India’s West Asian Blues Deepen As Gaza Plan Shifts Gear

M.K. Bhadrakumar

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The overnight visit by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to India has been rather thin on the ground. Although this has been his first visit to India as Foreign Minister, and notwithstanding Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘hands-on’ approach to the India-Israel relationship which has seen a huge upswing during his years in power through the past 11 years, it comes as a surprise that he was not received by the PM. One plausible explanation could be that PM has his hands full what with the crucial state election in Bihar, which has traditionally been a weathercock in India’s national politics.

Couldn’t the visit of Sa’ar have been scheduled in such a way that a meeting with PM was possible? The only explanation is that the Israeli dignitary’s consultation was hastily arranged. What happened for such an unseemly haste for Sa’ar to rush to Delhi?

The more one runs a fine comb through the visit, the more it seems that Sa’ar actually came to discuss Gaza situation even as the crucial upcoming template of the second stage of the Gaza Peace Plan on the deployment of the international force is coming up.

The MEA readout simply says, “FM Sa’ar shared Israel’s perspective and views on developments in West Asia and the Gulf. EAM expressed India’s support for the Gaza Peace Plan, welcomed the return of hostages and expressed hope that the Peace Plan paves way for a durable and lasting solution.”

Perhaps, some forensic work is needed here to dig deeper. To be sure, Delhi is aware of Washington moving to launch a UN draft resolution in the Security Council seeking mandate for the creation of an International Security Force (ISF) for Gaza.

From Hydropower To Human Capital: India’s Expanding Development Partnership With Bhutan

Shashwat Gupta Ray

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India and Bhutan share a relationship that is both time-tested and forward-looking—a partnership that has matured over seven decades into one of South Asia’s most enduring examples of neighbourly cooperation. Rooted in shared history and cultural continuity, it now spans the full spectrum of development—from hydropower and transport connectivity to digital transformation and education.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to Bhutan on 11–12 November 2025, coinciding with the 70th birthday of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, will reaffirm this deep friendship. During the visit, Modi is scheduled to inaugurate the Punatsangchhu-II Hydropower Project, a landmark bilateral venture that will boost Bhutan’s generation capacity by nearly 40 percent. The trip underscores India’s commitment to Bhutan’s economic transformation through sustainable infrastructure, renewable energy, and cross-border connectivity—cementing India’s status as Thimphu’s largest development partner.

A Civilisational Continuum: The Deep Roots of Indo–Bhutan Relations

The India–Bhutan relationship predates the modern era, grounded in centuries of cultural, religious, and commercial exchange across the Himalayas. Long before the 1949 Treaty of Friendship—later updated in 2007—the two nations were bound by shared Buddhist traditions, monastic networks, and trade routes linking the plains with the highlands. These spiritual and social connections built mutual familiarity and trust, later formalised through diplomatic cooperation after India’s independence.

Uncertainty of USA-China Tariff War Pause Unlikely To Deter India-China Initiative To Reduce Tension

Subrata Majumder

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Uncertainty surrounding the USA-China tariff war pause, coupled with a marginal reduction of tariffs by 10 percent are unlikely to arrest the attempt by India-China to reduce tensions. The escalation of the tariff war between the USA and China leased out an opportunity for reduction in India-China tensions, given the fact that both are haunted by high US tariffs – India by 50 percent and China by 47 percent (after the pause).

China is one of the top two trading partners of India. So is the USA. The difference between China and the USA behemoth in trade partnership with India is that while China is the biggest source for imports, the USA is the biggest destination of exports for India.

Nevertheless, though China is the trigger for the widening trade deficit of India, it also underscored as the backbone for the success of India’s manufacturing industry and exports. A common proverb states, “Make in the India relies on Make in China”. The success of new industries like electronics and the pharmaceutical industries are the cases in point.

Historically, India-China relations have been characterized in paradox. Politically it remains thorny. Trade and economically, it emerges as the backbone for new industries growth and export. Political tension thrives due to repeated Chinese infiltration in Indian borders and trade relations surged owing to large imports from China. In the light of USA-China trade relation rising volatile during the second term of Donald Trump presidency due to the threatening of high tariff on China, a new wave of opportunity underscores for India-China trade and investment relations.

Renewal of India–Pakistan rivalry over Afghanistan

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury

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India has increased its engagement with the Taliban regime, as evidenced by Foreign Minister Muttaqi’s recent visit. This is a pragmatic move but will escalate tensions with Pakistan.

Crucial aspects of Muttaqi’s week-long visit to India were the meeting with his Indian counterpart, External Affairs Minister Dr Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, and his visit to the Darul Uloom Deoband seminary in northern India.

Muttaqi and Jaishankar met with their respective delegations on 10 October 2025. The joint statement that followed was practical and restrained. It emphasised trade (Indian companies were invited to bid for mining licences), connectivity (commencement of the India–Afghanistan air freight corridor) and cooperation on hydroelectric projects and humanitarian issues. The latter included building a 30-bed hospital in Kabul and five maternity health clinics in the provinces of Paktika, Khost and Paktia. Also notable is what the statement did not mention. As recently as 6 March 2024, the Indian representative on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had stressed ‘the need to counter terrorism, bring in inclusive governance and safeguard the rights of women, children and minorities in Afghanistan’. Not only did the statement not address these concerns, but in previous bilateral interactions with Muttaqi, including India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s meeting with him in Dubai on 8 January 2025 and Jaishankar’s first phone call with Muttaqi on 15 May 2025, no reference to these issues was made either.

The Deoband seminary in northern India is considered the intellectual birthplace of the Taliban ideology. With a large crowd of clerics and students surrounding Muttaqi, the event was portrayed as an act of cultural hospitality, even as it created an opportunity for India’s religious engagement with the Taliban through faith and education.

The Trial and Imprisonment of Pakistan’s Imran Khan

Rafia Zakaria

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In September, Imran Khan, the former prime minister of Pakistan, who has been in prison for more than two years, wrote a letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, describing his incarceration in a 9-by-11 foot “cage.”

“I have endured continued solitary confinement,” Khan wrote. “All access to books and newspapers has been denied to me.” He is 72 years old and has been sentenced to 14 years in prison. His letter can be seen as a plea for mercy, an exhortation to justice, and even as suggestive of his fading hopes of legal reprieve.

Millions of Khan’s supporters and members of his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), believe the charges against him are fabricated and politically motivated. Technically, Khan’s imprisonment is the consequence of an entangled mess of numerous legal cases. He has been convicted in some and he continues to be on trial in several others. Recently, a court in the city of Lahore dismissed his petition to merge the cases against him.

After a decade and a half of making little headway in politics, Khan aligned himself and his PTI with the military in the early 2010s, and eventually rose to power as prime minister in 2018. After some years of power-sharing, Khan fell out of favor with the military establishment and was ousted from office after a parliamentary no-confidence vote in April 2022.

Khan blamed the army and the United States for engineering his ouster, and led energetic protests demanding immediate, fresh elections. After he was briefly arrested in May 2023, his followers attacked Pakistan’s military headquarters in Rawalpindi and the home of a senior military official in Lahore. Khan stands accused of instigating those attacks.

A crackdown on his party followed. Most of the PTI leaders have been either arrested or forced to resign. Hundreds of party workers have been imprisoned. Amnesty International has recorded cases of family members of PTI leaders being “forcibly disappeared.” In July, more than a hundred members of the party were arrested. Khan’s party has lost its street power and ability to protest as most of its leaders are either in prison or have found safety in leaving the party.

The PLA’s expanding joint-exercise profile and modernisation

Rupert Schulenburg

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The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) participation in joint bilateral and multilateral military exercises with partner militaries has steadily increased in number over the last decade. This article defines ‘joint exercises’ as Chinese bilateral or multilateral military exercises with international partner militaries, rather than using ‘joint’ to denote integration or jointness between these militaries.

In 2015, the year Chinese President Xi Jinping announced large-scale military reforms, the PLA participated in a total of 19 joint exercises with partner militaries, compared to 36 in 2023 and 34 in 2024. Various diplomatic, political and military objectives have driven this growth. These objectives include improving the PLA’s image as a ‘world-class military’ (世界一流军队) as well as its overseas operational experience and inter-operability with select foreign militaries. Joint exercises, especially those conducted alongside partners belonging to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, also advance China’s bilateral and multilateral relationships. Underlining these numbers, however, are several inter-service dynamics that reveal the different roles and priorities held by the PLA Army (PLAA), Navy (PLAN) and Air Force (PLAAF) towards joint exercises.

Inter-service dynamics

Examination of bilateral and multilateral joint-exercise data from 2015 to September 2025 demonstrates the PLA’s sustained interest in growing and diversifying its exercise profile. 2016 saw the largest annual increase of this period (discounting for anomalies because of the COVID-19 pandemic), when the number of joint exercises in which the PLA participated grew by 58% to 30. After an expected reduction during the pandemic, the number of joint exercises involving the PLA rebounded to 36 in 2023 and 34 in 2024. This recent increase has come through participation in bilateral rather than multilateral joint exercises. Between 2022 and 2024, the average annual growth rate in the number of bilateral joint exercises was 80%. In comparison, the number of multilateral joint exercises reduced from 13 to four between 2023 and 2024 (compared to 30 bilateral joint exercises in 2024).

China’s joint military exercises, 2015–25

Erik Green

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The number of China’s joint military exercises has steadily increased between 2015 and 2025, peaking at 36 joint exercises in 2023. Southeast Asia has been the primary location of these exercises, albeit slightly more were conducted in China in 2024 and 2025. The PLA Army has been the most active lead service since 2015, but between 2021 and September 2025 the PLA Navy has carried out the most joint exercises.

In 2015 the PLA participated in a total of 19 joint exercises with partner militaries. This increased to 36 in 2023 and 34 in 2024.

2016 saw the largest annual increase of this period (discounting for anomalies because of the COVID-19 pandemic), when the number of joint exercises in which the PLA participated grew by 58% to 30.

Increases in the last few years have come through participation in bilateral rather than multilateral exercises. Between 2022 and 2024, the average annual growth rate in the number of bilateral exercises was 80%. In comparison, the number of multilateral exercises reduced from 13 to four between 2023 and 2024 (compared to 30 bilateral exercises in 2024).

In 2019 the PLA Army participated in 18 joint exercises compared to eight for the PLA Navy. Since 2021, however, the PLA Navy have replaced the PLA Army as the service participating in the highest number of joint exercises.

The PLA Air Force has participated in joint exercises less frequently than the PLA Army and PLA Navy.

Will Chinese Rare Earth Mineral Bans Cripple Taiwan’s Chip Production?

Brandon J. Weichert

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China has played its most dangerous hand yet in the ongoing trade war: it has threatened the world with export bans on critical rare earth minerals, using its stranglehold over global markets to undermine would-be competitors.

Not to worry, says the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the producers of the world’s most sophisticated semiconductors. TSMC insists that it has taken precautions to insulate itself from the Chinese rare earth mineral export control and that their operations will be unaffected by Chinese threats.

Even if TSMC can insulate itself from Chinese export bans on rare earth minerals, though, the fact remains that China could invade Taiwan—and knock out TSMC production lines entirely.

According to the government of Taiwan, the new Chinese export controls are not expected to have a major impact on the chip sector because the rare earths that China is curbing do not have to do with the rare earth minerals needed for semiconductor production. Further, Taiwan (and TSMC) source many key materials or derivatives from outside China—including from Europe, the United States, and Japan—which means dependence on Chinese exports for those specific items is reduced.

TSMC has indicated that for certain key raw materials (such as gallium and germanium) they have a buffer or alternative supply which gives them time to adjust. Plus, many of the “rare earth minerals” that get media attention are those used in magnets (for electric vehicle motors or certain defense applications). TSMC insists these are not necessarily the rare earths critical for, say, wafer fabrications at the most advanced nodes.

Could Iran buy nuclear weapons from North Korea?

Mark Fitzpatrick

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Israeli and American air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025 caused extensive damage but did not extinguish the country’s desire for a nuclear option. The attacks fanned a growing mood among Iran’s security community that a nuclear deterrent is needed more than ever. For the time being, Iran apparently still adheres to Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei’s non-nuclear fatwa. Senior officials say, however, that the fatwa can be changed if circumstances warrant.

To buttress United States President Donald Trump’s premature boast that Iran’s nuclear programme was obliterated, Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted the destruction of a facility at Isfahan to convert uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to metal, a key step to producing nuclear weapons. A Pentagon spokesman said the strikes had set back Iran’s efforts by ‘probably close to two years’.

That lengthy time frame may be misleading. Independent researchers have pointed out that, to sprint for a weapon, Iran does not need to rebuild the damaged nuclear facilities. Its 400 kg of 60% highly enriched uranium (HEU), enough for ten bombs by most estimates, is in canisters that apparently are buried under rubble but could be dug out. Whether this could be done without detection is another question – and detection would likely trigger further bombing. Still, even before the June attacks, Iran was constructing a new enrichment facility at Isfahan where the HEU could be further enriched. Uranium conversion is an 80-year-old technology, a plant for which could be set up quickly.

But let’s give the benefit of the doubt to US government declarations that Iran could not easily overcome bottlenecks if it wanted to rush for a bomb, an assessment shared by Israeli military intelligence. If so, Iran would have another option. It could seek to acquire any necessary technology or materials from its old friends in Pyongyang – perhaps even a few intact warheads from North Korea’s estimated stockpile of 50–90 nuclear weapons (although this is highly speculative).

DPRK as a potential supplier

If Iran were to seek outside help, North Korea would be a natural marketplace. As charter members of the club of so-called rogue states – serial violators of international rules and norms – Iran and North Korea are natural partners and past collaborators on missiles. Both are under sanctions from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which prohibit trade in weapons technologies. For foreign technology, they thus have to turn to fellow outcast states, run their own procurement networks, or turn to criminal enterprises, such as the black market network formerly led by Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear engineer who died in 2021.

North Korea is not known to have transferred nuclear technology since 2007, when the plutonium-production reactor it helped build for Syria was destroyed by an Israeli strike, which also reportedly killed several North Korean workers.

A Brief Overview Of Israel’s Strategy After Ceasefire Agreement

Dr. Punsara Amarasinghe

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The Middle East closely resembles a time bomb that awaits its destruction depending on the actions of the key actors there. This time bomb came to the closest point of explosion in the aftermath of the macabre perpetrated by Hamas on the 7th of October 2023, which paved the way to unleash Israeli military strength upon Gaza with two main objectives: the complete extermination of Hamas and bringing the hostages held under Hamas captivity back to Israel. In achieving this task, Tel Aviv engaged on multiple fronts over the last two years, amidst both local and international pressure. The ceasefire agreement brokered by President Trump finally cooled the burning theatre of the Middle East.

A central debate among strategic planning experts is whether Israel has abandoned its overarching goal of defeating Hamas entirely as a result of the current ceasefire. To address this, one must consider how Israel pursued its security strategy through multiple operations prior to Trump’s engagement with Hamas. From Operation Iron Swords to Operation Gideon’s Chariots, the IDF’s objective was clear: intensify strikes on Hamas leadership and systematically target Qassam brigade fighters, particularly those implicated in the events of October 7. As Edward Luttwak notes, Israel’s campaign of removing key Hamas military leaders—from Mohomad Deif to Yahiya Sinwar—served as a deterrent, reinforcing that any attack on Jewish targets triggers severe consequences.

Apart from confronting Hamas, Israel tamed the Tehran-backed Hezbollah network, primarily targeting its leadership and destroying its key infrastructure facilities in Lebanon . For the first time , Israeli attacks in Iran exposed Tehran’s vulnerability to the world as Israeli fighter jets dominated the Iranian sky. These factors serve as corner stones depicting Israel’s triumph supported by its tenacity before the peace deal.

Swiss Initiatives And The Limits Of Western Involvement: Regional Lessons In Sri Lanka’s Reconciliation

A. Jathindra

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Recently, a Sri Lankan political delegation travelled to Switzerland at the invitation of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). Organized jointly by the Peace and Human Rights Division (PHRD) and the Embassy of Switzerland in Colombo, the trip aimed to provide participants with a firsthand understanding of Switzerland’s unique constitutional system.

The delegation visited several Swiss cities, where they explored the country’s political framework. In Bern and Murten, they engaged in discussions on federalism, direct democracy, and inclusive approaches to linguistic and cultural diversity with Swiss lawmakers as well as representatives from federal, cantonal, and communal authorities. Tamil political leadership was represented by Members of Parliament Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam and Dr. Sathiyalingam, along with Suresh Premachandran, leader of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front. According to Tamil media reports, the Swiss Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Dr. Siri Walt, also recently briefed M.A. Sumanthiran, General Secretary of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), on the program held from September 14 to 21.

During this meeting, the Ambassador also mentioned that representatives of the National People’s Power who participated in the Swiss trip expressed their willingness to engage with the Tamil parties in seeking a solution to the national ethnic question based on the federal system. Representing the NPP were Minister Dr. Upali Pannilake, Secretary Nihal Abeyasinghe, Deputy Minister Munipar Mulappar, Members of Parliament Chandima Hettiarachchi, Nilanthi Kotagachchi, Samanmalli Gunasinghe, and Jaffna District Member Kabilan Sundaramoorthy.

Trump’s Golden Opportunity To Win Over Central Asia

James Durso

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This is President Trump’s first meeting with all the leaders, though he did meet the presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the United Nations General Assembly session in September. Uzbekistan’s leadership under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has played a pivotal role in deepening regional cooperation — it borders the other four republics and Afghanistan — while maintaining constructive relations with all the U.S., China and Russia.

Now, with his recent ASEAN meeting in the rearview mirror, Trump will arrive in a good mood, reinforced by some earlier economic diplomacy with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to grease the wheels: the sales of Boeing 787 Dreamliners and Wabtec Corporation locomotives. The president will likely advocate for more contracts with U.S. companies, especially access to critical minerals, but he has some competition from China.

The Belt and Road Initiative is the primary way for China to connect with Central Asia. When outbound investment dipped in 2020-2022, we were told by the experts it was failing to achieve its goals and that China’s officials had wasted a trillion dollars. We appear to have been misinformed.

A return to nuclear testing in an unstable age?

Dr Daniel Salisbury

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Only North Korea has tested nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century, having exploded six devices since 2006. Before this, the last tests were conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998, and by China and France in 1996. The US has not tested since Congress passed a law to suspend testing for a year in 1992, and Moscow has not conducted an explosive test since 1990, a year before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The context of Trump’s announcement suggests that he may have been referring to tests of nuclear delivery systems, such as missiles, or prior allegations of low-yield ‘supercritical’ testing by Russia. However, the episode remains emblematic of a more dangerous and volatile era where strategic competition continues to raise nuclear risks.

The suggestion of a return to testing came just hours before Trump was due to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea. The meeting came amidst a tense US-China relationship, with dialogue on arms control suspended since July 2024 over US arms sales to Taiwan. According to current US assessments, China’s nuclear arsenal is growing exponentially in size, with the March 2025 Annual Threat Assessment from the US director of national intelligence noting that China is ‘intent on modernizing, diversifying, and expanding its nuclear posture’.

Since 2020, the Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China has assessed that China’s warhead stockpile has undergone massive growth. In 2020, the report noted that the Chinese arsenal of 200 warheads would ‘at least double in size’ over the subsequent decade. In 2021, the report assessed that China’s arsenal would grow to 700 deliverable warheads by 2027 and 1,000 by 2030.

Russia Is Taking Over 1,000 Casualties a Day Fighting in Ukraine

Stavros Atlamazoglou

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Thus far in 2025, the Russian forces have taken approximately 353,000 casualties.

As the Russian forces are pushing hard to capture Pokrovsk and other Ukrainian fortress towns in the Donbas, their casualties continue to increase.

Russian losses have reached levels unheard of in a European conflict since the end of World War II.

1,140,000 Losses and Counting

According to the latest estimates, the Russian forces have sustained approximately 1,140,000 casualties, including killed and wounded troops, since the full-scale invasion began on February 24, 2022. Thus far in 2025, the Russian forces have taken approximately 353,000 casualties.

According to data provided by the Ukrainian General Staff, the average daily Russian casualty rate during October 2025 was 1,008 troops killed and wounded. This marked a slight increase from September, when Russian forces lost an average of 950 troops on a daily basis. Russian casualties are picking up, as this was the second consecutive month with an increase in losses.

It is likely that Russian casualties will not exceed those of last year, when in 12 months of bitter fighting, the Russian military, paramilitary units, and pro-Russian separatist forces suffered approximately 420,000 losses. To match last year’s casualties, the Russian forces would have to sustain around 80,000 losses in November and December. Although not something unheard of in the conflict—during some months, Russian average daily losses exceeded 1,500 troops—it is unlikely the Russian military will pursue an increase in the operational tempo.

Israel’s New Spike Missile Was Built for Electronic Warfare

Maya Carlin

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The latest iteration of the Spike family of missiles has been unveiled by manufacturer Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. The “fire and forget” anti-tank guided missile could arguably be labeled as Israel’s most prominent and effective homegrown weapon. Rafael’s introduction of the L-SPIKE 4X last month at the AUSA exhibition in Washington marks a big milestone for the company. Unlike previous Spike variants, the new prototype is reportedly capable of loitering over a target before striking in a fashion similar to a “kamikaze” or “suicide” unmanned aerial vehicle. As detailed by the CEO and president of Rafael, Yoav Tourgeman, “with L-SPIKE 4X we bring Spike’s missile pedigree into a new dimension — combining the speed and precision of a missile with the persistence of a Launched Effect.”

An Overview of the Spike Series

Like many of Israel’s domestically designed military defense endeavors, the Spike family of missiles was developed during the country’s early founding days. When Israel’s Armored Corps and fleet of main battle tanks were greatly diminished during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israel Defense Forces began outlining the requirement for a lethal anti-tank weapon capable of precisely taking out adversarial armored vehicles. Rafael was ultimately tasked with designing the resulting Spike platform.

The Israeli-designed anti-tank weapon uses a small fiber-optic cable that links the weapon to its launching system, in addition to a camera within the weapon itself. According to Rafael, the Spike’s operator can launch a precise strike while remaining up to 30 km away. The weapon’s operator is also able to alter the missile’s trajectory post-launch. Prior to the debut of the L-SPIKE 4x, the Spike NLOS (non-line of sight) missile represented the most advanced iteration in this series. As detailed by its manufacturer, the NLOS variant has the capability to engage non-line-of-sight targets. “With the help of images provided by various electro-optical sensors, the missile locates the target on its own, marks it, and helps the operator to neutralize it more accurately and simply.”

Bring Kazakhstan into America’s Critical Minerals Club

Dana Masalimova

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When President Donald Trump welcomes the leaders of Central Asia to Washington for the C5+1 summit—the first ever to be held at the White House—he will mark the framework’s first decade with a distinctly transactional twist: minerals. The meeting offers Washington a chance to secure a strategic foothold in a region that sits atop some of the world’s richest reserves of critical minerals yet has long been caught between Moscow and Beijing.

This summit comes on the heels of Trump’s recent Asia tour, during which he sealed critical minerals partnerships with Australia, Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand—each deal aimed at reducing Beijing’s dominance of global mineral processing and securing access to materials that power advanced manufacturing, electric vehicles, and defense systems. The logical next step is to extend this effort to Central Asia and make Kazakhstan a founding member of America’s critical minerals club.

Kazakhstan is the natural anchor. It is the world’s top uranium producer and holds an estimated 2.6 million tons of rare earth elements, with a recently identified major deposit potentially vaulting it to third place globally, behind only China and Brazil. The country holds half of the 50 designated as “critical” by the US government and already produces 19 of them. Kazakhstan’s industrial base can already support full-cycle production for several advanced materials, and the government is actively courting Western partners through reforms such as a new subsoil code modeled on Western Australia’s and digital licensing. However, its broader investment regime is still a work in progress.

The Trump administration has pursued two models for critical minerals cooperation in Asia: advanced frameworks with established allies like Australia and Japan, and basic MOUs with emerging partners in this sector, such as Thailand and Malaysia. The advanced framework is the one that suits Kazakhstan: the country’s mining maturity, legal reforms, and political will position it well beyond entry-level cooperation, for a high-impact framework that combines financing, offtake guarantees, and technology transfer.

The Americas’ Critical Minerals Moment

Earl Anthony Wayne, Rebecca Bill Chavez, and Eduardo Castellet Nogués

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The United States has a narrow window to reshape its economic future and its role in the Americas if it moves decisively. A network of special economic zones could secure critical minerals supply chains, compete with China, and catalyze growth across the Western Hemisphere. Designed with enforceable standards, it would demonstrate that the Americas can deliver long-term growth and security.

Critical minerals are at the heart of technological dynamism and national security, powering everything from chips to grid-scale storage to defense platforms. Yet, most mines and refineries are concentrated in a few countries, with China being predominant across midstream processes. China processes more than 90 percent of the world’s battery-grade manganese sulfate, 70 percent of cobalt, nearly 60 percent of lithium, and 40 percent of copper, leaving manufacturers and US companies vulnerable to geopolitical shocks.

The Western Hemisphere offers a credible alternative. It holds one of the world’s richest concentrations of critical minerals, but lacks a common framework to knit these strengths together. The lithium triangle of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile contains about half of the known global resources.

Latin America also dominates in copper production, with Chile producing 23 percent, Peru 12 percent, and Mexico nearly 4 percent of global output. Between 2022 and 2030, copper production is projected to rise by 30 percent in Peru and 15 percent in Chile. Brazil holds between 19 percent and 23 percent of global rare earth reserves, though its infrastructure lags behind some neighbors. Mexico is also the world’s sixth-largest producer of zinc, another critical mineral.

Deals, Not Declarations: America’s New Central Asia Strategy

Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili

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Once dismissed as a remote frontier, Central Asia has emerged as the beating heart of Eurasia.

When the presidents of Central Asia descend on Washington this week for the C5+1 Summit, the United States has two goals in mind. First, it wants deals: access to rare earths and other critical minerals that China dominates and trade routes that bypass Russia. It also wants Central Asian countries to work more closely as a bloc. Washington sees regional integration as key to helping these states resist domination by Moscow and Beijing while opening space for American engagement.

Once dismissed as a remote frontier, Central Asia has emerged as the beating heart of Eurasia. Regional cooperation has changed the game, transforming these landlocked states from bystanders in great-power politics into the engine driving a new continental order.

What’s Changed?

Washington is no longer lecturing Central Asia about democracy and human rights. The Trump administration has made clear that economic partnership and strategic cooperation matter most. For Central Asian governments—still authoritarian but increasingly attuned to public pressure for jobs and rising living standards—this shift is welcome.

To be fair, Washington long gave lip service to democracy while prioritizing security. After September 11, 2001, the United States overlooked severe rights abuses to access airbases during the war in Afghanistan. The transactional nature of the relationship is now explicit. Central Asian leaders want partners who can compete with Beijing and Moscow on infrastructure.

This new realism mirrors trends elsewhere. What is taking shape in Central Asia is, in many ways, the region’s equivalent of the Abraham Accords: a web of pragmatic partnerships built on shared interests, not ideology. In the Middle East, those accords aimed to contain Iran. In Central Asia, similar dynamics are at play as states seek balance against Russia, China, and Iran.

How Russia Recovered

Dara Massicot

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The story of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been one of upset expectations and wild swings in performance. At the start of the war, most of NATO saw Russia as an unstoppable behemoth, poised to quickly defeat Ukraine. Instead, Russia’s forces were halted in their tracks and pushed back. Then, outside observers decided the Russian military was rotten, perhaps one counterattack away from collapse. That also proved incorrect—Ukrainian offensives failed, and Moscow resumed its slow advance. Now, plenty of people look beyond Russia to understand the state of the battlefield, blaming Kyiv’s troubles on insufficient external

Drones Won’t Save Us: Learning the Wrong Lessons from Ukraine Will Cost the US Army its Edge in Maneuver Warfare

Matthew Revels and Eric Uribe 

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The US Army remains anchored to an era when its technological and qualitative superiority ensured dominance on the battlefield. Yet battlefield losses and grinding attrition in the Russo-Ukrainian War reveal the growing vulnerability of platforms such as the Big Five, which have long defined the Army’s approach to land warfare. The Department of War’s recent drone dominance initiative reflects the growing sense that small drones have reached a critical demonstration point—one capable of transforming the character of land warfare and challenging the conceptual foundations of the Army’s preferred way of fighting. As potential challengers for land dominance integrate small drones into their arsenals, the Army must determine whether to adopt or counter the ongoing innovation to help it maintain its asymmetric advantage in maneuver warfare.

As the world’s leading military power and defense spender, the US armed services are actively working to adopt drone innovations diffusing from Russia and Ukraine, driven by their technophile military culture. But the quest to rapidly adopt small drones and make the attendant organizational changes to optimally employ them ignores the capital required to do so and fails to recognize that Russian and Ukrainian employment methods are misaligned with the US Army’s preferred way of war. Unfortunately, the assumption that the United States must adopt the innovation misses the alternative—one far more aligned with the American way of war—of countering the drone revolution to restore maneuver to the battlefield. Reestablishing the Army’s land dominance and tilting the balance of power in America’s favor will require pursuing counterinnovations in the form of counterdrone integrated air defense systems that restore tactical and operational maneuver. Succeeding on the future battlefield does not necessitate the blind acceptance of new technologies and concepts, but rather a consideration of which innovation response leverages the state’s advantages and mitigates its strategic limitations. Seeking to counter recent drone innovations will provide the US Army with the capabilities to restore its asymmetric advantage on the battlefield—rapid maneuver, sustained by a high operational tempo and massed armored penetration forces.

The Drivers of Diffusion: Assessing the Impact of Critical Task Focus on Organizational Capital

How Russia Recovered

Dara Massicot

Sourec Link

The story of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been one of upset expectations and wild swings in performance. At the start of the war, most of NATO saw Russia as an unstoppable behemoth, poised to quickly defeat Ukraine. Instead, Russia’s forces were halted in their tracks and pushed back. Then, outside observers decided the Russian military was rotten, perhaps one counterattack away from collapse. That also proved incorrect—Ukrainian offensives failed, and Moscow resumed its slow advance. Now, plenty of people look beyond Russia to understand the state of the battlefield, blaming Kyiv’s troubles on

The Case for Trump’s Second-Term Foreign Policy

Robert C. O’Brien

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Last year in Foreign Affairs, I outlined a framework for a second Trump administration foreign policy that would restore the “peace through strength” posture that prevailed during Donald Trump’s first term as president. This vision of “America first” stood in stark contrast to the foreign policies pursued by the Obama and Biden administrations and the approaches advocated by influential Democratic strategists during the 2024 presidential campaign. Broadly speaking, they believe that the United States is in decline, and that this process must be skillfully managed through a variety of steps: unilateral disarmament (via gradual but significant cuts to military spending

Report: Pentagon Can’t Forget About PNT for Golden Dome

Courtney Albon

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The Pentagon should establish a dedicated budget to support its Golden Dome missile defense shield’s positioning, navigation, and timing needs and assign a PNT lead to coordinate needed improvements to ground and space-based navigation systems, according to a new report from the National Security Space Association.

The organization’s space-focused think tank, the Moorman Center, argues in a Nov. 4 report that PNT capabilities are critical to Golden Dome’s ability to track targets, guide interceptors, and command and control a complex network of missile defense systems. The Department of the Defense, the report states, should recognize this dependency and invest accordingly.

“Urgent investments in a national, resilient PNT architecture with at least two or three sources that have markedly different failure modes are needed to address and mitigate known vulnerabilities of GPS and other systems, while bolstering the effectiveness of Golden Dome,” James Frelk, vice chair of the Moorman Center for Space Studies, writes.

The Pentagon has yet to publicly release a detailed plan for Golden Dome, an advanced missile defense shield that the White House has projected will cost $175 billion to field over the next three years. That price tag is likely to grow as the Defense Department validates and fields more advanced elements of that architecture like space-based interceptors. Whatever shape the program ultimately takes, a robust position, navigation, and timing capability is needed, NSSA argues.

The report identifies potential vulnerabilities across the Defense Department’s PNT enterprise as well as opportunities to upgrade existing systems or leverage commercial alternatives. The GPS constellation, a mix of 31 legacy and modern satellites in medium-Earth orbit, is vulnerable to all kinds of enemy attack from anti-satellite weapons to signal jamming and other electronic warfare effects.

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, Russia has repeatedly interfered with GPS, and there are numerous other examples of Iran and China disrupting the capability in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.

The Right Fight in the Wrong Frontier

Rachel Butler

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Why Moral Signaling in Emerging Domains Undermines the Credibility of the United States

When state actors violate legal or ethical norms, the United States and its allies have a duty to respond—not just strategically, but morally. Yet when punishment or pressure is applied in an emerging domain where U.S. capabilities are contested, it risks undermining U.S. credibility more than deterring bad behavior. This dilemma is most evident in space and the Arctic region, both of which are considered emerging warfighting domains. These domains are parallel in their exposure to intensifying global power competition, accelerating military modernization, and the expanding presence of state and non-state actors. Yet the most striking similarity is the contested status of U.S. power and influence in both regions. This prompts a critical question: What drives the U.S. to assert moral authority in domains where it lacks enforcement capabilities?

China and Space

Angered by China’s long-standing human rights violations, Congress sought to alter Beijing’s trajectory by hindering its progress in space. Believing that China’s capacity to advance in orbit depended on American cooperation, the Wolf Amendment was enacted which prohibited NASA and the OSTP from collaborating with China on any "policy, program, order, or contract of any kind" without explicit authorization from Congress and the FBI. The U.S. thought it had claimed the moral high ground while tightening its grip on strategic superiority. Yet China’s human rights record has deteriorated further, while Beijing clearly demonstrates its ability to advance its space capabilities without aid from the U.S.

China's advancements in space have been significantly aided by a longstanding pattern of stealing intellectual property, enabling progress that is both impressive and alarming despite operating at under 30% of the U.S. space budget in FY2023 (NASA’s $25.4 billion and the US Space Force's $26.3 billion). The Tiangong Space Station, the planned International Lunar Research Station, as well as the Chang’e-6 mission, which established China as the first nation to collect lunar samples from the far side of the Moon, are just a few notable examples.

Yet China’s exploratory initiatives and deepening human rights violations have become the least of U.S. concerns. China has begun positioning itself to establish warfighting readiness in a domain intended to be a shared frontier. Fusing its space resources by integrating its civil and military spheres, China has enabled the development of dual-use technologies that, although nominally aligned with international norms due to their peaceful applications, conveniently enhance its warfighting capabilities. Launch sites, control centers, and numerous satellites now fall under the control of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army). This integration has yielded technology that has heightened tensions in the space domain. Recent developments include satellite systems equipped with grappling mechanisms capable of disrupting or capturing other satellites, as well as "kinetic kill vehicles" (KKVs) designed for satellite disruption and missile interception. These capabilities were identified alongside Russia’s in the DoD’s 2020 Defense Space Strategy as “the greatest strategic threat” to the U.S. in space.

Forward, Flexible, Formidable, and Relevant

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Since its inception, the MEU has embarked on an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and continues to serve as the preeminent example of the contribution of the Navy-Marine Corps Team to national security. An inherently versatile, agile, and persistent formation, the ARG/MEU is the most responsive and flexible expeditionary power projection option the Navy and Marine Corps can provide the Joint Force. As the Nation’s premier forward-deployed crisis response force, ARG/MEUs provide scalable and rapidly responsive modern combat power in competition, crisis, and contingency, all from sovereign, afloat U.S. territory. As great-power competition, rapid technological change, and instability in the global littorals threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad, the ARG/MEU offers the right tool for the Joint Force during highly complex and dangerous times, following in the footsteps of its highly successful predecessors and bridging to future emerging capabilities as the character of war rapidly changes. This article explains how the current ARG/MEU contributes to homeland defense, deters Chinese coercion, and enables effective burden-sharing among our allies and partners.

The Strategic Environment

Today’s strategic environment poses multiple threats and demands a correspondingly diverse range of solutions for national leaders. Most acutely and for the foreseeable future, China presents a pervasive danger. The Chinese Communist Party’s military modernization, coercive behavior in Southeast Asia, and expansion of overseas military infrastructure threaten U.S., ally, and partner security and prosperity throughout the Indo-Pacific region. China also presents an increasingly global threat. Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative has laid the framework for China to project force not just throughout Asia but across the sea to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Such efforts are designed to challenge U.S. interests globally and at multiple levels. For example, China’s vast illegal fishing vessels operate throughout the Indo-Pacific and as far as South America and Africa, including recently engaging in violent confrontation with the Argentinian military. These gray-zone activities are used to influence and control vulnerable nations through coercion and demand a U.S. presence to counter.