the world.” The review, Smith said, focused on business records, financial statements, internal documents and other records without accessing the content of the stored material.

During the investigation, the company says it found evidence that supports elements of the investigation from the news outlets, including Israel’s “consumption of Azure storage capacity in the Netherlands and the use of AI services.” Microsoft informed Israel of the decision “to cease and disable specific [Israel Defense Ministry] subscriptions and their services, including their use of specific cloud storage and AI services and technologies.”

An Israeli security official said, “There is no damage to the operational capabilities of the IDF.”

Microsoft said the review was still ongoing.

How an Army Truck Is Beating the Pentagon at Innovation

John Ferrari

If the Army can unlock remarkable innovation with a simple truck, why can’t the entire Pentagon do the same with billion-dollar platforms?

The Pentagon is spending years and billions chasing the next generation of exquisite systems. Meanwhile, the Army has quietly shown up with something far more disruptive: a low-cost, off-the-shelf troop carrier that startups are now transforming into a laboratory for autonomy, sensors, and AI. The vehicle in question is called the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV), and it’s proving that America doesn’t need to wait for massive programs of record to innovate. The future of modernization may already be rolling across training ranges—and it is cheap, flexible, and soldier-tested.

What to Know About the US Army’s Infantry Squad Vehicle

Originally conceived as a lightweight, off-the-shelf way to move troops around the battlefield, the ISV was never meant to be revolutionary. Yet its simplicity and availability have made it an ideal platform for experimentation. Startups are now modifying ISVs with autonomous navigation kits, modular sensor payloads, hybrid-electric drives, and even AI-enabled mission systems.

Because the ISV is inexpensive and fielded in numbers, soldiers can test these emerging technologies in realistic conditions without risking multi-billion-dollar assets. The result is rapid iteration: new capabilities can be quickly bolted on, trialed in exercises, and refined through soldier feedback. If this pattern—non-stop innovation in warfare, almost in real time in response to battlefield conditions—sounds familiar, it is likely because it is exactly what is going on in the conflict in Ukraine today. Someone in the Army is paying attention to the paradigm shift, and Army leadership appears not only to fully support, but to be actively participating in ISVs development.

This bottom-up innovation model, pairing military needs with commercial ingenuity on an adaptable platform, should be the Pentagon’s blueprint for modernization. The ISV proves that the United States does not need to wait for massive programs of record to deliver finished products. Instead, it can evolve incrementally, in the field, at the speed of relevance.

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