Tahir Azad
Introduction
The recent war between Iran and Israel has elevated hypersonic weapons from specialized military periodicals to the forefront of conversations regarding Gulf geopolitics. Iran’s potential deployment of basic hypersonic weapons has prompted Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to advance missile technology, speed, survivability, and penetration to counter evolving regional defenses. Analysts dispute Tehran’s claims, distinguishing “fast ballistic” missiles from true hypersonic glide vehicles. The conflict illustrated the considerable psychological and political impact of the hypersonic narrative: what ramifications does this present for Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Manama, Kuwait City, and Muscat if concentrated barrages and unique flight paths can undermine Israel’s multi-layered defense system? The existing solution comprises enhanced collaboration on integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) spearheaded by the US, targeted research into domestic strike and counter-hypersonic technologies, and strategic hedging among principal suppliers, particularly given that China and Russia aim to convert their hypersonic investments into arms transactions and geopolitical leverage.
An effective starting point is to examine the technical and political context of Iran’s assertions on hypersonic weapons throughout the conflict. Tehran asserted that it employed hypersonic weapons during and subsequent to the conflict, frequently referencing the term “Fattah” to substantiate these assertions. However, specialists in open-source technology were uncertain whether the missiles in issue exhibited the long-range maneuverability and low-altitude flight characteristics typical of contemporary hypersonic glide vehicles. The configuration of Arrow and David’s Sling atop Patriot and Aegis, supported by partners, maintained elevated interception rates.
US Push for Regional Air Defense
The United States is leveraging the Iran-Israel conflict to propose a long-discussed concept: a comprehensive regional air and missile defense system that would combine sensors, interceptors, and command-and-control across national boundaries. In late May 2024, Washington conducted U.S.–GCC Defense Working Groups on integrated air and missile defense and marine security in Riyadh. The insights gained during the Iran-Israel interaction demonstrated that collaboration is preferable to isolation. The proposal envisioned real-time data sharing, common operating pictures, and de-conflicted interceptor employment—ingredients that would be indispensable against maneuvering or depressed-trajectory threats. All of these measures are necessary to safeguard against threats that are in motion or descending. The proposal arrived at an opportune moment for Gulf officials who were abruptly altering their strategies and assessing the associated risks. But it also went against people’s concerns about sovereignty, data security, and the political repercussions of openly coordinating defense, especially when working together can be regarded as supporting Israel.
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