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It was not business as usual at China’s 2024 ‘Two Sessions’ meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Largely a rubber-stamping exercise, the NPC normally follows a formulaic pattern of events. In the past, the two weeks of meetings and discussions would have set the government’s course of action for the next year. In 2024, the NPC has been shortened to just seven days of meetings and presentations. This year’s NPC deviated from standard practice in two other important ways: no personnel appointments were announced, and the premier did not take questions following his speech on the government ‘work report’. Notwithstanding these two practical differences, nothing in the National Development and Reform Commission’s (NDRC) work report, the government budget report or the major political speeches suggests major changes in China’s foreign-policy trajectory are on the horizon.
The 2024 NPC comes at a time of continued economic malaise and domestic political challenges. At the meeting, the GDP growth target for 2024 was set vaguely at ‘around 5%’, which, although a cautious approach, is still considered ambitious by some domestic and international observers. The way the NPC has been run suggests these issues have not yet been resolved. The NPC was meant to be preceded by a Third Plenum – a five-yearly assembly at which the leadership sets out major economic policies and reforms – at the end of 2023. The plenum has been delayed since then. This is not unprecedented, as President Xi Jinping has delayed the meeting once before, holding the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 2018 Third Plenum in February 2019 instead. But as of yet, the 2023 Third Plenum has still not even been scheduled.
Xi’s tightening grip
The absence of personnel announcements from the congressional agenda marked a departure from previous years and fuelled speculation about Xi’s personalised control over Party procedure and potential instability within the Party. Many expected Liu Jianchao, a former ambassador to the Philippines, to be announced as the new foreign minister following the abrupt removal of Qin Gang from the role. Wang Yi, the Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CCP, will instead continue to serve as foreign minister for the time being.
In another break from tradition, Defence Minister Admiral Dong Jun has not yet been given a member seat on the Central Military Commission nor a state councillor position. Until he gains these two positions, his role in policy-making will be even more limited than the largely diplomatic role that defence ministers normally play. This indicates that, for the time being, foreign and defence policy will be decided by an increasingly small circle of Xi’s trusted allies and risks group think.
A refocused international agenda
China’s international policies are set to continue – albeit with a slightly different focus. The NDRC’s work report highlights the continued pursuit of a ‘high-quality’ Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – focussing on fewer large-scale infrastructure projects balanced with ‘small but beautiful’ projects. According to the report, digital, trade (including e-commerce), health and green tech will be key areas of activity, as will the development of a BRI legal-service system. The government will also focus on promoting and supporting Chinese investments abroad, as well as improving protections and risk control.
China’s bid for greater self-reliance means it is already pursuing indigenous innovation. This year’s work report highlighted new efforts to facilitate greater science and technology research and development across the country and in public and private sectors. Indeed, science and technology (S&T) innovation is a key priority as China faces heightened restrictions, led by the United States, on technology and core-components imports. China’s science and technology budget is set to increase by 10%, while support for basic research is set to increase by 13.1% in 2024.
However, the NDRC report also referenced the importance of pursuing science and technological innovation cooperation. Chinese universities and technology companies already collaborate with foreign counterparts in areas like joint artificial intelligence (AI) labs, and in 2023, BRICS countries agreed to deepen their S&T and innovation cooperation. Premier Li Qiang’s speech and the work report both promoted the further development of the Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative, though without detailing how.
Foreign engagement in Xi’s third term
Despite slowing growth, China’s foreign-policy ambitions will be bolstered by a not-insignificant budgetary increase. In 2024, the government will spend RMB60.8 billion (USD8.5bn) on diplomatic activity, an increase of 6.6% from RMB57.0bn (USD8.1bn) in 2023. Spending on diplomatic activity thus outpaces China’s economic growth target of 5%.
On 7 March, Wang Yi gave a foreign-policy press conference which complemented areas of Li’s Monday speech. The Sino-Russian relationship, noted Wang, is a strategic choice, and one that must be maintained ‘to keep pace with the trend of the world’, appearing to pit this relationship against the West’s continued criticism of it. Wang’s assertion that this form of ‘new major-country relations’ is based on ‘non-alliance, non-confrontation and not targeting any third party’ is unlikely to convince many in the West.
Indeed, Li’s speech and the NPC work report seemingly linked China’s economic picture to its deteriorating external environment, which they described as ‘more complex, grave, and uncertain’. Wang’s remarks appeared to attribute this partly to US and European actions. Wang questioned the United States’ confidence as a major power and accused it of being ‘obsessed’ with suppressing China. He pointed to the United States’ double standards designed to protect its own interests, attacking it for ‘persistently monopolis[ing] the high end of the value chain and keep[ing] China at the low end’. While Wang was critical of the European Union’s tripartite strategy towards China – by which it approaches Beijing as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival – he emphasised both parties’ interest in mutual cooperation.
Wang’s promotion of an ‘equal multipolar world’ – in which all countries enjoy the same rights regardless of their ‘strength’ – is somewhat ironic at a time of heightened scrutiny, from the US and some Asian countries, of the Chinese military’s increasingly assertive and aggressive actions. In his remarks, Wang warned Southeast Asian and other countries operating in the South China Sea not to abuse China’s good faith.
Declining western investment and business confidence in China has been of concern to Beijing. Li’s speech called for opening up new areas of the Chinese economy to foreign investment with fewer restrictions, as well as strengthening intellectual property (IP) protection in China. However, investment from the West is likely to continue to decrease as countries look to derisk their supply chains. The amendments to the State Secrets Law passed at this NPC and the Counter-Espionage Law enacted in July 2023 have created greater uncertainty around the stability of foreign investments and operations in China, and will likely work against Beijing’s efforts to reassure investors.
For China, emerging and developing countries will become increasingly important: the NPC work report notes that 46% of China’s total trade in 2023 was with BRI member countries. Wang likened China and Africa to ‘brothers’, and pointed to the Global South as a ‘key force for reforming the international order’. That said, China’s intention to join existing agreements such as the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership remains unchanged, though uncertain, as members in these groupings grow increasingly concerned about Chinese revisionism of the rules-based international order.
Beijing’s language on reunification
There were no major changes to cross-strait policy in Li’s speech, despite his omission to refer to reunification as ‘peaceful’, which itself is not unprecedented. Wang’s remarks on 7 March reiterated China’s support for peaceful reunification even as he warned that reunification is inevitable. Wang’s comments linked global stability and peace with a strong commitment to the One China principle (incorrectly asserting that the CCP’s One China principle is already an international consensus, when the majority of countries adhere only to a One China policy).
Ahead of Taiwan’s presidential inauguration on 20 May, it is possible that Beijing wishes to signal the strength of its resolve to achieve reunification, or to pressure president-elect Lai Ching-te (William) into acknowledging the 1992 Consensus. This signalling will be bolstered by the defence-budget increase of 7.2% for this year, with defence remaining a priority for China.
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