Indian Strategic Studies: 12/04/25

4 December 2025

India–UK defence industry ties: what lies ahead?

The Labour-led UK government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of June 2025 emphasised a ‘NATO first’, but not a ‘NATO only’, policy, minus the tilt towards the Indo-Pacific which was the hallmark of the previous, Conservative-led government. The review, however, recognised India’s presence on the global stage and sought to deepen the bilateral defence relationship. The UK government’s subsequent National Security Strategy of June 2025 emphasised this intent, stating that ‘India is a country with which we seek a genuine strategic partnership’.

Since June 2024, there has been a flurry of significant bilateral defence and trade developments, providing momentum towards the next stage of the India–UK defence industry partnership. In July 2024, then-UK foreign secretary David Lammy, on his first official visit to India, launched the landmark UK–India Technology Security Initiative (TSI), fostering collaboration on critical and emerging technologies, including minerals, artificial intelligence, quantum and semiconductors. In February 2025, the UK’s Defence Partnership-India (DP-I) was launched intended to boost defence collaboration and support India’s domestic manufacturing ambition known as Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India). In April 2025, the UK–India defence-industrial roadmap was signed, signalling an ambition to jointly design, develop and produce defence products.

The Geoeconomic Conundrum of India’s Oil Purchases

Shashwat Kumar

India is a net importer of crude oil, importing 88 percent of its requirement in FY 2025. For a high import-dependent and price-sensitive market like India, where demand is increasing every year, economics dictate import strategy, which is why the share of cheaply available Russian oil went from just 2 percent to more than 30 percent in a short span. However, India’s oil import basket is likely to undergo a drastic change as India may find it increasingly difficult to ignore geopolitical compulsions. The latest sanctions by the United States, along with decisions by the United Kingdom and the European Union, on Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia’s two largest oil companies, coupled with earlier sanctions on Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftgas, will require India to recalibrate its crude oil import strategy based on the steepening tradeoffs between cheap oil and geoeconomic ties with Washington and other members of the sanctioning coalition.

The lack of clarity from the United States on sanction enforcement provides India with maneuverability in planning a diversification strategy. Russian oil is not providing the high returns that it did in the early years of the war in Ukraine. A 50 percent tariff imposed on Indian goods by the United States is hurting India’s micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). Therefore, it is in India’s own interest to diversify its oil imports and use them as a bargaining tool in the bilateral trade negotiation with the United States. India’s strong macroeconomic indicators (e.g., low inflation and low current account deficit) and 2026 global oil outlook do favor a transition back to prewar diversified import levels.

Understanding the Red Fort Attack in New Delhi

S. L. Narasimhan

At about 6:52 p.m. on November 10, 2025, a car laden with explosives blew up near the iconic seventeenth-century Mughal-era Red Fort in New Delhi at a busy traffic signal. The driver of the car, Dr. Umar Un Nabi, a doctor by profession and an assistant professor at Al Falah University in Faridabad, Haryana, was the suicide bomber, and he died in the incident. He killed 12 more innocent civilians who were near the site of the blast and injured 32 people through this heinous act. The last attack of this nature in Delhi took place in 2011, when a briefcase exploded outside the premises of Delhi’s High Court.

A1: The following has been reported, though there has been no official statement or confirmation from India’s government on these claims. On October 19, 2025, some posters were found in Srinagar in Jammu and Kashmir, which said that “Some people shelter these Indian predators in their shops, which obstructs our work; therefore, we want to say openly to those people: stop, otherwise strict action will be taken against them as well.” The government had begun to investigate these posters and had identified the suspected terrorist group of the upcoming Red Fort attack. At 6:10 p.m. on November 10, 2025, the Jammu and Kashmir Police put out a message on X saying that “You can run but you can’t hide.” By then, Umar had arrived in Delhi and parked his car near Red Fort.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of Japan made remarks about defending Taiwan at Parliament

River Akira Davis and Hisako Ueno

Three weeks ago, it looked like Japan’s prime minister had made the biggest blunder of her early tenure with an off-the-cuff comment that ignited a diplomatic showdown with China.

Now Sanae Takaichi is in a position of strength at home, even though neither Japan nor China is backing away from the dispute.

Ms. Takaichi caused the row by signaling her country’s willingness to defend Taiwan in the event of Chinese military action. China, which regards the island democracy as its territory, responded by curtailing trade and tourism to Japan.

But the economic costs have not dented her popularity among Japan’s voters. If anything, they have increased her appeal as a conservative strong on defense.

Young citizens in particular have praised her stance, in a sign that she has struck a chord with a Japanese electorate that has been increasingly willing to question the nation’s longstanding pacifism. And she has been backed by Japanese, American and Taiwanese officials.

It is too early to say how the spat with China will color Ms. Takaichi’s legacy — she has been in office for less than six weeks. But it is likely to prove a defining early moment of her prime ministership.

China and Japan Are in a Showdown, With Trump in the Middle

Keith Bradsher and River Akira Davis

If anyone needed evidence that a critical moment is developing in Asia-Pacific diplomacy, look no further than the phone call on Monday between Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, and President Trump.

Mr. Xi reached out to Mr. Trump because a Japanese leader is taking her country’s strongest stance since World War II to assert that Taiwan’s security is also Japan’s security. While that has long been apparent to military planners, given Taiwan’s proximity to southern Japan — and also to U.S. bases there — Japan’s new strategic posture has alarmed Beijing’s leaders.

China has been doing everything possible in recent years to isolate Taiwan, an island democracy, and persuade other countries to accept Beijing’s claim to sovereignty there. Most countries have switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, leaving Taiwan increasingly friendless. Countries like Lithuania and the Czech Republic that dare to contact Taiwan informally face swift retribution from Beijing. Chinese air and naval patrols circumnavigate Taiwan with increasing frequency.

Reloading at Sea: Addressing America’s Overlooked Naval Vulnerability

Catherine Marie Abbott

Once considered a green-water force, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has rapidly evolved into a prominent blue-water navy, demonstrating its prolific naval ecosystem, including the 2022 launch of aircraft carrier Fujian and the 2025 resumption of joint operations with Russia in the East China Sea. With the preponderances of Beijing’s innovative infrastructure and expanding naval syndicate, designed not only to maintain regional hegemony in the East but also to extend its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) envelope and overall threat profile, its reach now threatens U.S. basing facilities in allied territories such as Japan.

This overextended naval reach has amplified vulnerabilities in U.S. maritime operations, particularly for repair and reloading, with Yokosuka Naval Base serving as a prominent U.S. naval ship repair facility and missile replenishment hub positioned within striking range. Although the U.S. maintains additional larger facilities in California and Hawaii, their use as a reload and repair station creates external vulnerability in sustaining logistical support during prolonged conflict.

Dispatch from Taipei: Now is the time to encourage Taiwan’s assertiveness, not hold it back

Markus Garlauskas

TAIPEI—I landed in Taiwan amid a war—fortunately, only a war of narratives so far. What I found during my visit was very different from what this narrative war would suggest. My observations underscored the need for the United States and its friends and allies to encourage and enable Taiwan to increase military self-reliance. At the same time, Taiwan’s friends should demonstrate an expanding international capability and willingness to aid Taiwan’s defense if China attacks—as with the political and military moves Japan is taking under Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae.

I arrived in Taipei just before US President Donald Trump’s latest trip to East Asia, amid worries in Taiwan and in Washington that he would “sell out” Taiwan during his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea. These worries proved to be overblown, with Taiwan apparently going unmentioned in the meeting, according to Trump. Meanwhile, other Americans have worried that the United States will be dragged into a supposedly unwinnable war over Taiwan, particularly if Washington does not find a way to reach a “stabilizing” accommodation with Beijing over Taiwan and restrain Taipei.

As part of this debate, two misleading lines of attack against Taiwan’s leadership have swept through Washington policy debates in recent weeks. Both incorrectly paint the self-ruling democracy as a liability to US security, but each comes at it from a different angle.

China’s Taiwan options narrow as U.S., allies fortify key waterways

Andrew Salmon

A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.

BANGKOK, Thailand — Beijing’s hybrid war tactics are fueling fierce blowback in Japan and the Philippines, two U.S.-allied island nations ideally suited to thwart a Chinese encirclement or blockade of Taiwan.

Dressed in a fatigue jacket and flanked by tactically uniformed members of the Ground Self Defense Force, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi spoke to the media on Yonaguni island, just 65 miles off Taiwan, Sunday about the emplacement of medium-range air-defense systems.

Mr. Koizumi delivered a stern message sure to be heard in Beijing, where China’s communist government, infuriated by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks equating Taiwanese security and Japanese security, has been blistering Tokyo via rhetorical, diplomatic and economic channels.

Lawmakers raise awareness of CCP’s cognitive warfare

Fang Wei-li, Chen Cheng-yu and Jason Pan

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lawmakers Puma Shen (沈伯洋) and Fan Yun (范雲) over the weekend in The Hague raised international awareness about the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) cognitive warfare by highlighting the threats and challenges Taiwan faces from China’s influence operations and “gray zone” tactics. They represented the DPP at Liberal International’s Executive Committee Meeting, which ran from Friday to yesterday. Shen during a panel discussion on Saturday provided an analysis on cyberwarfare, citing his own experiences in fighting against China’s increasingly sophisticated use of propaganda and “cognitive warfare” targeting Taiwanese.

Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Puma Shen poses for a photograph in The Hague, Netherlands, in an undated photograph. Democratic countries cannot just stay on the defensive or merely respond to fake news and slander, Shen said. China is using online and offline means, as well as other tactics, to collect the digital footprints of Taiwanese people and organizations, and integrate those into its cyber-physical system, he said. The CCP has been infiltrating local communities, buying influence to set up contacts and proxies at the grassroots level, and has reached key figures in local temples, where they tap into social networks to collect information, Shen said.

Evaluating the Twin Threats of Unsustainable Debt and China’s Ambition

To sum up my previous three essays for Military History in the News: In the next decade, we face the merging of two crises of our own making. First, our national debt will crash the economy. No nation can borrow more every year and maintain a stable currency. We have only ourselves to blame for reaching that precipice. Our politicians reflect our will. Nothing will be done to avert the debt collapse because a majority of voters favor the entitlements conferred by the borrowed money.

When debt service exceeds about 23% of revenues in next decade, then bond holders will demand higher yields. The Federal Reserve will step in to provide the liquidity, but at a cost of letting loose hyperinflation. Only during that chaotic period of, say, a month’s duration, will Congress bitterly debate cutting entitlements and/or raising taxes. It’s a 50-50 bet Congress will refuse to pass sensible legislation. If it remains deadlocked, our standard of living will plummet.

Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran

Evan Morgan

In recent years, declarations like “no-limits partnership,” “comprehensive agreement,” and “security partnership” between the United States’ adversaries have become increasingly common. On May 16, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party Leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed their comprehensive partnership during their historic 43rd meeting. Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian-Iranian collaboration has reached new levels, with Iranian drones becoming a familiar site over the battlefields. North Korea too, has upped its cooperation with Russia, working closely on schemes to avoid Western sanctions and even signing a mutual defense pact on June 19, 2024. The extent to which America’s adversaries cooperate on cybersecurity remains less understood but is a growing concern.

However, as unified Western actions against rogue and adversarial states have increased (e.g., sanctions, public shaming, etc.) and hot wars roil Ukraine and Israel, the agreements and cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have similarly grown stronger and more unified. In this context, the cybersecurity strategies of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have emerged as significant and irregular threats to global stability, threatening the contemporary geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, each nation has developed sophisticated cyber capabilities designed to asymmetrically attack the international security frameworks established by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Western powers. It is, therefore, important to assess how US adversaries collaborate in cyberspace and are using asymmetric and irregular tactics to undermine the liberal world order.

Taiwan War: 2 U.S. Carriers Sunk, PLA Navy In Shambles; CSIS Wargames Say Japan Holds The Key To Victory

Sakshi Tiwari

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has openly declared that any Chinese attack on Taiwan would constitute a direct threat to Japan’s survival—and that Tokyo would be prepared to join military action to repel it.

The statement marks the strongest linkage ever made by a sitting Japanese leader between Taiwan’s fate and Japan’s own national security, instantly escalating tensions with Beijing.

During a parliamentary session earlier this month, Takaichi described a hypothetical Chinese naval blockade or invasion of Taiwan as a “survival-threatening situation.”

This phrasing invokes the right to collective self-defense according to the 2015 security legislation. Therefore, indirectly implying that Tokyo could deploy its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in response to Chinese aggression against the self-ruled island state of Taiwan.

The Cornerstone and the Linchpin: Securing America’s Northeast Asian Alliances

Patrick M. Cronin

During an era in which strategic gravity is shifting to Asia, the United States cannot be careless in tending to its alliances with Japan and South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK). The three countries face persistent threats from North Korea and from China’s semi-transparent bid for regional hegemony. Meanwhile, rocky relations between Tokyo and Seoul are jeopardizing vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. The latest disagreement between America’s premier allies raises new questions about alliance strategy, commitment, and burden-sharing. These fissures have become exacerbated as the U.S. pressures allies to increase their contributions to regional security and reciprocal trade.

Real and perceived disarray among three of the world’s top democracies bodes ill for a future order. Now is a poor time to raise doubts about the durability of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia. Indeed, this is a time when solidarity among like-minded states should lead them to reinforce commitments to a rules-based order and check potential aggression in all its forms. The alliances are not just discrete relationships but part of a post–World War II system that is generally favorable to U.S. interests and values.

The Paradox of Europe’s Trumpian Right

Ivan Krastev

In the ten months since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to office, he has upended the way the United States engages with allies and adversaries alike. He is not only remaking the architecture and decoration of the White House; he is redrawing the mental maps through which Washington sees the world.

Initially, the administration’s focus on tariffs suggested that Trump was uninterested in the politics of other countries and cared only about trade balances. More recent moves have destroyed that illusion. It is ideology, not economics, that explains Trump’s hostility toward Brazil (whose leftist president, Luiz Iná

Little Spartans: How Small State Militaries Use Special Forces to Punch Above Their Weight

Óglaigh na hÉireann,

Dr. Simon Anglim teaches in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, where he specialises in contemporary war and warfare. He has testified before the UK House of Commons Defence Committee and participated in the drawing up of UK Ministry of Defence doctrine. His current research focuses on the state of UK defence policy in the 2020s, particularly in the fields of land warfare and special forces. His interest in special forces and unconventional warfare originated in his previous research on Major General Orde Wingate, a man whose unorthodox methods heavily influenced the ethos and doctrine of special forces, particularly in the UK and Israel. He is the author of Orde Wingate: Unconventional Warrior: From the 1920s to the Twenty-First Century (Pen and Sword Military, 2015).

Aggressive competition between great powers is once again the main steering force in global affairs. With increasingly predatory behaviour from Russia, China and Iran, and a more transactional USA less willing to be ‘global policeman’, small states around the world need to develop their own means of pursuing defence and security policy aims more than ever, particularly if they lay in regions where this competition is happening. We examine here how some small states have done this by using particular types of military unit, defined broadly as Special Forces, to achieve policy aims which may seem beyond their capacity.

The Future of Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles in the Maritime Battlespace

Brandon Schingh

Unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs) have revolutionized air- and land-based warfare by shifting the balance of power by providing inexpensive alternatives to traditional, high-impact platforms. The maritime battlespace – long dominated by capital ships, submarines, and aviation – is positioned for a fundamental transformation as UAVs increasingly play a central role in naval strategy. Policymakers and military leaders must grapple with the implications of this paradigm shift, as unmanned systems blur the lines between deterrence, escalation, and asymmetric warfare.

Maritime forces are already experimenting with unmanned platforms. The U.S. Navy has invested in systems like Boeing’s MQ-25 Stingray, an unmanned tanker designed to extend the reach of carrier air wings as well as smaller unmanned surface vehicles. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are being tested for reconnaissance, ship hull inspection, and mine countermeasures, such as General Dynamics Bluefin series and Northrop Grumman’s Manta Ray. Likewise, Ukraine has demonstrated the disruptive potential of low-cost, explosive-laden unmanned surface vessels (USVs), such as the Sea Baby 2024, against Russian Black Sea Fleet assets, revealing how small, inexpensive drones can damage or deter much larger naval forces. These developments signal a shift where unmanned systems are no longer supplementary but key capabilities in maritime warfare.

The Green Beret and the Identity Crisis We Can’t Ignore

Ken Robinson

The uncomfortable truth behind today’s “Special Forces identity crisis” is that it is not new. From Kennedy’s romanticized vision of unconventional warriors in the early 1960s, through the bitter lessons of Vietnam, the hollow post-war years, the birth of USSOCOM after Desert One, and twenty years of hyper-kinetic counterterrorism in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), U.S. Army Special Forces and the wider SOF enterprise have repeatedly drifted away from—and then fought to rediscover—their core purpose.

The latest round of this debate has been sharpened by COL (Ret.) Ed Croot’s JSOU study, “There Is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces: Who Are the Green Berets Supposed to Be?” and by COL (Ret.) Mark Grdovic’s subsequent commentary on doctrine and force employment.

Croot’s data-driven work demonstrates an erosion of shared narrative and internal coherence—what he calls an “existential drift”—as the Regiment has shifted from long-duration, politically attuned partner work toward short-term, transactional combat operations.

Why Does Steve Witkoff Keep Taking Russia’s Side?

Anne Applebaum

Pay attention to the dates, because the timing matters. Steve Witkoff spoke with Yuri Ushakov, a Russian official, on October 14. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky held a meeting with President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C., on October 17. Trump had been hinting that he would offer to sell Tomahawks, long-range cruise missiles, to the Ukrainian army. But he did not.

Why not? Perhaps because Ushakov listened to Witkoff’s advice and persuaded Russian President Vladimir Putin to call Trump on October 16. Witkoff, in other words, may have helped block that sale. And that would make Witkoff responsible for prolonging the war.

Pete Hegseth Is Wrong: America Needs Career Academics in the Service Academies

Yvonne Chiu

This anti-academic campaign taps into long-simmering tensions between career military and career academics across the range of military education institutions. During the COVID pandemic, a military professor and I found ourselves yelling at each other from 6 feet apart in an empty hallway at the Naval War College—where neither of us were supposed to be during the lockdown—about how to teach the course now that seminars had moved online and we could not cover as much material as we had in person. Some of the military professors who questioned the value of civilian professors saw an opportunity to stage a coup: to have each of the 15-or-so seminars teach the same three things from each case that they thought the students (also active-duty mid-career military) should learn, so that each student had a narrower but uniform education.

“We’re the ones who know what the students need—you should listen to us about what to teach!” the military professor shouted.

“Then why did you hire us?” I yelled back. “If you already know, then you don’t need academics to teach or develop the curriculum! You should just fire us!”

As he weighed saying, “What a great idea,” I continued: “You hired us because we have knowledge and skills that you don’t—so use it! Otherwise, why am I here? And not everyone in the military should be learning the same thing!”

With even more limited civilian academic input, the military academies and PME’s would deliver not education, but rather training—which certainly enhances lethality and wins battles, but lacks the broad knowledge and critical thinking necessary to win wars that genuine education provides.

From Kabul to Kyiv, Trump’s pattern is clear – negotiate with enemies, sideline allies

Mick Ryan

The past week’s events surrounding the new Russian-American plan to end the war in Ukraine provide an opportunity for America’s friends, allies and adversaries to reflect and learn about how much the US view of its role in the world has changed. The dedication of previous American administrations to preserving a world where the strong did not prey on the weak, and where changing borders by force was deterred by democracies with the Leader of the Free World at the forefront, is in its twilight.

During the first Trump administration, the United States conducted secret talks with the Taliban to end the Afghanistan war. The deal was negotiated without input from the Afghan government at the time. The final deal, known as the Doha Accord, had its ultimate manifestation in the humiliating, chaotic and tragic evacuation of troops and civilians in late August 2021. While blame was laid at the feet of the Biden administration, the foundations were cast by Trump.

Can the DoD Become a Lean, Mean, War-Fighting Machine?

Sam Raus

Government spending is often framed as a binary argument: Should we cut program funding or increase it? This tug-of-war dominates political debates across the federal, state, and local levels, surfacing in conversations about everything from healthcare subsidies to student loans.

Yet, this oversimplified dialogue misses a crucial question beneath the surface—what exactly are taxpayer dollars being spent on, and how efficiently are those funds being used? The challenge is not merely about how much the government spends, but whether that spending reflects modern priorities, strategic foresight, and fiscal responsibility.

As Congress begins its yearly review of defense appropriations through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026, this outdated “spend or cut” mindset deserves a serious overhaul. Defense spending is often treated as untouchable—an automatic area of increase justified by national security anxieties and global instability. But with the government spending over $1 trillion annually for defense, this legislation deserves stricter scrutiny.

Lawmakers like Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) argue that heightened threats from China, Russia, and Iran require surging budgets across the board. Yet even if America must strengthen its readiness, spending more should not exempt policymakers from scrutinizing where inefficiencies lie.

Saving and spending are not contradictory goals—they are complementary parts of good governance. Investing in advanced technologies, cyber defense systems, and next-generation weapons platforms should be accompanied by a willingness to phase out programs that no longer serve strategic needs.

Russia–Ukraine: turbulent diplomacy

The text was replete with contradictions, ambiguities and errors that betrayed a lack of legal or diplomatic expertise. Some parts suggested direct translation from Russian, while others drew on the recent Gaza peace plan, which addressed a fundamentally different conflict. Even its status – both a ‘memorandum’ and ‘legally binding’ – was unclear.

The terms heavily favoured Moscow. Russia would gain Ukrainian land (and, though unstated, people) beyond what it already occupied; regain full access to the global economy; and enjoy an amnesty for war crimes. European states, though not consulted, would be prevented from deploying forces in Ukraine; obliged to lift sanctions; and compelled to give America frozen Russian assets held in European financial systems. Ukraine would face restrictions on the size of its military and receive no credible security guarantees.

Strategy and the Last Manager: The Case for Dissenting War Studies

Jules J.S. Gaspard

James Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution is not, at first glance, a foundational text of war studies. Written in 1941 amid the cataclysm of the Second World War, it is most often treated as a work of political theory and historical prognostication. And yet, buried within its pages is a theory of war’s evolving function within society—one that has profound implications for the study of war itself.

For Burnham, war was not a mere eruption of violence or a failure of diplomacy; it was a mechanism of revolutionary transformation. It served as the crucible through which one form of social organisation—the feudal, the capitalist—was broken and replaced by another. In Burnham’s account, the First World War marked the death knell of capitalist hegemony. The Second World War heralded the rise of a new ruling class: the managers. The age of aristocratic warriors and capitalist entrepreneurs gave way to an era in which technical experts, bureaucrats and policy planners would not merely run the machinery of government and war—they would become its rationale.

By ‘managerialism’, Burnham meant something precise.[1] It was not simply administration or expertise, but a whole mode of social organisation in which control is exercised less through ownership or charisma than through the command of specialised knowledge, procedures and institutions. The managerial class is defined by its capacity to administer systems—economic, military, political—through technical expertise, credentialed authority and bureaucratic process. Its social domination lies not in direct command or traditional property rights but in planning, optimising, coordinating and regulating. It rules by managing.

CRINK in 10 Charts

Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, Maria Snegovaya, and Mona Yacoubian

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) are increasingly working together in ways that challenge the United States and global governance. The CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department released a series of briefs that leverage data to analyze the nature and degree of CRINK alignment across the economic, diplomatic, and security domains. This page draws on the data collected in those reports to highlight key insights, focusing on how China and Russia anchor CRINK cooperation and how Russia’s war in Ukraine has accelerated alignment among the four countries.

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea share a mutual desire to challenge U.S. and Western influence. Collectively, they can bring to bear considerable power on the world stage. CRINK countries are home to over one-fifth of the global population, and they generate one-quarter of global GDP. Militarily, the four countries account for roughly one-fifth of the world’s defense spending, and Russia, China, and North Korea collectively possess over half of all nuclear weapons

20 Characteristics of Special Operations by LTG Samuel V. Wilson

LTG Samuel V. Wilson

Special Operations is a root term/generic euphemism covering a wide gambit of special activities outside of conventional operations; examples are UW, PSYOP, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Direct Action (raids, snatches, heists), Diversions, and Deceptions, Special Operations is a form of military judo -

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