Marcus Loh
ASEAN isn't as receptive to Trump's approach as other regions. Photo: Agencies
United States President Donald Trump returns to Southeast Asia this weekend for the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia – his first visit to the region since 2017 – before proceeding to Busan, South Korea for the APEC Leaders’ Meeting and a long-anticipated meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
As ASEAN’s rotational chair, Malaysia underscores the region’s stabilizing role as a convenor in a shifting world order, hosting both the ASEAN and East Asia Summits that will be attended by Trump and Chinese Premier Li Qiang.
Analysts are already speculating about a repeat of the “Trump effect” seen during his Gulf Tour earlier this year, where nearly US$2 trillion in investment and defense deals re-anchored Washington’s influence across Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. But the Indo-Pacific is not the Gulf – and Trump is not a hegemon here.
In the Middle East, stability depends on hard-power projection to contain a binary axis: Iran and Russia on one side, Washington-aligned Gulf states and Israel on the other. The Indo-Pacific, by contrast, operates through webs of interdependence linking great, middle and small powers.
It is true that at the apex, the US and China anchor the regional system. Washington projects maritime reach through alliances with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea, and remains the region’s largest foreign investor.
Beijing, meanwhile, wields economic gravity and industrial depth, extending influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and regional supply chains. China is now ASEAN’s largest trading partner.
Yet rivalry alone does not define the Indo-Pacific’s logic. For all the spectacle of the “Trump effect” – diplomacy conducted through high-stakes deals and headline moments – the region’s steadiness rests on the influence of smaller and middle powers, which have long acted as quieter stabilizers.
No comments:
Post a Comment