21 November 2025

BRICS Is Missing Its Chance

Oliver Stuenkel and Alexander Gabuev

This year, the BRICS—a ten-country group whose first five members were Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has gained a renewed sense of purpose thanks to one catalyst: the United States. With U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the bloc looks, more than ever, like a necessary hedge against an increasingly erratic and fragmented global order. Many of Trump’s actions—including his chaotic tariff crusade against friends and foes, strikes on Iran and legally dubious military actions in Latin America, and withdrawal from the UN-supported Paris agreement on climate change—have sparked condemnation from the BRICS. Trump’s policies have put in stark relief BRICS’ raisons d’être: to help its members adapt to and build a less Western-centric world, gain greater leverage in their dealings with Washington, and find alternatives to Western-dominated institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

But despite their shared interests, BRICS as a grouping is not ready to seize the moment. Its members—which now include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates—are too divided to turn the group into a real challenge to Washington. They vary significantly in their degree of antagonism toward the United States, and each wishes to maintain strategic autonomy. As a result, the bloc will struggle to mount joint action. To unite and marshal their collective strength, the BRICS would have to turn into something akin to the G-7—a U.S.-led group of economically advanced countries that, in the interest of promoting their common purpose and values, willingly sacrifice a significant degree of strategic autonomy. But the BRICS countries, whose bond is based mainly on a collective rejection of U.S. hegemonic power, won’t find the cohesion that could make the bloc an effective geopolitical force.
POWER IN NUMBERS

Deception and Recruitment: Indians in Russia’s Military Ranks Indian Recruits in Russia’s War


As recently as November, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs reported identifying 44 Indian nationals serving in the Russian armed forces. However, data from the
I Want to Live project suggests the true number is considerably higher. At least 146 Indian citizens have been confirmed by name as having signed contracts, and at least 22 have been killed in action in Ukraine.

Our review of the records indicates that Russia, working through local recruiters in India, is actively targeting Indian nationals, drawing them into military service despite the Indian government’s efforts to curb such cases. In May 2024, India’s Central Bureau of Investigation arrested four individuals involved in trafficking citizens to fight for the Russian army. The suspects were based across multiple Indian cities and had collaborators in Dubai and Russia.

The issue drew national attention after reports surfaced that young Indians were being misled into joining the Russian military under the pretense of work or study visas. Families in Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Telangana said their relatives were pressured or deceived into enlisting as “support staff,” only to be deployed to the front lines.

DeepSeek: PLA's 'Intelligentized Warfare'

Sunny Cheung , Kai-shing Lau

On October 21, the Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) company DeepSeek (深度求索) announced the release of a new tool to converts large text datasets into compact image-based formats: DeepSeek-OCR (DeepSeek, October 21). While not the long-awaited R2 large language model (LLM), the firm’s latest release shows that it is continuing to innovate, even as it moves deeper into the orbit of the Party-state. DeepSeek’s success, however, has brought it to the attention of not just the government in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but also the military.

A procurement platform run by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shows that a number of defense companies have won contracts to develop AI tools for the Chinese armed forces. Across the past six months, dozens of distinct procurement documents have explicitly called for tools based on AI models created by DeepSeek. Although the number of procurement notices for military AI are relatively small (the platform posts around 25,000 notices every day), the focus on DeepSeek in the notices that are publicly available is still significant.

DeepSeek’s adoption by the PLA and, to a lesser extent, in the public security domain, is evident beyond this dataset. Research published by military institutions frequently discusses how DeepSeek and other models could be deployed across a range of application scenarios. In some cases, pilots of these systems are already underway. DeepSeek’s models have also been deployed widely across the public and private sectors over the course of 2025, and have become increasingly aligned with state interests (China Brief, March 28, April 25). Given the PRC’s policy of military-civil fusion, PLA deployment of DeepSeek was only ever a matter of time.

The Truth about Chinese Manufacturing

David Hebert, Peter C. Earle

Imagine for a minute that you have the world’s greatest chef working in your restaurant. The food is so incredible that people regularly travel from miles away to dine at your restaurant. Then, a new restaurant opens, and while it sells an impressive quantity of food, everyone is very much aware that its quality is lacking. While your restaurant’s output has remained steady, you decide that you need to protect your restaurant from this new entrant. To do so, you actively make it harder for your chef to buy ingredients, telling them, “if you want ingredients, you’ll have to grow them yourself!”

If this sounds absurd, that’s because it is. Unfortunately, this is exactly what Washington politicians are doing to the manufacturing sector in the United States right now. Why is that? Because of, primarily, China’s supposed manufacturing “dominance.”

It has become standard parlance for members of both parties to wax poetically about the “hollowing out” of the American manufacturing industry. said as much in 2022 as did just this past April. For the most part, these two are referring to jobs in manufacturing, which have certainly declined over the last 50 years. However, some go even further, purporting that “we don’t make anything anymore.” said as much in 2015 while on the campaign trail to his first term in office, echoed this in 2023, and joined this chorus just this past March.

A Five-Year Plan for Managed Confrontation

Matthew Johnson

The plan is therefore less a policy blueprint than a reconstituted Cold War playbook for both enduring and exerting external pressure without succumbing to internal fracture. It is, in effect, the operational expression of “comprehensive national power” (综合国力), the Party’s systems-engineered framework for converting the country’s material, technological, and institutional resources into strategic capability and geopolitical advantage (China Brief, September 5).

Most analysis still treats the economic turn in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a technocratic puzzle; a question of how quickly Beijing can rebalance toward consumption, reduce debt, or close its semiconductor gap, rather than a deliberate strategy to accumulate power. In Xi’s framework, supply-chain “weaponization” is not a reaction to Western pressure but a governing principle: the disciplined use of interdependence as leverage (Foreign Affairs, November 30, 2022; China Brief, October 17). Xi has recast trade, finance, and data as dual-use instruments—sources of both insulation and coercion—within an economy designed to endure external shocks while generating its own (Hoover Institution, April 2023; China Brief, June 30). The larger system taking shape is global in scope. It channels critical resources through PRC-controlled networks, hedges against sanctions, and extends the Party’s command capabilities across technology, capital, and information. The Fifteenth Five-Year Plan codifies this transformation, formalizing a doctrine of managed confrontation in which sustained rivalry with the United States is no longer a risk to be mitigated, but the structural condition of the PRC’s rise.

A Major Shift in Trump Policy—Protecting Nigeria’s Christians

Gordon G. Chang

That’s how President Donald Trump said he will send American forces to rescue Christians in Nigeria. “If we attack, it will be fast, vicious, and sweet,” he promised on Truth Social on the first of this month. “WARNING: THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT BETTER MOVE FAST!”

The American president, in a few words, upset not only the government in Abuja but also the one in Beijing, which today dominates the African continent.

“We oppose any country’s interference in other countries’ internal affairs under the pretext of religion and human rights,” said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning on November 4. “We oppose the wanton threat of sanction and use of force.”

Why is China so concerned about Nigeria? “China doesn’t care one way or the other about Christians but is just supporting the Nigerian government to protect its investment interests,” Thomas Riley, former American ambassador to Morocco, told Newsweek.

Political Purification and Strategic Realignment in the PLA

Gerui Zhang , Brandon Tran

On October 17, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) of the People’s Republic China (PRC) released a statement by video and text detailing disciplinary actions against nine PLA general officers. [1] The ministry revoked their Party memberships and military rank, and they now await further consequences (MND, October 17). Of the nine generals listed, seven held major commands in the former Nanjing Military Region Command, with He Weidong (何卫东), Miao Hua (苗华), Lin Xiangyang (林向阳), Qin Shutong (秦树桐), and Wang Xiubin (王秀斌) all serving in the former 31st Group Army (BBC News, October 23). He Weidong, Miao Hua, and He Hongjun (何宏军) controlled personnel selection, promoting the interests of their network of officers (China Brief Notes, October 17).

The purge of general officers responsible for planning and operations related to the unification of Taiwan has prompted a possible temporary strategic realignment. Given that the highest ranks of the PLA experienced an overhaul of officers in the PLA Navy and Eastern Theater Command, the probability of success for a protracted blockade or joint amphibious landing campaign has decreased. The remaining PLA leadership has incentives to pursue other strategies for unification, such as a joint firepower strike campaign or decapitation strikes. The purges therefore may influence a shift in PLA strategic decision-making, at least in the short-term.

Americans Must Counter China’s Coercion

Andrew Harding & Allen Zhang

To Honor Solomon Islands' Daniel Suidani, Americans Must Counter China’s Coercion

When former Solomon Islands politician and democracy champion Daniel Suidani died recently, few Americans noticed. Yet his passing carries deeper significance than they realize.

Suidani worked tirelessly to protect his nation—and the Pacific Islands region—from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) malicious intentions. For that, the CCP relentlessly persecuted him, ultimately taking nearly everything from him. Yet even in his final days, Suidani continued to fight against the CCP’s overwhelming authoritarianism. That’s a legacy Americans should honor.

Originally a schoolteacher, Suidani served as the Premier of Malatia Province from 2019 to 2023. Suidani had a reputation unmarred by past corruption, and his premiership offered a refreshing return to principles. He dedicated himself to improving the standard of living for thousands of Malaitans.

Most importantly, Suidani had the tenacity to stand against an already corrupt system largely funded by Chinese money. During his tenure, he firmly rejected the installation of telecommunications equipment from Huawei, a Chinese technology company known for espionage and malicious cyber activities.

How NATO Can Build Europe’s Drone Wall

Can Kasapoglu, and Peter Rough

NATO, rather than the European Union, has the experience and capabilities to manage Russia’s drone threat to the continent.

When as many as two dozen Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) entered Polish airspace on the night of September 9, European allies responded by scrambling perhaps the most sophisticated tactical defenses in the world. Italian airborne early warning and control aircraft (AEW&C), German Patriot air and missile defense batteries, Polish F-16s, 5th-generation Dutch F-35s, and a Belgian A330 MRTT tanker were all brought forth to track and engage the drones.

The next day, during her annual State of the Union address, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced plans to build a European drone wall. “This is not an abstract ambition,” she noted. “It is the bedrock of credible defense.”

This announcement was certainly of the moment: deterrence against attacks like those of September 9 has frayed. Days after Russia’s drone incursion into Poland, another Russian drone breached allied airspace, this time over Romania. Unidentified drone sightings have since caused the temporary closure of several European airports, including Copenhagen, Oslo, and Munich. Last week, Belgium even reported that multiple drones had targeted Kleine Brogel, a military base which reportedly hosts US nuclear weapons.

Ready for War: A Way Forward for Industrial Preparedness

Doug Orsi

The results of a 2023 wargame simulating a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan showed that the combined forces of Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S. successfully denied Chinese objectives and defeated the invasion. However, multiple aircraft carriers and dozens of cruisers and destroyers were lost. Additionally, critical munitions needed to defeat Chinese forces were rapidly depleted due to limited magazine capacity and delayed logistics support. Current events in Ukraine, Russia, and the Middle East have confirmed the wargame’s conclusions as prescient, revealing the U.S. defense industrial base struggles to support the nation’s military commitments and policy goals. As a result, although the country still produces advanced systems and munitions, it lacks the capacity to replace material losses and expenditures during prolonged combat. The country must promptly address these issues by expanding policies, authorities, investments, and partnerships with like-minded nations that foster co-manufacturing, maintenance, and knowledge sharing in the construction of combat platforms to compensate for existing industrial base deficiencies.

Atrophy and Sounding the Alarm

The health of the defense industrial base is vital to the success and sustainability of military campaigns. In 2024, a bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy found that the defense industrial base “is unable to meet the equipment, technology, and munitions needs of the U.S. and its allies and partners.” Through inattention, flawed policy, and poor strategic decisions, the U.S. allowed its defense industrial base to atrophy. The decline of the defense industrial base also included years of neglect of government-owned facilities, which served as the purveyor for the military’s higher-end modernization priorities.

The Guardian view on Germany under Merz: Europe’s powerhouse is still struggling

Friedrich Merz

Last March, following angst-ridden months as Europe came to terms with Donald Trump’s return to the White House, financial markets in Paris, Milan and Berlin were gripped by a surge of optimism. The cause was a historic deal brokered by Friedrich Merz, then Germany’s chancellor-elect, which loosened constitutional spending constraints in the EU’s powerhouse nation. Here at last, it was hoped, was the fiscal kickstart required to end a prolonged period of economic stagnation, and mitigate geopolitical headwinds blowing from the US and China.

Six months into Mr Merz’s premiership, the angst is back and there are the first murmurings of rebellion. The chancellor’s plan included “whatever it takes” levels of defence spending, designed to prepare Germany for a changed era in which the US was no longer a dependable ally, and a huge €500bn investment in infrastructure and the green transition. But last week, the chancellor’s team of economic advisers downgraded growth forecasts for 2026 to below 1%. And ahead of what would constitute a fourth year of near-flatlining, business confidence has slumped.

Lifting Germany’s “debt brake” was never going to be an instant panacea for longstanding problems. Patience will be required, for example, before the full impact of spending on the country’s ailing transport systems is felt. But across Europe, patience is a virtue that’s in short supply among voters, who feel that their living standards have been stagnating – or worse – since the crash of 2008. According to one recent survey, fewer than one in five Germans wish to see Mr Merz standing again at the next federal election.

A Former Terrorist Inside the White House

Hazem Salem Dmour

Imagine a scene, if you will, in which Osama bin Laden strolls through the front door of the White House with his Kalashnikov rifle (now hanging in the CIA’s private museum) slung over his shoulder to meet with the American president, his administration, and leaders of Congress. In the White House and on Capitol Hill, the man responsible for the September 11 attacks on America that caused 2,977 deaths and the destruction of the Twin Towers in downtown Manhattan delivers lectures on freedom and democracy. After which, guarded by the U.S. Secret Service, he rides in a presidential motorcade to visit Ground Zero, where the World Trade Center once soared 110-stories high.

Would the American people ever accept such a spectacle? Of course not.

So ask yourself, how is that twisted scenario any different from President Donald Trump welcoming into the White House on November 10 a jihadist imprisoned for killing American soldiers in Iraq under the terrorist moniker Abu Mohammad al-Julani—a man who as recently as last December had been designated a terrorist by the U.S. government with a $10 million bounty on his head? The unelected interim president of Syria has dropped his nom de plume and now goes by Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Donald Trump’s Venezuela Military Build Up Is Just Art of the Deal Geopolitics

Steve Balestrieri

The world's largest aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), sails in the Atlantic Ocean, July 4, 2025. Gerald R. Ford, a first-in-class aircraft carrier and deployed flagship of Carrier Strike Group Twelve, incorporates modern technology, innovative shipbuilding designs, and best practices from legacy aircraft carriers to increase the U.S. Navy's capacity to underpin American security and economic prosperity, deter adversaries, and project power on a global scale through sustained operations at sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Tajh Payne)

Key Points and Summary – The deployment of the USS Gerald Ford strike group and some 12,000 U.S. troops near Venezuela has sparked fears of an impending war and regime-change operation against Nicolás Maduro.

-Washington is hitting suspected narco-terrorist boats and designating Maduro’s Cartel de los Soles a terrorist group, yet officials privately insist there are no plans for an invasion.

The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) successfully completes the third and final scheduled explosive event of Full Ship Shock Trials while underway in the Atlantic Ocean, Aug. 8, 2021. The U.S. Navy conducts shock trials of new ship designs using live explosives to confirm that our warships can continue to meet demanding mission requirements under harsh conditions they might encounter in battle. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Novalee Manzella)

Mearsheimer: Europe’s Bleak Future

John J. Mearsheimer

Europe is in deep trouble today, mainly because of the Ukraine war, which has played a key role in undermining what had been a largely peaceful region. Unfortunately, the situation is not likely to improve in the years ahead. In fact, Europe is likely to be less stable moving forward than it is today.

The present situation in Europe stands in marked contrast to the unprecedented stability that Europe enjoyed during the unipolar moment, which ran from roughly 1992, after the Soviet Union collapsed, until 2017, when China and Russia emerged as great powers, transforming unipolarity into multipolarity. We all remember Francis Fukuyama’s famous 1989 article—“The End of History?”—which argued that liberal democracy was destined to spread across the world, bringing peace and prosperity in its wake. That argument was obviously dead wrong, but many in the West believed it for more than 20 years. Few Europeans imagined in the heyday of unipolarity that Europe would be in so much trouble today.

So, what went wrong?

The Ukraine war, which I will argue was provoked by the West, and especially the U.S., is the principal cause of Europe’s insecurity today. Nevertheless, there is a second factor at play: the shift in the global balance of power in 2017 from unipolarity to multipolarity, which was sure to threaten the security architecture in Europe. Still, there is good reason to think this shift in the distribution of power was a manageable problem. But the Ukraine war, coupled with the coming of multipolarity, guaranteed big trouble, which is not likely to go away in the foreseeable future.

Russia’s Intense Air Campaign in October

Yasir Atalan, Erik Tiersten-Nyman, and Benjamin Jensen

Moscow’s aerial campaign appears to be entering a new phase that sees higher ballistic missile strikes, sustained Shahed salvos, lower Ukrainian intercept rates, and increasingly fragmented launch patterns driven by industrial production cycles rather than coordinated operational design. These trends show that Russia’s strike campaign is now shaped more by what its factories can produce than by integrated battlefield planning. To counter this turn, Ukraine’s foreign backers must undermine the illicit supply network that allows Russia, despite sanctions, to import electronic components.

In October 2025, Russia conducted one of its most intensive strike months of the entire war. Moscow launched approximately 5,300 Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 74 cruise missiles, and 148 ballistic missiles, marking a sustained high pressure across all three systems while also reviving its campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This represents not only the largest ballistic missile salvo since the start of the conflict, but also one of the few months in which all systems operated simultaneously at above-average levels.

How to Win the Information Game in Venezuela

Erol Yayboke

As the Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group (CSG) arrived in the Caribbean on November 11, much of the coverage—including here at CSIS—is deservedly on whether the redeployment signals a change in strategy, global posture, or even an impending military intervention. These are all excellent questions, especially given recent attacks on boats off Venezuela’s coast. Regardless of strategic intent, Venezuela clearly matters more to the U.S. government than it has at any point in recent memory. The feeling might be mutual among at least some Venezuelans, with recent Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado even publicly supporting the deadly strikes.

U.S. actions should be defined by its strategic goals for engagement with Venezuela and in the context of broader regional objectives. But kinetic action is not the only tool in the United States’ national security toolkit, nor should its deployment be seen as an inevitability. Short of war, there is covert action (already authorized) and plenty of games to play—and win—in the information space, particularly with the assistance of agentic AI, effectively leveraging organic discontent while limiting risk to innocent Venezuelans.

Information: Too Important to Centralize

Todd Simmons

One of the central questions in modern warfare is how to organize military forces to fight with information effects to gain an advantage. Across the military services, commanders grapple with how to harness data, employ sensors, and use influence to generate real combat power. Within the Marine Corps circles, this debate has centered on the role and structure of the Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group (MIG). On one hand, there’s a sense that the information group is a failed concept; on the other, several authors propose taking the idea a step further and forming “information combat elements” led by their own commander. The creation of the MIG was a necessary corrective that injected critical planning factors into the understanding of modern war, but the idea of an information commander pushes a good thing too far.

Modern war is an information war. But the question isn’t whether information matters—it’s how to best organize to fight in an information-saturated environment. Every drone video, radio transmission, and social media post generates a potentially overwhelming stream of information. Making operations in the information environment the responsibility of any single commander is a mistake. Information is the coin of the realm for all commanders. Subordinate commanders should be able to understand their battlespace independently of higher headquarters in order to act effectively in the absence of orders. Every commander must be able to sense the threats and opportunities they face (physically and in the electromagnetic spectrum) without requesting that information from a higher headquarters that may have other priorities. Winning the battle for information, by blinding, deceiving, and confusing the adversary to out-cycle their OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, and act), isn’t the concern of any individual commander. It’s the primary concern of every commander. Information is too important to centralize.

Russia’s Intense Air Campaign in October

Yasir Atalan, Erik Tiersten-Nyman, and Benjamin Jensen

Moscow’s aerial campaign appears to be entering a new phase that sees higher ballistic missile strikes, sustained Shahed salvos, lower Ukrainian intercept rates, and increasingly fragmented launch patterns driven by industrial production cycles rather than coordinated operational design. These trends show that Russia’s strike campaign is now shaped more by what its factories can produce than by integrated battlefield planning. To counter this turn, Ukraine’s foreign backers must undermine the illicit supply network that allows Russia, despite sanctions, to import electronic components.

In October 2025, Russia conducted one of its most intensive strike months of the entire war. Moscow launched approximately 5,300 Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 74 cruise missiles, and 148 ballistic missiles, marking a sustained high pressure across all three systems while also reviving its campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This represents not only the largest ballistic missile salvo since the start of the conflict, but also one of the few months in which all systems operated simultaneously at above-average levels.

A Five-Year Plan for Managed Confrontation

Matthew Johnson

The plan is therefore less a policy blueprint than a reconstituted Cold War playbook for both enduring and exerting external pressure without succumbing to internal fracture. It is, in effect, the operational expression of “comprehensive national power” (综合国力), the Party’s systems-engineered framework for converting the country’s material, technological, and institutional resources into strategic capability and geopolitical advantage (China Brief, September 5).

Most analysis still treats the economic turn in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a technocratic puzzle; a question of how quickly Beijing can rebalance toward consumption, reduce debt, or close its semiconductor gap, rather than a deliberate strategy to accumulate power. In Xi’s framework, supply-chain “weaponization” is not a reaction to Western pressure but a governing principle: the disciplined use of interdependence as leverage (Foreign Affairs, November 30, 2022; China Brief, October 17). Xi has recast trade, finance, and data as dual-use instruments—sources of both insulation and coercion—within an economy designed to endure external shocks while generating its own (Hoover Institution, April 2023; China Brief, June 30). The larger system taking shape is global in scope. It channels critical resources through PRC-controlled networks, hedges against sanctions, and extends the Party’s command capabilities across technology, capital, and information. The Fifteenth Five-Year Plan codifies this transformation, formalizing a doctrine of managed confrontation in which sustained rivalry with the United States is no longer a risk to be mitigated, but the structural condition of the PRC’s rise.

Trump’s Mayflower Address

Olga Lautman and Julie Roginsky

Last week, we wrote about Operation Crossfire Hurricane, the FBI’s counterintelligence investigation into whether anyone connected to Donald Trump’s campaign had cooperated with Russia’s election attack, and how Carter Page, with his long trail of Kremlin entanglements, further deepened those suspicions. This week, we turn to Trump’s first major foreign-policy address. It was organized by Dmitri Simes, who would later be charged with funneling Kremlin funds and signaling an openness to Moscow, while quietly aligning Trump’s candidacy with Moscow’s strategic ambitions.

On April 27, 2016, in the gilded ballroom of Washington’s Mayflower Hotel, Trump delivered what would become one of the most consequential foreign-policy speeches of the 2016 campaign — an address that, in retrospect, reads as an early, unmistakable articulation of a worldview aligned with the strategic objectives of Vladimir Putin. Before an audience of diplomats, policymakers, and Beltway insiders, Trump unveiled a sharply defined “America First” doctrine that repudiated decades of bipartisan consensus on alliances, embraced a transactional understanding of global commitments, and signaled a willingness to reset relations with Russia at a moment when Moscow was illegally occupying Crimea, waging a bloody war across eastern Ukraine, intervening militarily in Syria to support Assad’s atrocities and crimes of aggression, and actively attacking the U.S. election to install Trump.

Trump’s new radiation exposure limits could be ‘catastrophic’ for women and girls

Lesley M. M. Blume, Chloe Shrager

Experts warn that women and children around contaminated sites are particularly vulnerable to health fallout. Cancer rates among women and girls around Coldwater Creek are already “astronomical,” and survival rates are low, says Dawn Chapman (second to right), one of the co-founders of Just Moms STL, a nonprofit that advocates for the cleanup of her community the expansion of the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) to cover affected areas of St. Louis. In July, the House passed the RECA expansion as part of the reconciliation bill, and residents in the St. Louis region have started receiving radiation exposure compensation this month.

In a May executive order, aimed at ushering in what he described as an “American nuclear renaissance,” President Donald Trump declared moot the science underpinning decades-old radiation exposure standards set by the federal government. Executive Order 14300 directed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to conduct a “wholesale revision” of half-a-century of guidance and regulations. In doing so, it considers throwing out the foundational model used by the government to determine exposure limits, and investigates the possibility of loosening the standard on what is considered a “safe” level of radiation exposure for the general public. In a statement to the Bulletin, NRC spokesperson Scott Burnell confirmed that the NRC is reconsidering the standards long relied upon to guide exposure limits.

Securing Space A Plan for U.S. Action

Nina M. Armagno and Jane Harman

Space is a strategic vulnerability. The United States has more strategic assets in space than any other country. Almost as important, dynamic American companies—particularly SpaceX—have revolutionized space, placing in orbit thousands of commercial satellites on which the U.S. economy increasingly depends. But other countries are following suit. China in particular is on track to have thousands of its own satellites in orbit in the not-too-distant future.

Further complicating matters, the space assets that the United States already has—mostly satellites, but also ground stations and modes of communication—are increasingly vulnerable now that China and Russia have developed the means to divert, disable, or destroy them. The methods include electronic warfare and jamming as well as direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles.1

Space is a strategic challenge. Space is becoming more congested by the year. Since 2018, the number of satellite payloads orbiting in low Earth orbit (LEO)—that is, objects below an altitude of 1,200 miles—has more than quadrupled.2 Then there is space debris—defunct objects or fragments of human-made materials. Over 40,000 items of space debris greater than 10 cm in diameter now orbit Earth at speeds of up to 18,000 miles per hour. This increase in space traffic and space debris makes collisions more likely. It also threatens the lives of astronauts on the International Space Station (ISS) and on the space stations being constructed by China and Russia. China, Russia, and the United States are the source of most of that debris and share an interest in avoiding collisions, but they are also wary of one another’s intentions.

U.S. Economic Security

Anya Schmemann

These targeted government actions, and others detailed in the report, are intended to unleash the U.S. innovation ecosystem, allowing the private sector to scale and diffuse technology globally and responsibly. Given the rapid pace of technological change, the institutional improvements recommended above would also position the United States to better respond to future changes and technologies that have yet to emerge. Looking beyond today’s immediate challenges, the Task Force report concludes by offering principles to help U.S. policymakers decide whether and how to intervene in markets in the name of national security.

The Rise of Economic Security

Economic power has long been an important foundation for national security and an enabler of U.S. military and diplomatic power.1 In recent years, however, a series of global shocks have pushed economic power further to the front lines of national security policy. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted global supply chains and exposed the downsides of concentrated economic interdependence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shook global energy and food markets and exposed Europe’s dangerous dependency on Russian energy supplies. China’s actions—especially its massive subsidies aimed at dominating the commanding heights of technology and attempts to dominate critical supply chains—directly threaten U.S. economic growth and technological leadership, as well as the interests of U.S. partners and allies.2

The Dark Crusade of “Little” Wars

Chris Mott

Large, conventional wars break old structures and change the world around them. They shatter societies and individuals in a tempest of carnage and displacement. Even if the outcome is not decisive, as it often is not, the impact on social stability always is. This is not to say that war is always undesirable, or that it cannot sometimes shake up a complacent order and force through a new order, because these events do happen in history. However, there is always a costly societal danger that more often than not introduces unexpected and sometimes devastating changes, even in times of victory. The war will always come home. Even, and sometimes especially, in times where the public believes war is a distant danger. For it is then that the disconnect between those who fight wars and those at home who remain aloof of them can most aggressively manifest. Policymakers who concoct justifications for small wars of choice are always embarking on a dark crusade for the societies they lead.

In the present Gaza War, an organization known as the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation employs a network of former intelligence and military veterans, many from the Global War on Terror, to explicitly support Israeli military operations under the guise of humanitarianism. This network is made up of people who dream of exporting an apocalyptic religious war both at home and abroad. Additionally, recent revelations about the organized crime networks set up on U.S. soil by ex-special forces operators have shown that even the smallest scale and most targeted operations of the War on Terror can bring massive backwash effects to the communities even in supposed peace time. This type of thinking, spawned from seemingly distant conflicts, is hardly an outlier. It is part of a pattern where the shadow wars of the past leach into and distort the policy priorities of the present. This is worth considering as we contemplate the possibility of another intervention in perhaps Venezuela or wherever else where political leadership promises minimal cost.

Pentagon pares down list of critical emerging technology areas

Mikayla Easley

The Defense Department’s CTO has revised its list of critical technology areas — reducing the number of research-and-development priorities by more than half.

The Pentagon announced on Monday that the 14 critical technology areas established during the Biden administration will be trimmed to just six categories. In a video shared on LinkedIn, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Emil Michael emphasized that the shortened list will steer the department’s efforts to efficiently deliver the emerging capabilities that warfighters need.

“When I stepped into this role, our office had identified 14 critical technology areas. While each of these areas holds value, such a broad list dilutes focus and fails to highlight the most urgent needs of the warfighter. 14 priorities, in truth, means no priorities at all,” Michael said Monday in a statement.

The focus areas in the updated catalog include applied artificial intelligence (AAI); biomanufacturing; contested logistics technologies (LOG); quantum and battlefield information dominance (Q-BID); scaled directed energy (SCADE); and scaled hypersonics (SHY).
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