30 September 2025

India’s Biggest Problem Is Its Own Backyard

Safina Nabi

NEW DELHI—Back-to-back student-led uprisings in Bangladesh and Nepal have toppled governments there, signaling a generational shift in South Asian politics. From Colombo to Dhaka to Kathmandu, Generation Z is emerging as a disruptive force, challenging corruption, dynastic elites, and stagnant economies.

The scale and speed of these social movements have surprised entrenched political classes in their respective countries—but also the political leaders of India, the region’s biggest and most influential country. India now finds itself grappling with an unexpected question: What does its rise as a global power mean when its immediate neighborhood is in political free fall?

Safina Nabi is an independent multimedia Journalist from South Asia based in Kashmir. She covers South Asia and Indian administered Kashmir. She writes on a range of subjects including gender, social justice, human rights. She has written for publications like Fuller Project, Christian Science Monitor, Nikkei Asia, Aljazeera among others.

What the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Pact Means for South Asia

Sumit Ganguly

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a defense pact last week that provides mutual security guarantees. The agreement is likely to have ramifications for South Asia, as it comes as a particularly fraught moment in the region. It follows the short but intense India-Pakistan conflict in May, after a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, which New Delhi says was sponsored by Islamabad.

In the wake of the May military skirmish, Indian officials were piqued when U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Pakistan Army chief Asim Munir at the White House. India also took umbrage over Trump’s claim that he played a pivotal role in defusing the conflict and bringing about a cease-fire. India-Pakistan relations are now at their lowest ebb in decades, and the new pact is likely to cause further distress in New Delhi.

India and the Rebalancing of Asia

C. Raja Mohan

One of the unanticipated features of Asia’s new geopolitics has been the return of India to center stage. During the colonial era, British India played a decisive role in shaping the security order in the region, including substantial participation in the two world wars and other conflicts. Independent India deliberately chose to withdraw from such a security role in the name of non-alignment and opposition to Cold War bloc politics. India compounded its geopolitical abstinence by cutting links to Western capital in the name of socialism. Together, the choices steadily marginalized India in Asia—despite the centrality of the idea of post-colonial solidarity in India’s foreign policy.

With the end of the Cold War, India began to move away from these ideas, which had been dominant in India’s political class for almost half a century. As it opened its economy in the 1990s, India’s growth rate picked up. By the end of the 2020s, India is likely to overtake Japan to become the second-largest economy in Asia and the third-largest in the world. India’s economic transformation has been accompanied by growing defense expenditures, making it the sixth-largest military spender in the world in 2024. It also has the world’s third-largest armed forces. The 21st century has also seen the rapid growth of India’s technological capabilities, especially in emerging digital and related fields. India’s comprehensive national power—which was on a path of relative decline—began to grow in both absolute and relative terms in the early 21st century.

Opinion – Xi’s Balancing Act and the West’s India Problem

Roie Yellinek

Two recent trilateral meetings hosted by Chinese President Xi Jinping captured global attention. In one, Xi stood with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In the other, with Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. On the surface, both scenes suggested a tightening axis against the West. But beneath the symbolism lie very different dynamics. For Western policymakers, failing to distinguish between them would be a costly mistake.

The Xi–Putin–Kim meeting represents a classic coalition of grievance. Russia, isolated by its war in Ukraine, leans heavily on Chinese markets and political cover. North Korea supplies Russia with munitions and receives food and energy in return. China gains leverage over both by allowing the relationship to flourish. This triangle is held together by shared hostility to the United States and a common interest in undermining Western dominance. Its logic is defensive but durable, and it is likely to endure as long as Russia’s dependence and Kim’s isolation persist.

The meeting with Modi looked similar, but rests on much weaker foundations. India’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS reflects a long tradition of hedging rather than alignment. Modi shook hands with Xi and Putin not because he trusts them but because he wants to signal independence from Washington after recent frictions. U.S. tariffs on Indian oil exports and loose talk of mediating in Kashmir played directly into Beijing’s hands. Still, New Delhi has no illusions about China’s intentions. Border clashes, economic rivalry, and Beijing’s partnership with Pakistan ensure that trust will remain elusive.

India has always valued room to maneuver. During the Cold War, it led the Non-Aligned Movement. Today, it balances multiple partnerships: joining the Quad with the U.S., Japan, and Australia, while also maintaining seats at the SCO and BRICS. Modi calls this “strategic autonomy”; critics call it opportunism. In practice, it is India’s way of extracting maximum benefit without binding commitments. Xi’s “dragon and elephant” metaphor conceals the reality that the two countries’ interests collide more often than they converge.

Opinion – The Power and Peril of the Youth Bulge: Nepal’s Gen Z Protests

Alok Shubham

Nepal, the Himalayan nation is once again in the limelight at the global stage due to the recent massive unrest and violent protests that started on 8 September. The intensity of protest has surprised not only the Nepalese ruling dispensation but also the international observers. The prima facie reason behind the call for protest was of the recent government ban on social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook and Instagram etc. due to the regular defiance of the compliance code by the tech giants. September 3rd was the deadline for the companies to act upon according to the guidelines of the Supreme Court of Nepal and subsequently, no response from the other side pushed the government for total ban that fuelled up the growing mounting anger among the youths.

As scheduled, the protest erupted all around Kathmandu on 8th September that amounted to 19 casualties during police assault. This brutal effort of suppression by the government ignited the violent protest in many parts of Nepal that led to the mob attack on parliament, supreme court and other govt offices. In a short span of just two days, the government under KP Sharma Oli was compelled to step down. This series of incidents highlights the deeply ingrained discontent among Nepal’s youth that has been fuelled by widespread corruption, nepotism, unemployment, and government dysfunction.

The Youth Bulge phenomenon is a new discourse for social change or movements. All around globe, it can be seen through exemplary historical events. Theoretically, the idea of ‘Youth Bulge’ gained its prominence from the works of scholars such as Gunnar Heinsohn, Gary Fuller, and, Jack A. Goldstone holds that a high proportion of young people (often defined as those aged 15–29) can either propel economic growth or, under conditions of unemployment and perceived disenfranchisement, contribute to social upheaval and violence. Young populations face intense competition for limited jobs and resources, creating frustration, diminishing self-esteem, and occasionally fuelling participation in protests or movements. Countries with significant youth bulges have historically shown a higher propensity for civil unrest, with one major study indicating that between 1970 and 1999, 80% of civil conflicts occurred in nations where over 60% of the population was under thirty.

The youth bulge theory posits that when a country has a disproportionately large youth population relative to other age groups, it may experience heightened social and political unrest, particularly when economic opportunities and avenues for political engagement are limited. The recent massive Gen Z protest in Nepal is a striking embodiment of this theory, wherein grievances about corruption, restricted opportunities, and government censorship have catalysed large-scale youth mobilization.

An Introduction to Chinese Video Game Diplomacy: How Beijing Weaponized Parasocial Intimacy and Jiggle Physics for Global Influence

Sean Guillory and Cogni-Chan 

Introduction: China’s Rise in Gaming and America’s Brand Decline

In recent years, China’s gaming industry has matured into a global powerhouse. Titles such as Genshin Impact, Naraka Bladepoint, and Black Myth: Wukong are not simply commercially successful; they also showcase a cultural ambition that rivals or even surpasses that of their Japanese, European, and American competitors. When Black Myth: Wukong sold more than ten million copies in its first week and went on to win the 2024 Steam Game of the Year Award [1], it marked a turning point. Chinese studios, long dismissed as imitators, had firmly established themselves as peers, and in some ways leaders, in the global gaming industry.

This rise is no accident. It reflects government support for the industry, from national investment funds to regional incentives that nurture developers [1]. It is also the result of expanding markets, as Chinese-speaking players now make up more than half of Steam’s global user base [1&2]. Perhaps most importantly, it reflects strategic ambition: Beijing views gaming as not just entertainment, but as a driver of innovation and national power [3&15].

Meanwhile, America’s brand in gaming has faltered. Once synonymous with dominance and innovation, U.S. companies are now mired in regulatory uncertainty, culture wars over content moderation, and growing distrust abroad. Into this vacuum, Beijing has positioned Chinese games as aspirational, technologically advanced, and culturally resonant.

What makes this trend particularly significant is that games are more than entertainment. They are immersive environments where fiction and reality, identity and ideology, freedom and control blur. Chinese games leverage addictive mechanics, parasocial character design, and expansive digital worlds to foster intense emotional attachments. At the same time, they come bundled with invasive technologies, such as kernel-level anti-cheat systems, which grant root access to players’ devices [11]. In other words, these games are dual-use assets, combining psychological influence with technical infiltration.

China uses AI as cognitive warfare tool, official says


China is stepping up its use of artificial intelligence (AI) in cognitive warfare operations against Taiwan, a national security official said on Saturday.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the official said the national security apparatus is investigating a YouTube channel called AI Shared Destiny (AIๅ‘ฝ้‹ๅ…ฑๅŒ้ซ”), which on Wednesday last week released an AI-generated video simulating a conversation between President William Lai (่ณดๆธ…ๅพท) and Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim (่•ญ็พŽ็ด).

While the channel described its output as “entertainment,” much of the content — including the fictional conversation between Lai and Hsiao — amplified Beijing’s information warfare messages targeting Taiwan, they said.

In the fabricated exchange, the AI-generated Lai says that the US could no longer contain China, suggesting Taiwan’s arms procurement is futile and declaring his intent to make as much money as possible before the end of his term, the official said.

The 48-second video conveyed themes of China’s rising power, Taiwanese and US impotence, and the futility of Taiwan’s defense investments, amounting to a checklist of Beijing’s standard talking points, the official said.

The channel, which has posted about 50 videos, has amassed more than 12,000 subscribers since its launch in July — an unusually rapid rise for a new platform, the official said.

Its content uses simplified Chinese characters, phrases used mainly in China and narratives identical to those of China’s state-run media, suggesting direct involvement by Beijing, they said.

Citing a recent study by Vanderbilt University’s Institute of National Security, the official said the Chinese People’s Liberation Army-affiliated GoLaxy Co (ไธญ็ง‘ๅคฉ็’ฃ) has been using generative AI to study personal data collected from 5,000 Taiwanese from social media.

Russia is helping prepare China to attack Taiwan, documents suggest

Catherine Belton and Christian Shepherd

Russia has agreed to equip and train a Chinese airborne battalion and share its expertise in airdropping armored vehicles that analysts say could boost Beijing’s capacity to seize Taiwan, according to newly obtained documents that show the two nations’ deepening military cooperation.

China-Russia partnership is less than meets the eye

Lyle Goldstein

Earlier this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing, where the two leaders observed China’s military parade. Watching it, one could be forgiven for thinking Beijing and Moscow are growing dangerously close to the detriment of the United States.

That’s all the more concerning given the Chinese military might on full display at the parade. And while the People’s Liberation Army is indeed no paper tiger, the Beijing spectacle raised an obvious question: if China and Russia are really marching in “lockstep,” why is none of this fearsome Chinese hardware currently being used on the battlefield in Ukraine?

Washington pundits rarely stop to ponder why Russian forces have not been reinforced with Chinese “volunteers” or military gadgetry and firepower. In fact, China has offered the Kremlin only tepid support for its Ukraine war effort.

While this has frustrated some Moscow strategists, it reflects Beijing’s caution, restraint and a more fundamental conviction that a “new cold war” against the West should be strenuously avoided.

This could be seen at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Tianjin, attended by both China and Russia among other nations, which had diplomatic and economic overtones but very little military agenda.

The major headline from that summit was that Chinese and Indian leaders were finally coming together to dialogue and hopefully get beyond the persistent border dispute that has drastically soured that key bilateral relationship since 2020.

Instead of wringing their hands over a new world order run by an “axis of authoritarians,” Washington should be celebrating a major breakthrough between two formerly hostile nuclear powers with a history of recent and intensive violence.

How China Stands to Gain as the U.S. Steps Away From the U.N.

Mara Hvistendahl

China has long sought greater influence in international bodies. Now, as the White House cuts funding for the United Nations and other global organizations, it finally has its chance.

And instead of trying to match America’s deep pockets, as once seemed necessary, Beijing can gain influence on the cheap.

The Trump administration has canceled billions in funding for the United Nations, the U.S. Agency for International Development and other international aid agencies. The clawback has aggravated a pre-existing U.N. budget crisis, prompting widespread cuts.

Chinese officials have long denounced multilateral efforts on labor rights, minority rights and other areas as an excuse for meddling in countries’ affairs. They are seizing the opportunity to diminish that work. At meetings in Geneva, the center of U.N. human rights work, China has joined with Cuba, Iran, Russia and Venezuela to propose saving money by scaling back human rights inquiries, a New York Times investigation found.

Chinese officials have argued that while Washington is pulling back, Beijing is upholding global values. On Sept. 12, a Chinese former U.N. official wrote in China Daily, a state-run newspaper, that with the “doubts and challenges facing the U.N., it is notable that China has been a steadfast supporter of the U.N.’s global governance endeavors, standing firm in shaping solutions to global challenges.”

Influence for Less

In fact, China has contributed to the U.N. budget crunch by paying its dues so late in the year that they cannot be used. But the U.S. retreat is overshadowing that reality.

China-Russia partnership is less than meets the eye

Lyle Goldstein

Earlier this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing, where the two leaders observed China’s military parade. Watching it, one could be forgiven for thinking Beijing and Moscow are growing dangerously close to the detriment of the United States.

That’s all the more concerning given the Chinese military might on full display at the parade. And while the People’s Liberation Army is indeed no paper tiger, the Beijing spectacle raised an obvious question: if China and Russia are really marching in “lockstep,” why is none of this fearsome Chinese hardware currently being used on the battlefield in Ukraine?

Washington pundits rarely stop to ponder why Russian forces have not been reinforced with Chinese “volunteers” or military gadgetry and firepower. In fact, China has offered the Kremlin only tepid support for its Ukraine war effort.

While this has frustrated some Moscow strategists, it reflects Beijing’s caution, restraint and a more fundamental conviction that a “new cold war” against the West should be strenuously avoided.

This could be seen at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Tianjin, attended by both China and Russia among other nations, which had diplomatic and economic overtones but very little military agenda.

The major headline from that summit was that Chinese and Indian leaders were finally coming together to dialogue and hopefully get beyond the persistent border dispute that has drastically soured that key bilateral relationship since 2020.

Instead of wringing their hands over a new world order run by an “axis of authoritarians,” Washington should be celebrating a major breakthrough between two formerly hostile nuclear powers with a history of recent and intensive violence.

The SCO, founded in 2001, has traditionally focused on border security and extremism, not minor subjects in the vast expanses of Asia, particularly after the sudden collapse of the USSR. Notably, the organization took a pass on joining the US effort to pacify Afghanistan, despite many calls for it to “step up” in that complex and ultimately futile situat

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The Consequences of Declining Patriotism in the United States

Coercive Deterrence: Adapting Deterrence for Strategic Competition with China

Russian Arctic Land Forces and Defense Trends Redefined by NATO and Ukraine

Disinformation as Ground-Shifting in Great-Power Competition

Bangladesh in Transition: Testing Democratization in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific

Who Is in Charge of Cyber Incidence Response in the Homeland?

War Fighting: The Case of Ulysses S. Grant

Gabbard Ends Intelligence Report on Future Threats to U.S.

Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper

Every four years U.S. intelligence officials have published Global Trends, a public document that predicts what challenges the United States — and the world — will face in the coming decades.

With the intelligence community often focused on immediate issues, the Global Trends report has taken a longer-term look. Past editions warned of threats and shifts that came to pass, including climate change challenges, new immigration patterns and the risk of a pandemic.

But the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, led by Tulsi Gabbard, is eliminating the group that compiles the report.

Some of the warnings, most notably on climate change, had become politically inconvenient, according to former officials.

Ms. Gabbard’s office, in announcing the decision, said the National Intelligence Council’s Strategic Futures Group had “neglected to fulfill the purpose it was created for” and had pursued a partisan political agenda.

“A draft of the 2025 Global Trends report was carefully reviewed by D.N.I. Gabbard’s team and found to violate professional analytic tradecraft standards in an effort to propagate a political agenda that ran counter to all of the current president’s national security priorities,” the office said.

The elimination of the office last month was little noticed because it came amid a flurry of activity by Ms. Gabbard, including the closure of the National Intelligence University and sharp cutbacks of officers working on foreign malign influence and election threats.

Defending the move, Ms. Gabbard’s office highlighted what it said were problems of tradecraft, or the methodology used to gather information and analyze intelligence for the report.

Why Is the Pentagon Afraid of the Press?

Nancy A. Youssef

In the 18 years I have been reporting at the Pentagon, military leaders have rarely been delighted to see me. Over the years, I have had heated conversations with generals, spokespeople, and civilian leaders. I have reported news that the department officials didn’t want publicized, as well as information they were eager to share. I have traveled in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan, prepared to die in pursuit of informing others, losing colleagues along the way and getting seriously injured myself. To witness the horrors of war means to forever carry scars. And yet, I am one of the lucky ones. I survived.

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My job has been to ask questions on behalf of my fellow citizens, seeking information we all have the right to know about national security in the United States. The First Amendment protects my ability to do this work. But one week ago, the Pentagon announced that journalists would no longer be accredited to enter the building unless they sign a new agreement. In the past, reporters were required to sign a one-page agreement with stipulations about locking office doors and wearing badges above the waist. The new restrictions are very different. Although worded somewhat ambiguously, they appear to put sharp limits on news-gathering activities and may impose penalties on people seeking information—including unclassified information—outside of what decision makers want to share. Under the proposed rules, which run to 17 pages, “information must be approved for public release by an appropriate authorizing official before it is released, even if it is unclassified.” Anyone who publishes unapproved information could, theoretically, have their accreditation revoked, which would leave them barred from the Pentagon—and maybe from military facilities worldwide. Reporters who refuse to sign will lose the badge that has, until now, given them the right to work in a building that has been available to the press—through wars and national crises, under Democratic administrations and Republican ones—since the Pentagon opened its doors on January 15, 1943.

How a Russia vs. NATO War Could Actually Start

Reuben Johnson

A U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon assigned to the 510th Fighter Generation Squadron takes off during Exercise Anatolian Eagle 25 at the 3rd Main Jet Base, Konya, Tรผrkiye, June 30, 2025. Through realistic multinational training, the 31st Fighter Wing enhances survivability, increases combat effectiveness and demonstrates that the U.S. and its Allies and partners are prepared to defend the homeland, deter aggression, and, if necessary, fight and win. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Zachary Jakel)

-Europe’s fragmented defense industry, ammunition shortages, and uneven appetite for risk create openings for a rapid, deniable “fait accompli” in the Baltics using EW, drones, and covert forces.

-That scenario wouldn’t resemble a set-piece tank battle; it would be a shock campaign designed to split allies before they can mobilize.

The Baltic Fait Accompli: Putin’s Most Likely Play Against NATO

WARSAW, POLAND – Recent incidents involving Russia and neighboring NATO member-states have the world asking two questions. One is just how a war between Moscow and the transatlantic Alliance might begin.

The other is what would have to transpire for a conflict to spread from a localized incursion or skirmish into a full-fledged war between the two.

On Sept. 9, at least 19 Russian drones heading toward targets in Ukraine crossed over into Poland, catching the Polish air defense command off-guard. In a second incident, three Russian Aerospace Forces Mikoyan MiG-31 fighters – manned aircraft with two-man aircrews – violated Estonian air space on Sept. 19.

In both cases, the nations in question – Poland and Estonia – called for Article 4 consultations in accordance with the NATO charter. Under Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty, “members can bring any issue of concern, especially related to the security of a member country, to the table for discussion within the North Atlantic Council.” Since the Alliance’s creation in 1949, Article 4 has been invoked only nine times.

Russia will equip and train Chinese air battalion, leaked documents reviewed by think tank show

Lex Harvey

Russia has agreed to help China equip and train an airborne battalion, according to leaked documents reviewed by a leading think tank, illustrating the ever-deepening military partnership between Beijing and Moscow.

Russia in 2023 agreed to sell a suite of military equipment to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including assault vehicles, anti-tank guns, and airborne armored personnel carriers, according to documents leaked by the Black Moon hacktivist group and verified by the British think tank the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

The armored vehicles would be equipped with Chinese comms and command-and-control suites, and Russia would train a battalion of Chinese paratroopers to use them, according to the approximately 800 pages of contracts and additional materials reviewed by RUSI.

Under the terms of the agreement, Russia would also transfer technologies to China, that will allow it to make similar weapons, RUSI’s review of the documents shows.

The agreement, if fully implemented, would bolster China’s air maneuver capabilities, one of the few areas where Moscow’s military still has an edge over the PLA. And improving in that area could – according to RUSI experts – help China one day achieve its aim of taking Taiwan, the self-governing island of 23 million which Beijing claims as its territory.

“Russia is equipping and training Chinese special forces groups to penetrate the territory of other countries without being noticed, offering offensive options against Taiwan, the Philippines and other island states in the region,” RUSI fellows Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Jack Watling wrote in an analysis of the deal.

The Philippines is one of many nations with which China has overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea. Vessels from both countries regularly clash in the region, as Beijing becomes more assertive in its claims.

CNN has not independently reviewed the leaked documents, and it is not clear whether the deal has been fully implemented. CNN has reached out to China’s Ministry of National Defense and Russia’s defense ministry for comment.

Is There Any Role for the United Nations in Trump 2.0?

Fred Fleitz

During his address to the United Nations General Assembly this week, President Trump denounced the UN for its uselessness in ending wars, stating that the world organization is not living up to its potential and pointedly asked, “What is the purpose of the United Nations?”

This is a question many Americans have asked recently as they watched President Trump and his foreign policy team try to end wars around the world while the UN did nothing but hold do-nothing meetings, issue “empty words” about global conflicts, and pass anti-Israel resolutions.

This, of course, is not a new problem. The UN has been corrupt and strongly anti-U.S. and anti-Israel for most of its existence. Like President Trump, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick once condemned the UN for the “bizarre reversal” of its founding intent to resolve conflicts. During the Cold War, the UN was dominated by an anti-Western/anti-Israel Third World-Soviet bloc alliance. Today, it is dominated by China and woke anti-U.S./anti-Israel ideologies.

Trump said his exasperation with the UN has also been driven by its obsession with climate change and “the failed experiment of open borders.” The president stated that these issues are destroying many nations.

Trump called climate change the “greatest con job ever perpetrated on the world” and “the green energy scam.” He also slammed UN aid to migrants, claiming the world organization is “funding an assault on Western countries,” and noted that the UN in 2024 “budgeted $372 million in cash assistance to support an estimated 624,000 migrants journeying into the United States.” The president concluded, “It’s time to end the failed experiment of open borders.”

Although Trump’s views on these topics are commonly held in the U.S., they are sacrilege at the UN and were received with gasps and grumbling in the General Assembly Hall—a clear sign of how out of touch the United Nations is with the American people.

Trump had harsh words for many nations that are making it harder to end the wars in Gaza and Ukraine. He criticized moves by several states to recognize a Palestinian state as rewarding Hamas. The president also criticized nations that are buying energy from Russia, noting that “China and India are the primary funders of the ongoing [Ukraine] war by continuing to purchase Russian oil. But inexcusably, even NATO countries have not cut off much Russian energy and Russian energy products.”

Running Out Of Troops, Russia Doubles Down On Hybrid War With Drones

Natasha Lindstaedt

DONETSK OBLAST, UKRAINE - JANUARY 16: Ukrainian soldiers of the 505th marines battalion receive training in trench digging, medical care and drone operations as the war between Russia and Ukraine continue in Kurakhove, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine on January 16, 2025. (Photo by Wolfgang Schwan/Anadolu via Getty Images)... MoreAnadolu via Getty Images

The war in Ukraine has been costly for Russia. To the British Ministry of Defence estimated a total of one million Russian casualties as of July of this year, including injuries, with the U.S.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies estimating over 250,000 Russian troops have died. Russia has suffered more deaths since February 2022 than all its wars combined since World War II, including Afghanistan, Chechnya, Syria and its first conflict with Ukraine in the Donbas.

Despite these staggering losses, Russia has gained an additional 12% of Ukrainian territory since 2022 (or an additional 29,000 square miles). But this territorial gain has come at an enormous price. At this rate, Russia is losing 10 troops for every square mile gained. Since late 2024, Russia has been so desperate for manpower that it has even turned to foreign fighters, including soldiers from North Korea.

Recruitment has long been a challenge for Russia’s military. New conscripts face appalling conditions, hazing, bullying, poor medical care and nutrition, and are badly trained. To avoid unrest, Moscow avoids drafting troops from major urban areas, and instead relies on poorer remote regions such as Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Yakutzia and Dagestan. As Russia’s approach to military recruitment has always been about the sheer quantity of troops, Russia is now struggling to keep up with the number of men needed to fight a conventional war in Ukraine.

As a result of its failure to win the war in Ukraine through conventional tactics, Russia began using long-range drones attacks in 2022. Since then, drone production has accelerated in Russia, with Moscow able to fire over 1,000 drones and missiles in one night. Russian drones pack a punch, with Politico reporting that drones are used in 60-70% of the attacks that left Ukrainian people killed or wounded.

The paradox of Russian escalation and NATO’s response

Charlie Edwards

The recent drone incursion into Poland represented a significant escalation in Russia’s unconventional war on Europe. On 9 and 10 September, a swarm of approximately 24 Russian drones launched from four different Russian sites and entered Polish airspace. The drones were made of plywood and Styrofoam and are estimated to have cost €10,000 (approximately US$11,800) each. Several drones were shot down, some crashed, while a number travelled hundreds of kilometres deep into Poland. At least five of the drones’ flight paths indicated they were headed towards Rzeszรณw-Jasionka Airport, a key NATO logistics hub – an act of deliberate intimidation. The incursion occurred amid a large-scale Russian attack on Ukraine.

Donald Tusk, Poland’s prime minister, described the incursion as a ‘large-scale provocation’ and Polish military command called it an ‘unprecedented violation’. NATO raised air policing and surveillance levels. Poland swiftly activated its air defences, with Polish F-16s and Dutch F-35s, supported by German Patriot systems and an Italian Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveillance aircraft. The Alliance has reinforced its posture under Eastern Sentry following the incident.

The Russian incursion was followed three days later by a Russian-made Geran drone violating Romanian airspace. On 19 September, Estonia reported that three Russian MiG-31s entered its airspace over the Gulf of Finland for around 12 minutes. Moscow denied any violation, stating that the jets were transiting to Kaliningrad over international waters. Earlier this week drones closed Oslo and Copenhagen airports for several hours. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said it was the ‘most serious attack on Danish critical infrastructure to date’ and suggested the Danish authorities were keeping an open mind as to who was behind the incident.

The incursions into NATO’s airspace starkly illustrate a dynamic of Russia’s unconventional war on Europe: the paradox of escalation. While the Kremlin keeps testing the Alliance’s resolve with drones, sabotage and disinformation, to make gains, it must keep pushing. In doing so, each probe increases the risk of a miscalculation, narrowing the room for crisis management that could turn a limited incident into a conventional war that the Kremlin wants to avoid.

Will Putin call Nato’s bluff? European militaries are a paper tiger

Edward Luttwak

“Paper tiger”. That is how Donald Trump described Russia during his UN speech on Tuesday, but judging by their performance, that put-down could equally be applied to most of America’s own allies. That became clear enough earlier this month, when 21 Russian drones flew into Polish airspace, triggering a Nato air-intrusion alert, the closure of Polish airports, the scrambling of fighters to intercept them — and a hard look at combat readiness right across the alliance.

Dutch F-35 fighters bagged four of the drones, and the others went down by themselves: they were not bombardment drones, just plastic decoys without explosive warheads. Debris aside, in fact, the only damage was the destruction of a house near Lublin, caused not by the Russians, but by a sophisticated $1.9 million US air-to-air missile. It had been launched by a Polish F-16 fighter at a drone — and missed.

Poland’s prime minister, Donald Tusk, was quick to use the Russian incursion to call for more defence spending, urging Nato members to spend 5% of their GDPs on defence. This week’s latest apparent drone incursion, this time over Denmark, has raised the pressure even further: especially now that Scott Bessent, the US Secretary of the Treasury, is warning that Trump has no plans to send more troops to help out his European allies.

Russian provocations How should NATO and the EU react?

Lawrence Freedman

If the Russian drones and aircraft appearing over European airspace were isolated incidents they might be explained away as unfortunate mistakes. But the incidents are accumulating sufficiently to detect a pattern.

Starting on 9 September when drones entered Polish airspace, with some shot down, we have had a drone in Romanian airspace, tracked for 50 minutes but not shot down, three MiG-31 fighter jets in Estonian airspace over the Gulf of Finland, and then drone sightings requiring Denmark and Norway to shut down their main airports for four hours.

On 24 September, two Russian Tu-95 long-range strategic bombers and two Su-35 fighter jets flew into the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). As this is still international airspace it is not quite so serious an incident, though the zone abuts US and Canadian sovereign airspace. The US sent up fighter aircraft to identify and intercept the Russian aircraft. The next day two Hungarian Gripen fighter jets, based in Lithuania, intercepted five Russian military aircraft over the Baltic Sea, close to but not in, Latvian air space.

We can discount any idea that this is all accidental, that the drones overshot or pilots lost their bearings. When a score of unarmed drones launched from four different points all find their way into Poland at the same time, or when aircraft edge into Estonian airspace for long enough to be noticed but not for so long or so far to appear as a major violation, you can assume that this is intentional. The Danes have not confirmed Russian responsibility but have hinted at it, with the head of their national security and intelligence service warning of the risk of Russian espionage and sabotage. A police official described the perpetrator as a ‘capable operator’ who wanted to ‘show off.’ That sounds about right.

What are the Russians up to? In public the Kremlin always denies responsibility and blames its adversaries for making stuff up or exaggerating its significance. It does not really care if its denials are plausible as it is not going to be held to account. The ever-dependable spokesman Dmitri Peskov dismissed ‘unfounded accusations.’

‘A party that takes a responsible and serious position should probably not make such unsubstantiated accusations again and again.’

After Trump Turned on Putin, Is Netanyahu Next?

Daniel Byman

Israel has many supporters within Trump’s inner circle, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, and Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, as well as many important pro-Israel donors. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has proved adept at flattering Trump, with Israel naming settlements after the president, lauding his accomplishments, and otherwise playing on his vanity. Netanyahu also has strong support among Republicans in Congress and with pro-Trump media, such as Fox News, OAN, and Newsmax. This mix of media support, congressional backing, and flattery seemed to work for Israel at a key moment, when Trump decided to join Israel in its attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in June.

Russia Future Watch – IV. Growing Rifts Between Moscow and Dagestan

Umar Hitinav, Zarema Gasanova

Growing Rifts Between Moscow and Dagestan by Umar Hitinav and Zarema Gasanova is the fourth article in a series of analyses as part of “Promethean Liberation: Russia’s Emerging National and Regional Movements,” a project from Jamestown Senior Fellow Janusz Bugajski.

Umar Hitinav is an activist advocating for Dagestan’s independence, and Zarema Gasanova is an independent Dagestani activist.

Executive Summary:

Protests against Russia’s war against Ukraine have been larger in Dagestan than in any other entity in the Russian Federation. Conscription of young men to fight in Ukraine is perceived as a threat to national identity.

Colonization of Dagestan by the Russian empire continued under the Soviets and the Russian Federation, and resentment of Moscow’s denial of any level of sovereignty for Dagestan is growing.

Resistance to the Kremlin occupation of Dagestan started after the collapse of the Soviet Union, presenting a multi-layered phenomenon with both national liberation elements and religious roots in Islam.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has intensified the already existing dynamics of asymmetric relations between Moscow and Dagestan, revealing deep contradictions between the imperial vertical of power and the ethnic, cultural, and religious identity of the region. Against the backdrop of the ongoing “partial mobilization” that began in September 2022, Dagestan has experienced one of the largest waves of protest compared to other regions of the Russian Federation. Residents, mostly women, have taken to the streets of the capital, Makhachkala, and other cities and towns, chanting “No to war!” and blocking roads, despite harsh detentions and forceful pressure from police forces.[1] This reaction demonstrates both distrust in Moscow and a deep sense of threat to national identity, when young men, native speakers of the local languages and keepers of traditions, find themselves drawn into a conflict far from their land and against their interests.

Ethnic and Religious Composition of Dagestan

Silent Exodus: Rising Desertions in the Russian Army


Our research, based on tens of thousands of personal records, shows that the typical deserter in the Russian army is a 37-year-old male under contract, and that his chance of desertion in 2025 doubled compared with 2024. If the desertion trend continues, we estimate at least 70,000 deserters in the Russian army this year - roughly 10% of the entire force deployed in Ukraine. In some units heavily engaged in combat operations in Donetsk Oblast, the monthly rate of battlefield desertions rose nearly tenfold in the first half of 2025.

Despite the rising numbers, Russia has so far built a relatively effective system for tracking down and returning deserters. However, this system will be severely tested as cases continue to grow, and bringing back such large numbers will become increasingly difficult.

To identify trends and draw conclusions, we analyzed tens of thousands of Russian records provided by the Ukrainian project I Want to Live, as well as internal documents from various Russian units, including, but not limited to, the 2nd Motor Rifle Division, 30th Motor Rifle Brigade, 291st Motor Rifle Regiment, 144th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, 1st Tank Army, and elements of the 58th Army.

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A blurred screenshot showing multiple documents and Excel spreadsheets from various units and districts

While we place considerable trust in the I Want to Live project, we conducted our own verification. Our team randomly selected 21 cases from the spreadsheet and cross-checked each soldier’s name, date of birth, and address using third-party services. Nineteen cases matched perfectly; the two discrepancies involved addresses, likely reflecting pre-war records that had not been updated. Overall, the spreadsheet appears authentic.

I. Understanding the Terms

Dissipative Warfare: The PLA’s Potential New Strategy in the AI Era

K. Tristan Tang

For the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the AI era, dissipative warfare could be the theory that replaces attrition with a strategy focused on maintaining internal order and creating disorder in an adversary’s system.

The strategy reflects a broader emphasis on intelligentized warfare within the PLA, prioritizing information dominance, algorithms, and systemic disruption over population, resources, or industrial capacity.

The Chinese military likely will adopt dissipative warfare to some degree.

On September 10, the PLA Daily’s military forum published an article by Wang Ronghui (็Ž‹่ฃ่พ‰) titled “From Attrition Warfare to Dissipative Warfare: An Analysis of the New Transformation in Winning Intelligentized Wars (ไปŽๆถˆ่€—ๆˆ˜ๅˆฐ่€—ๆ•ฃๆˆ˜——่ฏ•ๆžๆ™บ่ƒฝๅŒ–ๆˆ˜ไบ‰ๅˆถ่ƒœๆ–นๅผๆ–ฐๅ˜้ฉ).” [1] He had previously published “Dissipative Warfare: A Typical Form of Intelligentized Warfare (่€—ๆ•ฃๆˆ˜:ๆ™บ่ƒฝๅŒ–ๆˆ˜ไบ‰ๅ…ธๅž‹ๆ–นๅผ)” in the same outlet on May 9, 2023 (PLA Daily, May 9, 2023; September 10). Wang argues that, in the era of artificial intelligence (AI), dissipative warfare (่€—ๆ•ฃๆˆ˜) differs from traditional attrition warfare and that the key to victory in both strategic competition and combat lies in maintaining order within one’s own system while creating disorder within the adversary’s system. Multiple signs indicate that the People’s Liberation Army will likely adopt this concept to some degree.

A Theory of Intelligentized Conflict

Wang defines dissipative warfare as a form of intelligentized warfare under conditions of nuclear deterrence. It reduces the degree of bloodshed but intensifies political isolation, economic blockades, and diplomatic strangulation. It is enabled by the fusion of military systems to generate comprehensive combat power (็ปผๅˆๆˆ˜ๅŠ›), creating sudden external changes that combine material consumption, energy dissipation, and information diffusion. [2] Crucially, Wang argues, the PLA can conduct dissipative warfare in both wartime and peacetime.