Why the West Should Take BRICS+ Seriously (But Not Literally)

Brian Wong and Kevin Zongzhe Li

Source Link

The BRICS countries (henceforth BRICS+) have received growing attention and visibility in international discourses over recent years – in part due to intensifying geopolitical fissures between select members of the grouping and the proverbial “West,” and in part because of a series of expansions that resulted in the bloc doubling in size.

After the 17th BRICS Summit in Brazil in July 2025, BRICS+ expanded to ten full members: the original Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and the newly incorporated Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and Nigeria. With 10 further countries as partners, the grouping appears to have been transformed from a loose acronym into something closer to a political brand, though the substance and value of what it apparently offers remains to be seen.

With major energy exporters such as UAE and Iran now inside the tent, alongside emerging economies like Egypt and Indonesia, BRICS+ has achieved a scale that commands attention. The recent signs of a tentative thaw between India and China only add to the bloc’s diplomatic weight, which now represents 56 percent of the world’s population and 44 percent of global GDP.

When Western leaders and policymakers dismiss BRICS+ as little more than a geopolitical vanity project of China and Russia, they risk repeating the error many analysts tend to make: writing off the rhetoric as mere bluster and overlooking the substance beneath it. The correct approach is to take BRICS+ seriously, albeit not literally.

The temptation is to laugh off BRICS+ communiques about de-dollarization or the birth of a “multipolar world order.” The gap between rhetoric and reality is indeed vast, but that does not make the grouping irrelevant. If anything, the danger is the opposite: that Western governments, lulled by a mixture of skepticism and comfortable hubris, miscalculate and are caught off guard when experiments begun in the name of symbolism yield practical innovations.

Three Emerging Clusters

As it stands, the bloc has demonstrated growing interest and influence in three areas.

The Saudi-Pakistani ‘strategic mutual defense’ pact that no one saw coming

Nour Eid 

Sourec Link

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact in September stipulating that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” The announcement sparked confusion after Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif suggested that the pact, which cements a long-standing relationship between the two countries, included a nuclear umbrella. Although Asif later retracted his comment, whether Pakistan has extended a nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia remains unclear.

The Pakistan-Saudi Arabia pact signals to Washington the kingdom’s discontent over flailing US security guarantees, and its willingness to use strategic ambiguity, as the need to counterbalance Israel and Iran heightens.

Increasing regional security concerns. Many media outlets depicted Israel’s missile strikes in Qatar earlier in September, which targeted Hamas political leaders, as the trigger for the pact. Israel’s blatant violation of Qatar’s sovereignty, one of the major US allies in the region, deeply rattled the Gulf monarchies, traditionally shielded from regional turbulences.

Despite being officially neutral in the war between Iran and Israel, the Gulf countries, and Qatar in particular, found themselves dragged into the conflict when Iran retaliated for US attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities by attacking the US Al Udeid Air base near Doha, although with little damage and only after giving Washington early notice. Saudi Arabia’s security was also put at risk, albeit unintentionally, in September as two Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at Israel broke apart mid-flight over Saudi territory.

While Israel’s increasing boldness and growing hegemony in the region certainly worry the Gulf monarchies, it is hard to believe that the Pakistan-Saudi pact was a direct product of the attacks on Qatari territory. An agreement of this magnitude would ordinarily take months, or even years, to negotiate. That said, the timing of the pact sends a message to the unleashed Israeli government. But most of all, it results from a mounting perception that the United States had abandoned the region, a fear that first solidified following Washington’s mild reaction to Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019.

Could the Pakistani-Saudi Defense Pact Be the First Step Toward a NATO-Style Alliance?

Diya Ashtakala, Doreen Horschig, and Bailey Schiff

Source Link

On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA), a defense pact that considers “any aggression against either country” as “an aggression against both,” echoing NATO’s Article 5 language and signaling their intent to strengthen deterrence amid rising tensions in the Middle East. For Saudi Arabia, the agreement provides a formalized security partnership that reassures domestic and regional audiences of its ability to deter aggression, particularly in a volatile Gulf environment. For Pakistan, the pact offers strategic, political, and economic benefits, including a stronger footprint in the Middle East.

The pact suggests that Riyadh is diversifying its security partnerships beyond its reliance on Washington, with the recent Israeli strikes in Doha providing the final political cover needed to execute the shift. U.S.-Saudi defense ties are anchored in a decades-long security partnership in which the United States provides advanced weapons systems, training, and security guarantees, illustrated by major arms sales including F-15 fighter jets and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missiles, U.S. military training programs for Saudi officers, and U.S. deployments to protect Gulf oil infrastructure. The SMDA reconfigures regional power dynamics by deepening the Pakistani-Saudi relationship, intensifying India’s security balancing act, and raising questions about Israel’s regional access to air corridors.

While the pact’s NATO-like language signals an intent to strengthen collective deterrence, the SMDA currently lacks the necessary provisions for nuclear deterrence and regional political consensus to evolve into a joint defense framework. Instead, one of the pact’s main implications is a heightened U.S. and international focus on the credibility of Riyadh’s nuclear nonproliferation commitments, as the security partnership reinforces existing concerns over Riyadh’s potential shortcut to a nuclear weapon via Islamabad.

Q1: What current developments or triggers caused Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to formalize a mutual defense pact?

A1: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia reportedly discussed the pact for over a year, influenced by Riyadh’s longstanding concerns over Tehran’s and Washington’s reliability, but it appears to have gained momentum due to renewed fears of regional spillovers following Israeli strikes in Doha.

The Dilemma of Shan State for Myanmar’s Revolution

Michael Martin

Source Link

Nowhere in Myanmar is the revolutionary struggle more complex and confounding than in Shan State. Several separate ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) are operating in Shan State, each with their differing views of the current armed struggle against the military junta. Some of these EAOs have overlapping territorial claims that occasionally lead to fighting between their respective armies. In addition, Shan State is home to several ethnic communities that claim their right to autonomously govern their homeland. If there is any hope that the current civil war will lead to the reestablishment of a unified Myanmar, creative solutions will have to be found to resolve the conflicting claims in Shan State.

A Plethora of Ethnic Armed Organizations

More EAOs are active in Shan State than in any other part of Myanmar. The larger EAOs operating in Shan State include the Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Shan State Army–North (SSA-N), the Shan State Army–South (SSA-S), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the United Wa State Army (UWSA). The smaller EAOs reportedly active in Shan State include the Danu People’s Liberation Army, the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force, the Kayan New Land Army, the Lahu Democratic Union, the National Democratic Alliance Army, the Pa-O National Army (PNA), the Pa-O National Liberation Army, and the Wa National Army. As the list reveals, some of the ethnic communities have two or more EAOs, often with differing views of the revolution and political goals.

Some of the EAOs support the armed struggle to overthrow the military junta; others have chosen to remain neutral with regard to the revolution; still others are siding with the junta. For example, the AA, KIA, MNDAA, and the TNLA formed the Northern Alliance to establish a united front against the junta. The UWSA, however, has chosen to remain neutral, provided that the various combatants respect the autonomy of its territorial control of eastern Shan State. Similarly, the SSA-S has chosen to abide by its ceasefire with the junta. The NDAA appears to have allied itself with the junta in return for partial control over a portion of eastern Shan State.

Taiwan’s 2025 National Defense Report: Multilayered Deterrence and Resilient Defense

Ying Yu Lin

Source Link

The biennial National Defense Report is one of Taiwan’s most important defense documents. In addition to outlining the government’s recent defense policies, it also serves to communicate to the international community Taiwan’s defensive posture and determination in the face of threats from China.

Notably, the report explains the evolution of Taiwan’s defense thinking from multiple perspectives – including force structure, training, and equipment – showing how the armed forces have adapted to a changing threat environment. Beyond informing the public of the military’s progress, it also conveys Taiwan’s strategic stance to the world. The National Defense Report is thus a crucial document for explaining strategy domestically and expressing policy resolve externally.

The National Defense Report also functions as an essential resource for national defense education. The 2025 edition, released on October 9, specifically addresses the changing international environment following the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump, maintaining a focus on Taiwan’s security context as the main analytical framework.

It emphasizes the most significant threat to Taiwan – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the People’s Republic of China. It is important to note, however, that the report is not meant to provide an overview of China’s military power. Rather, it focuses on the threats the PLA poses to Taiwan and identifies how recent developments differ from those of the past. These changes are used to introduce Taiwan’s subsequent adjustments in defense posture – discussed beginning in Chapter 3, which addresses strategic guidance and defense capabilities.

In analyzing Taiwan’s defense strategy, the concept of resilience has become a central theme in this year’s report. While Taiwan has long emphasized deterrence – aiming to prevent aggression through credible defense – the PLA’s growing capabilities and the Chinese Communist regime’s increasingly irrational decision-making make unexpected military action possible. Although Taiwan will not initiate hostilities, it must possess the ability to withstand an attack, preserve combat power, and mobilize reserves and civilian resources to launch a counteroffensive – thereby shattering Beijing’s illusion of a quick and decisive first strike. This reflects the core idea of resilience, which has repeatedly appeared in recent defense discussions.

Signals in the Swarm: The Data Behind China’s Maritime Gray Zone Campaign Near Taiwan

Jose M. Macias III and Benjamin Jensen

Source Link

The IssueUnder the guise of fishing, Beijing is using dual-use and unmarked vessels to surveil, harass, and assert presence around Taiwan. Analysis of AIS tracks, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) drill zones, and Global Fishing Watch data narrowed a subset of 12,000 vessels traveling near Taiwan on days likely to coincide with maritime drills down to 315 vessels that were both flying the Chinese flag and identified as fishing vessels. The classification framework developed at the Futures Lab flagged 128 likely gray zone actors. Institutionalizing this framework inside a Coalition Joint-Maritime Anomaly Cell (CJ-MAC) would automate anomaly detection and scale coverage across the Taiwan Strait and Indo-Pacific. CJ-MAC should be leveraged to fuse intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), publish suspect-vessel alerts, and cue real-time monitoring and patrols.

Many suspect vessels manipulate identity and visibility—going dark, switching names, or masking movements—behavior consistent with covert tasking. Publishing and punishing a rolling blacklist of repeat offenders through sanctions on owners, insurers, and operators would raise costs and shrink deniability. To support this effort, U.S. and allied intelligence agencies should map corporate ownership networks tied to suspicious vessels—identifying shell companies and economic exposure in allied jurisdictions.

Gray zone tactics exploit ambiguity, with mixed fleets and massive automatic identification system (AIS) volumes making it hard to separate commerce from covert operations. A Taiwan Transparency Dashboard and an annual Gray Zone Maritime Threat Estimate would give policymakers and partners a clear, shared operating picture.

Introduction

Gray zone activity is a constant in modern great power competition. Authoritarian states use indirect ways and means that fall beneath the threshold of armed force to set conditions for both future military operations and long-term coercive campaigns. This approach, termed “advancing without attacking,” is a central feature of how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pressures Taiwan and other states.1 China has waged disinformation campaigns around Taiwanese elections, stolen intellectual property to accelerate its technological rise, and seized disputed border territory by quietly building villages, all while avoiding direct military confrontation.2 These operations often rely on ambiguity, plausible deniability, and the strategic use of nonmilitary assets.3

China’s New Rare Earth and Magnet Restrictions Threaten U.S. Defense Supply Chains

Gracelin Baskaran

Source Link

In advance of President Donald Trump’s upcoming visit to South Korea later this month—where he is expected to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping for the first time since 2019—China announced that it has expanded its restrictions on rare earth and permanent magnet exports. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s Announcement No. 61 of 2025 implements the strictest rare earth and permanent magnet export controls to date. The move both strengthens Beijing’s leverage in upcoming talks while also undercutting U.S. efforts to bolster its industrial base.

Q1: What is new about today’s rare earth and permanent magnet export restrictions?

A1: The new export controls mark the first time China has applied the foreign direct product rule (FDPR)—a mechanism introduced in 1959 and long used by Washington to restrict semiconductor exports to China. The FDPR enables the United States to regulate the sale of foreign-made products if they incorporate U.S. technology, software, or equipment, even when produced by non-U.S. companies abroad. In effect, if U.S. technology appears anywhere in the supply chain, Washington can assert jurisdiction.

Under the measures announced today, foreign firms will now be required to obtain Chinese government approval to export magnets that contain even trace amounts of Chinese-origin rare earth materials—or that were produced using Chinese mining, processing, or magnet-making technologies. The new licensing framework will apply to foreign-produced rare earth magnets and select semiconductor materials that contain at least 0.1 percent heavy rare earth elements sourced from China.

Given China’s dominance in the sector—accounting for roughly 70 percent of rare earth mining, 90 percent of separation and processing, and 93 percent of magnet manufacturing—these developments will have major national security implications.

Q2: What do the new restrictions mean for the defense and semiconductor industries?

A2: Rare earths are crucial for various defense technologies, including F-35 fighter jets, Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, and the Joint Direct Attack Munition series of smart bombs. The United States is already struggling to keep pace in the production of these systems. Meanwhile, China is rapidly scaling up its munitions manufacturing capacity and acquiring advanced weapons platforms and equipment at a rate estimated to be five to six times faster than that of the United States.

Why China Built 162 Square Miles of Solar Panels on the World’s Highest Plateau

Keith Bradsher

Source Link

On the Tibetan Plateau, nearly 10,000 feet high, solar panels stretch to the horizon and cover an area seven times the size of Manhattan. They soak up sunlight that is much brighter than at sea level because the air is so thin.

Wind turbines dot nearby ridgelines and stand in long rows across arid, empty plains above the occasional sheep herder with his flock. They capture night breezes, balancing the daytime power from the solar panels. Hydropower dams sit where rivers spill down long chasms at the edges of the plateau. And high-voltage power lines carry all this electricity to businesses and homes more than 1,000 miles away.

China is building an enormous network of clean energy industries on the Tibetan Plateau, the world’s highest. The intention is to harness the region’s bright sunshine, cold temperatures and sky-touching altitude to provide low-cost, renewable energy. The result is enough renewable energy to provide the plateau with nearly all of the power it needs, including for data centers used in China’s artificial intelligence development.

While China still burns as much coal as the rest of the world combined, last month President Xi Jinping made a stunning pledge. Speaking before the United Nations, he said for the first time that the country would reduce its greenhouse gas emissions across its economy and would expand renewable energy sixfold in coming years. It was a moment of global significance for the nation that is currently the world’s biggest polluter.

China’s clean energy efforts contrast with the ambitions of the United States under the Trump administration, which is using its diplomatic and economic muscle to pressure other countries to buy more American gas, oil and coal. China is investing in cheaper solar and wind technology, along with batteries and electric vehicles, with the aim of becoming the world’s supplier of renewable energy and the products that rely on it.

The main group of solar farms, known as the Talatan Solar Park, dwarfs every other cluster of solar farms in the world. It covers 162 square miles in Gonghe County, an alpine desert in sparsely inhabited Qinghai, a province in western China.

How Russia and China Technologically Enable Authoritarian Partners

David Kirichenko

Source Link

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not only accelerated the erosion of the international order but also deepened its partnership with China. Beijing has made clear it does not want the war to end and Russia to lose, viewing Ukraine as the battlefield that weakens the West while advancing its own vision of an autocracy-led world, starting with Taiwan.

Cuban and North Korean soldiers are now fighting en masse against Ukraine. North Korea and Venezuela are receiving drones and other weapons through networks supplied by Russia and Iran. What may appear to be a regional war is part of a broader strategic alignment—one that is far more interconnected than some policymakers are comfortable admitting.

Venezuela, once a marginal player, has become Latin America’s most advanced drone producer, fielding Iranian-designed strike drones through covert cooperation with Tehran. Rybar, a major pro-Kremlin Telegram channel, has even suggested sending Russian Geran drones to Venezuela, claiming they could target U.S. bases in the Caribbean and hit the U.S. mainland.

In Pyongyang, Kim Jong-un recently presided over ceremonies for North Korean families whose sons were killed fighting in Ukraine. South Korea estimates that 15,000 North Korean troops have been deployed, with hundreds already dead and thousands wounded. Serhii Kuzan, chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center, told me in an interview that ‘without foreign recruitment, Moscow would likely be unable to sustain offensive operations, as seen in Kursk, where North Korean troops supported Russian forces.’

Though North Korean troops suffered heavy early losses due to poor preparation and coordination, Ukraine’s spy chief, Kyrylo Budanov, warned that they are adapting quickly—learning to use drones, move in small groups and defend against modern systems. This battlefield experience, unprecedented for Pyongyang, is now being passed back to its 1.3 million-strong army.

‘[U.S. President Donald] Trump understands how dangerous regimes like North Korea and Iran are, but he must also recognise that Russia is actively supporting them,’ said Oleksandra Ustinova, a Ukrainian member of parliament.

China ends ‘hide-and-bide’ military strategy

Bill Gertz 

Source Link

The Chinese Communist Party and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army, last month began a major shift away from the 40-year-old strategy known as “hide and bide” — keeping a low profile while advancing military and economic power — according to an Air Force think tank report.

Instead, Chinese supreme leader Xi Jinping announced during a massive military parade showing off new weapons and firepower that the communist regime is now the leader of a forthcoming world order designed to replace the United States.

“The September 3rd Victory Day parade in Beijing showcased an array of military capabilities intended to demonstrate the fruits of its decades-long modernization effort,” the report by the China Aerospace Studies Institute said.

Pragmatic trio: China, Russia, North Korea’s triangle of convenience

Shamuratov Shovkat

Sourec Link

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un aren't as close as they try to portray. Image: X Screengrab

The war in Ukraine and the resulting Western sanctions have dramatically reshaped Moscow’s external priorities.

Facing isolation from European and American markets, Russia has pivoted decisively eastward, rediscovering strategic and economic opportunities with China and North Korea. What has emerged is not a formal alliance but a pragmatic network of survival — a triangle defined less by shared ideology than by mutual necessity and the constraints of sanctions.

Russia’s pivot to the East is not new, but the urgency imposed by sanctions has intensified it. China, Russia’s largest trading partner, provides both a reliable market and a critical supply of energy, technology and manufactured goods. In 2023, China–Russia trade hit a record US$240 billion.

Meanwhile, North Korea – long isolated and dependent on China – has found renewed value in a Russia willing to engage outside formal international frameworks, with an increasing share of its trade — arguably over 90% — flowing through Chinese channels.

For Russia, engagement with Pyongyang is largely pragmatic. Moscow seeks low-cost labor, logistical support and occasionally materiel or munitions —all of which North Korea can supply.

Pyongyang, in turn, gains access to food, fuel and a degree of diplomatic leverage. The result is a network of informal economic arrangements – sometimes referred to as a “gray trade corridor” – that enables both countries to circumvent certain key aspects of international sanctions.

Nihilism, Denialism, and Annihilation in New Xinjiang White Paper

Arran Hope

Source Link

Xi Jinping’s personal imprimatur on the Party-state’s policies in Xinjiang are unambiguous, according to a new white paper published to coincide with a central-level delegation to the region in late September.

The Party uses cultural and historical arguments to justify its ongoing policies of cultural erasure in the region that have been characterized by governments, parliaments, and other entities as genocidal. The white paper celebrates many of these policies.

In defiance of Western measures aimed at curbing human rights abuses, the government actively provides support to sanctioned entities, while senior officials reject accusations of forced labor, instead blaming the United States for “unemployment” in the region.

Beijing’s quest to normalize the situation in Xinjiang is part of a broader project that sees the region as strategically important, opening up the country to deeper trade and connectivity with Eurasia as part of its ultimate pursuit of national rejuvenation.

General Secretary Xi Jinping’s centrality to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) project in Xinjiang is unambiguously clear in a new white paper issued by the State Council Information Office (SCIO). Titled “CPC Guidelines for Governing Xinjiang in the New Era: Practice and Achievements” (新时代党的治疆方略的成功实践), the document has been released to coincide with a central-level delegation Xi led to the region to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the region’s founding under the PRC (CCTV, September 23). The text reads as a triumphal vindication of the Party’s work. Pushing back against international human rights concerns, it is also replete with Orwellian passages eulogizing Xinjiang’s advances in democratic processes and human rights (Xinhua, September 20).

The white paper reveals three aspects of Xi’s Xinjiang policies: nihilism, denialism, and annihilation. First, it pushes a conception of Chinese history, culture, and civilization that provides a theoretical underpinning for the Party’s domination of the region. Second, it denies evidence of genocidal actions, instead blaming the United States and other external powers for causing unrest in the region. Third, it celebrates policies of cultural erasure that seek to annihilate distinct cultural and religious practices in pursuit of forging a unitary ethnonational conception of the “Chinese nation” (中华民族).

The U.S.-China Crisis Waiting to Happen

Kurt M. Campbell

Source Link

On October 24, 2023, a U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber was flying a nighttime mission in international airspace over the South China Sea when it was intercepted by a Chinese fighter jet. In a series of dangerous high-speed maneuvers, the jet pilot flew within ten feet of the bomber, endangering both aircraft and crews. This came on the heels of a June 2023 incident when the USS Chung-Hoon, a U.S. Navy destroyer, was sailing through the Taiwan Strait and a Chinese warship overtook her on the port side at high speed. The Chinese ship then abruptly tacked and crossed her bow

How Europe Can Defend Itself with Less America

Max Bergmann and Otto Svendsen

Source Link

With the war in Ukraine and a potential reduction of U.S. military presence in Europe on the horizon, there is a renewed imperative for European leaders to strengthen and integrate their defense capabilities. How Europe Can Defend Itself with Less America examines the military gaps that would be created by a significant reduction of the U.S. military footprint in Europe. The report outlines five key tasks Europeans should undertake to address these gaps and deter further Russian aggression: creating a pan-European force, integrating weapons procurement, expanding stockpiles, mitigating dependence on U.S. enablers, and building redundancy in command structures.

What Comes Next for Israel-Hamas Ceasefire?

Mona Yacoubian and Will Todman

Source Link

On October 8, President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Hamas had agreed to the first phase of his peace deal for Gaza. He had unveiled a 20-point plan to end the war in Gaza after meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the White House on September 29.

If implemented, the first phase of the deal will see an initial cessation of fighting in Gaza, a partial withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from Gaza, the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, and a surge of humanitarian aid.

Q1: Why did Israel and Hamas agree to this now?

A1: The agreement between Israel and Hamas comes almost two years to the day after Hamas’s unprecedented October 7 attack on Israel. Two years of war have devastated Gaza, exhausted the IDF, and accelerated Israel’s international isolation.

International pressure has sharpened on Netanyahu in recent weeks. Several key Israeli allies recognized Palestinian statehood in September, global outcry over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza has grown, and Netanyahu was chastened after his failed strike on Hamas officials in Doha.

Domestic pressure on Netanyahu has also grown. Opinion polls show two-thirds of Israelis now believe it is time to end the war, including most Jewish Israelis. Families of hostages also engaged in consistent advocacy for a deal, organizing large public protests. Although hardliners in Netanyahu’s government continued to resist a deal, the combination of international and domestic pressure forced Netanyahu to pursue a diplomatic path.

Hamas’s calculation changed in recent weeks. Regional states have pushed harder for Hamas to compromise, raising the cost for Hamas to reject the deal unilaterally. After two years of war, Arab states fear the repercussions of continued fighting on their own populations and sought an offramp. Eight foreign ministers of Arab and Muslim-majority states issued a joint statement welcoming President Trump’s plan. The Israeli government’s decision to launch a ground offensive into Gaza City convinced Hamas leaders to compromise. Israel’s offensive put even more military pressure on Hamas, but also risked killing or freeing the hostages, which was their last key source of leverage. Agreeing to the first phase of the deal and to release the hostages forestalls the Israeli operation in Gaza City and enhances Hamas’s standing with regional mediators when subsequent phases of the deal are negotiated.

The Gaza Ceasefire Is Welcome, but Will It End the Conflict?

Alexander Langlois

Source Link

President Trump’s multi-stage plan still leaves plenty of opportunities for the Israel-Hamas war to restart.

What was unthinkable just weeks ago is now a reality: the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza may be coming to an end—at least for now. President Donald Trump announced on October 8 that both Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire agreement that is widely described as a realistic conclusion to the two-year conflict.

Yet, while any agreement that ends Israel’s campaign in Gaza and releases the remaining captives held by Hamas is a welcome one, the details of the so-called “roadmap” remain vague and questionable at best, leaving room for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to spoil broader peace talks again.

Trump’s 20-point peace plan, negotiated extensively with Arab leaders across the Middle East at the UN General Assembly in September, contains many details that look similar to previous ceasefire agreements. That approach, coupled with a clear rejection of Israel’s most hawkish demands, has helped garner Hamas’ acceptance of some core elements while cornering Netanyahu and blocking his ability to spoil the deal. The effort constitutes the strong-arm approach to foreign policy that has come to define the Trump administration.

In pressing Netanyahu and following through when the Israeli prime minister has attempted to sidestep clearly stated US interests and demands, Trump differentiates himself from previous presidents, particularly former President Joe Biden. Netanyahu has made a name for himself in US and Israeli political circles as a master of manipulation, displaying political gamesmanship that has allowed him to advance his political interests—even at the expense of his country’s security and people since October 7, 2023. At the moment, those days appear to be over.

Trump’s desire to achieve deals quickly clearly played a role in that dynamic. Values did not. Ever interested in highlighting political “wins,” the US president has consistently proven his impatience with perceived stalling tactics that go against his interests—namely that of depicting those political wins. To be clear, those “wins” are often exaggerations that can be and are debunked, such as Trump’s claims of achieving peace in seven conflicts.

The bleak lesson Israel — and the world — might learn from the Gaza war’s end Story

Joshua Keating

Source Link

Palestinians climb over rubble around wastewater© Mahmoud Issa/Anadolu via Getty Images

At last, Israel and Hamas have reached a deal — of a sort. On Wednesday evening, President Donald Trump announced that the warring parties in Gaza agreed to implement the “first phase” of the peace plan he presented in September. While this doesn’t quite mean the war is completely finished just yet, it appears to be an earnest attempt by Israel and Hamas to begin ending two years of bloody conflict, destruction, and despair.

Over two years of war — launched after Hamas invaded Israel and killed around 1,200 people, most of them civilians, and took around 250 more as hostages back to Gaza on October 7, 2023 — Israel has annihilated the Gaza Strip. It has killed more than 67,000 Palestinians, starved and displaced most of Gaza’s 2 million residents, and reduced most of the territory’s buildings and infrastructure to rubble. The fate of the hostages has also wrenched Israel’s population, driving many of its citizens to join massive protests demanding a deal to end the war and return those kidnapped for more than a year. Globally, Israel’s conduct has left its reputation in tatters, its leaders charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Court and isolated on the world stage by nearly all but its closest ally, the United States. The war, and its unpopularity abroad, led Israel’s former allies Britain, France, Canada, Australia, Portugal, and Belgium to recognize Palestinian statehood at last month’s U.N. General Assembly.

Now we’ll find out if the peace can hold, and if so, what the “day after” actually looks like. Wednesday’s deal means, the parties say, that all Israeli hostages who are still being held in Gaza will be returned, beginning with those still living, estimated to be around 20 people, as soon as Monday; the remains of the dead Israeli hostages (approximately 30) will reportedly be returned in phases afterward. In exchange Israel will release nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, approximately 1,700 of whom were captured during the current conflict. Israel also says its army will retreat to an agreed upon line in Gaza as the first part of its withdrawal from the territory.

US immigration enforcement using military hardware and tactics on civilians

George Chidi

Source Link

Even without the national guard, law enforcement agencies of the federal government have been using military hardware and tactics on civilian targets.

At a low-rent apartment complex on Chicago’s south shore, people started hearing the boots hit the roof around one in the morning. The oh-dark-thirty immigration enforcement raid in the early hours of 1 October featured an air assault from helicopters. Officers went door to door in the building, using charges to blow the hinges off doors and flash-bang grenades to clear apartments. They hauled men, women and children from the building in zip ties and often little else, ostensibly to capture undocumented gang members.

The troubled apartment building at 7500 S South Shore Drive hadn’t passed an annual inspection since 2022. With the remains of doors and furniture and the bloodied, scattered belongings of former tenants in tatters, it may struggle to pass another.

“So many of these people remain without shelter or a place to live because it essentially rendered their homes and that entire apartment complex uninhabitable,” said Colleen Connell, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois. She described the apartment raid as a military-style attack. Days afterward, the building looked like a war zone, which may be the point.

Addressing an assembly of high-ranking military officers last week, Donald Trump in impromptu comments called for the military to use American cities as “training grounds for our military”. The comment was a continuation of his belligerence toward cities full of Democratic voters and populations of color, delivered a couple of weeks after he meme-posted an image cribbed from the war movie Apocalypse Now about going to “war” in Chicago.

American cities should be 'training grounds for our military', says Donald Trump

For those on the receiving end of federal force from masked agents in military fatigues, a flash-bang grenade thrown by an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Ice) agent or a soldier may be a distinction without a difference.

Mónica Solórzano was standing next to the mayor of Carpinteria, a farm town in southern California, watching Ice raid a marijuana farm when a flash-bang grenade went off at her feet.

Kremlin’s New Moves Towards ‘Internet Sovereignty’

Luke Rodeheffer

Source Link

The Kremlin instituted restrictions on the civilian use of virtual private networks (VPN) and U.S.-built technology at the beginning of September, ostensibly fearing that the U.S. government is using the technology to sow internal discord in Russia.

The Russian Duma approved legislation on July 15 to create a national messaging system, known as “Max,” that will combine communications with state services, similar to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) WeChat.

These measures fit into Moscow’s broader project of creating a sovereign internet space, which includes banning foreign messaging platforms, restricting VPN use, and the continued crackdown on civilian digital encryption.

The Kremlin is continuing to develop its “sovereign internet,” a project to silo its domestic internet from global networks, under the pretext of national security (see EDM, February 15, November 25, 2024, February 6). Beginning September 1, Moscow instituted additional restrictions on the use of virtual private network (VPN) technology, including a ban on advertising VPNs or sharing information on circumventing the bans. VPNs are now also considered an “aggravating circumstance” while committing a crime (SKBGroup, August 11; Meduza, September 1). These new laws will require service providers to monitor search queries made by customers and continue traffic monitoring to block many VPN encryption protocols. One survey cited in the Russian press found that over 60 percent of VPN users in the country use the technology to access banned social media networks, highlighting the technology’s ability to bypass the Kremlin’s censorship structures (Newizv, August 1).

The September legislation is not a full ban on VPNs, as commercial VPN technology is still necessary for various information technology (IT) tasks. The partial ban will still make work more difficult for Russia’s Search Engine Optimization (SEO) firms, Russian companies that have employees outside of Russia, the numbers of which have grown dramatically since the outbreak of the war in 2022, and firms that rely on access to foreign information technology (Interfax, July 21).

How Trump’s new H-1B fee will hurt Silicon Valley and AI startups

Jeremy Hsu

Source Link

On September 19, President Donald Trump issued a presidential proclamation directing his administration to require a $100,000 payment from US employers for each H-1B application. That was followed on September 24 by a Department of Homeland Security proposal to change the H-1B selection process—currently a randomized lottery—by giving the equivalent of more lottery tickets to applicants who are assigned a higher wage level as defined by the federal government.

These proposals targeting H-1B visa applications used by American companies to employ foreign workers—overwhelmingly in the tech sector—threaten to undermine Trump’s own stated goal of ensuring US “global dominance” in harnessing artificial intelligence. Experts warn that the Administration’s attempted overhaul of the H-1B visa program could erode Silicon Valley’s advantage in attracting top-tier talent from around the world—even as other countries like China step up their AI research and talent recruitment game.

“The US’s singular advantage in the AI race has been its ability to draw the best minds from everywhere—turning international students into the founders and researchers of the world’s leading AI firms,” says Jeremy Neufeld, director of immigration policy at the Institute for Progress, a think tank in Washington, D.C. “China, meanwhile, is rolling out new talent pathways like the K visa and has set an explicit goal of rivaling US leadership by 2035. At the very moment competitors are doubling down, America risks walking away from its own edge.”

The proposed visa application changes would represent a seismic shift for tech companies, which dominate the top 10 ranking of US employers sponsoring H-1B visas. Amazon alone sponsored more than 14,000 approved H-1B visas in the first three quarters of this fiscal year, followed by Microsoft and Meta with more than 5,000 visas each, and then Apple and Google with more than 4,000 visas apiece. But the H-1B fee and proposed changes would be especially devastating for smaller AI startups that cannot afford such additional visa costs for recruiting foreign talent and makes it more challenging for international students graduating from American universities to get sponsors for legal employment in the United States. That threatens to throttle both the startups often responsible for the greatest innovations and Silicon Valley’s pipeline of young up-and-coming AI talent.

The Gaza Deal Is Not Too Big to Fail

Joost R. Hiltermann and Natasha Hall

Source Link

With the announcement that both Hamas and Israel have signed on to the first phase of U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza, a rare opportunity has emerged to end two years of terrible violence. Under the U.S.-brokered agreement, Hamas has promised to return all the remaining hostages it seized in 2023 in exchange for Israel’s release of nearly 2,000 Palestinian detainees and pledge of a partial withdrawal of its forces from the territory. In addition to life-saving relief to Palestinians in Gaza and the families of hostages, many hope the deal could bring renewed stability to

The Perilous Path to Sustained Peace in Gaza

Source Link

On October 8, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Hamas and Israel had agreed to a cease-fire deal in Gaza. According to initial reporting, Hamas will free the remaining Israeli hostages in Gaza; in return, Israel will free hundreds of Palestinian prisoners and withdraw its troops from part of the enclave. Although Trump’s 20-point proposal aims to bring sustained peace to Gaza and address long-standing drivers of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the next steps and many of the thorniest issues remain unsettled — raising the question of whether a cease-fire will open up real progress toward ending the war or offer just a brief respite.

Foreign Affairs Editor Daniel Kurtz-Phelan spoke with Philip Gordon about what the deal means for Israel, Gaza, and the wider world, and what may happen from here. Gordon has long experience as both a practitioner and scholar of U.S. Middle East policy. He served as National Security Adviser to U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris and as the National Security Council's Middle East Coordinator during the Obama administration. His many books include Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East. Gordon and Kurtz-Phelan spoke the morning of Thursday, October 8. Their conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Does this deal mean, as Trump says, “peace in the Middle East”?

It is an extraordinary day, and if hostages are released as announced, and there is even a temporary cease-fire that provides some relief to the people of Gaza, we should rejoice. But the deal is a long way from “peace in the Middle East.” I would call it more of a respite from the hell of the past two years and an opportunity to move forward.

From Divide to Delivery: How AI Can Serve the Global South

Anjali Kaur

Source Link

Next week’s World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) meetings will focus on rebuilding economic resilience in a fragile global economy. Yet amid these discussions in Washington, one issue risks being overlooked : The AI infrastructure and governance frameworks being built right now will shape development trajectories for decades. Whether that transformation is designed with the Global South or merely delivered to it will depend on decisions being made now on infrastructure, governance, and priorities.

AI is not just technology, it’s infrastructure. It depends on compute clusters, energy grids, and network connectivity—assets rooted in specific geographies that determine where value is created and risks accumulate.

Treating the Global South as a unified category obscures more than it reveals. China has invested heavily in building domestic AI capacity—from chips to cloud platforms. India generates roughly one-fifth of the world’s data but holds only about 3 percent of global data center capacity; it is data rich but infrastructure poor.

These disparities will determine who captures value from AI and who gets left behind. The IMF warns that AI could exacerbate cross-country income inequality, with growth impacts in advanced economies potentially more than double those in low-income countries. South Asia alone has nearly 100,000 young people entering the labor market daily, with almost half the region’s 1.8 billion population under age 24. That demographic momentum could be a dividend or a disaster. Without compute infrastructure and workforce transition strategies, AI may erode the very labor advantages that once underpinned growth.

The India-hosted AI Impact Summit in 2026 will test whether the international system can address these dynamics. Success depends on three issues: infrastructure access, governance influence, and local adaptation.

Infrastructure: Access as a Foundation, Not an Afterthought

Digital addiction: the compulsion to stay online

Devika Rao

Source Link

Digital addiction is a broad term for unhealthy behaviors related to spending too much time on the internet, in particular when a person cannot stop these behaviors despite experiencing negative consequences. The addiction can take many forms and is becoming more common.

The basics

Digital addiction can come in many forms, including excessive interaction with social media, internet gaming, online gambling, online shopping and online pornography. As with gambling and pornography, the internet can amplify addictions by increasing accessibility. Some people can be especially vulnerable to falling into digital addiction, like “those with high levels of internet use for socialization, education and entertainment,” said Psychiatry.org.

Those who struggle with digital addiction may “compulsively” feel the urge to check notifications or need to “spend increasing amounts of time online to achieve satisfaction,” said Northwestern Medicine. They may also tend to lose track of time while on the internet and feel “restless, moody, depressed or irritable” when attempting to cut back on phone or internet usage.

It is not surprising that the internet has become so addictive. After all, it was designed that way. Many social media apps use what is called the Hook Model to keep users on their apps. In this model, the app will first trigger a person to interact, like with a notification. This, in turn, will prompt someone to enter the app. Then, the app will use a variable reward system to prompt a user to remain there. “Even if users open a social media app because of a notification, they’ll likely engage with other parts of the app as they seek additional rewards,” like endless scrolling content, said ADDitude. In a vicious circle, the users will like, save and share content that gives the app’s algorithm knowledge about what keeps them hooked.

Another way websites and apps keep people hooked is through gamification, which turns internet interactions into a game. Social media is not the only area of the internet using gamifying techniques; online shopping also employs the method. The way the shopping app Temu prices and promotes products is “deliberate,” with the company “pushing the exact consumer psychology buttons necessary to keep shoppers shopping,” said the BBC. “Customers are encouraged to keep shopping with the introduction of bonuses and coupons that mimic the rewards you might accumulate in a video game.”

US foreign adversaries use ChatGPT with other AI models in cyber operations: Report

Julia Shapero 

Source Link

Malicious actors from U.S. foreign adversaries used ChatGPT jointly with other AI models to conduct various cyber operations, according to a new OpenAI report.

Users linked to China and Russia relied on OpenAI’s technology in conjunction with other models, such as China’s DeepSeek, to conduct phishing campaigns and covert influence operations, the report found.

“Increasingly, we have disrupted threat actors who appeared to be using multiple AI models to achieve their aims,” OpenAI noted.

A cluster of ChatGPT accounts that showed signs consistent with Chinese government intelligence efforts used the AI model to generate content for phishing campaigns in multiple languages, in addition to developing tools and malware.

This group also looked at using DeepSeek to automate this process, such as analyzing online content to generate a list of email targets and produce content that would likely appeal to them.

OpenAI banned the accounts but noted it could not confirm whether they ultimately used automation with other AI models.

Another cluster of accounts based in Russia used ChatGPT to develop scripts, SEO-optimized descriptions and hashtags, translations and prompts for generating news-style videos with other AI models.

The activity appears to be part of a Russian influence operation that OpenAI previously identified, which posted AI-generated content across websites and social media platforms, the report noted.

Its latest content criticized France and the U.S. for their role in Africa while praising Russia. The accounts, now banned by OpenAI, also produced content critical of Ukraine and its supporters. However, the ChatGPT maker found that these efforts gained little traction.