India's data centre boom confronts a looming water challenge

Nikhil Inamdar

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The extraordinary rise of artificial intelligence has turbocharged data centre growth in India, Asia's third largest economy.

Data centres - the centralised physical facilities that enable our growing digital existence by hosting computer servers, IT infrastructure and network equipment - power everything from ChatGPT queries to electric vehicles and streaming services.

Last month, Google made an eye-popping $15bn (£11.49bn) investment in an AI data centre in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh - its biggest in India.

It was the latest among a string of investments from companies - including global giants like Amazon Web Services and Meta and local players such as Reliance Industries - that are pumping billions of dollars into India's data centre market. Even luxury real-estate developers have joined the bandwagon to build these computing facilities.

The sector is poised for "explosive growth", according to global real estate advisory JLL, with India's data centre capacity projected to surge 77% by 2027 to reach 1.8GW. Some $25-30bn is expected to be spent in capacity expansion by 2030, according to various estimates.

While vital for India's developmental needs, the growth of such energy hungry, water-guzzling infrastructure has profound implications for the country's decarbonisation plans.

India has 18% of the world's population, but only 4% of its water resources

India has no option but to attract big data centre investments, some experts say.

While the country is said to account for 20% of global data generation, it has only 3% of global data centre capacity. And demand for such infrastructure is soaring, with India expected to consume the most data in the world by 2028 - higher than developed markets like the US, Europe and even China.

Ricin Threat And The Jihadist Conspiracy Against India

Animesh Roul

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The Gujarat Police’s Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) on 8 November 2025 arrested Ahmed Mohiyuddin Saiyed, a doctor from Hyderabad (Telangana), along with firearms and nearly 4 kg of castor-bean mash, which is used to extract ricin, a bio-toxin, at Adalaj toll plaza on Ahmedabad–Mehsana Road in Gandhinagar.[1] His call records led to the arrest of two Uttar Pradesh residents, Azad Suleman Sheikh and Mohammad Saleem Khan, in Banaskantha, Gujarat.[2]

Initial investigation indicated that Saiyed had been in contact with one Abu Khadija, a Pakistan-based operative linked to Islamic State-Khurasan Province (ISKP), a transnational jihadist group. Saiyed, a China-trained physician, was manufacturing large quantities of ricin, possibly for mass poisoning. He conducted reconnaissance at several security-sensitive sites in Lucknow, Delhi and Ahmedabad. The Gujarat Ricin plot involved the bio-terror links of radicalised individuals with cross-border operatives. It reflects the ISKP’s broader strategy of using skilled individuals for low-cost, high-impact attacks.

International Regulations of ‘Scare Chemical’

Ricin (from castor beans/Ricinus communis) remains appealing to extremist groups more for its symbolic and psychological significance than for its actual lethality. Classified by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as a Category B bioterrorism agent[3] and listed under Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),[4] ricin is a typical ‘bio-chemical toxin’ well-known for its high toxicity. Still, it has a low technical barrier for crude extraction from castor beans. Regulatory oversight on ricin control remains strict. Under the CWC, it has no legitimate large-scale use outside of research or defence. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540[5] and national laws such as India’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (2005)[6] also ban the production or possession of any biotoxin by non-state actors.

Is an Army unit something that the Chief of Army can do with as he likes?

Brian Hartigan 

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He’s the one in charge … so, why not? If he wants a unit to undertake a new role managing emerging technology, what’s wrong with him simply stripping tanks from 1st Armoured Regiment and making it a non-combatant?

What’s wrong … is that a unit is much more than just the numbers of those serving in it at a particular time. A unit is what esprit-de-corps, heritage and tradition, makes it. This is accrued during the service of former members; and maintained and built upon, by those currently serving.

An Army unit has stakeholders in the same way that a business does. These are people who have an interest in it and who are impacted by decisions affecting it, i.e. former and serving members.

1 Armd Regt has crewed tanks for 75 years. Stripping it of its tanks is obviously a decision of major significance for stakeholders. One would anticipate widespread consultation. There was none.

Nor were options involving other contender units, seriously entertained. Serving members were given a choice: either stay with the unit in Adelaide and become a Combat Experimentation Group (CXG); or transfer to 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Townville, for those who wished to continue crewing tanks. Former members were not consulted; nor were they given any warning about what was to happen.

The announcement on 28 Sep 2023, was a complete surprise: “The 1st Armoured Regiment will be re-roled as an experimental unit to deliver and integrate emerging technologies. This will remain in Adelaide.”

Rivalries and missed opportunities stole Afghanistan’s peace

Masoom Stanekzai

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Geography and a history of proxy politics have made Afghanistan an arena for others’ contests, undermining its stability. Internal fragmentation has compounded the damage. Regional rivalries have repeatedly undermined Afghan-led efforts toward peace.

These rivalries have included those between Pakistan and India and between Iran and the Gulf States. Intensifying US–China competition and US tensions with Russia and Iran have also been factors.

The rivalries that robbed Afghanistan of peace began during the Cold War and persisted through the 1979 Soviet invasion, the rise of extremism, and the US-led intervention of 2001 to 2021. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and, later, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—a regional branch of Daesh—each emerged as a direct consequence of these interventions and their unintended outcomes. They emerged first during the Soviet invasion, the US-supported jihad against the Soviets, and later during the War on Terror in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

Today, Afghanistan is once again trapped in a cycle of geopolitical tensions. Shifting alliances and rivalries evoke the old game, but with some new players.

External actors have consistently prioritised their own security and strategic interests over Afghanistan’s peace and stability. Pakistan pursued strategic depth in Afghanistan against India; Iran and Russia viewed the Taliban as a hedge against ISKP and a potential destabilising force; and China eyed Afghanistan’s mineral and transit potential in the Belt and Road Initiative, while monitoring security risks related to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.

Anthropic Says Chinese Hackers Used Its A.I. in Online Attack

Meaghan Tobin and Cade Metz

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Chinese state-sponsored hackers used Anthropic’s artificial intelligence technology to conduct a largely automated cyberattack against a group of technology companies and government agencies, the company said on Thursday.

Anthropic, an artificial intelligence start-up, claimed that the large-scale online espionage campaign in September was the first reported case of an A.I.-powered agent’s gathering information on targets with limited human input.

It released a report detailing how attackers used the company’s artificial intelligence tools to write code that directed Anthropic’s A.I. agent, Claude Code, to perform the attack. The company said human operators accounted for 10 to 20 percent of the work required to conduct the operation.

The report did not disclose how the company had become aware of the attack or how it had identified the hackers, whom Anthropic said it had assessed “with high confidence” as being a Chinese state-sponsored group. It also did not identify the 30 entities that Anthropic said the hackers had targeted.

James Corera, the director of the cyber, technology and security program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said that although the campaign was not a fully automated attack, it demonstrated how hackers could now hand off large parts of their work to A.I. systems.

“While the balance is clearly shifting toward greater automation, human orchestration still anchors key elements,” Mr. Corera said.

AI firm claims it stopped Chinese state-sponsored cyber-attack campaign

Aisha Down

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A leading artificial intelligence company claims to have stopped a China-backed “cyber espionage” campaign that was able to infiltrate financial firms and government agencies with almost no human oversight.

The US-based Anthropic said its coding tool, Claude Code, was “manipulated” by a Chinese state-sponsored group to attack 30 entities around the world in September, achieving a “handful of successful intrusions”.

This was a “significant escalation” from previous AI-enabled attacks it monitored, it wrote in a blogpost on Thursday, because Claude acted largely independently: 80 to 90% of the operations involved in the attack were performed without a human in the loop.

“The actor achieved what we believe is the first documented case of a cyber-attack largely executed without human intervention at scale,” it wrote.

Anthropic did not clarify which financial institutions and government agencies had been targeted, or what exactly the hackers had achieved – although it did say they were able to access their targets’ internal data.

It said Claude had made numerous mistakes in executing the attacks, at times making up facts about its targets, or claiming to have “discovered” information that was free to access.

Policymakers and some experts said the findings were an unsettling sign of how capable certain AI systems have grown: tools such as Claude are now able to work independently over longer periods of time.

“Wake the f up. This is going to destroy us – sooner than we think – if we don’t make AI regulation a national priority tomorrow,” the US senator Chris Murphy wrote on X in response to the findings.

“AI systems can now perform tasks that previously required skilled human operators,” said Fred Heiding, a computing security researcher at Harvard University. “It’s getting so easy for attackers to cause real damage. The AI companies don’t take enough responsibility.”

Made in China 2025: Evaluating China’s Performance

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Made in China 2025 (MIC2025) exemplifies how China’s industrial strategy is a comprehensive mobilization of state resources, private enterprise, and national priorities that has reshaped global technology competition. Across ten key technologies in MIC2025, China has met or exceeded many of the very ambitious global market share, local sourcing, and technology development targets it set for itself in 2015. While it has fallen short on others, in most cases it still made significant gains in each sector. The bottom line is that after a decade of state support, China is more innovative, has moved up the global value chain, and has solidified its status as a global manufacturing powerhouse. In evaluating China’s progress, several lessons can be drawn:

The technologies in which China met most of its targets benefited from consistent, long-term government support, vertically integrated supply chains, and/or economies of scale. These include electric vehicles (EVs), electrical equipment, biopharma and high-performance medical devices, ships, and space equipment. China was already on track to dominate ships and electrical equipment from state support before MIC2025.

China used multiple interlocking policy tools to support targeted industries and help companies integrate their supply chains and scale up production. These policies included market entry barriers; subsidies, tax breaks, and financial incentives; forced technology transfer policies; equity investments and government guidance funds; and government and state-owned enterprise (SOE) procurement.

China missed its goals in markets dominated by a small number of strong global incumbents and when Chinese firms struggled to overcome barriers to entry, including extensive upfront investment and specialized intellectual property (IP) tightly controlled by incumbents, leading to mixed results in aviation, new materials, and integrated circuits.

A Five-Year Plan for Managed Confrontation

Matthew Johnson

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The Fourth Plenum of the Twentieth Central Committee, held in October 2025, marked more than a routine leadership meeting: it ratified the culmination of a ten-year project to fuse national planning, security strategy, and technological control under Xi Jinping’s direct authority. The new 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) formalizes an architecture that has been taking shape since 2013, as Xi consolidated command over the Party, military, and financial system and began redesigning the economy around “self-reliance” and long-term systemic confrontation. The result is a model of strategic endurance—a self-contained system able to sustain rivalry with the United States through control of capital allocation, industrial organization, and information flows. Three bedrock features define this strategy:Centralized control of strategic resources and flows. The state maintains direct command over the levers of production—finance, energy, data, and critical minerals—enabling it to calibrate access, pricing, and supply as tools of deterrence and coercion. The aim is not autarky but strategic interdependence: a system flexible enough to weaponize trade while preserving internal stability through external market access and resource absorption.

Directed innovation through the “new national system.” Xi’s new national system (新型举国体制) transforms the Party-state into a permanent strategic mobilization machine, fusing industry, research, and security planning. By integrating AI, infrastructure, and state finance into a single command framework, Beijing can coordinate technological catch-up and retaliation as routine functions of governance.

Security as the organizing principle of development. Economic growth, once an end in itself, is now subordinated to the preservation of political control and survival under pressure. The guiding formula, “using a new security pattern to guarantee a new development pattern” (以新安全格局保障新发展格局), recasts every policy domain, from technology to the One Belt One Road initiative, as a component of long-term confrontation management. [1]

Trump’s Year of Living Dangerously

Peter D. Feaver

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Both supporters and critics of U.S. President Donald Trump agree that the first year of his second term has been an extraordinarily disruptive one. But for all its significance, this disruption wasn’t entirely unexpected. Even as the final votes were being tallied, enough was known about Trump’s intentions to make some relatively confident predictions about the shape of his second term, as I did one year ago for Foreign Affairs. Many of these predictions have already manifested. For example, Trump’s most senior advisers are, as he promised they would be, people chosen based on personal loyalty

A New Map of the Arctic

Antonia Colibasanu 

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U.S. lawmakers are reportedly moving this week to formally establish a senior diplomatic role known as ambassador-at-large for Arctic affairs – a position created in 2022 but rarely filled – to better coordinate federal policy on Arctic strategy, security, environmental protection and Indigenous engagement. The legislative push seems to have begun in the final week of October, coinciding with the announcement of a landmark agreement between China and Russia to jointly develop and commercialize shipping along Russia’s Northern Sea Route. The deal will enhance Sino-Russian cooperation in the region and, in theory, turn the NSR into a major Asia–Europe trade corridor. Russia’s nuclear icebreaker operator, Rosatom, will lead infrastructure efforts to keep the route navigable. Beijing has also ramped up Arctic research, sending icebreakers on long expeditions to study sea-ice patterns and improve operational efficiency.

It’s a matter of fact that Western shipping activity along the NSR plummeted after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. The decline owes partly to operators’ desire to avoid sanctions and partly to the fact that they relied too heavily on Russian icebreaker escorts and ports to do business. What wasn’t immediately clear was just how quickly China and Russia took advantage of the void left by Western firms. After a brief hiatus in 2022, transit shipping rebounded in 2023 to record levels entirely because of Chinese demand. The NSR saw 75 transit voyages carrying 2.1 million tons of cargo in 2023 – a sharp recovery from virtually no transit traffic the year before. Today, China is the predominant international user of the NSR. More than 95 percent of all transit cargo in the region in 2023 traveled to or from China, according to data from the Center for High North Logistics. China accounted for almost all non-Russian NSR activity: Bulk carriers, tankers and a new Chinese-operated “Arctic Express” container service were virtually the only foreign-linked voyages that returned to the route.

J.D. Vance’s man in the Pentagon is a rare Trump appointee who commands bipartisan respect and affection. Naturally, this doesn’t sit well with his boss, Pete Hegseth, who doesn’t.

Julia Ioffe

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Last month, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth summoned two men into his office at the Pentagon: Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll and General Randy George, the Army chief of staff. After a tumultuous nine months of axing generals and admirals from across the armed forces, Hegseth had yet another burning personnel decision that he wanted the men to implement: Push out General James Mingus, the current vice chief of the army, and replace him with Hegseth’s own trusted advisor, Lt. Gen. Christopher LaNeve.

Maybe this was an inevitable part of the Trump Pentagon purge. During the Commander-in-Chief Inaugural Ball, the president had hailed LaNeve as straight from “central casting,” adding, “If I’m doing a movie, I pick him to play my lead.” For his part, Mingus was widely respected, had more stars than LaNeve, and had been in the job for less than two years. But he was tainted in the eyes of the administration for having served under former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley as the J3 (director of operations for the Joint Chiefs). Worse, he was seen as one of Milley’s protégés.

US Army Tests AI for Faster Targeting, Smarter Command Networks

Christine Casimiro

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The US Army’s Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) prototype is putting a new capability powered by artificial intelligence (AI) to the test.

During the 4th Infantry Division’s (4ID) Ivy Sting 2 exercise, the service trained an AI-aided target recognition system to spot hulks, or old vehicles used as targets, Breaking Defense reported.

The goal: teach the AI to identify a tank and automatically trigger a fire mission, shortening the “sensor-to-shooter” loop. That speed could give US forces a decisive edge in multi-domain operations, where milliseconds matter.

For now, the system can identify a single target, but the next step is teaching it to distinguish between multiple objects on the battlefield.

According to 4ID Commander Maj. Gen. Patrick Ellis, much of the effort focuses on refining and training models so they perform reliably in complex environments.

The system still relies on human oversight. When the AI flags a potential target, a human operator reviews the result before action is taken.

Ellis said the army sees strong potential in the technology and is working closely with industry partners to improve the algorithms and expand their capabilities.

Trump’s Foreign Economic Policy in Disarray

BARRY EICHENGREEN

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MANCHESTER – When it comes to US foreign economic policy, President Donald Trump’s administration has two problems on its hands. Following what has become something of a pattern for this administration, both problems are of its own making.

In South America, Trump & Co. are heavily exposed to a dubious effort to stabilize the Argentine peso, a task to which they have committed more than $20 billion. In Asia, they are engaged in an on-again-off-again trade war with China, in which Chinese President Xi Jinping has the upper hand.

Argentia’s President Javier Milei has made good on his promise to take a chainsaw to his country’s budget deficit. But to reinforce the fall in inflation, he has propped up the peso’s dollar exchange rate, which has hurt exports and slowed economic growth, leading to uncomfortably high unemployment.

The question is whether a restive public will continue to support Milei’s policies indefinitely. History suggests that it will not, notwithstanding last month’s legislative elections, which provided a temporary respite.

Temporary is the operative word: public opinion could turn again. To paraphrase my Berkeley colleague Maurice Obstfeld, Argentina is a graveyard of unsuccessful exchange-rate-based stabilizations. More than once, variants of this policy have collapsed in a heap of political dysfunction.

The Army's New M1E3 Abrams Tank Has a Message for Every Military on Earth

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Soldiers from Echo Company, 1st Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment, 194th Armored Brigade, conduct gunnery training with the M1 Abrams tank, Jan. 14, 2025, at Brooks Range, on Fort Benning, Georgia. (U.S. Army photo by Joey Rhodes II)

CINCU, Romania – U.S. Army Soldiers of 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, setup their M1 Abram Tanks during Getica Saber 17, July 10, 2017. Getica Saber 17 is a U.S.-led fire support coordination exercise and combined arms live fire exercise that incorporates six allied and partner nations with more than 4,000 Soldiers. Getica Saber 17 runs concurrent with Saber Guardian 17, a U.S. Army Europe-led, multinational exercise that spans across Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania with more than 25,000 service members from 22 allied and partner nations. Image Credit: US Military.

-Unlike Ukraine’s older M1A1 SAs, the M1E3 aims to leap beyond SEPv3’s armor and radios with a software-driven, modular architecture and smaller crew.

-The Army has accelerated timelines: four prototypes are slated to enter formations in 2026, validating survivability, sustainment and networking under combat-realistic conditions.

The M1E3 Abrams Tank Is Coming

It has been said countless times and bears repeating yet again: The American-made M1 Abrams is the most successful main battle tank (MBT) of all time.

Its unmatched prowess was proved during smashing performances in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War.

The Abrams has enjoyed continual improvements throughout its 46-year history: from the M1A1, which upgraded the primary armament from a 105-mm to a 120-mm main gun, to the current M1A2 SEPv3.

The latest upcoming improvement is the M1E3.

However, given the battering tanks have endured on both sides of the Russo-Ukrainian War, one cannot help but ask: Will the M1E3 be able to survive and contribute during the drone era?

Russia and China in the Gray Zone

Ariane Tabatabai

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A number of European nations, including Poland, Estonia, Denmark, and Norway, have experienced Russian manned and unmanned aircraft incursions into their airspaces. NATO allies responded with immediate defensive measures such as shooting down the Russian unmanned assets and have also reportedly started to revisit and refine their own approach and rules of engagement in the face of such incursions. They are doing so to telegraph their resolve and showcase their combined capabilities to Russia in the face of what Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has characterized as “the closest we have been to open conflict since World War Two.”

Though Russia has a long history of gradually pushing the envelope to achieve its aims, its recent activities are similar to the recent Chinese playbook on incrementally increasing pressure on Taiwan. To be sure, these two campaigns have significant differences (for example, while Moscow’s most recent activities have thus far been limited to air incursions, Beijing’s have also spanned the maritime domain). Russia’s recent activities have also been more ad hoc, and limited in their breadth and depth, while China’s have been sustained for several years, and gradually grown in scope, intensity, occurrence, and complexity. More fundamentally, China’s campaign should be understood in the context of its wish to reunify with Taiwan, which is not the case with Russia’s activities against NATO. But they share a number of similarities and are occurring against the backdrop of increased cooperation between the two countries in their “gray-zone campaigns,” a term used by the intelligence community to describe the “deliberate use of coercive or subversive instruments of power by, or on behalf of, a state to achieve its political or security goals at the expense of others, in ways that exceed or exploit gaps in international norms but are intended to remain below the perceived threshold for direct armed conflict.” Such cooperation has implications for NATO in Europe as well as U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. This is especially true as Beijing seeks to attain readiness to militarily seize Taiwan by 2027 even as its preference likely remains to do so without the use of force.

Ukrainian Units Facing Intense Pressure At Multiple Flashpoints – Analysis

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Last week Ukrainian units faced intense pressure at multiple flashpoints. Kyiv reported that between Monday night and Tuesday night, its forces engaged in some 170 tactical engagements—40 percent of which, according to some estimates, were in or around Pokrovsk.

Russian forces are pressuring the heavily fortified city from an increasing number of axes, conducting offensive maneuvers to encircle Ukrainian combat formations. An open-source intelligence assessment of the area shows that heavy fog is limiting Ukraine’s surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, which are crucial for defensive operations.

Several hundred Russian troops have already used light vehicles to penetrate Ukraine’s lines of defense and breach the outskirts of the city. Available intelligence suggests that a drone warfare battalion from Ukraine’s 68th Jaeger Brigade has been using first-person-view (FPV) drones to locate and destroy Russian groupings, including small motorbike assault infantry teams.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Russia is working to capture the city to signal to the West that supporting Ukraine is futile. Yet Russia’s fight for Pokrovsk has come at a steep cost. Moscow’s forces have borne an average of more than one thousand casualties per day this October and have seen 350,000 servicemen killed in action since January 2025. In all, Russia has suffered more than one million casualties since the start of the war.

Deep Precision Strike: Europe’s Quest for Long-range Missile Capabilities

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In response to a deteriorating strategic environment and the removal of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty constraints, a number of European states are now looking to buy or develop strike systems designed to hold an adversary’s forces at risk at long range, known as ‘deep precision strike’ (DPS) capabilities. One development related to this ambition, the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA), is an initiative by select NATO members aimed at determining the defence requirements for, and supporting the joint development of, conventionally armed DPS capabilities and enabling technologies, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

This paper focuses on the capability ambitions and doctrines of France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom, four of the six ELSA partners, while also considering other partners Italy and Sweden. It explores the similarities and differences among these partners, the capabilities and systems envisioned under ELSA, and the ways in which states conceive of employing DPS tools for deterrence and war-fighting purposes.

The analysis shows that all six partners are pursuing ambitious DPS programmes to expand beyond largely air-launched legacy missiles towards 1,000–2,000 kilometre+-range ground- and sea-launched cruise- and ballistic-missile options. While the partners generally agree on the strategic purpose of their intended DPS capabilities, there is considerable variation in each nation’s technological starting point, their defence-industrial approaches to missile development, their capability ambitions and the motivations behind their ambitions.

BBC apologizes to Trump for documentary edits, but pushes back on legal threat

Faith Wardwell

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Trump’s legal team sent the BBC a letter earlier this week demanding it retract any “false, defamatory, disparaging, and inflammatory statements” about the president from a 2024 documentary by Friday, or face a $1 billion lawsuit.

In a statement posted by the BBC on Thursday, the network said its chair, Samir Shah, had sent a personal letter to the White House apologizing for the edit and that the network has “no plans” to rebroadcast the program.

“While the BBC sincerely regrets the manner in which the video clip was edited, we strongly disagree there is a basis for a defamation claim,” an unnamed spokesperson wrote in the statement.

The White House deferred a request for comment to Trump’s outside counsel. Alejandro Brito, the attorney who sent Trump’s demands, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The legal threats center on a spliced edit of Trump’s speech ahead of the Jan. 6, 2021, Capitol riot that appeared in the network’s program “Trump: A Second Chance?” In the clip, the president appears to say “We’re going to walk down to the Capitol and I’ll be there with you, and we'll fight. We fight like hell.”

In reality, those lines were delivered almost an hour apart, and the footage also omitted a soundbite where Trump tells supporters “to peacefully and patriotically make your voices heard.”

The rise and fall of globalization: the battle to be top dog

Steve Schifferes

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For nearly four centuries, the world economy was on a path of ever-greater integration that even two world wars could not totally derail. This long march of globalization was powered by rapidly increasing levels of international trade and investment, coupled with vast movements of people across national borders and dramatic changes in transportation and communication technology.

According to economic historian J. Bradford DeLong, the value of the world economy (measured at fixed 1990 prices) rose from US$81.7 billion in 1650, when this story begins, to US$70.3 trillion in 2020 – an 860-fold increase. The most intensive periods of growth corresponded to the two periods when global trade was rising fastest: first during the “long 19th century” between the end of the French revolution and start of the first world war, and then as trade liberalization expanded after the second world war, from the 1950s up to the 2008 global financial crisis.

Now, however, this grand project is on the retreat. Globalization is not dead yet, but it is dying.

Is this a cause for celebration, or concern? And will the picture change again when Donald Trump and his tariffs of mass disruption leave the White House? As a longtime BBC economics correspondent who was based in Washington during the global financial crisis, I believe there are sound historical reasons to worry about our deglobalized future, even once Trump has left the building.

Control the Hemisphere, Contain China: Inside America’s Two-Front Strategy

Andrew Latham

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The USS Gerald R. Ford’s gray silhouette cutting across the Caribbean horizon marks a decisive shift in American statecraft: U.S. foreign policy, long focused on policing the planet-wide Rules-Based International Order, is narrowing to a more restrained focus on the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific.

From the Ford’s slow approach to Venezuelan waters to escalating trade tensions with Canada and early signs of a harder U.S. line toward Mexico and migration, Washington’s attention is once again concentrated on the regions most vital to its security and power.

This is no tactical coincidence. It reflects a deliberate recalibration under President Trump—one that binds hemispheric defense to the broader logic of great-power competition. The United States is refortifying its neighborhood not as a retreat from global leadership, but as the bedrock from which it intends to sustain it.

Weapons makers have 'conned' US military into buying expensive equipment, Army Secretary says

Idrees Ali

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"(The) defense industrial base broadly, and the primes in particular, conned the American people and the Pentagon and the Army," Driscoll told reporters, referring to prime contractors that work directly with the government.

He added that, in part, it was the government's fault for creating incentive structures that encouraged companies to charge astronomical prices.

Large weapons makers provide the U.S. military with all types of systems, from Lockheed Martin's (LMT.N), opens new tab F-35 fighter jets to missile defense systems from companies like RTX (RTX.N), opens new tab, Northrop Grumman (NOC.N), opens new tab and Boeing (BA.N), opens new tab.

Previously, the Army has said that a Lockheed-owned Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopter screen control knob that costs $47,000 as part of a full assembly could be manufactured independently for just $15.

"The system has changed. You will no longer be allowed to do that to the United States Army," Driscoll said.

The Army is launching an initiative to streamline its acquisition process. It is part of an overall effort by the Pentagon to allow the military to more rapidly acquire technology amid growing global threats.

Reuters reported last week that the U.S. Army is aiming to buy at least 1 million drones in the next two to three years and instead of partnering with larger defense contractors, it wants to work with companies that were producing drones that could have commercial applications as well.

Democratic U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren this month escalated pressure on the defense industry to stop opposing military right-to-repair legislation.

Pentagon Acquires Combat Proven ‘Multi-Dimensional Drone Swarm’

David Hambling,

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The developers also discovered early on that soldiers were overloaded with gear and could not easily carry all the drones, batteries, drone munitions and other equipment they wanted as well as well.

The solution to this is remote operation. Instead of troops carrying and launching the drones from forward positions as we see in Ukraine, the drones operate remotely from Nests. A Nest may be a mobile unit carried by a personnel carrier or uncrewed ground vehicle, a robot boat or a helicopter or other aircraft including drones. Nests may also be static, pre-positioned units with automated systems to change batteries and attach munitions to drones. There are many other such concepts, but XTEND have extensive real-world experience of using Nests.

“We put the emphasis on remote applications,” says Shapira. “We have the biggest advantage where the drones are operated far from people.”

With this setup, Shapira says, “distance is not an issue,” a great benefit to the Special Forces teams who will operate the new drones.

Mission Control

XTEND drones are designed to be deployed in mixed teams with several specialist typesXTEND

The drones are being supplied to the Special Operations / Low-Intensity Conflict Capability Development & Innovation Directorate.

Space-Based Laser Communications Making Strides

Tabitha Reeves

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The agency, which became part of the Space Force in 2022, has faced criticism for pushing forward with laser communications technology prematurely, but its rapid advancement has largely been a success, experts said during a panel at the Air and Space Forces Association’s recent Air, Space and Cyber Conference.

“The technology has moved faster in the past five years than I ever thought it would,” said Art Dhallin, director of military and strategic communications at Lockheed Martin. “That has largely been due to the demand signal the industry’s seen from SDA and in response taking a ‘go fast’ approach to your typical technology maturation. It has been, from my perspective, a success.”

Laser communications — also known as optical communications — use a narrow beam of infrared light to transmit data, sending information faster with greater precision and a lower risk of jamming than traditional radio waves. Space-based versions of the technology hold promise for defense missions, enabling warfighters to quickly and securely transfer data between satellites, ground stations and aircraft.

The Government Accountability Office reported in February that the Space Development Agency is issuing billions of dollars in laser communications-related contracts for its Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture program despite not having demonstrated operational network links in space. GAO recommended the agency fully demonstrate the technology’s capabilities before sinking more money into the effort.

The Army’s linking big guns, drones, and AI with its new command system and testing how it’ll fight future wars

Chris Panella 

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US Army soldiers at Fort Carson have been experimenting with a new command and control system that promises to fuse weapons, surveillance drones, and AI into a networked war machine.

The Next Generation Command and Control system, NGC2, is intended as a substantial upgrade over the current system and is all about readying the Army for a challenging potential future fight against a technologically sophisticated enemy.

The Army says command and control needs to be modernized "for large-scale combat operations against near-peer adversaries." The service's Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications, and Network argues the "current mission command systems are not mobile, intuitive, or survivable enough to easily overcome the current threat, changes in the character of warfare, and the pace of technology."

That's where NGC2 comes into play.

Last week, the Army wrapped its second Ivy Sting exercise testing and expanding how soldiers use the new NGC2. While the first round was focused on the basics, the latest event was notably more complicated.

VIEWPOINT: Why Army Forward Observers Should Operate Small Drones

Andrew T. Torrance

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VICENZA, Italy — As military technology evolves, so must tactics and organizational structures. Forward observers are the soldiers who serve as the eyes and ears for an infantry platoon. They are uniquely positioned and benefit tremendously from using unmanned aerial systems, leveraging them for faster, more effective targeting.

Providing drones directly to forward observers could significantly improve the speed and efficiency of the kill chain, especially in fast-moving, small unit operations. Swift Response 25 — a multinational exercise held in Lithuania and Latvia — offered several real-world examples where this capability would have enhanced mission outcomes.

During the exercise, paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade operated in dense woodland terrain, often facing visibility challenges. In multiple engagements, forward observers were tasked with locating retreating enemy forces following firefights. Without drone support, their line of sight was severely limited.

Had those observers been equipped with small drones, they could have quickly identified enemy movements beyond natural obstructions, relayed coordinates and initiated indirect fires before opposing forces had time to regroup. A single drone launch could have prevented enemy withdrawal and informed the platoon leader’s next tactical decision.

Under current standard operating procedures across the Army, junior infantry soldiers who lack formal fire support training sometimes find themselves operating a drone. While these operators can locate enemy positions, they must then relay that information to a forward observer — adding time, complexity and potential for miscommunication.

For many, only the operator can see the video feed from UAS platforms currently being tested in Army formations, requiring the user to verbally translate complex targeting data to a forward observer.

Additionally, forward observers are not always collocated with drone operators.