India’s AI awakening: a tech powerhouse races to reinvent itself

Biman Mukherji

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When Indian engineer Meetesh Bhatt first began tinkering with artificial intelligence during his college years in Pune, the technology was little more than an academic curiosity.

Back then, he could scarcely imagine that one day it would transform his family’s small property business. But a few years later, the 28-year-old is now using AI to shake up the Indian real estate sector.

“As a millennial, it excites me,” he told This Week in Asia, describing how the technology had helped the firm reshape its operations.

Today, potential buyers can take virtual tours of new properties without leaving the comfort of their own homes, while his sales team learns from AI-driven insights about what clients truly want – speeding up deals that once took weeks and boosting the company’s bottom line.

Our business revenues have increased by 20 to 25 per cent

Meetesh Bhatt, Indian AI adopter

Meanwhile, site engineers can file live progress updates into new AI systems that help management make faster, more precise decisions, replacing the costly research consultants of the past.

“Our business revenues have increased by 20 to 25 per cent,” Bhatt said proudly.

His is just one small business. But such stories, taken together, reveal a tectonic shift. From traditional conglomerates to start-ups, the digital energy of the world’s most populous economy is pouring into AI.

Once known as the outsourced back office of the world, India is attempting the leap from service provider to innovation leader.

Paper Promises: The Limits of Pakistan's Defence Guarantee to Saudi Arabia

Haleema Saadia

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Introduction

The September 2025 announcement of a “Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement” (SMDA) between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia revived old anxieties about an Islamic bomb being placed at Riyadh’s disposal. These fears are not new. Since the late 1970s, speculation about Pakistan providing Saudi Arabia with nuclear capabilities has recurred with every uptick in bilateral defense cooperation.

Yet, alarmism risks missing the central point: this agreement is far more a political signal than an operational transformation. It offers both governments symbolic reassurance in a volatile moment but falls far short of constituting a credible nuclear umbrella. Understanding why requires two lenses often missing in policy commentary: the theory of extended deterrence and the legal architecture of nuclear governance. Both lenses highlight why Pakistan cannot, and is unlikely to, extend nuclear deterrence to Saudi Arabia in any meaningful sense.

This commentary unpacks the defence pact along three lines. First, it draws on deterrence theory to explain what is required for states to credibly extend deterrence and why Pakistan does not meet these requirements. Second, it examines the international legal and nonproliferation constraints that would make any Pakistani nuclear guarantee controversial and potentially illegal. Third, it situates the pact in the broader politics of US-Saudi relations, Gulf insecurity, Pakistan’s domestic imperatives, and nuclear governance, and explains why this pact is more symbolic than anything else.

Extended Deterrence and Its Requirements

Extended deterrence refers to a state’s ability and willingness to use its capabilities, often nuclear weapons, to defend an ally against attack. The Cold War produced rich literature on what makes such deterrence credible, which translates to: the capability to project power on behalf of an ally, the interests at stake that make defending the ally plausible, and the credibility of commitments through signaling and alliance structures.

China’s Tech Obsession Is Weighing Down Its Economy

Scott Kennedy

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Every day brings new headlines about Chinese tech. Maybe it’s an electric vehicle with longer-range batteries, an updated artificial intelligence model, or a humanoid robot—but the message is the same every time: China is a tech juggernaut. Some credit China’s economic model. Others believe it’s the engineer-trained leaders and hard-edged entrepreneurs who know how to work the system or the sustained transfer of tacit knowledge from the United States and others. But whatever the cause, China’s continued tech ascent seems unstoppable.

Yet equally persuasive are signs of structural weaknesses: rising debt, an aging population, a collapsed real estate market, and rising youth unemployment. China’s economy, some say, has peaked. “Involution,” or wasted production, is not only the word of the year in China but for some is another sign of an inescapable downward growth spiral. If this trajectory continues, China will find it impossible to escape the middle-income trap. If China’s economy slows down or stagnates, nearly 1 billion people could be stuck in low-income livelihoods.

China honing abilities for a possible future attack, Taiwan defence report warns

Yimou Lee and Ben Blanchard

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TAIPEI, Oct 9 (Reuters) - China is increasing military activities near Taiwan and honing its ability to stage a surprise attack, as well as seeking to undermine trust in the government with "hybrid" online warfare tactics, the island's defence ministry said on Thursday.

Democratically-governed Taiwan, which China views as its own territory, has faced increased military pressure from Beijing over the past five years, including at least seven rounds of major war games around the island since 2022.

"The Chinese communists have adopted routine grey zone harassment tactics, combined with joint combat readiness patrols, targeted military exercises and cognitive warfare, posing a comprehensive threat to us," the defence ministry said in a report released every two years.

Grey zone refers to non-combat operations designed to put pressure on Taiwan such as coast guard patrols, damage to undersea cables and flying balloons.

China's coast guard is expanding its activities around Taiwan and may in future take "aggressive containment measures" in concert with the military while rehearsing attack scenarios, the report said.

SHIFTING A DRILL TO AN ATTACK

Beijing is also using "hybrid warfare" to weaken people's trust in the government and support for defence spending, and using artificial intelligence tools to weaken Taiwan's cybersecurity and to scan for weak points in critical infrastructure, it added.

"Through both conventional and unconventional military actions, it aims to test its capabilities for attacking Taiwan and confronting foreign forces," the ministry said.

China's defence ministry did not respond to a request for comment. China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control.

China’s lesson for the US: it takes more than chips to win the AI race

Vincent Chow

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When Alibaba Group Holding’s CEO Eddie Wu Yongming took the stage at the company’s annual Apsara conference in Hangzhou on September 24, few people expected the media-shy executive to deliver anything shocking, especially since he read from prepared statements at last year’s event.

Wu, however, immediately outlined a clear road map for Alibaba’s AI development, with a goal towards so-called artificial superintelligence (ASI) – when the firm’s Qwen open-source models and cloud services would serve as the software and computing infrastructure of the future.

In essence, Alibaba aimed to become the “world’s leading full-stack AI service provider”, he said. Alibaba owns the Post.

The blueprint laid out in Wu’s 23-minute speech signified not just a strategic upgrade for Alibaba, but also highlighted the competition between Chinese and US tech giants for the future of artificial intelligence – a field that has drawn some of the largest investments in history, with profound economic, social and geopolitical implications.

As he spoke, Alibaba’s shares surged to a four-year high in Hong Kong, leading several banks to raise their price targets for the stock.

A day later, US chipmaker Nvidia’s co-founder and CEO Jensen Huang referenced Wu’s remarks during a podcast with tech investors Brad Gerstner and Bill Gurley, in which he underscored the importance of spending big on AI.

When asked about Nvidia’s US$100 billion investment in OpenAI, Huang predicted that the ChatGPT maker could become a “multi-trillion-dollar hyperscale company” on the back of its rapidly expanding array of products.

The AI arena has now shifted from just large language models to include upstream hardware and downstream applications, according to Kyle Chan, a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University.

Why is Nvidia, the world’s leading AI chipmaker, entangled in the US-China trade war?

Auzinea Bacon

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California-based Nvidia has led the charge in the AI chips race, as a leading manufacturer of the technology powering data centers. David Paul Morris/Bloomberg/Getty Images

Tech giant Nvidia is the world’s leading artificial-intelligence chipmaker, but the company’s success has also put it in the crossfire of trade tensions.

The Santa Clara, California-based company, which is approaching a market capitalization of $5 trillion, has seen rapid growth due to its chips, which are predominantly used to power massive data centers used by other tech firms, like OpenAI, the creator of popular AI chatbot ChatGPT.

But Nvidia’s leading technology has been used as a negotiating tool in President Donald Trump’s trade spat with China, which was kickstarted by Trump’s sweeping tariffs in April and has escalated over rare earth mineral disputes.

It’s further complicated Nvidia’s relationship with China, where it was doing roughly 25% of its graphics processing unit sales, estimates Gil Luria, head of technology research at D.A. Davidson. Nvidia’s popularity has also embroiled the company in a steep controversy for potentially allowing China to skirt around export restrictions as trade tensions continue.

“Nvidia has gotten caught in the middle of two very important things: a trade dispute between China and the United States … but more importantly, AI has become a matter of national security,” Luria said.

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has argued that restricting sales of American AI chips will ultimately enable Chinese developers to create their own alternatives.

Who is Jensen Huang?

Huang, 62, was born in Taiwan, and at age 9 was sent by his parents to live in Tacoma, Washington. In 1993, the Oregon State and Stanford University grad co-founded Nvidia, which started as a graphics-based processing company.

China’s Tibetan Mega-Dam Is Veiled in Secrecy

Bibek Bhandari

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When Wen visited the Yarlung Tsangpo Grand Canyon in the spring of 2025, the independent Chinese ecologist saw numerous heavy trucks loaded with construction materials along Medog county in the southeastern part of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Only a single, narrow road connected the county seat and townships, and locals believed the roads were being paved just as the central government was ramping up plans to build a hydropower plant.

It wasn’t just a hydropower project, though. Chinese Premier Li Qiang called it a “project of the century,” as he stood alongside high-ranking officials to announce the construction of the 1.2 trillion yuan (about $168 billion) infrastructure project along the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo river in July. The state-run Xinhua News Agency hailed the world’s biggest planned hydropower dam as a “low-carbon development … a safe project that prioritizes ecological protection.”

AGI Has Quietly Become Central to Beijing’s AI Strategy

Matthew Johnson

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Pursuit of artificial general intelligence (AGI) is a top-priority project within the Party’s increasingly centralized technology planning apparatus. Its success would both close the gap with U.S. firms and bind AGI models to Party-state governance, shaping how intelligent systems are aligned, deployed, and exported.

Xi Jinping’s 2018 Politburo session operationalized the New Generation AI Development Plan, defining frontier breakthroughs as a lever of national power. Starting in 2020, Beijing and other provinces had institutionalized AGI in local initiatives, and by August 2025 the State Council’s AI+ Action plan codified AGI-linked targets into national modernization benchmarks.

The Party-state’s approach rests on two inseparable pillars: frontier breakthroughs to secure sovereign control of general intelligence, and diffusion across the real economy to sustain political legitimacy and commercial value. The two are treated as mutually reinforcing, not competing.

AGI is now written into China’s operating system for modernization. The MIIT meeting in June and the AI+ Actionplan in August 2025 tied frontier models to industrial upgrading, governance standards, and long-term milestones to 2027, 2030, and 2035.

Under the “new national system,” state institutions, elite labs, and firms are mobilized in concert, while outward-facing efforts such as Alibaba’s global intelligent network strategy show that Beijing views AGI not only as a domestic modernization tool but also as a lever of international power.

The State Council’s August release of the Opinions on Deeply Implementing the ‘AI+’ Action reignited debate over whether Beijing is serious about artificial general intelligence (AGI) or focused only on embedding applied AI across the economy (State Council, August 26). Commentary has often leaned toward the latter, but Party sources and policy documents show a clear throughline: since the 2017 New Generation AI Development Plan first defined “generalizable” intelligence as a research horizon, AGI has steadily moved from implicit objective to explicit policy goal. By 2025, that goal was tied to modernization benchmarks and reinforced through Party-state planning at every level.

In Retaliatory Move, Trump Threatens 100% Tariffs on Chinese Goods

Ana Swanson

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President Trump on Friday said he would impose a 100 percent tariff on all products from China in response to curbs Beijing announced this week on rare-earth minerals, a rapid escalation of tensions between the world's largest economies.

On Truth Social, Mr. Trump wrote that the tariffs would take effect on Nov. 1 and be imposed “over and above” other tariffs on Chinese exports, which are already 30 percent and in some cases much higher. The United States would also put export controls on critical software, he said.

In an earlier post on Friday, the president threatened to retaliate and cancel a planned meeting with China’s leader, Xi Jinping.

Mr. Trump called the curbs that China put out this week on its exports of rare-earth minerals “sinister and hostile” and said they would “make life difficult for virtually every Country in the World.” He added that he had planned to meet Mr. Xi in two weeks at an international economic conference in South Korea, “but now there seems to be no reason to do so.”

“One of the Policies that we are calculating at this moment is a massive increase of Tariffs on Chinese products coming into the United States of America,” he wrote. “There are many other countermeasures that are, likewise, under serious consideration.”

Markets shuddered at the developments — the S&P 500 index sliding more than 2 percent on Friday.

Speaking Friday evening, the president suggested that the tariffs could be walked back before the Nov. 1 deadline and that he would not necessarily cancel his planned meeting with Mr. Xi.

“We’ll see what happens,” Mr. Trump said. He called China’s move “very, very bad.”

Rare-earth minerals, which are vital for making an array of products including motors, brakes, semiconductors and fighter jets, have been at the center of tensions between the United States and China this year. Mr. Trump has also placed extreme tariffs on Chinese exports before, only to walk them back after they restricted trade and hurt companies in both countries.

Critical minerals in crisis: Stress testing US supply chains against shocks

Reed Blakemore, Alexis Harmon, and Peter Engelke

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Critical minerals are foundational to the modern economy and state power via their centrality to advanced technologies across energy, military, and commercial applications. From permanent magnets in fighter jets and submarines to the batteries in electric vehicles and grid-scale storage, these inputs underpin the defense, energy, and technology bases of the United States and its partners. Yet critical mineral supply chains have become increasingly brittle: concentrated in a handful of countries, overwhelmingly refined in China, and increasingly exposed to extreme weather disruption.

China has demonstrated its willingness to weaponize its dominance over mineral markets, tightening export restrictions on graphite, antimony, and certain rare earths in retaliation for US trade and technology controls. Meanwhile, extreme droughts and heat waves are already disrupting mining and processing in regions the United States hopes to rely on for diversification. Policymakers are thus confronted with a stark question: How prepared is the United States to withstand a sudden, sustained disruption in access to critical minerals?

Policymakers in Washington are increasingly focused on mapping US critical mineral needs and boosting domestic production capacity to manage dependency risks. Given the long lead times for the development of critical mineral mining, processing, and manufacturing assets, even aggressive expansion of new, derisked supply chain activity may not yet bear fruit in time to protect the United States from a severe supply chain disruption.

To explore this challenge, the Atlantic Council, in partnership with TMP Public, convened a scenario workshop in July 2025, bringing together experts from government, industry, and academia.1 Through two stress tests—one geopolitical, one extreme weather-driven—participants mapped the likely impacts of severe mineral disruptions, the limits of the current US response tool kit, and the role that allies, markets, and industry could play in bridging vulnerabilities.

The Way Ahead is Down: The Case for Underground Defense

Mark Thomas 

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Introduction: A Role Reversal

To defeat China in armed conflict, the US military must embrace underground defenses. Military history repeatedly demonstrates that subterranean defenses are effective counters to superior firepower. The volcanic caves of Iwo Jima, the communist Vietnamese tunnels of Cu Chi, and the mountain hideouts in Afghanistan are all infamous in US military lore.

In each of these cases, American forces are always on the offense thanks to superior logistics, intelligence collection, and firepower. As such, current US military planners approach underground combat strictly from an attacker’s perspective, consistent with the American Way of War. There are specialized units, doctrine, and training to penetrate and clear underground facilities, but no reciprocal efforts dedicated to constructing and defending underground fortifications. There is an assumption that US forces will always be the side to force their adversaries underground. In the Pacific, this presumed position of strength is eroding daily as China expands its long-range strike capabilities. In response, the US military should invest in tactical underground defenses in the Pacific to harden allies, deter aggression, and hold key terrain in armed conflict.

The Limits of Dispersion

Any conflict with China in vicinity of the first island chain places the US at an extreme disadvantage. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) enjoys shorter supply lines supporting an increasingly more sophisticated anti-access, area denial battle system. The PLA A2/AD system includes outposts of artificial islands, hundreds of maritime militia vessels, long-range missiles, fifth-generation fighters, and a growing navy built around modern aircraft carriers. This impressive constellation of sensors and shooters was developed to prevent the US from concentrating combat power, as demonstrated in the Gulf War.

To survive inside the PLA’s weapon engagement zone (WEZ), the US military is counting on dispersion. The Marine Corps divested heavier equipment, such as tanks and military bridges, in support of their Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept, which favors lighter, more mobile forces. The Air Force Agile Combat Employment concept eschews large, permanent air bases for smaller, temporary bases. The Army is creating mobile combat teams, trading their heavy joint light tactical vehicles (JLTVs) for lighter infantry squad vehicles built on a pick-up truck frame. These concepts are rational tactical solutions, but present serious vulnerabilities.

Fighting China, Fast and Slow

Maximilian K. Bremer and Kelly A. Grieco

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More than 80 years after Allied troops stormed the beaches of Normandy, D-Day is frequently referred to in discussions of potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Western observers often cite that historic event to highlight the formidable challenge that China’s military would face in launching an amphibious assault on Taiwan. Chinese analysts and military planners also study the Normandy landing campaign closely, looking for insights into logistics for their air and sea forces.

But the United States should learn another lesson from D-Day: how to keep U.S. forces supplied under fire without relying on fixed infrastructure. In June 1944, Allied

The Hypersonic Dilemma: GCC States and the Future of Missile Procurement Post-Iran–Israel War 2025

Tahir Azad 

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Introduction

The recent war between Iran and Israel has elevated hypersonic weapons from specialized military periodicals to the forefront of conversations regarding Gulf geopolitics. Iran’s potential deployment of basic hypersonic weapons has prompted Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to advance missile technology, speed, survivability, and penetration to counter evolving regional defenses. Analysts dispute Tehran’s claims, distinguishing “fast ballistic” missiles from true hypersonic glide vehicles. The conflict illustrated the considerable psychological and political impact of the hypersonic narrative: what ramifications does this present for Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Manama, Kuwait City, and Muscat if concentrated barrages and unique flight paths can undermine Israel’s multi-layered defense system? The existing solution comprises enhanced collaboration on integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) spearheaded by the US, targeted research into domestic strike and counter-hypersonic technologies, and strategic hedging among principal suppliers, particularly given that China and Russia aim to convert their hypersonic investments into arms transactions and geopolitical leverage.

An effective starting point is to examine the technical and political context of Iran’s assertions on hypersonic weapons throughout the conflict. Tehran asserted that it employed hypersonic weapons during and subsequent to the conflict, frequently referencing the term “Fattah” to substantiate these assertions. However, specialists in open-source technology were uncertain whether the missiles in issue exhibited the long-range maneuverability and low-altitude flight characteristics typical of contemporary hypersonic glide vehicles. The configuration of Arrow and David’s Sling atop Patriot and Aegis, supported by partners, maintained elevated interception rates.

US Push for Regional Air Defense

The United States is leveraging the Iran-Israel conflict to propose a long-discussed concept: a comprehensive regional air and missile defense system that would combine sensors, interceptors, and command-and-control across national boundaries. In late May 2024, Washington conducted U.S.–GCC Defense Working Groups on integrated air and missile defense and marine security in Riyadh. The insights gained during the Iran-Israel interaction demonstrated that collaboration is preferable to isolation. The proposal envisioned real-time data sharing, common operating pictures, and de-conflicted interceptor employment—ingredients that would be indispensable against maneuvering or depressed-trajectory threats. All of these measures are necessary to safeguard against threats that are in motion or descending. The proposal arrived at an opportune moment for Gulf officials who were abruptly altering their strategies and assessing the associated risks. But it also went against people’s concerns about sovereignty, data security, and the political repercussions of openly coordinating defense, especially when working together can be regarded as supporting Israel.

With daily drone incursions over bases, NORTHCOM takes aim through Falcon Peak

Michael Marrow 

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DESTIN, Florida — Flying hundreds of feet in the air against a clear blue sky, the small drone barreled toward a defended position, its profile similar to other unmanned systems that have evaded authorities on US installations. But this drone wouldn’t return to its sender: soon after its detection, defending personnel dispatched their own drone that smashed into the encroacher, sending both plummeting back to earth.

That’s life for a drone during Falcon Peak, a second-year exercise hosted by US Northern Command in late September to hone counter-drone prowess at domestic military facilities. Despite concerted efforts by the US government to defeat unmanned threats, their incursions into US military installations are increasing, according to NORTHCOM head Gen. Gregory Guillot.

“We’re between [about] one and two incursions per day” at DoD installations, Guillot told reporters during a roundtable here. A NORTHCOM spokesperson later told Breaking Defense there were 230 drone incursions reported over military installations between September 2023 and September 2024, which jumped by 82 percent to approximately 420 sightings reported over roughly the same period the following year.

Whatever the cause of the increase — and Guillot noted, “I don’t know if the problem’s worse, or we have more systems out there that can detect them” — that kind of major jump is bound to get a response from the Pentagon.

Drone incursions over domestic bases have been a top problem for officials following mysterious unmanned flights over Langley Air Force Base in Virginia in late 2023 and other high-profile sightings, prompting widespread scrutiny over why many installations seem powerless to stop them. The issue, officials have said, is that typical counter-drone technologies are not safe to use in civilian airspace, a problem compounded by a byzantine set of rules for installation self-protection.

Hence the Falcon Peak effort, where the government has called up industry to offer its very best solutions that can detect, track and defeat small drones in ways that maintain the integrity of civilian airspace. Similar to the first Falcon Peak, held last year at the foothills of Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado, this year’s event used testing ranges belonging to Eglin Air Force Base on the beaches of Santa Rosa Island in Florida.

US Army eyeing new sensors and shooters for Eastern Flank Deterrence Line

Ashley Roque 

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WASHINGTON — As European nations grapple with mounting incursions of Russian drones in the skies above, US Army forces there are ramping up plans to test new air defense tech and move ahead with the Eastern Flank Deterrence Line concept, according to an official.

“We want to increase our ability to counter mass drone attacks. So how do we do that across an extensive line, really the Eastern Flank Deterrence Line?” 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command Chief Warrant Officer Brett Bernier told Breaking Defense Thursday.

“[But] countering mass one-way attack drones is only one part of an air defense challenge, we still have ballistic missiles and cruise missiles,” he later added.

The evolving Eastern Flank Deterrence Line (EFDL) concept is a NATO strategy for enhancing deterrence by creating a unified, data-driven defense infrastructure. Bernier, who is focusing on new tech and ways of knitting that together, said that while there are Patriot, Sergeant Stout, and Avenger battalions available to defend the skies, much more is needed on both the sensor and shooter fronts. And they need to be “attritable, maneuverable and automated.”

Today, the architecture is in “various stages” depending on the weapons system, he explained. Link 16, for example, is available to share data with NATO countries but proves “cumbersome” for maneuver forces that are outfitted with smaller weapon systems and across large swaths of land.

“How do we have these smaller sensors, more attritable, produced at scale when we’re talking in the 1000s?” Bernier said. “If you’re looking at passive sensors or acoustic sensors … how do we integrate that at speed to be usable within the NATO-supported EFDL construct?”

When it comes to “effectors,” or weapons to be used to down incoming aerial threats, Bernier said the service needs cheaper options that may also be unmanned. One such item is a common launcher.

Venezuela’s New Dawn

MARÍA CORINA MACHADO

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CARACAS – Venezuela is on the cusp of a profound transformation. An organized popular movement is mobilizing to oust President Nicolás Maduro through lawful and institutional means. I am honored to help spearhead this effort to restore my country’s democracy, alongside a diverse coalition of citizens, professionals, and political and social leaders.

My country’s spectacular economic collapse is notorious worldwide. Years of negative growth under Maduro has resulted in staggering poverty and mass migration, with estimates suggesting that nearly 25% of the population has left since 2015. No one sincerely believes economic recovery is possible under the corrupt, dictatorial, and criminal regime that has been in power for the past quarter-century.

Twenty-five years ago, Venezuela was the wealthiest country in Latin America; today, it is one of the poorest in the Western Hemisphere. From 2012 to 2022, GDP plummeted by an astonishing 75%, with no signs of bottoming out. The bolivar, Venezuela’s national currency, has experienced unprecedented depreciation, resulting in hyperinflation reminiscent of the Weimar Republic in the 1920s, Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe in 2008, and Hungary and Greece in the aftermath of World War II.

As a result of Maduro’s economic mismanagement, Venezuela’s health-care system is in ruins, with more than 60% of hospitals lacking clean water. Our education system is falling apart, with teachers earning an average of $20 per month and public-school students attending classes only two days a week.

This grim reality is a direct result of the “twenty-first-century socialism” introduced by Maduro’s predecessor, the late Hugo Chávez. The regime Chávez created depends for its survival on predatory and parasitic practices, and has thus gone to great lengths to protect its hold on power, for example by taking control of the judiciary and silencing independent media.

Bulging Biceps Don’t Win Modern Wars

Paul Krugman

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Why did Pete Hegseth, the defense secretary — he may call himself secretary of war, but Congress has not, in fact, voted to change his department’s name — summon 800 top generals and admirals to Washington? I admit that I feared the worst — that he would demand that they pledge personal fealty to Donald Trump. But no: They were summoned to listen to a speech about “lethality,” followed by a highly political speech by Trump himself.

How do you achieve lethality, according to Hegseth? By telling the military that it’s OK to engage in hazing, sexual abuse and bigotry — he didn’t say that explicitly, but that was his clear message. Also, war crimes are no big deal. And members of the military, including the top brass, must shave their beards, lose weight and do pullups.

Hegseth’s speech was morally vile. It was also, however, profoundly stupid. Hegseth seems to have gotten his ideas about what an effective military looks like by watching the movie 300.

I am, of course, by no means a military expert myself. But I read and talk to people who are military experts, and think I have some idea about how modern wars are fought. Furthermore, there’s a clear family resemblance between Hegsethian stupidity about modern war and Trumpian stupidity about economic policy. Modern nations don’t achieve prosperity by emphasizing “manly” jobs; they don’t win wars by having big biceps.

War still requires extraordinary courage from the men and women engaged in combat — courage that, according to officers I’ve spoken with, is rooted in a sense of honor, not swaggering machismo. Combatants also have to be physically fit enough to endure incredible hardship.

But they don’t have to look like bodybuilders — and anyway, only a small fraction of a modern army engages directly in combat. These days, war is conducted largely with machines and ranged weapons, and most of an army’s personnel are employed, one way or another, keeping those machines and weapons in action and providing the intelligence that makes them effective. These noncombatants are every bit as essential to victory as front-line troops.

Ukraine’s ‘New Generation’ Army Chief of Staff Discusses Reforms in the AFU

Stefan Korshak 

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Training, honesty about problems inside the force, and a focus on finding the enemy and destroying them were the priorities named by the number two man in the Ukrainian military, Major General Andriy Hnatov, in a rare, wide-ranging interview Tuesday.

In remarks published by the state-run Ukrinform news agency, Hnatov, a 30-year veteran, since March serving as the Chief of the Army General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), said that his country’s military is an organization that has learned to acknowledge imperfections and discuss them, but it’s not always been easy.

“If you compare, for example, the situation when I was a young officer and joined the army – what was the communication like, what were the relationships (within the chain of command) were like – then I can tell you that we have finished a marathon. I believe that now both the leadership and the units are quite open, and (now) we speak openly about successes and failures,” Hnatov said in part.

Hnatov, 45, served most of his career in elite marine units, and in February 2022 was a high-profile commander leading Ukrainian forces fighting in the southern Kherson sector. In March, Hnatov was promoted to head the Army General Staff (AGS), as part of an overhaul of national military leadership replacing older with younger officers, ordered by President Volodymyr Zelensky. At the time, Zelensky said he wanted more experienced combat leaders at the top of the organization.

The US President warns Russia he will arm Ukraine with long-range cruise missiles if war is not settled quickly. The Kremlin’s reaction is one of “deep concern.”

Six months into his tour as the Ukrainian army’s senior planning officer, Hnatov said that the AFU remains an only partially professional force of career officers and enlisted, along with mobilized civilians still learning how to be soldiers on the job, at times in battle. Improving combat effectiveness takes training and discipline and frank discussion of mistakes, and civilian inclination to be polite and downplay problems doesn’t disappear the moment a Ukrainian citizen puts on a uniform, he said.

Experts on how to raise the cost of war for Russia: ‘Be cleverer’

Clare Sebastian

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Three and a half years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with a US-led peace process on ice and a stalemate on the battlefield, Kyiv’s allies are calling for renewed economic pressure on Moscow. The aim: to raise the cost of war for the Kremlin to a level that forces it to change course.

Eighteen packages of European Union sanctions and dozens more from the United States, United Kingdom and others have weakened Russia’s economy – but not its resolve to carry on fighting.

What’s needed, then, is not just more but smarter penalties, experts say.

“We just need to be cleverer,” said Timothy Ash, a Russia researcher at the UK-based Chatham House think tank who has advised a number of governments on the impact of sanctions against Moscow.

A massive rise in military spending helped the Russian economy grow more than 4% in 2023 and 2024, but this year the government is expecting just 1% growth. It also sees inflation at 6-7% by the end of the year, and interest rates are at a painful 17% level, aimed at containing price rises.

The Kremlin’s hugely important earnings from oil and natural gas are falling and the budget deficit – the gap between government spending and revenue – is widening.

Yet the latest three-year budget plan, submitted to parliament in late September shows that military spending will stay at around four times pre-war levels. And that’s thanks largely to Russian taxpayers.

Starting from January, the Kremlin has decided to raise value-added tax (VAT) from 20% to 22%, with the extra revenues “primarily directed” toward defense and security, according to the finance ministry.

Ukraine’s Manpower Shortages Continue To Hobble Its Fighting Efforts – Analysis

Can Kasapoğlu

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1. Battlefield Assessment

Military activity increased across the battle space last week, with an average of over 170 tactical engagements taking place per day. The Novopavlivka and Pokrovsk sectors saw the heaviest combat, while clashes also raged in Toretsk, Kupiansk, Siversk, Kramatorsk, and in the direction of Orikhiv. Russia also heavily shelled the central district of Kherson.

Russia’s drone use has also spiked. In September the Russian military attacked Ukraine with almost 7,000 drones, more than half of which were Geran-2/Shahed 136 one-way attack drones originally engineered by Iran but now widely produced in Russia. Most of these salvos deliberately targeted civilian areas of Ukraine.

For their part, Ukrainian forces continued to attack energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukrainian territory. On October 6, Ukrainian drones hit an oil terminal in Feodosia in the Crimean Peninsula, 155 miles from the front lines.

2. Ukraine’s Manpower Disadvantage Worsens

The Ukrainian military’s manpower shortages continue to cause serious problems for Kyiv. Reports from the battle space suggest that Ukraine’s dearth of infantry has left gaps along the lines of contact, which should feature uninterrupted combat groupings supporting positions within overlapping zones of defense. Ukrainian military planners have compensated by manning line infantry posts with tactically important mortar teams and even drone operators. Notably, the Ukrainian General Staff, having transitioned to a corps-centered doctrinal order of battle, is now attempting to field new combat units, such as assault troops to launch blitz offensives and specialized air defense crews to counter Russian drones.

Russia, on the other hand, has all but cemented its superior force-on-force and force-to-terrain ratios. On September 29 Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a conscription decree that will draft some 135,000 fighting-age men into the Russian military. Although these draftees are not technically allowed to fight outside Russia’s borders, most are forced to sign contracts to fight in Ukraine following their official term of service.

3. Russian Drones Probe European NATO Airspace

The Domestic Response To Operation ‘Rising Lion’ – Analysis

Anat Shapira, Idit Shafran Gittleman, Yarden Assraf and Dana Karniely

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Introduction

(FPRI) — Operation Rising Lion, Israel’s military campaign against Iran, commenced on June 13, 2025, the 615th day of the ongoing Swords of Iron war against Hamas. The launch was immediately felt on the Israeli home front: Air raid sirens sounded nationwide in the early hours of the morning, directing citizens into shelters, while the defense minister announced that Israeli forces had struck targets deep inside Iranian territory.

The declaration placed the country under a formal state of emergency. The initiation of Rising Lion occurred within a domestic context already marked by acute political polarization and prolonged societal strain. Public debate in Israel had been dominated by disputes directly linked to the war in Gaza — most notably over government policy toward Gaza itself and the unresolved hostage crisis. At the same time, the war had exacerbated older structural controversies within Israeli society, such as the contentious question of ultra-Orthodox military service. The day before the operation began was marked by political turbulence, with fears of the government’s collapse sparked by the ongoing conscription law crisis. Thus, while the campaign against Iran represented a new strategic phase in Israel’s external conflict, it took place alongside pre-existing internal divisions, which shaped the conditions under which Israeli society would experience and respond to the escalation.

This chapter examines the domestic response of the Israeli public to Operation Rising Lion through the lens of public opinion surveys conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Data Analytics Center during and after the campaign, combined with media and social media monitoring and other indicators.[1] The analysis proceeds in four stages. First, it documents the immediate “rally around the flag” effect, reflected in overwhelming support fot the war, heightened trust in political and military institutions, increased perceptions of social solidarity, and confidence in the preparedness of the home front. Following that, it explores the limits of this effect by situating the operation within the broader context of the ongoing Gaza war, demonstrating how the persistence of attritional conflict constrained enthusiasm and reinforced public skepticism. Third, it analyzes perceptions of the operations achievements, with particular attention to the shifting official objectives, the conditional nature of public support, and the influence of U.S. involvement in shaping expectations. Finally, it considers the aftermath of the ceasefire, highlighting the rapid reemergence of polarization around Gaza policy and structural societal divisions such as ultra-Orthodox conscription. The chapter’s findings point to the conclusion that short successful military operations such as Rising Lion may well have positive short-term effects on public trust and social cohesion, but the persistence of such effects will remain constrained by the wider context of protracted war in Gaza. So long as the Gaza war persists, and even expands — with its ongoing casualties, unresolved hostage crisis, and mounting societal strain — short, high-profile campaigns abroad are unlikely to produce lasting change in domestic dynamics.

Initial Response Among the Israeli Public

Soft Power Viral: TikTok, Memes, and Transnational Dissent in the Age of Digital Influence

Mauricio Percara

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In the last decade, we have witnessed the emergence of a new form of digital soft power, driven by social media and meme culture. Platforms such as TikTok have evolved from mere entertainment hubs into powerful tools of political influence and transnational activism. From viral videos documenting wars in real time to global youth-led solidarity campaigns, the international stage is increasingly shaped by content produced and disseminated in a decentralized, digital environment. Across the Global South and among younger generations worldwide, TikTok and memes have become cultural weapons used to challenge official narratives, mobilize global support, and amplify transnational dissent. This article explores how TikTok and meme-driven culture function as instruments of soft power—that is, the ability to influence through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion—in today’s social and political contexts. It presents an updated conceptual framework of soft power in the digital era, drawing on recent academic sources (2023–2025) that address both its transformation and its emerging dilemmas. Through three key case studies—the war in Ukraine, global pro-Palestine mobilization, and the pan-Asian digital alliance known as the Milk Tea Alliance—we examine how viral videos and memetic content are shaping international conflict narratives and social movements. Finally, we engage in a critical discussion of the opportunities, risks, and ethical challenges posed by this decentralized form of soft power. In a world where ordinary users can shape global perceptions as much as—if not more than—traditional state actors, the dynamics of influence, legitimacy, and information flow are being fundamentally redefined.

Conceptual Framework: Soft Power in the Digital Age

The concept of soft power was first introduced by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s, defined as “the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye, 2004). Traditionally, a state’s soft power stemmed from its culture, political values, and foreign policy, and was exercised through public diplomacy, educational exchange, international aid, and global media. For decades, states sought to “win hearts and minds” abroad by showcasing the most attractive aspects of their identity—Hollywood films, French cuisine, Japanese anime—all became instruments of cultural influence with geopolitical implications.

The Army’s New Intel Playbook: How AI and Data Are Rewriting the Battlefield

Chad Hultz

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The U.S. Army is betting big on artificial intelligence and data to reshape how intelligence is gathered, analyzed, and delivered to commanders. The goal is simple: make faster, smarter decisions in an era where wars are fought not just with weapons, but with information.

Unlike past modernization pushes, this effort is about weaving AI into every layer of Army operations, from headquarters planning to frontline decisions. For soldiers in the intel community, it means their work is changing fast.

Data Overload Meets AI Solutions

Army leaders know the problem: intelligence analysts are drowning in information. From satellites, drones, and cyber feeds, there’s more data than any human can process.

“Soldiers will use AI in the Army Intelligence Data Platform … AI will help Army intel analysts leverage the amount of data they consume from all sources … Once the soldiers have all of their data in the right place…” said Lt. Gen. Karl Gingrich, the Army’s deputy chief of staff for programs (G-8) (ExecutiveGov).

By automating the tedious work of sorting and structuring information, AI frees up analysts to focus on what matters, spotting patterns, predicting enemy moves, and giving commanders usable insights at the speed of relevance.

The Army is already testing this approach through the Army Intelligence Data Platform (AIDP), a cloud-based hub that consolidates streams from satellites, sensors, and cyber systems. At Fort Huachuca, Arizona, soldiers are using AI tools to process hours of drone footage in minutes, as part of ongoing field experiments covered in Army Testing AI Tools to Speed Battlefield Intel Decisions.

The Artificial Intelligence Integration Center (AI2C) in Pittsburgh is developing new models that can flag suspicious activity across multiple domains, turning raw data into real-time intelligence. Officials say these experiments are feeding into larger efforts like the Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE), which link Army data into joint command networks.

The Army is leading on unmanned aviation. Who will follow?

John Ferrari 

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Sgt. 1st Class Alfred Little, assigned to 188th Infantry Brigade, mans the Parrot ANAFI USA Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) during field training on Fort Stewart, Georgia, March 20, 2025. The 188th Infantry Brigade is breaking new ground in Army training and readiness with the launch of its Innovation Lab, a future forward initiative dedicated to the development, construction, and integration of drones in modern warfare.

The US Army just did something bold: It announced a cut of 6,500 active-duty aviation billets over the next two years, about one-fifth of its entire aviation branch. This isn’t trimming fat around the edges. It’s a deliberate move away from manned helicopters and toward unmanned systems, with talent panels now deciding which pilots and crew will remain in cockpits, and which will transition into new roles.

The easy reaction is to mourn the change. After all, generations of aviators have carried the Army on their shoulders in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the harder, truer assessment is this: The Army is adapting to the new reality. Inexpensive unmanned systems and air defenses in Ukraine and Colombia have swatted multi-million dollar helicopters out of the sky. To keep buying and manning yesterday’s aviation fleet is to prepare for the wrong war. By cutting 6,500 billets, the Army has forced itself to invest in the future and forced the rest of the Joint Force to confront its own reluctance to do the same.

By moving quickly, the Army is signaling that they know that war has changed. Drones, autonomy, loitering munitions, and swarms will define the future battlefield, and the Army is getting ready to dominate it.

This is a tectonic shift. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll is proving that he is both bold in thought and action, and should gain credit internally with Secretary Pete Hegseth for actually following his directions to the service. But the Army’s decision should also serve as a challenge to the other military branches to let go of the past and embrace the future.

There are several reasons the Army is right to make a large shift towards unmanned systems.