India-Taliban Handshake in Delhi Triggers Diplomatic Quake in South Asia

Ajai Shukla

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Neither New Delhi nor its allies across Afghanistan has happy memories of Taliban takeovers in Kabul. Kabul’s first experience of Taliban rule began in 1996, when Taliban vanguards, backed by the Pakistan army, stormed into Kabul after steadily fighting their way north from their southern strongholds around Kandahar. Consolidating their hold over Kabul, the Taliban’s leadership under Mullah Omar discovered that the United Nations (UN)-backed government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani and First Vice President Ahmed Masood had already slipped out of the capital and retreated to their traditional fortress, the Panjsher Valley.

Searching for a target to vent their fury, the Taliban leadership zeroed in on former President Mohammed Najibullah, who had taken refuge with the U.N. in Kabul. Dragging Najibullah out of the U.N. compound, the vengeful Taliban tortured him to death and then hanged him from a lamp-post. For Kabul’s shocked citizenry, this was the introduction to the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan, as the Taliban called itself. For the next five years, from 1996 to 2001, Afghans across the country were governed in accordance with a strict, literalist version of Sunni Islam in which the final arbiter of right and wrong was the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice and its interpretation of the Shariah, or Islamic law.

From 2021, when the Taliban reconquered Kabul, there has been a return to that nightmare period, with public lashings and executions, the banning of music and confinement of women largely to their residences.

Against this backdrop, last week saw a diplomatic earthquake that could reshape strategic and diplomatic alignments across South Asia. Afghanistan’s officiating foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, embarked on a week-long visit to India, during which he held direct meetings with India’s Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar. This was the first ministerial visit to India by a Taliban official.

Muttaqi’s visit to India has yielded several important outcomes. Following official talks on October 10, New Delhi has announced it would upgrade its “technical mission” in Kabul to a full embassy. With the Indian and Afghan governments now opening a dialogue track, there is a possibility of useful cooperation. Both sides have agreed to deepen cooperation on development projects, particularly in healthcare, public infrastructure, and capacity-building. Jaishankar handed over five ambulances to the Afghan government as a gesture of goodwill. This high-level engagement by New Delhi reflects a pragmatic shift in India’s Afghanistan policy, with a more liberal twist in the functioning of the Taliban-controlled government.

From Uzbekistan to France: The Environmental and Geopolitical Fault Lines of Exporting Uranium

Kamila Fayzieva

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In late 2022, Uzbekistan’s state-owned uranium producer Navoiuran signed a contract worth nearly 9 million euro with the Kazakh logistics company TOO Logistic Centre to supply Uzbek uranium to France via Russian territory. The deliveries are scheduled to continue until the end of the first quarter of 2026, following a route that passes through St. Petersburg and onward to Malvési, France.

Concluded amid France’s renewed interest in Central Asia, the deal represented not just a logistical arrangement but a strategic commitment — one that ties Uzbekistan into a complex web of environmental, economic, and political dependencies.

The route begins in Navoi Region, crosses Kazakhstan, and proceeds through Russia to the port at St. Petersburg, from where the cargo is shipped to Orano — the French nuclear giant formerly known as Areva.

In Tashkent, the contract has been presented as a success of industrial modernization, yet it exposes a range of vulnerabilities — from environmental consequences to geopolitical risks in the context of war and sanctions.

Hidden Costs of Extraction

Since 1994, all uranium in Uzbekistan has been extracted using the acid in-situ leaching (AISL) method — a process in which diluted sulfuric acid is injected deep underground to dissolve uranium ore, and the resulting solution is pumped back to the surface.

This technique is cheaper and visually “cleaner” than open-pit mining, but it leaves behind a long-lasting chemical footprint.

Studies conducted in the Ili Basin (China) and Kurgan Region (Russia) have shown that even decades after operations cease, the underground environment remains acidic and oxidizing, keeping uranium mobile and contaminating groundwater.

According to Andrey Ozharovsky, a nuclear physicist and co-founder of the public program Radioactive Waste Safety, the environmental threat from in-situ leaching is far greater than the risk of transportation accidents.

Amid China’s Export Ban, Don’t Forget the Human Costs of Myanmar’s Rare Earths

Debby S.W. Chan

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China controls approximately 90 percent of the world’s rare earths processing. Its dominating position in the rare earth supply enables Beijing to weaponize its structural advantage in the high-tech industry and green energy transition.

Last week, China’s Ministry of Commerce tightened restrictions on rare earth exports, abruptly ending the tariff truce reached in May 2025. In response, the Trump administration threatened to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on Chinese exports to the United States.

While the China-U.S. trade conflict continues to evolve, discussions about diversification of rare earth sourcing have been growing. Some actors have considered engaging with Myanmar, a major external supplier of rare earths to China. However, strategies to counter China’s rare earths monopoly must confront the entrenched and multilayered injustices underpinning the global supply chain. A case study of Myanmar’s rare earths reveals inequalities between the Global North and the Global South, between China and Myanmar, and between local powerholders and affected communities.

Since the 2021 military coup, which ended a decade of political liberalization, rare earth exports from Myanmar to China have sharply increased. Chinese customs data report that imports rose in value from $388 million in 2020 to $1.4 billion in 2023.

Most of Myanmar’s rare earth elements, especially heavy rare earths such as dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb), are extracted from mines in Kachin State and Shan State, adjacent to China. In Kachin State alone, the number of mining sites increased from about 130 in 2020 to at least 370 in 2025, as revealed by satellite analysis from the Institute for Strategy and Policy.

These developments trace back to the post-coup collapse of public administration and intensifying armed conflict. The resulting flow of rare earths into China has reinforced Beijing’s dominance in the sector.

With that in mind, one proposed strategy for other countries to reduce dependence on Chinese rare earth imports involves engaging with Myanmar directly. Although many international stakeholders remain hesitant to cooperate with the military regime, some contemplate collaboration between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the United States, India, Australia, and Japan through the Quad grouping.

Why Is the US Defense Department Funding China’s Military Research?

Caroline Nowak and Ryan Fedasiuk

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A recent report by the House Select Committee on the CCP issued a startling warning: U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) funding has routinely sponsored research conducted by institutions with deep links to China’s defense industrial base. More than 700 publications supported by DoD funding between 2023-2025 involved collaboration with Chinese defense-affiliated institutions – including some that had been at least nominally blacklisted from receiving U.S. equipment.

The report – aptly titled “Fox in the Henhouse” – highlights how a breakdown in interagency communication has led the U.S. government to systematically fail to enforce laws barring Chinese defense institutions from receiving material support.

Defenders of open science are quick to claim that coauthoring research papers is inconsequential. After all, if Chinese researchers can read published articles in Nature, what makes coauthorship such a threat? The important difference is that active research collaboration may provide Chinese defense-linked researchers with tacit knowledge, sensitive data, and experimental designs – insights that never make it into printed research, but that are immensely valuable to accelerating China’s military modernization.

For example, a 2025 U.S. Navy-funded study on swarm mission planning was co-authored by the University of Texas and a “Seven Sons of National Defense” school that had been on the U.S. Entity List since 2001. That collaboration gave Chinese defense-linked institutions access not just to results with direct military applications, but to the research process (such as choosing a decision-making model) in areas directly applicable to autonomous systems, cyber defense, and electronic warfare.

There is no reason U.S. taxpayer dollars should support research partnerships with foreign institutions that are building weapons for the People’s Liberation Army. The United States already prohibits companies identified on its 1260H list of Chinese military-affiliated companies from contracting with the Department of Defense, while the Commerce Department’s Entity List blocks exports of sensitive U.S. technology to named institutions. But these prohibitions are limited to restricting government procurement and equipment sales, not the allocation of research grants. This has allowed certain Chinese defense labs to benefit from U.S. funding, even while they are formally recognized as national security risks.

Chinese arms makers urged to embrace AI technology in weapons development

Liu Zhen

Sourec Link

Chinese arms makers should explore the use of artificial intelligence in the development of weapons to improve efficiency and quality, according to a state-run defence industry magazine.

But the article in the latest issue of Modern Weaponry also noted that AI technology had risks and challenges and its use should be approached with caution.

“Artificial intelligence will leverage its self-learning capabilities in the development of weapons and equipment, serving as an advisory tool that provides recommendations,” according to the article in the publication run by state defence corporation China North Industries Group, or Norinco.

It said the technology could also provide more efficient and accurate design and simulation tools using historical data and optimising design algorithms, and it could significantly upgrade traditional systems like artillery production.

AI would do that by analysing historical trajectory data and integrating real-time sensor data. So it would learn about then create more detailed firing tables for the artillery, and adjust the key factors that affect projectile accuracy.

“The earlier a traditional weapon system was introduced and the lower its level of automation, the more significant the performance enhancement that can be achieved by applying AI to optimise its design methodologies and underlying performance principles,” the article said.

It also pointed to the use of AI in new system research and development, particularly digital twin technology that creates a virtual replica of the equipment for simulation and testing. It said the technology could improve early prediction of potential failures and diagnosis of mechanical faults by having the twin model reverse-engineer the cause.

AI could also be used to evaluate the combat performance of weapons and equipment – including testing and assessment under near-realistic operating conditions – and it could improve testing methodologies to improve accuracy, according to the article.

The EU’s worst nightmare has never looked so real

Marion Solletty and Tim Ross

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Brussels’ fear of a founding member of the European Union swinging to the far right was abruptly reactivated this week as France’s snowballing political crisis gathered more momentum, leading one of French President Emmanuel Macron’s historic allies to join the chorus of opponents calling on him to step down.

The French president is under extraordinary pressure after his prime minister’s latest attempt at forming a functioning government collapsed in just 14 hours and with new elections in the coming months, if not weeks, looking more and more likely.

At both the presidential and parliamentary levels, victory for Marine Le Pen’s National Rally is now distinctly possible, meaning a Euroskeptic, far-right figure might soon speak for France in the EU’s core institutions, adding to a growing chorus of populist, right-wing voices.

“We have a continent that has experienced war, lockdown, a kind of light dictatorship in Budapest, we are used to continuing to function with a lot of shocks” said a European Commission official, who like others quoted in this story was granted anonymity to speak candidly.

But “Le Pen is different,” he reckoned, referring to a widely shared assessment in Brussels that a radical change in French leadership would have far-reaching consequences for the EU.

While the far right has been urging Macron to call new parliamentary elections, this week’s events also raise the prospect of earlier presidential elections if Macron is at some point forced to step down — something he has always strongly ruled out, vowing to stick around until the end of his term in 2027.

If the National Rally accessed executive power in France it would significantly add to the EU’s headaches, already personified around the Council table by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, and likely soon to be joined by Andrej Babiš after his recent electoral triumph in the Czech Republic.

Ehud Barak: Our Hostages Are Coming Home—and It’s Because of President Trump

Ehud Barak

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The hostages are coming home. It will take 72 hours, possibly longer for some of the deceased, but it is happening. In the Israeli and Jewish ethos, this is a supreme moral and operational duty that underpins the Israeli fighting spirit and national resilience. Over the past year and a half, suspicions repeatedly emerged that the Prime Minister sabotaged mature deals for the hostages' release. Today, that is behind us.

This is, first and foremost, an achievement of President Trump, who demonstrated determination to end the war and showed greater sensitivity to the hostages' fate than Netanyahu did. As with his order to end the 12-day war with Iran, Trump seemed to dictate to Netanyahu what is good for Israel, against Netanyahu's wishes. Trump also recruited Turkey to pressure Hamas. With Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah neutralized, and Hamas politically surrounded by its supporters—Qatar and Turkey, alongside Egypt which controls their "oxygen pipeline," and the UAE and Saudi Arabia which hold the purse for Gaza's reconstruction—Hamas had no choice but to submit.

Key partners in this struggle were the hostage families and the protest movement. Trump referred to their moving images from Tel Aviv repeatedly in his social media posts. Before us is proof of a painful truth: Israel and Netanyahu are not the same thing. Netanyahu's government and Israel's security-national interests are not in the same place. Citizens and leaders worldwide can support Israel or criticize its actions while simultaneously opposing Netanyahu and his government. Many Israeli patriots are in exactly that position.

The first four points of the agreement will likely be implemented in the next 72 hours. Implementation of the remaining 16 points could still go awry. One must hope that Trump's determination will hold. Before us is an opportunity to end the war in Gaza, which includes replacing Hamas with an inter-Arab force, a technocratic government and Palestinian bureaucracy, under supervision of an international steering committee headed by Tony Blair.

In parallel, a new security force will be built, to which Hamas's heavy weapons will be transferred, and reconstruction will begin with primarily Saudi and Emirati funding. Israel is supposed to insist on two conditions: first, no person who belonged to Hamas's military wing can be a member of any organ of the new entity. Second, the withdrawal to the final line will occur only when agreed-upon security milestones are actually implemented. This arrangement could open a new chapter including normalization with Saudi Arabia, expansion of the Abraham Accords, and establishing the "economic corridor" from India through the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia to Israel and from there to Europe.

Putin Is Not Winning Story

Andrew Ryvkin

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Since the beginning of September, Russia has sent dozens of drones into European airspace. In response, NATO governments have briefly shut down civilian airports, scrambled fighter jets, and invoked NATO’s Article 4—calling for formal consultations among allies.

This pattern of incursions is Vladimir Putin’s most overt attempt to show NATO as hollow and unable to defend its own territory, much less Ukraine. But more remarkable than the provocation itself is how confidently observers in the West deemed it a victory for the Russian president. The intrusions had contributed, one CNN analysis asserted, to a level of confusion and distraction that represented a “win for Putin”—yet another instance of his being depicted as enjoying one success after another, regardless of battlefield losses, unfavorable geopolitical shifts, and growing turbulence at home.

After taking over from the ailing Boris Yeltsin a quarter century ago, Putin started his presidency by projecting a near-comical image of manliness and invincibility. But no one in the Kremlin could have imagined how the West would adopt and then amplify this narrative. If you Google phrases such as victory for Putin and big win for Putin, you find news stories stretching back years: Brexit, Syria, Donald Trump’s presidential victories in 2016 and 2024, Marine Le Pen competing in France’s presidential election, the Israel-Hamas war. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is now the public face of opposition to Russian imperialism, but even his election in 2019 was interpreted as a win for Putin.

Putin, a ruthless septuagenarian bent on restoring Russia to its imperial glory, is simply too good a villain for Western politicians and media commentators to ignore. Casting him as omniscient and unstoppable creates a clear story amid the chaos of global affairs. For Trump’s critics, emphasizing Putin’s strength has become another way of denigrating the U.S. president. But this emotionally convenient mythmaking spills over into news and political analysis.

Early in my career, I worked inside several propaganda outlets in Russia. All had an unspoken rule: No matter the crisis, Putin can’t lose. Many Western commentators are unwittingly following that rule too. But overestimating Putin’s power means doing his job for him. It means amplifying every one of his threats, mistaking posturing for reality, and making policy decisions based not on facts but on what Putin wants us to believe. And although he has had some successes—his annexation of Crimea, to name one—Putin’s biggest win comes from convincing the world that he’s winning, even when he isn’t.

Top US Army General Says He’s Letting ChatGPT Make Military Decisions

Joe Wilkins

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If it’s worrying that high school kids are outsourcing their brains to AI, it’s downright alarming to imagine US military leaders — the commanders of the most well-equipped armed forces in history — doing the same.

Unfortunately, that scenario is no longer the stuff of cold war fiction. As first reported by Business Insider, Major General William “Hank” Taylor, commander of the 8th Field Army in South Korea, told reporters that “Chat[GPT] and I” have become “really close lately.”

“I’m asking to build, trying to build models to help all of us,” he said, adding that he’s using ChatGPT to help make military and personal decisions affecting the soldiers under his command. This includes the joint United Nations Command in South Korea, which Taylor currently leads as chief of staff.

“As a commander, I want to make better decisions,” Taylor reportedly said. “I want to make sure that I make decisions at the right time to give me the advantage.”

It’s a remarkable comment coming from the top US military official in Korea, a nation the US has occupied since 1945. ChatGPT is notorious for its often-agreeable answers, prioritizing endless engagement over accuracy. In extreme cases, ChatGPT has even encourages users as they’ve fallen into severe mental health crises that led to involuntary commitment and even death by suicide.

The company behind ChatGPT, OpenAI, has since tried to address more extreme cases of brown-nosing with the release of the more grounded GPT-5. That was short-lived, however, as a massive outcry from users prompted the company to reinstate the chatbot’s sycophantic traits.

Beyond sycophancy, GPT-5 has been found to generate false information on basic facts “over half the time” — a problematic track record even before you consider the fact that it’s now helping manage the US military in the shadow of one of the longest-standing geopolitical showdowns of the modern era.

I Corps adapts to meet modern challenges in the Indo-Pacific

Jen Judson

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The U.S. Army’s I Corps is at a moment of strategic transition, shouldering the responsibility of shaping the service’s readiness across the vast, complex Indo-Pacific theater.

Overseeing that effort is Lt. Gen. Matthew McFarlane, under whose command the Corps, through continuous exercise and training, is rethinking itself as both a forward campaign-capable headquarters and a practical force provider for homeland defense.

The Corps has adopted innovation from the top to the bottom, working to modernize networks, integrate long-range precision fires and manage how unmanned systems in formations will transform the force.

Defense News sat down with McFarlane in a recent interview to discuss how the Corps is preparing for various phases of conflict and recap lessons from its expansive training campaign.

Portions of this interview have been edited for clarity.

DN: The Pentagon is placing a greater emphasis on homeland defense but is also focused on China as a pacing threat. I Corps is focused on both. How has this shift in emphasis affected I Corps?

McFarlane: I Corps is undergoing significant transformation, purposely evolving to meet complex challenges of the 21st-century battlefield.

This isn’t simply about adopting new technology. [It’s] fundamentally reshaping how we think, train and operate, building a more agile, resilient and lethal force capable of rapidly responding to a wide spectrum of threats and contingencies across the Indo-Pacific region.

This transformation is driven by clear understanding of the evolving strategic landscape and a commitment to maintaining our competitive edge.

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Triggers Logistics, Comms & Operational Disruption

Richard Gardiner

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Russia’s “gray zone” tactics are a manifestation of growing geopolitical risk by sabotaging and disrupting critical systems throughout the communication and supply chain. Companies and suppliers are stepping up mitigation efforts. Richard Gardiner of consultancy S-RM examines how organized crime proxies acting on behalf of Russian intelligence services provide the Kremlin with plausible deniability for unsophisticated attacks.

While propagandist social media posts and drone incursions are a more visible form of attack, at a more covert level, logistics chokepoints and digital infrastructure are among the most vulnerable targets of Russian hybrid warfare.

The likelihood of US companies’ logistics systems or digital networks being targeted rises sharply if they support Ukraine’s war effort or operate in the defense sector, particularly where they contribute to strengthening European security. By sabotaging or disrupting these businesses, Russian actors seek to delay military aid deliveries, weaken supply chains and undermine the broader war effort.

Such attacks are often carried out by organized crime proxies acting on behalf of Russian intelligence services, providing the Kremlin with plausible deniability. As a result, the tactics used are typically unsophisticated, ranging from arson at warehouses to incendiary devices sent to distribution centers and designed to detonate in transit.

Operational and communications threats

Against this backdrop, operations leaders can alert themselves to several early warning signs that proxy-perpetrated instability could affect their production and supply continuity. One sign is the sudden targeting of well-known US companies through mass disinformation campaigns, efforts specifically designed to erode the reputation and stakeholder confidence of iconic brands. Another indicator is a marked rise in cyberattacks, especially those focused on logistical, communications or industrial control networks, with notable spikes in phishing, ransomware or DDoS incidents. A surge in suspicious arson or vandalism at key European facilities — including warehouses, factories, ports and supply hubs — often shows evidence of coordinated covert activity. Finally, disruptions to critical infrastructure, whether outages in telecoms, power grids, underwater cables or transport networks, are signs that further sabotage attempts may come next, with the intent to paralyze infrastructure.

The Dilemma of Duty Under Trump

Max Boot

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It might be difficult to remember now, but U.S. President Donald Trump delivered his first blow to American civil-military relations in 2017, when he first started talking about “my generals.” He had appointed a former Marine general, James Mattis, as secretary of defense, which is a position typically reserved for civilians to preserve civilian control of the military. Mattis became the first former general to serve as defense secretary since George Marshall in 1950, and he needed to secure a congressional waiver in order to take the job.

Trump also appointed other high-ranking military officers to civilian posts, including former Marine General John Kelly (who served first as secretary of homeland security and then as White House chief of staff) and his first two national security advisers: Michael Flynn, a retired three-star general, and H. R. McMaster, an active-duty three-star general. Even Vice President Mike Pence’s national security adviser was a retired army lieutenant general: Keith Kellogg (who is now special envoy for Ukraine). Few, if any, previous U.S. presidents had so brazenly tried to benefit from proximity to the U.S. military. Appointing so many generals to such high offices is more typical of a military junta than of a constitutional republic. But Trump reveled in the aura of toughness conveyed by these military men; he delighted, for example, in referring to Mattis as “Mad Dog,” a nickname that the cerebral general hated.

It did not take Trump long to become disenchanted with his generals. Within two years, he fired almost all of them, insulting most on their way out the door. He later said that Army General Mark Milley, his handpicked choice for chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and one of the few Trump kept until the end of his term), should have been executed for treason because he had called his Chinese counterpart to offer reassurances that the United States was not planning to start a war after the storming of the Capitol by Trump’s supporters on January 6, 2021.

When Trump came into office for a second time this past January, he was deeply suspicious of the uniformed military, believing that the retired and active-duty generals he had appointed during his first term had stymied his unilateralist and isolationist instincts. Trump came to see all these generals as part of a “deep state” cabal frustrating his MAGA mandate, and he was determined not to fall into the same trap in his second term.

Russia Ignores Global Peace Developments to Focus on Putin’s War

Pavel K. Baev

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Moscow’s muted response to the October 10 announcement of Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado’s Nobel Peace Prize win and the ceasefire in Gaza underline how Russia’s war against Ukraine has come to dominate the Kremlin’s attention.

Recent independent polling by the Levada Center shows a desire for a conclusion to the war against Ukraine among the Russian public. Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, has shown no flexibility in curtailing his maximalist aims.

U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently discussed the potential supply of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, which Moscow fears could force it to compromise on its war aims.

Extraordinary international attention was focused on the Nobel Peace Prize announcement on October 10. Anxiety was palpable in Moscow, where official skepticism had dominated since the award of the 2022 prize to the Memorial Society—a Russian human rights organization that was branded as a “foreign agent” and forced to operate outside the country. Mainstream Russian commentators were eager to speculate about the potential awarding of the prize to U.S. President Donald Trump (Izvestiya, October 8; Kommersant, October 9). Russian President Vladimir Putin, while asserting that the Nobel Prize had lost its reputation, however, expressed the opinion that Trump deserved it, which earned him a word of gratitude from the U.S. president (RBC, October 10).

The official announcement that the Nobel Prize was awarded to Maria Corina Machado, a leader of the Venezuelan opposition, was met in Moscow with indifference. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro may be Russia’s strategic partner, but his support for the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine is worth very little (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 3). Similarly, the breakthrough in stopping the war in Gaza is receiving only superficial coverage in the Russian media (Izvestiya, October 10). Moscow has discontinued its attempts to form ties with the Hamas leadership, and after the fall of its key regional ally, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, Russia’s interest in the Middle East has somewhat dissipated (see EDM, February 6, June 16, October 6; Forbes.ru, October 9).

Gaza’s Broken Politics

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Whatever fragile political system existed in Gaza has collapsed, along with the institutions that once gave public life its structure. Hamas, weakened militarily and decapitated by the assassinations of its leaders, faces isolation abroad and a diminished mandate at home. The Palestinian Authority, long discredited in the West Bank, has been absent in Gaza. Leftist factions survive as symbols rather than as real organizations. Independent political figures are scattered or silenced. After two years of war, Gaza has no functioning political body with the authority or legitimacy to shape what comes next.

President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan is being sold as the answer. Announced by Trump at the White House in late September, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at his side, the twenty-point framework promises to end the war, restart aid, and stand up a transitional authority to run Gaza. It creates a “temporary International Stabilization Force,” an apolitical technocratic Palestinian committee under a new international “Board of Peace,” chaired by Trump himself. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair would help oversee the transition. The body will aim to manage Gaza’s redevelopment through modern, “efficient” governance, to attract foreign investment. The plan’s clauses include an exchange of hostages for prisoners and detainees, amnesty for Hamas members who disarm, safe passage for the members who choose to leave, a surge of humanitarian deliveries, and a multi-stage withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces tied to “security benchmarks”—including Hamas’s demilitarization and border-control arrangements, all verified by independent observers. The document also notes that civilians will be allowed to leave but “no one will be forced out” of Gaza, a shift from Netanyahu’s earlier talk of “voluntary” emigration and Trump’s “Riviera” proposal “to rebuild and energize Gaza.”

Strip away the framing, and the design is clear. Gaza is to be managed from the outside, without a locally elected government. The P.A. is told to make reforms—anti-corruption and fiscal-transparency measures, increased judicial independence, a path to elections—before it can even be considered for a role in Gaza’s governance. Hamas is removed from political life by decree. Core questions—borders, sovereignty, refugees—are deferred. In this architecture, Gaza becomes a security-first regime, where aid, reconstruction, and “transition” are subordinated to Israeli security metrics under the oversight of the U.S. and its partners. Palestinians are offered administration without authority. The occupation is dressed in managerial language. The danger is that this “temporary” system becomes permanent, sustained by donors, monitors, and memoranda.

How America Can Win the Biotech Race

Todd Young

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In September 2024, Akeso, a little-known Chinese biopharmaceutical company, announced that clinical trials had shown that its new drug could halt the progression of a type of lung cancer for nearly a full year. These results sent shock waves through the pharmaceutical industry: the previous best-in-class drug, produced by the U.S. pharmaceutical giant Merck, delayed new tumor growth for only six months.

Putin's theory of victory

Lawrence Freedman

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The war between Russia and Ukraine is more likely to end with a negotiated ceasefire than with a sweeping military victory though neither seems close. Donald Trump’s peace process has petered out but, perhaps flush with the praise he’s getting over Gaza, he might try again.

At any rate both sides discuss their strategy in terms of getting to the best possible position for an eventual negotiation. They tell Trump they appreciate his endeavours and share his desire for an early peace. Their military efforts, they insist, are directed towards this end. Rather than a bloody fight to finish they want their enemy to realise that it is time to make the vital concessions to get a deal.

A Bloomberg article of 20 September described the conclusions Vladimir Putin drew from his meeting with Trump at Anchorage in mid-August:

‘military escalation is the best way to force Ukraine into talks on his terms and that Donald Trump is unlikely to do much to bolster Kyiv’s defences, according to people close to the Kremlin.’

The key element in Putin’s strategy according to this account was to continue targeting ‘Kyiv’s energy network and other infrastructure.’ It also reported that Putin left Alaska convinced that however hard Russia hit Ukraine, ‘Trump has no interest in intervening in the conflict.’

For his part Volodymyr Zelenskyy is working to prove him wrong. He reports conversations with Trump about how to bolster Ukraine, adding ‘There needs to be readiness on the Russian side to engage in real diplomacy—this can be achieved through strength.’ He can claim some success. More American systems are starting to reach Ukraine, albeit paid for by Europe, and Trump is even discussing, though not yet committing to, the provision of Tomahawk cruise missiles.

This is in part a response to those Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities and energy. These have been stepped up since Anchorage, although the new attacks may simply reflect the availability of large numbers of missiles and drones and the nearness of winter. More on this below. Yet when Putin talks about his special military operation he rarely talks about this feature of the Russian campaign. He focuses instead on the battle for territory, and when he does so he exudes confidence in a coming Russian victory. He has yet to give even a hint of concern that the war cannot be prosecuted to a successful conclusion.

The Uncomfortable Truth About Netanyahu’s ‘Victory’

Shira Efron

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Dr. Efron is the distinguished Israel policy chair and a senior fellow at RAND.

Questions linger about whether the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas will hold, and how — or if — the parties will move on to the far thornier issues in the U.S.-sponsored plan that led to it. Still, it’s clear that this breakthrough signals the beginning of the end.

That is, it is clear to most except the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which is minimizing the deal’s scope while selling it as a diplomatic, moral and security triumph: Israel keeps troops in most of Gaza even after freeing the hostages, with no firm timeline for further withdrawal.

The government voted to approve the first phase of the agreement — the hostage and prisoner exchange, the military pullback in Gaza, increased humanitarian aid to the strip, and the cease-fire. It did not address the harder issues: the full withdrawal to the security perimeter, Gaza’s governance and “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood,” as later phases of the deal called for.

Journalists close to Mr. Netanyahu were blunt: “There’s no phase two. That’s clear to everyone, right?” Amit Segal wrote on social media. “What we have now is a hostage deal, and a cease-fire while talks continue in good faith.” The working assumption in Jerusalem, it seems, is that while full-scale combat won’t resume, the Israeli military may keep striking wherever it detects threats.

Yet here’s the uncomfortable truth: This “victory” is actually a defeat — a necessary and blessed defeat — of this government’s messianic vision. In fact, the agreement directly contradicts what the government has sold Israelis for two years: the promise of total victory and the destruction of Hamas.

Mr. Netanyahu repeatedly rejected cease-fires, calling any pause a surrender to Hamas and terrorism, demanding total victory. Ministers vowed to obliterate Hamas’s military and end its governance permanently.

What Trump Does—and Doesn’t—Get Credit for in Gaza

Bobby Ghosh

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It isn't easy to praise someone who habitually, preemptively, and lavishly praises himself. But there is no gainsaying the fact that President Donald Trump—and President Donald Trump alone—deserves credit for the scenes of joy and relief we've seen in Israel and Gaza, respectively, over the past four days.

Had it been left to the druthers of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the leadership of Hamas, there is every likelihood that the devastation of Gaza would have continued into a third year. It is also certain that more of the Israeli hostages would have died in their miserable confinement, whether murdered by their terrorist captors or accidentally killed by the munitions of their own country.

Instead, the guns in Gaza have quieted. And it isn't because of the nudgings of real estate developers Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, the promptings of Qatar and Egypt, the pleadings of Europe, the finger-wagging of human-rights organizations, or the hand-wringing of the United Nations alone.

The ceasefire is the gift of Donald Trump.

A delayed gift

Now for the caveats. As gifts go, this one comes much belated—and with a high risk of disintegrating even as it is being unwrapped.

Trump could have brought us to this place much sooner if he had been quicker to apply the pressure that finally forced Netanyahu to accept the peace deal. If the president had not wasted time floating perverse ideas about real-estate opportunities in Gaza, thousands of Palestinian lives might have been saved, and more of the Israeli hostages would be in the bosom of their families. (These numbers would have been higher still if President Joe Biden had not restricted himself to pious posturing.)

What finally snapped Trump into action was Netanyahu's decision to bomb Qatar in a failed attempt to eliminate Hamas's exiled political leadership in Doha. This was an attack on a key U.S. ally, one that hosts 10,000 American troops at a strategic air base and has committed to hundreds of billions of dollars in investments in the U.S.—and moreover, one that has promised Trump an upgraded Air Force One.

The new AI arms race changing the war in Ukraine

Abdujalil Abdurasulov

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Russian AI drones such as this present a new challenge to Ukraine, says Serhiy Beskrestnov

"This technology is our future threat," warns Serhiy Beskrestnov, who has just got his hands on a newly intercepted Russian drone.

It was no ordinary drone either, he discovered. Assisted by artificial intelligence, this unmanned aerial vehicle can find and attack targets on its own.

Beskrestnov has examined numerous drones in his role as Ukrainian defence forces consultant.

Unlike other models, it didn't send or receive any signals, so could not be jammed.

Russian and Ukrainian forces have both been testing AI in this war, and in some areas they are already using it, for finding targets, gathering intelligence and de-mining.

And for the Ukrainian army, AI has become indispensable.

"Our military gets more than 50,000 video streams [from the front line] every month which are analysed by artificial intelligence," says Ukraine's deputy defence minister, Yuriy Myronenko.

"This helps us quickly process this massive data, identify targets and place them on a map."

AI processes the feeds from Ukraine's front line, shown here behind Ukraine's deputy defence minister Yuriy Myronenko

AI-empowered tech is seen as a tool that can enhance strategic planning, make the most of resources and ultimately save lives.

But when it comes to unmanned weapons systems, it is also transforming the battlefield.

Ukrainian troops already use AI-based software so that drones lock on a target and then fly autonomously for the last few hundred metres until the mission is over.

By Sending Drones Into NATO States, Russia Is Repeating the Mistakes of 2022

Alexander Baunov

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Carnegie Politika is a digital publication that features unmatched analysis and insight on Russia, Ukraine and the wider region. For nearly a decade, Carnegie Politika has published contributions from members of Carnegie’s global network of scholars and well-known outside contributors and has helped drive important strategic conversations and policy debates.

While the war in Ukraine remains virtually at a standstill, Russia has crossed a new line in Europe. Since the meeting in Anchorage between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump, Russia has not only ramped up its attacks on Ukrainian cities, but has also, for the first time, attacked NATO countries in Europe—albeit without casualties.

Judging by his words and actions, Putin drew three conclusions from that summit. First, Trump is not prepared to hand victory to him and end the war solely at Ukraine’s expense. Second, Trump is willing to develop relations with Russia even without an end to the war, although he will not fully restore them until the fighting ends. Third, Trump does not rate Ukraine very highly and will only intervene to save it as a last resort, and not at any cost.

All of this gives Putin ample room for creativity between the current state of affairs and that same last resort. At Russia’s Valdai Discussion Club last week, the Russian leader’s opening remarks were that compared with the past, the new world order is a “creative space.”

To stop the Ukrainians from continuing to put up a fight, Moscow needs to knock Europe out of the game. Since the meeting in Anchorage, Russia has applied itself single-mindedly to this task. After all, in Russia’s calculations, Trump does not like Europe either, is convinced that people who think like him are prevented from coming to power there, and views NATO as a freeloader and the EU as a competitor.

Russia hasn’t only seen an opportunity to turn the screws on Ukraine by scaring Europe away. The very concept of victory has changed. Moscow is now feeling out opportunities to reverse the order: instead of defeating Ukraine and, through it, the collective West, it is seeking to inflict a kind of hybrid military-propaganda defeat on the collective West itself—Europe and NATO—and in that roundabout way, on Ukraine.

Why Gradualism Can Help in Gaza

Amr Hamzawy

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As Western and international leaders take stock of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas that was signed in Egypt on October 9, many have raised doubts about the deal’s phased structure. According to the 20-point plan announced by U.S. President Donald Trump, the initial stage that is now unfolding calls only for a partial or limited Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the release of nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of the remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas. The deeper issues, including questions over the postwar governance of Gaza and the stabilization

The Ethical Imperative of Information: Just War Considerations for Global Information Strategy

C.B. Duncan 

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This article examines the implications of Just War Theory, an ethical framework governing the use of lethal force by governments, for the use of information warfare in the 21st century. The author posits that ethical considerations demand a robust, integrated approach to information operations, both as a means of averting armed conflict and for accomplishing strategic objectives with minimal human harm or suffering. Classical ethics theories are applied to the requirement for and application of information warfare in the modern context.

Introduction

Navigating the ethical challenges of competition and warfare in the 21st century is daunting at best and treacherous at worst. Warfighters and policymakers must leverage creative and unconventional approaches to navigate a complex environment rife with threats. America, which for decades has served as the de facto guarantor of the current international order, has an ethical obligation to respond to each of these threats, both for the good of its own citizens and for the good of the entire world. Doing so, however, is akin to walking a minefield blindfolded; one strategic move in the wrong direction could have second- or third-order effects that send nukes flying or innocent civilians to their graves. It is imperative that the United States and its allies pursue ethical means of dealing with threats to stability in the modern era, especially in ways that lie below the threshold of all-out war. In this context, gray-zone tactics like information warfare present a valuable ethical tool to address the actors seeking to undermine a secure global environment. By adhering to Just War theory principles, the U.S. can ethically leverage information as a soft-power tool to pursue the common good while avoiding the destruction brought on by full-scale military conflict.

Just War Considerations in the Modern Era

Just War theory, first outlined by Augustine of Hippo in the sixth century and further developed by the philosopher-theologian Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae, provides a framework to evaluate the morality of the use of deadly force as a tool of statecraft. The principles of Just War theory have long informed discussion as to whether a nation or other entity can ethically engage in war, even in the modern era.

Eighth Army commander eyes generative AI to inform how he leads

Brandi Vincent

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U.S. Army forces in South Korea are increasingly integrating artificial intelligence across their low- and high-stakes operations, according to Maj. Gen. William “Hank” Taylor.

And as the new acting commander of Eighth Army, Taylor is personally leaning on existing and emerging AI capabilities to help influence and shape how he operates as a leader.

“I’ve become — Chat and I are really close lately,” Taylor told DefenseScoop on Monday, using the trendy terminology to prompt generative AI chatbots (“Hey, Chat”) that’s taken off in popular culture recently.

During a roundtable at the annual AUSA conference, Taylor briefed a small group of reporters about his team’s near-term priorities and how technology is improving their decision-making processes and readiness pursuits.

“As we talk about protection, drone use, counter-drones and counter-UAS, medical modernization, aviation modernization, we have something going on in almost every domain of modernization in Korea, right? AI is one thing that, as a commander, it’s been very, very interesting for me. Obviously, I’ve been in the Army for a long time, right? And so I was in the Army before computers,” Taylor said.

On AI applications that make specific sense for South Korea, which is very close geographically to China, he said the field army he commands is “regularly using” AI for predictive analysis to look at sustainment. He’s also keen to see use cases expand for intelligence purposes.

“Just being able to write our weekly reports and things, in the intelligence world, to actually then help us predict things — I think that is the biggest thing that really I’m excited about — it’s that modernization piece,” Taylor told DefenseScoop.

Generative AI marks one of the most buzzy, cutting-edge branches of the technology in the current era.

Cyber attack contingency plans should be put on paper, firms told

Joe Tidy

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A cyber attack stalled production at Jaguar Land Rover factories in September, including at their Solihull site (pictured, file photo)

People should plan for potential cyber-attacks by going back to pen and paper, according to the latest advice.

The government has written to chief executives across the country strongly recommending that they should have physical copies of their plans at the ready as a precaution.

A recent spate of hacks has highlighted the chaos that can ensue when hackers take computer systems down.

The warning comes as the National Cyber-Security Centre (NCSC) reported an increase in nationally significant attacks this year.

Criminal hacks on Marks and Spencer, The Co-op and Jaguar Land Rover have led to empty shelves and production lines being halted this year as the companies struggled without their computer systems.

Organisations need to "have a plan for how they would continue to operate without their IT, (and rebuild that IT at pace), were an attack to get through," said Richard Horne, chief executive of the NCSC.

Firms are being urged to look beyond cyber-security controls toward a strategy known as "resilience engineering", which focuses on building systems that can anticipate, absorb, recover, and adapt, in the event of an attack.

Plans should be stored in paper form or offline, the agency suggests, and include information about how teams will communicate without work email and other analogue work arounds.

These types of cyber attack contingency plans are not new but it's notable that the UK's cyber authority is putting the advice prominently in its annual review.

Soldiers should fight with tech as good as they ‘use at home,’ Army secretary demands

COREY DICKSTEIN STARS AND STRIPES

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Army Secretary Dan Driscoll said Monday he would not tolerate sending soldiers into a modern conflict with decades-old weapons, using an expletive in a public speech to highlight his distaste for the service’s slow acquisition system. “No one can predict the next war, but we cannot wait — we cannot f------ wait to innovate until Americans are dying on the battlefield,” Driscoll said in his keynote speech Monday at the outset of the annual Association of the U.S. Army convention in Washington. “We must act now to enable our soldiers. Our window to change is right now, and we have a plan to do it.” The Army’s top civilian — an ex-Army officer, Iraq war veteran, lawyer and former venture capitalist — pledged to adopt a Silicon Valley-like approach to weapons and tech development and procurement. Driscoll demanded that Congress and arms developers must allow the Army to quickly adopt new technology in communications, artificial intelligence, drones and robotics outside of the traditional acquisition system that has proven slow and expensive. 

The Army has long failed its soldiers, he said during his speech at the Army’s largest soldier development conference and trade convention, where manufacturers show off their latest gear and gadgets from rifles and tiny drones to helicopters and armored vehicles. Members of the United States Army Band, “Pershing’s Own,” perform during the opening ceremony of the AUSA convention Monday, Oct. 13, 2025, in Washington. (Eric Kayne/Stars and Stripes) Driscoll spent part of Monday listening to small companies pitch their latest technology to Army leaders in a competition dubbed XTechDisrupt for a chance at a potential contract to supply the service their tech. But there’s also more soldiers can do themselves to improve their battlefield kits, he said. In some cases, soldiers can develop their own technology, like those in the 101st Airborne Division who have built their own 7-inch drone systems, known as “attritable battlefield enablers.” The tiny drones cost about $750 a piece, can travel about 2 kilometers and reach speeds approaching 90 mph, according to the Army. 

“They are modular (and) you can swap components, make software updates, transition between attack, recon or defense,” Driscoll said. “Trained soldiers can assemble it in 20 minutes and then deliver it to the front lines — 100% soldier assembled.” Soldiers can also solve other costly problems on expensive platforms like UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, which manufacturers have long limited how much the service can repair on its own because of intellectual property rights agreements. Driscoll has pushed for Congress to remove such agreements and grant the service “right-to-repair” powers even in its most expensive legacy programs. Driscoll held up a small black and tan fin for a Black Hawk external fuel tank that soldiers 3D printed for about $3,000.