Indian Strategic Studies: 10/29/25

29 October 2025

India’s Rare Earth Dilemma: Between Chinese Leverage and an Afghan Offer

Shushant VC Parashar

Beijing is signaling geoeconomic control over a chokepoint industry by deciding to resume the supply of rare-earth magnets to India on the condition of a written “no-diversion” pledge. This is more than just a contractual detail. The action encapsulates two factors influencing New Delhi’s decisions: the diffusion of great-power competition into contracts, standards, and midstream processing instead of territorial disputes, and asymmetric interdependence in critical materials.

At the same time, Kabul’s request for Indian investment in Afghanistan’s mineral industry provides a long-term hedge that is both operationally and politically ambiguous. When combined, these changes compel India to balance its long-term goal of strategic autonomy with its immediate industrial needs.

Minerals as New Geopolitics: Structure and Conditionality

Critical minerals have moved from the periphery of trade policy to the center of strategic competition. Washington’s “de-risking” and friend-shoring, Beijing’s countermeasures regarding gallium, graphite, and rare earths, and the European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act together point to a partial bifurcation of value chains.

In this setting, critical minerals like rare earths operate more as coordination goods and less as mere commodities. Whoever controls metallization and separation sets prices, schedules, and, most importantly, others’ policy space. According to the International Energy Agency, China controls about 90 percent of the world’s rare-earth refining capacity, demonstrating its institutional rather than incidental dominance at the processing stage.

Considering this, Beijing’s “no re-export/no diversion” clause accomplishes two goals. As an extension of export control, it first aims to stop leaks to U.S. supply chains through developing countries via governance-by-contract. Second, it signals status: agreeing to the clause would be read in many capitals as an implicit acceptance of China’s gatekeeper role over magnet trade. The stakes are high right now. Electric vehicles (EV) drive trains, wind turbines, telecom networks, and an expanding array of dual-use defense systems all contain magnets — shortages in inventory result in production delays and increased costs.

Hedging Across Clocks: India’s Two-Level Game, Afghanistan, and Sequencing

India Is Still Committed to the Russian S-400 Triumf Air Defense System

Peter Suciu

India appears intent on buying more Russian-made S-400s after the systems performed well in its recent war with Pakistan.

If there was hope in Washington or among the NATO alliance that India would move away from Russia in any meaningful way, it was dashed this week. India, which has long been the largest purchaser of Russian-made military hardware, appears close to signing a deal for the S-400 Triumf air defense system. Such an acquisition would all but ensure that New Delhi could never acquire the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation fighter, which would firmly integrate the American and Indian militaries for decades to come.

India had previously adopted the S-400, but there had been speculation that it would move away from Russian-made hardware after President Donald Trump floated the idea that the Indian Air Force (IAF) could be offered the F-35 during an Oval Office meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in February.

However, India ultimately rejected the F-35 after Trump announced the United States would impose a 25 percent tariff on Indian goods, which reportedly “shocked and disappointed” Indian officials. Moscow followed up on the rejection by offering a co-production deal that could see India manufacture the Sukhoi Su-57 (NATO reporting name “Felon”) domestically—a priority for New Delhi, which has tried to emphasize indigenous production over foreign purchases.

Stung by Pakistan, India Wants More S-400 Systems

According to a report from the Indian-based ANI News Agency, the IAF was impressed with the performance of the S-400 Triumf, which it claimed shot down five or six Pakistani fighters and an S-130 military transport/spy plane in Operation Sindoor, in which India launched missiles and carried out air strikes at nine sites in Pakistani-administered Azad Kashmir and the Punjab province.

Pakistani officials have disputed the claims, labeling them a “comical narrative.” In past flare-ups, both India and Pakistan have been known to downplay their respective losses while claiming more aerial victories than independently confirmed. Despite the unclear nature of both sides’ losses, though, New Delhi appears to be pleased with the S-400’s performance in the recent conflict.

India’s Bonhomie With Taliban Could Help Rein In Islamic Terrorists In Afghanistan – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

The Al Qaeda Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and its cognate Jihadi groups are based in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan

India’s much publicised bonhomie with the Taliban is not just to create a two-front conflict in Pakistan, but also to rein in the “Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent” or AQIS and other radical Islamist outfits ensconced in Afghanistan.

The AQIS is an offshoot of Al Qaeda Central (AQC) led first by Osama bin Laden (1957-2011) and later by Ayman al Zawahiri (1951-2022).

It was in September 2014 that the AQC launched the AQIS to carry out Jehadi and terrorist activities in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar, with its leadership based in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In his paper entitled “Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent” published by The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism at The Hague, Alastair Reed says that the AQIS had three objectives – (1) counteracting the breakaway Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh, (2) expanding AQC’s activities in South Asia and (3) continuing to function in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Americans.

AQIS’ presence in Afghanistan was needed both to have secure bases and to see that the Taliban was committed to the Sharia and Jihad in Afghanistan as well as the South Asia region as a whole.

Ghazwa-al-Hind

The AQIS coined the term “Ghazwa-al-Hind” (Battle of India) for the task before it in South Asia. Afghanistan and Pakistan were made the headquarters of the “Ghazwa-al-Hind” project. Most Pakistan-based Jihadist groups have framed their attacks on Indian soil as part of the “Ghazwa -al-Hind”.

The AQIS recruited fighters and united different pre-existing Jihadi groups in the Indian Subcontinent. The groups brought under the AQIS were – Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) (Bangladesh and Pakistan), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) (Kashmir), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al Almi (HuMA) (Pakistan), Brigade 313 (Pakistan), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) (Pakistan), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) (Pakistan), Jundullah (Pakistan), Ansar ut-Tawhid wa al Jihad (Kashmir), Ansar al Islam Bangladesh (Bangladesh), Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) (Bangladesh), Indian Mujahideen (IM) (India), Lanshkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (Pakistan), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Pakistan), and Turkistan Islamic Party (Pakistan).

Squeezed dry: Pakistan faces water war on two fronts

From Kashmir's glaciers to the Hindu Kush mountains, Pakistan's lifelines are becoming leverage. India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, and now Afghanistan is building dams on the Kunar River, threatening to choke Islamabad's water supply.

Pakistan is drowning in irony. The country that once weaponised terrorism now finds itself surrounded by neighbours weaponising water. India struck first, suspending the Indus Waters Treaty after the Pahalgam terror attack that killed 26 civilians. Now, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan has joined the offensive, ordering rapid construction of dams on the Kunar River that could strangle water flow into Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

For decades, the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty kept tensions in check, giving India control over eastern rivers whilst Pakistan managed the western ones. But in April 2025, New Delhi put that agreement on hold, disrupting Pakistan's irrigation networks and hydroelectric output. The message was brutal: Why water the fields of those who bury our citizens?

Just as Islamabad scrambled to contain that crisis, Kabul opened a second front. The Taliban's Supreme Leader, Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, commanded the construction of dams to assert "water sovereignty". The timing was no accident. Following deadly border clashes along the disputed Durand Line that left hundreds dead, Afghanistan's dam decision feels like payback served cold.

The Kunar River, stretching 480 kilometres from the Hindu Kush before entering Pakistan, feeds into the Kabul River, which ultimately merges with the Indus near Attock. Any reduction upstream ripples catastrophically downstream, starving not just Khyber Pakhtunkhwa but Punjab's agricultural heartland. Pakistan's per capita water availability has already plummeted from 5,000 cubic metres in 1947 to less than 1,000 today, crossing the threshold of absolute scarcity.

India's quiet support for Afghanistan's water projects adds another layer of strategic suffocation. The India-Afghanistan Friendship Dam in Herat and the upcoming Shahtoot Dam, backed by $250 million in Indian aid, are diplomatic anchors that reduce Afghan dependence on Pakistan whilst giving Kabul leverage over its former patron.

Confronting Pakistan’s Deadly Trifecta of Terrorist Groups

Amira Jadoon

After more than two decades as a frontline state in the Global War on Terror, Pakistan continues to face a complex and adaptive threat landscape. Militant outfits affiliated with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Baloch insurgency, and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) have regenerated and evolved, positioning themselves to exploit Pakistan’s vulnerabilities since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The escalating surge in militant violence — marked by attacks such as last month’s suicide bombing at a Balochistan National Party-Mengal rally, alongside attacks on the Federal Constabulary headquarters in Bannu and Quetta — has spurred a forceful military response from Pakistan. This has included actions such as the resumption of Operation Sarbakaf in Bajaur, and airstrikes in Kabul targeting the TTP leadership, triggering deadly border clashes with Afghanistan only a few days ago.

2024 was one of the deadliest years in Pakistan’s recent history, with a 70 percent surge in militant attacks compared to the year prior, propelling Pakistan to second place on the Global Terrorism Index. And the violence has continued unabated into 2025.

However, these numbers capture only part of Pakistan’s security crisis. The militant violence is further exacerbated by overlapping governance and geopolitical challenges, including federal-provincial disputes over military operations, the detention of activists, mass protests, and stalled negotiations between local peace councils and militants. This escalating crisis demands adaptive security strategies that learn from past failures, alongside reforms in security policies that rebuild trust between state institutions and local communities, and restore cooperation with neighboring states.

In its fight against militancy and terrorism, Pakistan would have to develop tailored approaches to each group — the TTP’s religious insurgency blended with elements of Pashtun nationalism, the BLA’s ethno-nationalist movement, and ISKP’s transnational agenda — rather than a one-size-fits-all security response.

Dealing with the Deadly Trifecta: TTP, BLA, and ISKP

Southeast Asia: China’s Cyber Incubator and the Looming Day One Threat

Christopher Braccia

On October 19, 2025, China-linked hackers known as “Salt Typhoon” were detected attempting to infiltrate yet another European telecommunications provider, deploying sophisticated techniques and exploiting Citrix NetScaler Gateway vulnerabilities. The intrusion marks the latest expansion of a campaign that has already compromised telecommunications infrastructure across more than 80 countries.

The pattern is consistent: Operations first tested against ASEAN targets eventually appear in attacks against Western infrastructure, often with marginal adjustments. Yet despite mounting evidence from regional security firms and governments, Western intelligence agencies have treated Southeast Asian cyber incidents as peripheral concerns rather than early warning indicators of threats that would later target their own critical systems.

China’s Laboratory for Cyberattacks

Southeast Asia serves as Beijing’s operational testing ground, offering a diverse technology landscape ideal for stress-testing intrusion methods as well as lower risks of attribution and retaliation. Southeast Asian governments are often reluctant to publicly attribute attacks to China given economic dependencies. From Vietnam’s government networks to the Philippines’ energy sector, China’s state-linked actors exploited a region characterized by hybrid technology ecosystems to refine what would later become their most sophisticated intrusion techniques.

For Beijing, Southeast Asia has proven an ideal laboratory. For the West, it’s a missed opportunity to prepare.

The sophistication of advanced persistent threat (APT) groups like Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon, their ability to persist in networks for years and evade detection, is not a fluke. It represents the culmination of iterative, low-risk research and development. This capability refinement follows clear strategic logic.

China Expands Air-Defence Network Near Pangong Lake Amid Border Tensions

Gaurav Sharma

China is rapidly advancing its air-defence infrastructure in Tibet, with new satellite imagery revealing a major military complex under construction near Pangong Lake. The development underscores Beijing's sustained push to strengthen its defences along the India frontier, integrating high-altitude radar systems, missile shelters, and advanced command-and-control structures.

The facility near Pangong Lake's eastern edge features command centers, barracks, radar stations, munition depots, and, notably, covered missile launch positions with retractable roofs. These hardened structures are designed to accommodate Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) vehicles, allowing missiles to be stored, raised, and fired with minimal exposure. Analysts believe the site will host HQ-9 long-range Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) - China's domestically developed air-defence system capable of intercepting aircraft and ballistic missiles at long ranges. This deployment would enhance the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities across the sensitive India-Tibet border region.

Integrated Design and Technological Sophistication Recommended For You India-China Flights Resume After 5-Year Hiatus, First Plane to Depart Tonight at 10 PM According to AllSource Analysis, a US-based geo-intelligence firm, the new Pangong facility shares architectural and operational similarities with another Chinese missile base in Gar County, approximately 65 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Both sites feature sliding-roof launch bays that conceal missile launchers until activation, a design previously seen at Chinese outposts in the South China Sea. This configuration allows for concealment, rapid deployment, and protection of TEL systems, reducing their vulnerability to reconnaissance and precision strikes. The complex is also connected through a wired command-and-control network, integrating radar feeds, communication hubs, and missile batteries into a unified air-defence grid. Strategic Significance of the Pangong Site You May Also Like Tamil Nadu Weather: Heavy Rains To Lash Chennai, 11 Dist As Depression Forms Over Bay of Bengal The Pangong complex was first identified in late July by geospatial researcher Damien Symon, when early construction was visible on satellite imagery. Within months, the site has expanded rapidly, with multiple highbay garages, storage shelters, and radar-linked nodes now visible. Its location - overlooking the volatile Pangong Lake region, which witnessed clashes between Indian and Chinese troops in 2020 - gives it strategic surveillance and missile coverage over key high-altitude zones.

When Will China Begin Earning Nobel Prizes in Science?

Markku Larjavaara

China’s rise in science has been even more dramatic than its rapid economic development. China and the United States currently spend far more on research and development and publish significantly more scientific publications than any other country. Many Chinese scientists are highly cited, but Nobel laureates remain scarce and many in China were once again disappointed when the last prize was awarded on October 13.

Chinese nationals have won the Nobel peace prize (Liu Xiaobo, who has been strenuously disavowed by Beijing) and the Nobel prize for literature (Mo Yan), but malaria researcher Tu Youyou’s 2015 award in medicine is the lone recognition of a Chinese national in the sciences. In the past ten years (2016–2025), China has not received a single one of a total 106 prizes in science and economics while citizens of the United States have earned 63.

Nobel prizes are often awarded for work performed decades earlier, and more Chinese scientists could become laureates in the future. However, as China has earned so few prizes, and the level of Chinese research funding has already been high for some time, the time lag cannot explain most of the difference.

I argue that the current Chinese education and science cultures and policies are not building a curiosity-driven intrinsic motivation among Chinese scientists and are therefore not conducive to game-changing research. Most scientists in every country repeat established methods on well-studied themes. Only exceptionally curious minds instead seek answers to questions about the world around them, and when an answer is not available, they passionately develop a method to get the answer, which may lead to important new openings.

There are three options for increasing the number of these exceptionally curious minds in China. China could attract more foreign scientists, Chinese researchers based abroad could be lured back, or domestic education and research policies could be improved.

Much of the most applauded “American” research has been carried out by recent immigrants. Of the 63 recent laureates having U.S. citizenship, 16 had another passport as well. No wonder that in 2020 China’s President Xi Jinping insisted: “We must progressively open up to international S&T organizations setting up in our country’s territory and foreign-national scientists taking up positions in our country’s academic S&T organizations, making our country into a broad global stage for open S&T cooperation.”

Charging Ahead: How China is Driving Innovation to Dominate the Global Electric Vehicle Market

Our latest report by Associate Director for Foreign Policy Channing Lee, “Charging Ahead: How China is Driving Innovation to Dominate the Global Electric Vehicle Market,” analyzes the deliberate, two-decade industrial strategy that propelled China to command nearly 60% of the global Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) market. It details the transition from domestic champion to global leader, driven by state coordination, massive scale, and rapid technological innovation. Ultimately, the research serves as a critical warning about the economic, innovation, and national security stakes for the U.S. and its allies.

The Era of Protectionism In TikTok And Rare Earth Elements: How China Is Counter Diminishing Strategic Weight For Its Own BATNA – Analysis

Jumel Gabilan Estrañero

Barely three months before the 2025 ends, United States finds itself structurally vulnerable in the supply chain for critical rare-earth elements (REEs), while China holds disproportionately strong leverage. China commands around 85% of processing and more than 90% of magnet production.

Moreover, the U.S. (under the Donald Trump administration) is ramping up its efforts to build a domestic supply chain for rare earths—including via legislation such as the Rare Earth Magnet Security Act and the Critical Minerals Security Act. In fact, a key U.S. deal: the MP Materials mine (in the U.S.) is backed by the U.S. Department of Defense, which will become the largest shareholder and commit to off-take plus price-floor mechanisms. But despite this push, the U.S. still lacks commercial-scale capability in heavy rare-earth separation, magnet manufacturing know-how, and has an “expertise gap.”

Meanwhile, we can observe that China is not passive. It is reportedly cataloguing rare-earth experts, monitoring travel, tightening controls. The up-shot is that China retains a “powerful hand” in any near-term U.S.–China trade fight because of its dominant position. In other words, the rare-earth supply chain as a strategic vulnerability for the U.S. and a tool of leverage for China.

Geopolitical Vulnerabilities and Strategic Stakes

Prior to this October development, only last month, a deal has been reached between the Trump administration and China to keep TikTok operational in the United States. That an emerging TikTok deal with China will ensure that U.S. companies control the algorithm[2] that powers the app’s video feed. On the technicality and legal terms of the deal, the app will be spun off into a new U.S. joint venture owned by a consortium of American investors — including tech giant Oracle and investment firm Silver Lake Partners.

On the other hand, the recent move by China relative to the rare earth minerals is not just a trade-issue; it is a strategic one. Several interlocking dimensions emerge:

a) Strategic materials as geopolitical leverage

China’s dominance in REE processing and magnets gives it the potential to exert coercive leverage. China being able to “switch on the tap whenever they want and switch it off whenever they want and control the market.” In a geopolitical standoff, controlling inputs to military systems (fighter jets, submarines, missiles)is a source of power. For example, many U.S. defense platforms rely on foreign REEs. Meanwhile TikTok, by contrast, is a maturing consumer app with diminishing strategic weight as pointed out by Dimitar Gueorguiev, Syracuse University associate professor of Political Science.

United States-China Trade Tension Escalates: Testing Times For India – Analysis

Amitendu Palit

The trade friction between the United States (US) and China has escalated in the run-up to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting scheduled in Seoul at the end of October 2025. This increases worries for India, which is struggling to manage impacts of high US tariffs. Even if the current tensions are dissolved, India, like many other middle powers and large economies of the world, will have to be prepared to cope with the multiple downsides of the rivalry.

The latest friction comprises China expanding curbs on export of rare earths and introducing controls on foreign production of rare earths consisting of Chinese materials. New controls have been announced for use of Chinese rare earths and processing technology in foreign defence and military use and semiconductors and their re-export. A global licensing system will kick in on 1 December 2025 to screen the use of rare earth magnets and critical materials sourced locally from China and further used in any supply chains.

The US’ reaction to the Chinese curbs has been predictably aggressive. President Donald Trump announced 100 per cent additional tariffs on Chinese exports. The retaliation comes on the back of both countries increasing the docking fees for ships made or run by the other, in their ports, in an ostensible effort to reduce each other’s control over global shipping services.

While reciprocal tariffs on countries with whom the US had cut deals begun getting implemented from August 2025, those for China were held back for 90 days. The truce was timed by factoring in a meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the APEC summit. It is not clear yet whether the leaders will meet at APEC after the current muscle-flexing.

Neither China nor the US are backing down from a raw display of their respective economic might and the desire to control the global market, trade and strategic supply chains. The US’ weaponization of tariffs and export of chips has now been ‘complemented’ by China’s weaponisation of its near-monopoly control over global rare earth supply chains. The fight is unlikely to end if both presidents meet at Seoul. Both will keep working towards chipping away each other’s strategic ambitions. Newer geoeconomic tactics will be employed leading to greater fragmentation of critical supply chains and reorientation of global trade.

In China’s dangerous interceptions, see the breakdown of peaceful world order

Jennifer Parker

The White House meeting between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and US President Donald Trump produced a string of positives. Chief among them is Trump’s ringing endorsement of AUKUS and his first public commitment to sell nuclear-powered submarines to Australia under phase two of the deal.

The message was clear: the defence relationship between the United States and Australia remains strong. It was also a message Australia needed to hear after yet another unsafe and unprofessional intercept by a Chinese fighter aircraft, which endangered the crew of a Royal Australian Air Force P-8 maritime patrol aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace over the South China Sea on Sunday.

During recent Senate estimates hearings, senior Defence Department officials again warned that Australia’s strategic circumstances are ‘deteriorating.’ Defence secretary Greg Moriarty cautioned that ‘the risk of an incident has heightened over recent years, and the trends continue to be worrying’. He’s right. Sunday’s events are proof enough: the P-8 was harassed by the Chinese fighter that released flares dangerously close to its flight path, a reckless act that could have caused engine failure and cost Australian lives.

This incident is not an isolated case or the actions of an overly aggressive People’s Liberation Army Air Force pilot who will be reprimanded on return to base. It forms part of a clear pattern of aggressive and reckless behaviour by Chinese pilots and naval commanders toward Australian—and other nations’—ships and aircraft operating in international waters and airspace, regions through which more than two-thirds of Australia’s vital maritime trade flows.

The Australian public was first made aware of such behaviour in early 2022, when an RAAF P-8 operating within Australia’s exclusive economic zone had a military-grade laser directed into its cockpit by a Chinese naval vessel transiting the Arafura Sea.

Trump and Putin: Something happened on the way to the Forum

Stephen Bryen

Something happened that caused Donald Trump to “cancel” the expected meeting between himself and Vladimir Putin in Budapest.

Consider this: Plans were moving ahead for the meeting. Hungary’s Foreign Minister arrived in Washington to work on planning for the meeting. While he was still here, Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a “productive” phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov – and then recommended that Trump cancel the Putin meeting.

The primary issue is over the US demand for a ceasefire in place. The Russians, said Lavrov, would never agree to any such thing, so Rubio told the President a meeting in Budapest would not be successful.

The Rubio-Lavrov exchange was on Monday, October 20. It came after Zelensky met with President Trump on October 17th, a meeting that was fraught with conflict.

While there is no definitive readout on the Zelensky meeting, most of the leaks to the press focused on two things: the President told Zelensky he was not releasing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine and he also told Zelensky that Ukraine had to accept territorial concessions for any peace deal to happen.

Zelensky had come to the White House equipped with maps showing targets inside Russia for the American-supplied Tomahawks. He fully expected Washington to agree to the plan to hit Russia’s infrastructure, military-industrial complex and, quite probably its main decision-making organs, including the Kremlin. Zelensky was looking for US approval of the targets.

One recalls that on May 3rd, 2023 Ukraine launched an audacious drone attack on the Kremlin, specifically targeting Putin’s office. Because drones fly slowly and carry limited amounts of explosives, the attack was not successful.

Tomahawks, on the other hand, fly much faster than drones because they are jet powered. They fly close to the ground and can maneuver around air defenses and other obstacles, and have a unitary high explosive 1,000-pound warhead capable of destroying hardened targets, with blast effects and fragmentation that can kill in a large swath, making the Kremlin target likely a high Ukrainian priority.

The U.S. Is Preparing for War in Venezuela Story

Nancy A. Youssef

As a naval aviator, Alvin Holsey trained to conduct missions that required precise targeting. For years, his job was to fly helicopters over potential targets and, using radar and other detectors, assess whether they posed a threat to the United States; if so, he had to determine whether to launch an attack.

On September 2, Holsey, now an admiral leading the U.S. military’s southern command, was put in charge of a mission unlike any that has come before: The United States was, without any warning or attempt at interdiction, striking suspected drug boats in the Caribbean Sea. Early into the mission, Defense officials told us, he privately raised concerns to Pentagon leadership about the operations, which have now struck at least 10 suspected drug-trafficking vessels that the U.S. redefined as “terrorist,” killing 43 people.

Holsey’s complaints led to a tense meeting with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, officials said, after which the 37-year Navy veteran announced that he planned to leave his post next month, less than a year into what was supposed to be a three-year tenure. (Like other officials we spoke with for this story, they requested anonymity because they are not authorized to speak publicly. The Pentagon did not respond to requests for comment on Holsey’s departure.)

Since then, the strikes have escalated even as the legal questions around them have yet to be answered. There was another strike overnight, this one killing six, according to Hegseth. And today, the Pentagon announced that the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft-carrier strike group, a multi-ship force staffed by as many as 5,000 troops, would travel from the Mediterranean to the Caribbean. The intent, the Pentagon said, is to “bolster U.S. capacity to detect, monitor, and disrupt illicit actors.” The ships, which are currently on a port visit in Croatia, will take just over a week; their movement was the latest indication that what began as a campaign to pick off alleged drug runners as they ply the seas in small fishing vessels is evolving into something far larger.

Science Fiction Won’t Kill You, but the Terms of Service Will

Ali Crawford

From Black Mirror to Her to Cyberpunk 2077, science fiction reveals that our real threat isn’t killer robots—it’s the corporate systems quietly rewriting what it means to be human.

Entertainment provides an escape from reality. Audiences consume film, television, books, and video games to be transported to worlds unlike our own. As a genre, science fiction offers imagined technological progress based on known or theoretical possibilities. Early concerns and public perceptions of artificial intelligence (AI) were shaped by science fiction movies like The Matrix or The Terminator, where seemingly unfounded fears of sentient machines and killer robots were the ultimate existential threat to humanity. However, in more modern and darker science fiction, these fictitious worlds can also be a mirror that forces the audience to confront harsh realities or unthinkable truths about the present. In other words, science fiction teaches us that the most dangerous futures are the quiet trade-offs we make with technology, convenience, and corporate control.

Selling Survival

Consider the alternative futures presented in Black Mirror, a dystopic anthology television series, where each episode explores the morbid but human-centric realities of technology. Season 7, Episode 1 finds an average middle-class couple facing a health emergency in which the wife receives synthetic brain tissue from a tech startup. An initial monthly subscription fee of $300 to keep the tissue operational seems a small price to pay to keep someone alive, but the couple quickly realizes that their service tier has severe limitations—including the wife making random advertising announcements. Their only recourse is buying into the continuous corporate cycle of upgrades and updates, which causes their own financial and mental ruin. This feels less like fiction and more like tomorrow’s updated terms of service.

The business of technology is also a prominent feature in the world of Cyberpunk 2077, an award-winning video game set in the futuristic Night City, where everyone blindly chases synchronicity in a society dominated by corporatocracy, advertisements, and cybernetic enhancements. The game makes the same point as above, but in a louder neon: the future is not about killer machines, but about the ways corporate power can turn human life into a transaction through increased interdependence on technological innovation. (Although to be fair, there are a lot of killer machines in the game. Most of them are amalgamations of humans with impressive cyberware.)

A Frog in a Pot – Turning Around Russia’s Hybrid War

Eerik Kross and Dr Greg Mills

‘A wolf circling sheep’ is how Christopher Steele once described Vladimir Putin’s relationship with the West.

Steele’s case has itself become part of the Russian president’s cognitive warfare strategy. The former MI6 officer compiled the 2016 dossier alleging that Donald Trump had been cultivated and supported by Moscow for years before his first presidential victory. Just as the dossier contained – in all likelihood – Russian disinformation crafted to split readers between those demanding more and those dismissing the entire text, Putin has pursued a broader strategy of injecting toxic doubt into Western minds. He has sown uncertainty not only over America, but across every country and in every domain where trust and unity matter.

The world has since tilted in favour of autocracies and their malign agendas, with disruption of the rules-based international order a reality, and with it an increase in the frequency of geopolitical upsets such as the transatlantic rift. Democracy remains in retreat in the face of authoritarianism. Freedom House, which since its creation in 1941 has been tracking the state of freedom, found 2025 to be the 19th year of declining freedom, due to political repression, armed conflict and authoritarianism.

Russia is a main protagonist in a new pattern of conflict, defined by the term ‘hybrid warfare’, a format which allows the Kremlin to overcome its power asymmetry to destabilise Europe, build alliances worldwide, including in Africa, and pursue its imperial ambitions in Ukraine by undermining support for Kyiv.

But others are learning from Moscow’s experience – and the West’s response – not least on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. These lessons should be learned quickly, particularly in the fight for democracy and against authoritarianism.

The Lessons of Grey Zone Conflict

‘Hybrid warfare’, otherwise known as the ‘grey zone’, describes a spectrum of hostile actions below the threshold triggering a military response, from political interference at one end, to cyberattacks, assassination and non-conventional conflict – such as the covert invasion of Crimea in Ukraine – at the other. The frog is heated slowly enough as not to risk it hopping out of the pot.

Turning Back the Clock: Leveraging Game Theory Across the Conflict Continuum

Peyton E. Ugolini, Paul L. Knudsen

Eighty-nine seconds to midnight; this is the current time on the Doomsday Clock, maintained in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. When the clock hits midnight, it means the extinction of humanity is at hand. Albert Einstein and Robert Oppenheimer founded this organization in 1945. It is not a surprise that those who worked on the Manhattan Project would use nuclear risk and global conflict as indicators of the world’s vulnerability to catastrophe. Over time, this has evolved to examine various sources of global risks, including emerging technologies and diseases. As we approach midnight, policymakers need to determine how to reset the clock.

The nature of a negotiated settlement after a conflict determines the subsequent position of actors in the conflict continuum, shaping whether the post-conflict environment leans towards competition, crisis, or renewed conflict. Each phase of the conflict continuum corresponds with a greater likelihood of specific game theory opportunities, such that the competition phase enables positive-sum outcomes, crisis engenders zero-sum outcomes, and conflict creates a landscape favoring negative-sum outcomes. To illustrate this, this article will first provide a brief overview of the conflict continuum, game theory, and military operations. Then it will examine several case studies, spanning from historical to contemporary. Following the examination of these case studies, the framework will then consider practical applications including Professional Military Education (PME) and negotiation preparation. Finally, this investigation will respond to potential counterpoints and conclude with a summary of the information discussed.

Background Information

The Conflict Continuum identifies three broad phases of international engagement: Competition, Crisis, and Conflict. Competition below armed conflict exists when two or more nations have incompatible interests but are not seeking armed conflict. Crisis is the gray zone where an emerging threat is detected, and a nation will respond. Crisis could be the result of an adversarial state or non-state actor, or even the mere threat or warning of such an actor. It is also important to note that a crisis can exist when any instrument of national power is threatened or weakened. Armed conflict is the use of violence as the primary means to achieve an objective. Competition is the desired phase of the continuum because this is the time when a nation can prepare for crisis and armed conflict. It is also worth noting that, during the competition phase of the continuum, a nation retains all the advantages of its instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic, otherwise known as DIME). As we transition from competition to armed conflict, we lose our ability to utilize all instruments of national power effectively.

From Culture to System: A Roadmap for Turning Ukraine’s Counterdrone Innovation into a Capability

Mykhailo Lopatin, Julia Muravska and Mark Opgenorth

The spring and summer of 2025 have seen Russia unleash an attritional aerial campaign against Ukraine, repeatedly launching massed salvoes of Shahed-type one-way attack drones. These attacks have targeted civilian areas and infrastructure as well as military sites. Consisting of both one-way attack and decoy drones and frequently combined with both cruise and ballistic missiles, they aim to exhaust and overwhelm Ukraine’s air defense systems. The massed attacks have a grim psychological purpose as well: to demoralize the civilian population and destroy its will to resist aggression.

Russia began using Shahed-131 and -136 drones against Ukraine in late 2022, initially as loitering munitions for long-range strikes, to compensate for cruise missile shortages. What we see now, well into the fourth year of the war, is a sharp increase in the pace and scale of attacks—Russia launched 728 one-way attack and decoy drones against Ukraine on July 9—as well as continuous technological improvements to the drones themselves.

Despite deploying a level of innovation, agility, and civil-military collaboration that is simply unmatched in NATO nations, Ukraine seems unable to get ahead of this threat and remains critically vulnerable to it.

Asking Difficult Questions

In 2022, mobile fire groups were quickly formed and deployed in response to Ukraine’s shortage of traditional air defense interceptors, holding off the initial threat from various types of enemy drones. Ukrainian forces also began deploying electronic warfare early on, and these systems are continually improved and widely used today. Ukraine has recently prioritized the development and deployment of specialized drone interceptors.

Yet, any advantage won against Shahed-type one-way attack drones has proven fleeting and fragile, while the impact of the attritional warfare enabled by these systems is high and far-reaching. Not only is this impact measured in lives lost, but if the threat is not neutralized, it can have grave strategic consequences—specifically, Ukraine’s military defeat. The enemy’s use of Shahed-type one-way attack drones is aimed at crippling Ukraine’s economy and critical infrastructure; these attacks are central to Russia’s strategy of waging war against all of Ukraine’s society, directly. The Kremlin has judged that it can break the front by decimating the rear.

The Quieting of Combat

Mark W. Castillon

For generations, America’s combat arms thrived on a hard edge—dark humor, vulgar cadences, and rough rites that forged trust under fire. Full Metal Jacket and Platoon captured a truth veterans know: banter and gallows humor aren’t moral failings; they’re pressure valves that build cohesion.

Reform was overdue after Tailhook and Fort Hood’s Vanessa Guillén tragedy, which exposed failures of leadership and justice, but overcorrection followed. In the rush to protect dignity, culture itself was treated as the enemy—commanders began to sanitize the very grit that once welded Soldiers together. What began as accountability became sterilization, and with it, a profession built on toughness started to lose its voice.

Readiness Not Nostalgia

The past decade’s zero-tolerance culture blurred the line between crime and camaraderie. Leaders, fearing headlines more than failure, traded judgment for process. What once ended with a quick “knock it off” now launches investigations that crush trust and initiative. When every joke or ritual risks legal review, Soldiers learn paralysis, not professionalism.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s 2025 directive confronted that paralysis head-on, ordering an end to anonymous complaints and frivolous investigations. His review of hazing, bullying, and harassment definitions admitted that policies had become “overly broad, jeopardizing combat readiness and trust.”

That recognition mattered. Commanders stripped of discretion can’t build disciplined units; bureaucracy replaces leadership. Hegseth’s order for a 30-day rewrite of definitions was the first official acknowledgment that protecting dignity must not mean criminalizing grit.

Meanwhile, the numbers tell their own story. According to Military.com reporting in March 2025, U.S. Army data show that nearly a quarter of Soldiers recruited since 2022 failed to complete initial contracts. Some losses stem from health or performance—but cultural softness is part of it. A force that processes out those who say “I can’t handle it” instead of training them for hardship invites decline. War offers no opt-out.

Why the West’s war on industry has become its greatest weakness

Ralph Schoellhammer

The post-war order of free trade is dying before our eyes—and perhaps that’s the best thing that could happen to the West. What we’re witnessing today is nothing less than a fundamental realignment of geopolitical power relations, where democratic states find themselves forced to adopt authoritarian economic practices to defend their own sovereignty. But this transformation reveals a deeper cultural problem that has been decades in the making: Our civilisation’s inexplicable war against the very foundations that make modern life possible.

The European Union is planning measures that would have been unthinkable just a decade ago. Chinese companies will be required to transfer technology to European firms if they want access to European markets. Joint ventures could become mandatory, local sourcing quotas enforced—in short, all those practices about which the West has criticised China for years. These measures, announced for November, are theoretically directed against all non-EU companies, but the real target is obvious: China’s subsidized industrial products have flooded European markets while Beijing’s looming restrictions on rare earth elements threaten to squeeze European manufacturers into submission.

The irony is unmistakable but strategically necessary. A rules-based international order only works when all participants play by the same rules—a condition that has long ceased to exist. Yet this shift exposes something more troubling: We’re adopting these measures not from a position of strength, but because we’ve systematically weakened our own industrial foundations.

Even more drastic action came from the Dutch government’s takeover of Chinese-owned semiconductor manufacturer Nexperia under the rarely-used Goods Availability Act. This “highly exceptional” intervention, as Dutch authorities themselves call it, shows how deeply Chinese capital has penetrated European critical infrastructure. Nexperia, owned by China’s Wingtech Technology, produces basic semiconductor components essential for automotive and consumer electronics—chips that form the backbone of Europe’s industrial economy. What was once considered normal business activity is now recognised as potential leverage that European policymakers can no longer ignore.

The Risk of Financial—And Moral—Collapse Story

Evan Hughes

In his new book about the stock-market crash of 1929, the journalist Andrew Ross Sorkin recounts a scene from a summer day that year in Manhattan. The dining room of the Plaza Hotel came to attention, he writes, when top figures from Wall Street and the business world trickled in for Saturday lunch. The presence of such a crowd might not have created a stir at another historical moment, but these were not typical times. The nation was infatuated with the market, which was showering wealth on investors big and small.

Several of these boldface names, including the esteemed leaders of big banks, had a history of joining forces in market-manipulation schemes that were not a well-kept secret. Together, major players would form a pool and bid up a stock through “wash trades” with one another, creating the appearance of high demand, before they all sold, cratering the price and devastating the dupes who had followed their lead.

One might think that some of these men would have faced consequences, or at least lived in fear of exposure, even though their conduct was technically legal at the time. But they were well connected. One of them, John J. Raskob, was the chair of the Democratic National Committee and a prominent political donor; his biggest beneficiary, the former New York governor and presidential candidate Al Smith, was dining with him that day. Another, William Durant, had secretly met with President Herbert Hoover earlier in the year, to lean on him to stop the Federal Reserve Board from curbing Wall Street’s excesses.

In his book 1929: Inside the Greatest Crash in Wall Street History—And How It Shattered a Nation, Sorkin refers to “remarkable parallels” between the run-up to that crisis and today’s political and economic climate, but he doesn’t elaborate on the notion; his account is essentially a straight history, written in a journalistic register. Yet some revealing parallels do emerge from beneath the surface, and they don’t reflect well on our current path. In addition to the greed and “this time is different” hubris that precedes every stock-market tumble, the 1929 collapse was powered, it seems to me, by a more insidious and pervasive force that is in fact everywhere in evidence today.

Lessons and Stories From the Frontlines in Ukraine

Ahvish Roy

After President Trump met with Zelensky at the White House, and talks with Putin are currently on hold, there are many unknowns about how the Ukraine War will end. Zelensky presses for U.S. Tomahawk Missiles while reports that Russia already lost 281,550 soldiers in the first eight months of this year, indicate Kyiv may have the advantage in a war of attrition, despite having less manpower. Lost in all these details is the resounding question of how Ukraine has persevered for almost four years. Having just returned home from a week as a citizen journalist in the company of Ukrainian soldiers, many not much older than me, I learned that Trump’s hand at the bargaining table is greatly bolstered by Ukrainian resilience and initiative. Their stubborn battlefield resistance could bring the Kremlin to the table and set the stage for President Trump to become the frontrunner for the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize.

Hold, Advance, or Retreat

I went to Ukraine as a witness, to listen, learn, and hear the stories of those on the front. Sitting across from me, a young helicopter pilot described the war from above. Flying an aging Soviet-era Mi-8, he found himself locked by a Russian missile hundreds of meters above the ground. With only seconds to act, he plunged the aircraft into a swamp, submerging the rotors in freezing water to throw off the missile. The gamble worked. The missile screamed overhead and exploded harmlessly in the distance. His crew, soaked and freezing, laughed uncontrollably at the fact that they were still alive.

His story became instantly familiar. Ukrainian orders are deceptively simple. Hold the line. Advance if you can. Retreat if you must. But the how is left to the soldiers themselves. Freedom to adapt and determination to survive has produced extraordinary stories — from Kyiv to Kharkiv to Kherson.

I listened as an officer of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army -- call sign “Thirteenth” -- described the first days after the February 24, 2022, invasion. His unit was tasked with stopping the Russian column from reaching Brovary, the gateway to Kyiv. On paper, it was impossible: 360 armored vehicles and tanks against a handful of mortars and RPGs. The men dug into frozen soil and waited. Hours passed in silence until the column rumbled into view. They let the lead vehicles pass, then struck the middle and rear in groups of four. Within minutes, the Russians were trapped; because the tanks sat on high ground, their guns couldn’t angle low enough to return fire. By nightfall, the Russian advance was shattered; the city was safe.

U.S. Should Strengthen, Not Constrain, Its Most Integrated and Innovative Companies

Daniel Bob

Leadership in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, robotics, advanced materials, biotechnology, and aerospace will determine who leads the world economically and strategically in the decades ahead. These technologies spur productivity gains, provide supply chain resilience, and shape military strength that sustain national security and prosperity.

At the moment, however, the United States is no longer ahead in many of these fields. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute reports that China now leads in 57 of 64 critical technologies. Studies by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation and others have found China advancing in robotics, batteries, quantum communication, and advanced materials. These gains are not accidental. They reflect Beijing’s deliberate effort to integrate research, manufacturing, and state financing into a single system that can move from idea to global scale faster than market-driven rivals.

In addition to innovation from entrepreneurs and start-ups, one of the defining features of America’s past success has been the rise of vertically integrated companies that design, build, and distribute under one roof. From the early days of computing to today’s clean energy, aerospace, and healthcare industries, these companies have provided the scale, speed, and reliability that have helped give the United States its global competitive edge.

Unlike China’s state-directed approach, America’s integrated companies compete, collaborate, and innovate in open markets. They link invention to production and connect the nation’s research universities, engineering talent, and industrial capacity, thereby enhancing America’s global competitiveness.

They also expand opportunity at home. Their national scale and infrastructure lower costs and broaden access for consumers, reaching underserved and remote communities with essential goods and services such as prescription drugs, broadband internet, and clean energy. Their wide distribution networks and operational reach drive consistency and reliability, ensuring that critical products remain available even in times of crisis or disruption.

How Ukrainian Cities Were Wiped Out By Russian Glide Bombs And Artillery

Donbas.Realities

They can make apartment blocks collapse like a house of cards. In Ukraine, Russia's use of air-dropped bombs equipped with glide kits and precision-guidance systems has brought staggering destruction to civilian areas. These weapons can glide for up to 60 kilometers before striking with devastating force. Together with various other artillery, tanks, and drones, their impact is evident across Ukraine.

Everywhere Russia has reached with this type of bomb, apocalyptic scenes have followed. Entire neighborhoods have been reduced to rubble, schools and hospitals flattened, and communities erased.

In Chasiv Yar, once home to more than 10,000 people, Russian forces reached the outskirts in May 2024 -- but the damage began long before that. Drone footage shows buildings collapsing under bombardment, with hospitals and key industrial sites destroyed. Apartment blocks are now hollowed-out shells.

Toretsk, a city of 36,000, has seen similar devastation. After months of Russian advances, apartment buildings, churches, and schools now lie in ruins. Streets once filled with life, like Druzhby and Lisova, are lined with the remains of shattered homes and public buildings.

In the border city of Vovchansk, Russian forces opened a new front in Spring 2024. Though Ukrainian armed forces repelled the assault, the city did not escape destruction. Glide bombs and shelling reduced apartment blocks to smoking husks. Schools, kindergartens, and even the central library were hit, with walls blown apart. Entire structures collapsed.

The making of an intelligence failure

David Omand

At a time when western intelligence agencies are confronted by mounting threats from hostile states and terrorists, averting disaster requires clear logical processes, strategic foresight, and the will to act.

In September, when drones forced Copenhagen airport to close, the questions came: was Russia responsible? How was the attack mounted? Within hours, conspiracy theories flooded social media claiming that the authorities had deliberately looked away. This pattern – shock, questions, accusations – has become grimly familiar after every attack on western soil.

After the attack on Heaton Park synagogue in Manchester, it was to be expected that the media would investigate how much the authorities knew about the terrorist beforehand. What was his motivation? Were there accomplices? Will there be further attacks? As the shock wears off, however, a sharper question follows: could the attacks have been prevented?

Following the collapse of the prosecution of two individuals in the United Kingdom on official secrets charges, a case in which the hand of Chinese intelligence was alleged to have been at work, the questions become political: did the previous government, in office when the alleged offences took place, assess China to be a national security threat? What is the intelligence evidence behind the prosecution (which the government has now published)?

When answers come, they will emerge from a careful multi-stage process of intelligence activity. But it is in the nature of human intelligence that those answers may be incomplete, fragmentary, and sometimes wrong. Nor can everything be made public. Were intelligence targets to understand what sources and methods have been used, they would be able to dodge and deceive them in the future. Equally, the inferential nature of reasoning applied to an intelligence judgement (for example, the attribution of a cyberattack to China, as the US and UK have done several times) may not be sufficient to meet the different evidential standards of a criminal court.

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