India’s indigenous weapons are turning cost into combat power

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India's defense strategy emphasises self-reliance, blending low-cost tools with high-end technology for a competitive edge. Army Chief Gen Upendra Dwivedi highlights the importance of indigenous capabilities and innovation to outpace adversaries. Operation Sindoor showcased the effectiveness of homegrown systems like Akash missiles and D4 anti-drone systems.

Modern warfare isn’t about having the biggest army or the heaviest tanks anymore. As Army Chief Gen Upendra Dwivedi said last week, the real edge comes from blending low-cost tools with high-end technology, a mix that, he argued, can let even a smaller force stand firm against a stronger adversary.

Speaking at a defence modernisation event, Gen Dwivedi framed self-reliance not just as patriotic rhetoric but as operational necessity.

The key, he said, lies in the “troika” of military, industry and academia, backed by a substantial budget, working together to build an ecosystem of indigenous capability.

“If you have low-cost high technology, you will be able to beat back a superior adversary. Force visualisation, force protection and force application are the three main things we need to work out,” he explained.

Here’s what this really means: battlefield advantage isn’t just about having a weapon, it’s about having one that evolves faster than the adversary’s.

“If I wanted something to fire at 100 km today, tomorrow it has to go to 300 km,” Gen Dwivedi said, making the point that self-reliance, aatmanirbharta, isn’t just about producing domestically or cutting costs. It’s about staying ahead, constantly upgrading, and innovating fast enough to outpace any adversary.

The numbers behind this push are significant. Projected defence spending for modernisation and acquisitions is expected to reach Rs 3 lakh crore annually over the next decade, with an annual growth of roughly 10%.

Three seconds TikTok and the future of politics

Sam Freedman

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I suspect many readers knew little, if anything, about Charlie Kirk before his murder on the 10th September. But if you have teenage kids they probably did. For months my son has been being showing me clips on TikTok of Kirk being “owned” by progressive students during his tour of university campuses. In schools across the UK this has been the biggest story of the year by far. With his fast-speaking and combative style, Kirk was perfectly suited to a site where you have an average of three seconds to engage the viewer before they flick on to the next video.

Meanwhile, my eldest daughter has been captivated by the overthrow of the Nepalese Prime Minister, K. P. Sharma Oli, and his replacement by former Supreme Court Justice Sushila Karki. Not only did she know about this through watching TikTok videos but the revolution itself was driven on the streaming site by young people barely older than her.

The immediate trigger for protests was the government’s decision to shut down dozens of social media sites including Facebook, X and YouTube. Ministers claimed this was because the sites were failing to abide by new regulations. But the “Gen Z” protestors believed the real reason was to stop the spread of viral memes about nepotism, with videos of politicians’ children living in luxury at the heart of the campaign. Protests quickly descended into violence and the resignation of ministers. Incredibly, the new Prime Minister was chosen via a vote on Discord (another social media platform).

Though Nepal is one of the most dramatic examples of this type of “Gen Z” protest it is not unique. Last year the Bangladeshi government was overthrown by a similar demographic, and there were mass protests in Nairobi at new taxes organised over TikTok and other platforms. In August, the Indonesian government found themselves facing violent protests over salary boosts for politicians. Tellingly, one of their countermeasures was to ask TikTok to stop live streaming. The average age in all of these countries is 30 or below (25 in Nepal and just 20 in Kenya), compared to 41 in the UK. That magnifies the effect both of disenchantment with lack of employment opportunities but also the power of new forms of politics.

Politicians get rich while we suffer - so I helped bring down our government in 48 hours

Rama ParajuliBBC Nepali, Kathmandu, Kamal PariyarBBC Nepali, Kathmandu and Kelly NgBBC News, Singapore

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Nepal's Gen Z protesters brought down a government in under 48 hours – but the victory has come at a heavy price.

"We are proud, but there is also a mixed baggage of trauma, regret and anger," says Tanuja Pandey, one of the protest organisers.

With 72 people killed, last week's protests were the deadliest unrest in the Himalayan country in decades. Official buildings, residences of political leaders and luxury hotels such as the Hilton, which opened in July 2024, were torched, vandalised and looted. The wife of a former prime minister is fighting for her life after their home was set ablaze.

The protests represented "a wholesale rejection of Nepal's current political class for decades of poor governance and exploitation of state resources", said Ashish Pradhan, a senior adviser at the International Crisis Group. But the damage to government services, he added, could "parallel the toll of the 2015 earthquake which took almost 9,000 lives".

The destruction is not only confined to the capital Kathmandu - at least 300 local government offices across the nation have been damaged.

The financial losses could amount to 3 trillion Nepalese rupees ($21.3bn; £15.6bn), nearly half of the country's GDP, according to the Kathmandu Post. Its offices were also attacked by crowds and set on fire.

Enraged by the huge inequality, young Nepalis have been calling the children of politicians "nepo babies"

'Nepo babies'

Two days before the deadly demonstration on 8 September, Ms Pandey, a 24-year-old environmental campaigner, uploaded a video showing a mining site in Chure, one of the most fragile mountain ranges in the region. Nepal's resources should belong to the people, not to "politicians' private limited companies", she wrote, calling on her peers to "march against corruption and the misuse of our nation's wealth".

War with China in the 21st Century?

Lieutenant General Michael Dana

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Over the past decade, tensions with China have ebbed and flowed. If these tensions escalate into conflict, what will a war with China look like? First, it is important to note that a war with China today will not be a replay of the war against Japan in WW II. In WW II, our industrial might overcame many obstacles, both foreign (the enemy) and domestic (our bureaucracy). Our industrial capacity dwarfed that of Japan, and it also overcame US government inefficiency. In World War II, we built a mass-enabled military for a conventional, relatively low-tech global conflict. Today our military is a blend of both old and new systems, and we are not fully embracing the promise of the ongoing technological revolution. As events in the Ukraine illustrate, we in the US keep preparing for the last war, while the Ukrainians, Houthis, and Hamas are tossing Clausewitz into the trash bin, while embracing their inner Sun Tzu. Said a different way, they are purposely ripping up the conventional warfare playbook and designing, innovating, and creating new and incredibly brilliant ways to kill their enemies. The current scale and scope of emerging technology is without historical precedent. 

The proliferation of drones and anti-ship missiles provide low cost, high-payoff kinetic capabilities. Advancements in cyber, electronic warfare, and space based ISR round out the non-kinetic, yet highly impactful means to optimize the kill chain. Artificial Intelligence and man-machine teaming will provide forces cognitive overmatch against adversaries. These developments should give us pause. We as a nation are vulnerable to asymmetric threats across the threat spectrum, especially those targeting our digital commons, electric grid, food supply, and transportation networks. Complicating matters is the anemic condition of our industrial base in certain sectors, such as conventional and precision munitions. Our true center of gravity in WWII was our ability to generate mass at unprecedented scale. No serious threat ever disrupted or hampered this production capability. Today, our tech-enabled industry, both legacy and modern, is very efficient, but not very resilient, regenerative or secure. Rebuilding that resilience will require expanding the Defense Industrial Base to include America’s most innovative commercial companies, not just the traditional primes, and removing the procurement barriers that keep them out.

Conflict with China could manifest itself in one of two ways. One view is the Communist Central Party (CCP) does not want, nor are they planning, for a protracted fight against the United States. They realize Great Power peers do not fight limited wars against each other; as these wars are usually protracted. The CCP also fears the domestic ramifications of an extended conflict and they know starting a conflict is much easier than ending it. The CCP also recognizes that conflict is tremendously costly in terms of resources, manpower, international reputation, and domestic stability. Their preference may be to achieve their strategic objectives via minimal kinetic and non-kinetic means. 

The Japan-China Senkaku Islands War of 2025: Who Would Win?

Andrew Latham

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An F-15 Eagle fighter jet launches from the runway during RED FLAG-Alaska 11-2 July 15, 2011, Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. The F-15 Eagle forms part of the Japan Air Self Defense Force fighter-interceptor aircraft inventory used to engage hostile aircraft. (U.S. Air Force photo by/Staff Sgt. Miguel Lara)

Key Points and Summary – China’s scripted coast-guard incursions around the Senkaku Islands aim to normalize control through mass and proximity.

-But Japan has reorganized for rapid joint action, dispersing long-range anti-ship missiles across the Ryukyus, expanding fifth-gen air and AEW, and adding Tomahawks to create a lethal denial web. The U.S.–Japan alliance now signals unambiguous coverage, with carrier, Marine Littoral Regiment, and ISR/long-range fires ready to stiffen defense.

-In a limited clash, quick fusion of coast guard, navy, and air overwatch favors Japan.

-A longer fight trends toward a bloody stalemate at sea—still a Japanese “win” by denying any durable Chinese foothold while keeping the conflict contained.

Senkaku Islands War of 2025: What Would It Look Like?

Chinese coast guard cutters now patrol the waters around the Senkaku Islands with numbing frequency, testing Japanese and allied resolve. Each scripted Chinese incursion risks a spark – say, a ramming incident, an attempt to board or detain a Japanese fishing boat, or an escalatory use of force starting with water cannons and moving to warning shots, all cloaked as “law enforcement.” The questions write themselves. If a clash came, who would win? Would the United States show up? Given what we know, the answers also effectively write themselves: In a limited fight over the Senkakus, Japan would likely win, and it would do so with Washington’s active military support.

Start with the balance China prefers. In disputed and heavily contested waters, Beijing relies on mass – large coast guard ships backed by maritime militia and the theater navy – to harass and shoulder aside ships from adversary nations. Size and proximity favor China day-to-day.

China’s Renewable Edge: EPC Strategies and Multilateral Financing for Overseas Projects

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The paper concludes that the EPC-driven engagements by Chinese firms reflect a commercially pragmatic approach to securing a central role in the global Renewable Energy (RE) landscape. It allows them to expand their global footprint through their technical expertise and implementation efficiency, and mitigate financial risks. For host countries, such engagements allow them to tap into affordable RE infrastructure that support their energy transition goals, while mitigating risks of unsustainable debt.

Key takeaways from the study highlight the dominance of solar and wind energy projects in EPC contracts, alongside the growing role of local and multilateral banks and the corresponding decline of direct overseas energy finance for energy projects by Chinese Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). EPC contracts also enable RE equipment manufacturers in China to secure new markets. Finally, implementation standards of RE projects vary depending on the financing parties involved, and the regulatory framework of host countries.

Mapping China's Borderlands: Dashboard

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The Mapping China’s Strategic Space: Borderlands research project investigates how China invests in, engages with, and deepens its presence within its land and maritime border neighbors in an attempt to reshape its immediate periphery. This research effort constitutes the second phase of NBR’s Mapping China’s Strategic Space project. The first phase defined strategic space as a realm vital to the pursuit of China’s national economic and security objectives and to the enduring survival of the Chinese state. Beijing aspires to freely wield its influence and assert its leadership over this realm. This dashboard was compiled in collaboration between NBR and AidData to identify thirteen indicators across 28 countries sharing maritime or land borders (or close proximity to) the People’s Republic China.

The borderland areas surrounding China’s national territory are a critical component of its strategic space. Whereas China’s geopolitical horizons stretch globally, its capacity to exercise control and effectively exert its transformative power over the full extent of its desired strategic space is still uncertain. By contrast, the country’s contiguous regions, situated in its immediate reach, present opportunities for making use of power and wealth asymmetries—testing out methods that may become trademarks of a future globally dominant China, and laying the ground for an entirely reconfigured Asia. In addition, shaping a cooperative neighborhood appears as the necessary preliminary step toward ensuring that Beijing’s global ambitions can eventually come to pass.

The Borderlands project examines the practice of Chinese statecraft in the fourteen countries with which it shares a land border (Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam) and in six countries with which it shares or claims a maritime border (Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, and South Korea). Following Beijing’s own priorities as defined by the Global Initiatives on Development, Security, and Civilization (GDI, GSI, and GCI), the project’s analysis is conducted across the economic, security, and political domains.

Searching For Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy Under Lai Ching-Te – Analysis

Thomas J. Shattuck

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(FPRI) — The multi-state dispute in the South China Sea has enveloped the region for decades, with no signs of abating. Much of the media attention on the region has recently focused on coercion and aggression conducted by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and China Coast Guard (CCG) against the Philippines. In August 2025, a CCG cutter pursuing a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel collided with a PLAN ship. The PCG ship, which escaped unscathed, documented the embarrassing and dangerous incident.

Despite the focus on the regular CCG-PCG interactions in the South China Sea, another player in the dispute—Taiwan—rarely figures into the broader regional discussion. That changed in early September after Andrew S. Erickson, Jason Wang, Pei-Jhen Wu, and Marvin Bernardo released a report at the Jamestown Foundation on PRC oil structures around Taiwan-occupied Pratas/Dongsha Island—within the island’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Since May 2020, the PRC has placed at least “seven ‘jackets’ (steel space-frame substructures of fixed offshore platforms that that support the weight of an oil drilling rig), three floating production storage and offloading (FPSOs—converted oil tankers with an oil refinery built on top), and five semi-submersible oil rigs.” The structures had been near Pratas for five years, and Taiwan’s presidential office only acknowledged them and pushed back against their presence after the report’s publication, calling on the PRC to “immediately cease illegal deployment and exploitation activities in the economic waters of countries in the region, including Taiwan.”

The revelation of these oil structures’ presence exposes key issues related to Taiwan’s position in the South China Sea and, perhaps more importantly, President Lai Ching-te’s South China Sea policy. Since Lai took office in May 2024, neither he nor his administration has released a clear statement or strategy on the South China Sea.

What President Lai Has Said

Throughout Lai’s campaign and presidency, he has discussed countless critical national security and cross-strait issues. However, he has generally avoided any substantive discussion of the South China Sea since launching his bid for the presidency. He did not mention the South China Sea issue in his inaugural address. And when discussing Taiwan’s territory and sovereignty vis-à-vis China, a glaring omission is Taiping and Pratas Islands.

What China Doesn’t Want

David C. Kang, Jackie S. H. Wong, and Zenobia T. Chan

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It is now considered common knowledge in Washington policymaking circles that China aims to replace the United States as the dominant global superpower and to aggressively expand its territory. Democrats and Republicans alike have embraced this consensus. Elbridge Colby, who advises the Pentagon as President Donald Trump’s undersecretary of defense for policy, has written that if China took control of Taiwan it would serve as a steppingstone to extending its reach into the Philippines and Vietnam. Rush Doshi, the deputy senior director for China and Taiwan on the National Security Council under President Joe Biden and one of the

China’s 300th J-20 Aircraft Rolls Out; Will PLAAF Surpass USAF To Operate World’s Largest Fleet Of Stealth Jets

Sakshi Tiwari

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The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) now operates 300 J-20 ‘Mighty Dragon’ fifth-generation stealth fighters—a spectacular feat that shows how Beijing is expanding its production lines and accelerating deliveries at a breakneck speed.

The milestone was disclosed when a J-20 fighter jet sporting the construction number ‘CB10300’ was spotted at the site of the upcoming Changchun Air Show in Jilin province, between September 12 and 14, 2025.

China military aviation researcher Andreas Rupprecht was among the first to post the image of the aircraft on social media. “It is assigned to the 19th Air Brigade and, even more important, finally it is one where the construction number is visible: CB10300, aka from Batch 10 & the 300th J-20 in total!” he wrote on X.

The J-20 entered mass production in 2017, with production catching up only in 2022. The aircraft production has now accelerated to 100-120 aircraft per year, aided by new assembly lines at Chengdu Aircraft Corporation.

In contrast, Lockheed Martin produces nearly 150 F-35s annually, many of which are meant for international buyers.

Notably, the PLA watchers and analysts believe that this number is just the tip of the iceberg, and the total number of J-20s has likely surpassed 300.

Rick Joe, a popular PLA aviation analyst, wrote on X: “Important to note that ‘300th J-20 in total’ refers to this specific airframe being the 300th production J-20 airframe — not that there are a total of only 300 J-20 airframes at present (almost certain to be a bit more than 300 by now).”

Besides the J-20, China has also developed an upgraded variant of the aircraft called J-20A, and a two-seat variant called J-20S, which was recently unveiled at its Victory Day Parade.

The news was received with a mix of awe and disappointment in India, as several netizens and journalists subtly compared the Chinese capability with that of India. Sameer Joshi, a popular Indian journalist, quipped: “Quantity has now caught up with Quality.”

Belarus and Poland Share Military Information Despite Worsening Political Relations

Yauheni Preiherman

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On September 10, Poland shot down at least 19 Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that had violated its airspace. Afterward, Poland invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) founding treaty.

Belarus’s armed forces notified Poland and Lithuania about the incoming drones via existing military-to-military communication channels.

Minsk’s sharing of sensitive information with the Polish armed forces represents an effort from the Belarusian military in risk reduction and pragmatic dialogue with NATO countries, even in the face of deteriorating bilateral relations.

On September 10, Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk stated that the previous night at least 19 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) violated his country’s airspace (YouTube/@APT, September 10). The Polish authorities are confident that the drones were Russian and that the incursions happened intentionally. Based on those factors, Tusk concluded that the occurrence brought Poland closer to an open military conflict than at any time since World War II, while also emphasizing that Poland is “not at war” (Polskiego Radia, September 10).

Most reactions from Western politicians and media naturally focused on Polish assessments of the incursions and their implications for the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Poland is a member. Warsaw invoked Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty, which launched formal consultations among its 32 member states as the “territorial integrity, political independence or security [of one of them] is threatened” (NATO, accessed September 14). On September 12, NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that, in response to the incursions, the alliance was launching operation “Eastern Sentry” to bolster its posture along its eastern flank (NATO, September 12).

The international focus on Poland and NATO’s big-picture reactions is understandable, as the incident posed a serious challenge to NATO’s overall strategy of effectively deterring Russia. There appeared to be little coverage in the West, however, about the drones entering Polish airspace from both Belarus and Ukraine, a fact that has potentially long-term implications for the security of Poland and NATO. In his statement at the Sejm, the Polish Parliament, Tusk underlined that this incident was the first time since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that drones entered Poland’s airspace from Belarus and Ukraine rather than just from Ukraine (YouTube/@APT, September 10). He argued that drones entering NATO airspace at the Belarusian border represented a major escalation that Warsaw and its allies need to counter. Crucially, Tusk failed to mention that Minsk did not silently watch the Russian drones fly over Belarus en route to Poland.

Strategy and Security

Colin S. Gray - United Kingdom

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Colin S. Gray is Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies, having retired from the University of Reading in 2014. Professor Gray wrote a trilogy of works on strategy with Oxford University Press, 2010, 2013 and 2014. Currently he is writing books on The Future of Strategy, and Strategy and Politics. His advisory work and writing for government is focused at present on Special Operations.

There can be little disagreement with the proposition that security is a basic human need and therefore has to be of fundamental importance to the high business of state. But it can be almost embarrassing to ask seriously what it is. If a simple and straightforward answer to the question about its nature is hard to obtain, one is right to ask sceptical questions in follow-up mode that may reveal a troublesome void in official thinking. In addition to desiring to know just what security is, and therefore also (logically) is not, we would like to know how we buy it; indeed, can we buy it? From whom or what do we buy security? Is there a usable common currency to meet security concerns? And, probably most important of all, how will we know that we have bought it successfully and therefore should judge ourselves to be sufficiently secure?

As scholars we cannot evade the elementary question, ‘how do we study security in order better to understand it’? To be blunt, what do we study with respect to security? You will discover readily enough that this basic question is not answered in the current literature and debate and you may well begin to suspect it is not answerable. This is the quite unremarkable reason why, over many years, I have refused the title of professor of Security Studies, and have resisted as best I could occasional institutional efforts to associate me with a Centre or Institute for Security Studies. The problem is not that the concept of security lacks meaning, but rather that it carries too much meaning that is thoroughly undisciplined. Alas, there is excellent reason for this unhappy condition. What we have in the concept of security is a boundary-free, not merely-‘lite’, idea. And this potent idea is overflowing with meaning to everyone, both individually and collectively. If I want to study security, what does that imply? What either does or might promote insecurity? I suggest that security is a feeling measurable by human and institutional agents on little reliable empirical basis. And even if we can agree on potentially relevant facts, it is very likely that we would disagree on what the verifiable facts mean. This is a reality disturbing to many people; frank recognition that security/insecurity is a feeling and therefore is liable to influence by personality and mood swing chemistry and consideration of circumstances, but scarcely at all reliably by empirical data.

What We’ll Be Watching for at UNGA

John Haltiwanger

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Welcome back to Foreign Policy’s Situation Report. We’re just a few days away from the 80th United Nations General Assembly. Remember to keep an eye out for pop-up editions of SitRep! Rishi and John will be running around Turtle Bay all week to offer you the most important (and juiciest) details on what’s happening. FP will also be hosting several public events alongside the gathering, including the Her Power summit and forums on energy, health, and technology, which you can sign up for here.

Alright, here’s what’s on tap for the day: We explain what we’re watching for at UNGA, the United States and United Kingdom sign a tech cooperation deal, and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia make a mutual defense pact.

‘No One Should Be Very Confident’: Four Economists Dissect Trump and the Economy

Rebecca Patterson, Oren Cass, Jason Furman and Lawrence H. Summers

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Ms. Patterson is an economist who has held senior roles at JPMorgan Chase and Bridgewater Associates. Mr. Cass, Dr. Furman and Dr. Summers are economists and contributing Opinion writers.

Matthew Rose, an Opinion editorial director, hosted an online conversation with four economists to discuss Wednesday’s Federal Reserve meeting and the state of the economy.

Matthew Rose: The Federal Reserve met this week and the least interesting thing it did was cut interest rates. This may rank as one of the oddest meetings in recent memory. It’s the first since the president tried to fire a Fed governor, Lisa Cook. It featured the first appearance by a Trump-appointed governor, Stephen Miran. And it’s the latest test for the chairman, Jerome Powell, who is facing attacks from the president, an array of contradictory economic signals and a very public contest to succeed him.

Stepping way back, what is your one big takeaway?

Lawrence H. Summers: Sometimes markets do better than is deserved based on the quality of policy. Between tariffs, wholesale attacks on Fed independence, deficits and attacks on the rule of law, there is much basis for uncertainty about our economic future.

Rebecca Patterson: The Fed’s decision this week and Mr. Powell’s news conference highlighted a really important divergence in the U.S. economy. While overall economic growth has been fine, it is masking very different experiences for different parts of the population. High-income earners with homes and equities have rising levels of wealth and continue to spend. But young people just out of college, lower-income earners and retirees on fixed incomes are increasingly struggling, given high and still-rising prices, a stagnant job market and a lack of housing supply. The Fed is trying to thread this needle: manage risk to the job market without exacerbating inflation pressures.

Jason Furman: My strongest takeaway was a little bit of relief on our worst fears about the Federal Reserve losing its independence. I was really encouraged that two people President Trump appointed in his first term, Michelle Bowman and Christopher Waller, both voted with the committee rather than dissenting and calling for a larger cut. This despite the fact that they have every incentive to flatter Mr. Trump, who is considering them, among others, for Federal Reserve chair. As long as the two of them want to keep the Fed independent, and I have every reason to think they are both serious people who care about the institution, it will likely stay that way.

Funding Europe’s Firepower

Dalibor Rohac and Eduardo Castellet Nogués

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European leaders know by now that they need to invest more in security. They know that the continent needs bigger defense budgets to fund more military capabilities and larger armies. Some of their motivation comes from Washington, which this year pushed European NATO members to commit to military spending targets of five percent of GDP (including 3.5 percent for outlays on core defense needs such as hardware). But Europe needs to spend for its own sake, too, to ensure the continent’s safety in a world in which it can rely less and less on the protection of the United States.

The Money Fight That Will Shape Europe’s Future

CARL BILDT

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STOCKHOLM – “Money makes the world go around,” sings the showgirl Sally Bowles in Cabaret, the iconic musical set against the backdrop of the Weimar Republic’s decadence. Money will certainly shape Europe’s future, as political leaders across the continent are forced to make painful decisions about how to allocate public funds in an increasingly unstable world.

Three urgent priorities are set to strain Europe’s public finances over the next few years. The first – and most obvious – is defense. The push to boost military spending is primarily a response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression, compounded by US President Donald Trump’s relentless criticism of America’s NATO allies. Together, these pressures have made strengthening Europe’s defense posture a strategic necessity.

The second, and arguably more urgent, priority is to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. If Ukraine’s defenses were to collapse, a revanchist Russia would likely go on a rampage. Ensuring that Ukraine can continue to defend itself will require European governments to go beyond their existing defense-spending commitments.

And lastly, there is the lengthy process of producing the European Union’s next multiyear budget, which will cover the period from 2028 to 2034. The European Commission has already presented its proposal, but the real challenge lies ahead, as member states and the European Parliament must go through internal negotiations before agreeing on the final numbers.

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The Commission’s proposal includes increased funding for security, global commitments, and competitiveness, as well as additional support for Ukraine. Although these priorities have been widely supported, the reallocation of resources needed to fund them has been the subject of fierce debate. It is safe to say the Commission is headed for a bruising political showdown before a consensus is reached.

Key Senate Vote Fails, Leaving No Clear Path to Avert Oct. 1 Shutdown

Nik Popli

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Senate Democrats on Friday voted to block a Republican stopgap spending measure that would keep the government open through late November, setting up a perilous showdown with just days before federal funding lapses and no clear path to prevent a partial shutdown.

The 44-to-48 vote came only hours after the House narrowly approved the same measure on a 217-to-212 tally, with all but one Democrat opposed and two Republicans breaking ranks. The House bill would have extended government funding at current levels until Nov. 21, while providing $88 million in additional security funds for Congress, the courts, and the executive branch in the wake of the assassination of conservative activist Charlie Kirk. It also allowed Washington, D.C. to resume spending its own local funds, after Congress voted in March to block the district from using $1 billion in funds the district had already budgeted.

But in the Senate, where Republicans needed at least seven Democrats to join them, Democrats held firm over their demands on health care and domestic spending. Senator John Fetterman of Pennsylvania was the lone Democrat to vote with a majority of Republicans in favor of the bill. Senators Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and Rand Paul of Kentucky were the only Republicans to vote against it.

The deadlock leaves Congress and the federal government in limbo. Both chambers are set to leave Washington for a recess pegged to Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish new year. While the Senate is expected to return on the eve of the Sept. 30 deadline, the House is not scheduled to be back until Oct. 1. House Speaker Mike Johnson has hinted Republicans may stay home in their districts through the end of the month, effectively daring Senate Democrats to accept the House-passed measure or take the blame for a shutdown.

With both parties dug in, there is little sign of a bipartisan deal emerging before the Sept. 30 deadline. The consequences of a lapse in funding would be immediate: hundreds of thousands of federal workers, including members of the military, would go unpaid; many government offices would close; and federal agencies would be forced to curtail services.

Funding Europe’s Firepower

Dalibor Rohac and Eduardo Castellet Nogués

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European leaders know by now that they need to invest more in security. They know that the continent needs bigger defense budgets to fund more military capabilities and larger armies. Some of their motivation comes from Washington, which this year pushed European NATO members to commit to military spending targets of five percent of GDP (including 3.5 percent for outlays on core defense needs such as hardware). But Europe needs to spend for its own sake, too, to ensure the continent’s safety in a world in which it can rely less and less on the protection of the United States.

Are Arab nations going to impose real costs on Israel?

Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley

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For nearly two years since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, the biggest question facing the Middle East has been: What combination of circumstances, pressures, or concessions can help the region break free from its spiral of violence? This week’s emergency Arab-Islamic summit, called in response to Israel’s unprecedented attack on Hamas leaders in Doha, promised possible answers.

As regional powers gathered in Doha on September 15, there were hopes, if not expectations, that they would coalesce around a tougher line against Israel—and a formula for securing a cease-fire in Gaza. The summit proved to be a missed opportunity, as the participating nations did not call for specific military or economic action, but the gathering did plant a seed for what could come.

Over the past two years, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu determined that the best path to his definition of national security was to eschew diplomatic negotiations and pursue military means to secure both the nation and his own political future. This required Israel to bomb Hezbollah, Houthi, and Iranian forces in clear self-defense. But it also led lsrael to bomb Syrians and destroy the Gaza Strip. The government of Israel has presided over a policy that led to the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians and cemented steps to prevent a Palestinian state. It has also ensured that the dwindling number of living Israeli hostages remain imprisoned.

Meanwhile, two different US presidents repeatedly dashed hopes that they would impose a permanent cease-fire. After all, the United States has also attacked Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria, bombed Iran, and intensified (before halting) assaults on the Houthis in Yemen, while giving Netanyahu free rein in Gaza and the West Bank. US policies are often viewed as part of the problem, even though they could be part of the solution. Don’t forget that US President Donald Trump helped force a Gaza cease-fire as he came into office in January and helped bring the Israel-Iran hostilities to a close in June.

Why the World Turned on NGOs

Suparna Chaudhry

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The Fall 2025 cover of Foreign Policy magazine with an illustration of a tattered flag with a globe waving from a makeshift stick flagpole/

In just nine months, the Trump administration has laid waste to the development landscape, dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and slashing nearly the entire U.S. foreign aid budget. This has posed a problem for nongovernmental organizations working on development the world over, derailing decades of work to increase access to health, food, education, and better governance. The impact is disproportionately felt across the global south, where these cuts will inevitably erode institutional knowledge and disrupt development trajectories.

But while the U.S. government’s actions have posed the biggest and most unexpected challenge for these groups, the reality is that the heyday of NGO influence was already long over. NGO revenue streams have dried up—and not just from the United States. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom had already begun their aid retreat before U.S. President Donald Trump took office a second time. In 2020, the U.K. effectively closed its equivalent of USAID, the Department for International Development, by merging it with the Foreign Office. Foreign aid dropped by about $6 billion after the merger, a decline expected to hit $11 billion by 2027.

Disruption continues at Heathrow, Brussels and Berlin airports after cyber-attack

Jasper Jolly

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Hundreds of thousands of passengers at Heathrow and Berlin airports faced flight delays on Sunday after a cyber-attack hit check-in desk software, while cancellations at Brussels airport suggested that disruption of Europe’s air travel would continue into Monday.

Airlines were forced to revert to slower manual check-ins from Friday night after the attack hit Collins Aerospace, which provides check-in desk technology to various airlines.

Brussels airport asked airlines on Sunday afternoon to cancel half of the departing flights scheduled for Monday. The airport said Collins was “not yet able to deliver a new secure version of the check-in system”, and confirmed a cyber-attack had taken place.

Airports urged passengers to check the status of their flights before travelling and asked them to arrive no earlier than three hours before long-haul flights and two hours before shorter journeys.

Collins said on Saturday it was dealing with a “cyber-related incident”. The hack joins a long line of attacks that have hit big companies in recent months. The UK’s largest automotive employer, Jaguar Land Rover, has been unable to produce any cars for three weeks because of a hack, while the British retailers Marks & Spencer and the Co-op were also hit by separate attacks earlier this year.

Airlines were still able to check in passengers manually.

At Heathrow 90% of more than 350 flights had been delayed by 15 minutes or more, while six were cancelled by 3pm on Sunday afternoon, according to the data company Flightradar24. The average delay was 34 minutes. Thirteen flights were cancelled on Saturday, although the vast majority of hundreds of flights were delayed.

A Heathrow spokesperson said the “underlying problem was outside our influence” but added that the airport had brought in extra staff to help cope with any disruption. It is understood that Heathrow has not mandated any cancellations for Monday, and the majority of flights are expected to be operating.

AI Is Learning to Predict the Future—And Beating Humans at It

Nikita Ostrovsky

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Every three months, participants in the Metaculus forecasting cup try to predict the future for a prize pot of about $5,000. Metaculus, a forecasting platform, poses questions of geopolitical importance such as “Will Thailand experience a military coup before September 2025?” and “Will Israel strike the Iranian military again before September 2025?”

Forecasters estimate the probabilities of the events occurring—a more informative guess than a simple “yes” or “no”—weeks to months in advance, often with remarkable accuracy. Metaculus users correctly predicted the date of the Russian invasion of Ukraine two weeks in advance and put a 90 percent chance of Roe v. Wade being overturned almost two months before it happened.

Still, one of the top 10 finishers in the Summer Cup, whose winners were announced Wednesday, was surprising even to the forecasters: an AI. “It’s actually kind of mind blowing,” says Toby Shevlane, CEO of Mantic, the recently-announced UK-based startup that developed the AI. When the competition opened in June, participants predicted that the top bot’s score would be 40% of the top human performers’ average. Instead, Mantic achieved over 80%.

“Forecasting—it’s everywhere, right?” says Nathan Manzotti, who has worked on AI and data analytics for the Department of Defence and General Services Administration, along with about a half dozen U.S. government agencies. “Pick a government agency, and they definitely have some kind of forecasting going on.”

Forecasters help institutions anticipate the future, explains Anthony Vassalo, co-director of the Forecasting Initiative at RAND, a US government think tank. It also helps them change it. Forecasting geopolitical events weeks or months in advance helps “stop surprise” and “assist decision makers in being able to make decisions,” Vassalo says. Forecasters update their predictions based on policies enacted by lawmakers, so they can predict how a hypothetical policy intervention is likely to change future outcomes. If decision makers are on an undesirable track, forecasters can help them “change the scenario they’re in,” says Vassalo.

AI can forecast your future health – just like the weather

James Gallagher

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Researchers developed the code for the AI model which looks for patterns in people's medical records

Artificial intelligence can predict people's health problems over a decade into the future, say scientists.

The technology has learned to spot patterns in people's medical records to calculate their risk of more than 1,000 diseases.

The researchers say it is like a weather forecast that anticipates a 70% chance of rain – but for human health.

Their vision is to use the AI model to spot high-risk patients to prevent disease and to help hospitals understand demand in their area, years ahead of time.

The model – called Delphi-2M - uses similar technology to well-known AI chatbots like ChatGPT.

AI chatbots are trained to understand patterns of language so they can predict the sequence of words in a sentence.

Delphi-2M has been trained to find patterns in anonymous medical records so it can predict what comes next and when.

It doesn't predict exact dates, like a heart attack on October 1, but instead estimates the likelihood of 1,231 diseases.

"So, just like weather, where we could have a 70% chance of rain, we can do that for healthcare," Prof Ewan Birney, the interim executive director of the European Molecular Biology Laboratory, told me.

"And we can do that not just for one disease, but all diseases at the same time - we've never been able to do that before. I'm excited," he said.

Lead researcher Prof Ewan Birney says the model's disease predictions stack up

Army cutting 6,500 aviation jobs as it moves toward drones

Patty Nieberg

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Warrant Officer 1 Alan Ortiz, a UH-60 Blackhawk pilot, trains in a flight simulator. The Army plans to slash thousands of aviation positions as it pivots to unmanned aircraft. Army photo by Sgt. Olivia Cowart.

The Army is slashing thousands of active duty pilots, flight crews, and helicopter maintenance jobs as the service begins a fundamental pivot towards unmanned drones for modern wars, officials told Task & Purpose.

The service will begin cutting nearly 6,500 active duty aviation jobs in fiscal years 2026 and 2027 as part of the Army’s broader transformation initiative.

The Army currently has around 30,000 aviation branch soldiers, but “talent panels” scheduled for October will decide which officers and warrant officers will be retained and which will transfer to a different branch within the Army. The service will also decide whether to hold similar talent panels for its enlisted aviation soldiers, which includes most flight crew and nearly all mechanics and maintenance troops, Army officials said.

“The use of airspace for maneuver that was once unique to our formations is now becoming accessible to soldiers in multiple formations via drone technology,” Maj. Montrell Russell, an Army spokesperson, told Task & Purpose. “The Army is rapidly transforming to meet the changing character of war and leverage these technological advancements, which is inducing changes in both ground and air formations to optimize our collective force structure.”

The strategy to cut aviators is a switch from the Army’s efforts to fill out its pilot force less than a decade ago. In 2019, the service offered pay raises and promotion opportunities to meet a warrant officer shortage of almost 700 soldiers.

As the service reduces its aviation force, Army leaders are doing an ongoing analysis “to determine the appropriate approved excess strength to minimize turbulence,” Russell said.

The 6,500 cuts are separate from the nearly 4,600 reserve soldiers who are facing cuts, a drawdown reported by Military.com. With those moves, the Army plans to eliminate all Army Reserve helicopter units by the end of the summer.

What is the US Military Preparing For? Force Design and the Pathology of Lessons Learned

Shane Praiswater 

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In 2006, Jonathan Bailey published “Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned: the Russo-Japanese War, a Case Study,” a chapter in an edited volume on history and the military profession. Bailey, a historian and retired British Army general, focused on why militaries failed to incorporate lessons learned during the 1904–05 conflict into pre–World War I planning. Nearly two decades later, his work is worth revisiting as militaries struggle to modernize and balance the potential need to “fight tonight” with the imperatives of future force design. Planners reasonably consider peer competitors and expected challenges when making acquisition decisions, but Bailey’s work suggests that technology and threats are not the only pieces of the modernization puzzle. Lessons learned via humble introspection and debrief in service of rapid innovation is a sacrosanct pillar of modern militaries; by equating the concept with pathology and disease, Bailey takes a controversial stance. Militaries often excel at identifying mistakes and adapting under fire, but evolving in peacetime for future conflicts is far more difficult.

To avoid the pitfalls of the past and repeating another instance of lessons observed over lessons learned, force design must account for technological, cultural, and tactical biases. Furthermore, even an unbiased and non-parochial force design might fall short if it does not consider two distinct observations: first, that escalation is a tactical—not just strategic—paradigm, and second, that militaries must have the humility to anticipate ambiguity and wars of attrition.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) was a pivotal conflict between Russia and Japan over rival regional ambitions. Marked by modern weaponry, trench warfare, and industrialized logistics, it foreshadowed key aspects of World War I, including the deadly effectiveness of machine guns and artillery. Japan’s victory shocked the world and demonstrated the rise of non-Western powers in global affairs. The war also exposed the decline of tsarist Russia, contributing to domestic unrest and the 1905 Russian Revolution. It signaled (in retrospect) a transition from nineteenth-century limited wars to twentieth-century total wars, where technology, public opinion, and industrial capacity became increasingly significant factors in warfare.