After Op Sindoor Losses, How Pakistan Reworking Its Asymmetric Aerial Doctrine To Counter India’s S-400 Air Defence Shield

RonitBisht

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Following the intense aerial clashes of Operation Sindoor in May 2025, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has initiated a sweeping transformation of its combat strategy. Prompted by the reported destruction of multiple fighter jets and a critical Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, Islamabad is abandoning its historical reliance on conventional fighter-to-fighter engagements. Instead, the military is pivoting towards asymmetric tactics, stand-off strikes, and network disruption, aimed squarely at bypassing India’s formidable S-400 Triumf long-range air defence shield.

The Rear-Tier Buffer Zone​While Islamabad has officially dismissed reports of heavy aircraft losses as exaggerated, its recent military deployments suggest a more cautious reality. Crucial, high-value platforms—specifically refuelling tankers and AEW&C surveillance planes—have been relocated far from the Indian border. By shifting these assets deep inland to military facilities like Pasni and Jacobabad, the PAF intends to keep them safely out of the S-400's lethal engagement range.

Were Foreign Nationals and Myanmar Rebel Groups Plotting an Attack Against India?

Rajeev Bhattacharyya

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A morning drill at the military headquarters of Chin National Front (Camp Victoria) in Myanmar’s Chin State.Credit: Rajeev Bhattacharyya

The arrest of six Ukrainian nationals and a U.S. citizen in India for entering the northeastern state of Mizoram without permission and engaging with rebel groups in Myanmar has put the spotlight on the covert entry and activities of foreign nationals to restricted zones in the country and their journeys to neighboring Myanmar.

The National Investigation Agency (NIA), the anti-terror agency handling the case, has alleged that the group was making efforts to train some ethnic armed organizations (EAO) linked to insurgent outfits in India’s Northeast, as well as supplying the EAOs with weapons from Europe, including drones. All the accused have been booked under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.

Why Africa Is Key To New Delhi’s Strategic Autonomy – Analysis

Raghvendra Kumar

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(FPRI) — The ongoing military conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has once again exposed that war and conflict not only carry significant human costs but also reveal deep structural vulnerabilities in the global economic and energy systems. The conflict has raised concerns about further escalation amidst the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint, triggering volatility in oil and natural gas markets. As a result, major oil and gas producing states in the Gulf region have declared force majeure due to the lack of export pathways.

While the objective of the US and Israeli-led “Operation Epic Fury” remains clear—that is, to limit Iran’s ability to project military power beyond its borders—the tactical approach adopted to achieve this has been to paralyze Iran’s command and control structure, particularly among its top political and military leadership. The early, coordinated, and targeted strikes appear to have functioned as “decapitation strikes,” aimed at disrupting decision-making and reducing Iran’s ability to coordinate a response, thereby weakening its ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against the United States, Israel, and their allies.

Caught Between Pakistan and the Iran War: What Comes Next for Afghanistan?

Mustafa Saqib

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In the rugged geography of the Hindu Kush, isolation has long been a tool of survival. But for the Taliban-led administration in early 2026, that isolation has become a trap. Afghanistan currently finds itself physically and economically squeezed by two volatile fronts. To the east, a long-simmering border dispute with Pakistan has boiled over into what Islamabad officially declared an “open war” on February 27.

To the west, a high-intensity conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has turned Afghanistan’s primary alternative trade route into a high-risk combat zone. The conflict in Iran, triggered by massive Israeli-U.S. strikes on February 28, has escalated into a sustained naval and aerial campaign. With U.S. carrier strike groups enforcing a partial blockade on Iranian ports to neutralize drone launch sites, maritime trade in the Gulf of Oman has effectively stalled.

War, Shipping, And Bangladesh As A Risk-Absorbing Maritime Node

Jianbo Wu

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When risk rises along the artery through which a significant share of the world’s energy flows, the first-order effects are familiar: insurance premiums climb, routes are reconsidered, and freight rates begin to move. But beneath these adjustments lies a quieter disruption — one that exposes a structural weakness in the global maritime system. The issue is not simply whether goods can move. It is whether the system can replace capacity fast enough when it is strained.

For decades, global shipbuilding has been organized around efficiency and scale. The world’s largest yards — clustered in China, South Korea, and, to a lesser extent, Japan — have steadily moved up the value chain, concentrating on technologically complex, capital-intensive vessels. China alone now accounts for more than half of global shipbuilding output, with order books stretching years into the future. Capacity has never been more advanced. It has also rarely been less flexible.

China deploys 42 ships and hundreds of oceanic sensors to prepare for submarine warfare against the US Navy.

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China deployed a network of 42 research vessels and hundreds of oceanic sensors to map subsea environments across the Pacific, Indian, and Arctic oceans, building a detailed operational dataset to support submarine warfare against the U.S. Navy.

The multi-year campaign combines seabed mapping and real-time environmental monitoring to enhance underwater navigation, concealment, and sonar performance in strategically contested maritime zones. Spanning across key chokepoints and naval corridors near Taiwan, Guam, and the Malacca Strait, this new capability directly strengthens China’s anti-submarine warfare and operational framework by enabling precise prediction of sonar conditions and optimized submarine operations in regions used by US and allied naval forces.

Beijing tightens drone rules, citing ‘low-altitude security’ concerns

Liu Zhen

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Citing security concerns, Beijing will significantly restrict drone sales, storage and transport after tightening regulation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Chinese capital’s airspace, according to state media.

Beijing has banned the sale or lease of UAVs and 17 designated “core components” to any person or organisation unless granted public security approval, according to the regulation approved by the municipal legislative body on Friday.

Bringing new drones or core components into Beijing’s administrative area would also be forbidden, state news agency Xinhua reported. It noted there would be an exception for drones that had already undergone real-name registration and were being carried by verified owners.

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan

Erik Green

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On 12 March 2026, China concluded its annual ‘Two Sessions’ – a large political meeting of delegates from China’s legislative body, the National People’s Congress, and its advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. At this year’s gathering, delegates approved China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP), which outlines the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) developmental objectives for 2026–30. This was President Xi Jinping’s third FYP as leader, delivered at a time of slowing economic growth, internal instability following last year’s widespread anti-corruption campaign and global uncertainty due to the ongoing war in Iran.

The 15th FYP highlights several points of continuity in the CCP’s strategic ambitions – namely its aim to achieve technological supremacy and self-reliance. More importantly, however, the FYP also emphasises a growing concern regarding internal and external risks that may threaten these ambitions and outlines how the CCP plans to mitigate them. As the CCP faces an increasingly unpredictable external environment as well as continued challenges at home, it is investing in enhanced early-warning and risk-monitoring systems. To achieve these ambitions and coordinate risk assessments, improvements in centre–local party relations and information flows will be key.

Winning in Iran Requires More Than Military Success

Craig Wonson

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Over the past several weeks, coverage of the conflict with Iran has followed a consistent pattern. Media reports have focused primarily on airstrikes, missile sites destroyed, drones intercepted, and other visible measures of military activity. While this coverage captures viewers’ attention and offers a snapshot of events, it risks reinforcing the perception that tactical military success equates to "winning," even as the strategic outcome remains unclear.

No military strategy can succeed without success at the tactical level. Tactical actions are complex, demanding, and often conducted at great risk, requiring a high degree of competence and professionalism. Yet the issue is not whether such actions matter. It is how they align with broader objectives that contribute to a desired political endstate.

Iran War Weekly Update – 28 Mar 2026

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During the past week of Operation Epic Fury, U.S. and Israeli military operations continued to degrade Iranian military capability while strategic challenges became more pronounced. The United States and its partners maintained a high operational tempo, targeting missile infrastructure, naval assets, and military production facilities. However, Iran’s leadership structure has demonstrated resilience, and Tehran continues to leverage its geographic control of the Strait of Hormuz to exert pressure on global energy markets. Diplomatic activity increased, with competing ceasefire proposals reflecting widening gaps between Washington and Tehran over acceptable end-state conditions. Meanwhile, regional escalation risks remain elevated as proxy activity persists in Lebanon and Iranian missile and drone attacks continue against Gulf state infrastructure.

At the operational level, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reports significant degradation of Iranian naval and missile capabilities. However, strategic objectives remain less clearly defined, raising questions regarding the long-term trajectory of the conflict. Economic effects, alliance cohesion challenges, and growing munitions expenditure pressures suggest that the conflict may be entering a transitional phase where political outcomes increasingly shape military decision-making.

Exclusive: U.S. can only confirm about a third of Iran's missile arsenal destroyed, sources say

Phil Stewart, Idrees Ali, Jonathan Landay and Erin Banco

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One of the sources said the intelligence was similar for Iran's drone capability, saying there was some degree of certainty about a third having been destroyed.

The assessment, which has not been previously reported, shows that while most of Iran's missiles are either destroyed or inaccessible, Tehran still has a significant missile inventory and may be able to recover some buried or damaged missiles once fighting stops.

The intelligence stands in contrast to President Donald Trump's public remarks on Thursday that Iran ​had "very few rockets left". He also appeared to acknowledge the threat from remaining Iranian missiles and drones to any future U.S. operations to safeguard the economically vital Strait of Hormuz.

Reuters first reported that he is weighing whether to escalate ​the conflict by deploying U.S. troops to Iranian shores along the Strait.

"The problem with the straits is this: let's say we do a great job. We say we got 99% (of their ⁠missiles). 1% is unacceptable, because 1% is a missile going into the hull of a ship that cost a billion dollars," Trump said at a televised Cabinet meeting on Thursday.

How risky would a US assault on Iran’s Kharg Island be — and why might Trump consider it

Billy Stockwell

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Even as US President Donald Trump has declared the “war has been won” with Iran, amphibious warships, landing craft and thousands of Marines and sailors are being deployed to the region. The deployment has caused speculation to swirl over whether the US plans to capture Kharg Island, a coral outcrop off Iran’s coast and an economic lifeline for Tehran that handles roughly 90% of the country’s crude oil exports.

Even if Washington successfully took the tiny but strategic island, experts have questioned whether this would give the US enough leverage to force Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz amid a spiraling global energy crisis.

The Strait of Hormuz Is Burning, But China Is Not Panicking

James Char

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On paper, the ongoing Israeli-U.S. offensives against Iran have turned into a nightmare for many countries due to the concomitant oil and gas crunch. As the factory of the world, China should be no different given roughly half of its crude oil and condensate imports come from the Gulf producers: Iran, as well as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and others.

Regarding the blockaded Strait of Hormuz at the center of the world’s attention, about 20 percent of global oil and 20 percent of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade flows through the chokepoint – with roughly 80 percent of the volume sold to Asia. However, in the weeks since the conflict began on February 28, Beijing has appeared self-assured.

The West Is Losing To Iran, And Not For The Reasons You Think – OpEd

Suminda Jayasundera

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Four weeks ago, the United States and Israel set out to break Iran. Today, Iran is battered, leaderless, and more isolated than it’s ever been — and somehow, it’s still winning.

Think about what’s been accomplished: Khamenei assassinated, air defenses shredded, nuclear facilities in ruins. By any conventional military scorecard, that’s an overwhelming result. And yet Iran has already made its most consequential move: it’s closing the Strait of Hormuz. Not with a navy. With cheap drones and a willingness to absorb whatever gets thrown at it. Oil prices are spiking. The global economy is running out of runway. The decapitation worked. The strategy didn’t. And understanding why gets at something the West has fundamentally misread about Iran — not just in this campaign, but for decades.

U.S. Security Guarantees Under Scrutiny In Gulf States

James Durso

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The Arab states of the Persian Gulf have suffered major economic and security costs in the wake of the U.S./Israeli attack on Iran. Iranian missile and drone retaliation hit airports, ports, and energy infrastructure, disrupting aviation, trade, tourism, and hydrocarbon exports, and damaging the Gulf’s reputation as a stable business hub.

Attacks on shipping and energy facilities, such as the disruption at Fujairah port and the Shah gas field in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), show how quickly a U.S./Israel war on Iran can spill over onto Gulf territory. Or “What happens in Iran doesn’t stay in Iran.” UAE businessman Khalaf Ahmad al-Habtoor, a former business partner of U.S. president Donald Trump, publicly castigated Trump, “You have placed the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] and the Arab countries at the heart of a danger they did not choose…Who gave you permission to turn our region into a battlefield?” If Habtoor represents elite thinking in the Gulf, and local sources confirm he does, Gulf countries will reduce their future exposure to the U.S. They might:

The Iran War Is Reshaping Asia’s Energy Security Strategies

Joshua Kurlantzick

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In a matter of weeks, the Iran war has generated massive uncertainty about the future of the Middle East and rocked the global economy. The price of oil has skyrocketed as Tehran has essentially closed the critical Strait of Hormuz and many oil and liquefied natural gas producers in the Persian Gulf have shuttered or cut back operations. Every major stock market has fallen since the war started, and central bankers, economists and policymakers have projected that a drawn-out war could cause inflation to spike and undermine economic growth worldwide.

According to the International Monetary Fund’s managing director, Kristalina Georgieva, a 10 percent increase in energy prices that lasts a year would increase global inflation by 40 basis points and slow global economic growth. Indeed, the war has already plunged the world into its “largest-ever” disruption in oil supplies, according to the International Energy Agency.

Here’s how the US military could reopen the Strait of Hormuz — from boots on the ground to air assaults

Caitlin Doornbos

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WASHINGTON — As President Trump cranks up pressure on Iran, Pentagon brass are quietly lining up a wide menu of military options — which could put US boots on the ground in a major war for the first time in nearly half a decade. For now, Trump is pursuing a dual-track strategy: building overwhelming military pressure while leaving the door open to a deal — even extending a Friday deadline for Tehran to meet US demands.

Meanwhile, thousands of US troops, including elements of the elite 82nd Airborne Division, are surging into the region alongside Air Force, Navy and Marine assets — a show of force designed to box Tehran into negotiations while preparing for a potential clash. What’s more, the Pentagon is reportedly considering a plan to send an additional 10,000 troops to the Middle East amid the war with Iran, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Iran targets US public opinion with online information war

Joanna YORK

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When President Donald Trump announced in a social media video on February 28 that the United States and Israel had launched strikes on Iran, he kickstarted a war that has engulfed the Middle East. But he also sparked an online information war that analysts say has been dominated by the use of AI-generated content to spread fake news about the conflict

One study from Clemson University in South Carolina found that, within 24 hours of the US and Israel launching attacks on Iran, dozens of social media accounts affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had begun posting Iranian propaganda about the war, some of which reached an audience of millions.

America Needs Cognitive Civil Defense

David Maxwell

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Thucydides showed that fear, honor, and interest move states. Clausewitz taught that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Mao described politics as war without bloodshed and war as politics with bloodshed. Sun Tzu wrote what is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy’s strategy. These were not ancient observations. They are field manuals for today. The battlefield has expanded. It now sits inside the mind.

A democracy stands on what its citizens believe is true. If they cannot judge truth, they cannot judge policy. If they cannot judge policy, they cannot guide power. An adversary does not need to win elections or battles. He only needs to erode trust. Russia proved this. Its operations did not seek one vote or one law. They sought doubt. Doubt in media. Doubt in institutions. Doubt in each other. So ask. What does an enemy want us to think? What decisions does he want us to make? What actions does he want us to take? If we cannot answer, we are only reacting and already losing.

One month into Iran war, some Trump objectives are unfulfilled as he looks to wind down the conflict

MICHELLE L. PRICE

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WASHINGTON (AP) — President Donald Trump has listed five objectives that the U.S. wants to achieve before ending its war with Iran. Now, one month into the conflict, he has suggested the U.S. may soon be “winding down” the operation, even though some of his key aims remain undefined or unfulfilled.

Trump last week outlined five goals for the massive air campaign. That’s up from four laid out by his staff since the war’s start on Feb. 28 (and up from the three generally enumerated by the Pentagon and Secretary of State Marco Rubio). Though the Trump administration has said its objectives are clear and unchanging, the list of priorities has expanded and shifted as the war has taken a toll on the global economy, tested alliances and raised unanswered questions about the planning for the conflict, its justification and its aftermath.

How Trump’s Plot to Grab Iran's Nuclear Fuel Would Actually Work

Caroline Haskins

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President Donald Trump and top defense officials are reportedly weighing whether to send ground troops to Iran in order to retrieve the country’s highly enriched uranium. However, the administration has shared little information about which troops would be deployed, how they would retrieve the nuclear material, or where the material would go next.

“People are going to have to go and get it,” secretary of state Marco Rubio said at a congressional briefing earlier this month, referring to the possible operation.

There are some indications that an operation is close on the horizon. On Tuesday, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Pentagon has imminent plans to deploy 3,000 brigade combat troops to the Middle East. (At the time of writing, the order has not been made.) The troops would come from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, which specializes in “joint forcible entry operations.” On Wednesday, Iran’s government rejected Trump’s 15-point plan to end the war, and White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said that the president “is prepared to unleash hell” in Iran if a peace deal is not reached—a plan some lawmakers have reportedly expressed concern about.

Transforming Army Education: The Leadership Laboratory

David Duckett 

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Modern warfare is characterized by continual change, driven by rapidly evolving technology and the growing interconnectedness worldwide. To achieve success in this complex environment, as outlined in the Army’s operating concept, the United States Army requires a new model of leadership. Leaders must demonstrate agility, adaptability, resilience, and innovation to navigate uncertainty and ambiguity. The predictable battlefields of the past have evolved into multidomain operational environments where information, cyberspace, and cognitive factors are as decisive as traditional combat power. This environment requires not only tactical proficiency but also cognitive dominance.

In response, Army University is spearheading a fundamental transformation of military education in order to better deliver warfighting capability to the operational force. This initiative moves beyond time-worn instructional models to forge the critical and creative thinkers the Army needs for 2030 and beyond. This is not a superficial update to curricula but a shift in the approach to adult learning, moving away from lecture-based instruction to a student-centric model. The new paradigm prioritizes intellectual agility over rote memorization, active problem-solving over passive reception of information, and collaborative learning over solitary study. It recognizes that in the twenty-first century, the ability to learn, as well as unlearn, is the most critical strategic advantage.

How Iran Aims To Win The War

Neville Teller

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The success or failure of the US-Israeli military operation in Iran hangs in the balance​. It is very largely dependent upon how ​”success​” is finally adjudged.

Since February 28 the Iranian regime has sustained a massive armed offensive, and as a result its resources and its infrastructure have been substantially depleted. US President Donald Trump has on several occasions detailed the vast losses Iran has ​incurred, and hinted that he is on the verge of declaring victory. At other times he has indicated that he has considerably more in reserve by way of military power,​ including the possible use of American troops, to be used in loosening Iran’s grip on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and ensuring the unconditional surrender of the regime.

Trump has been criticized for the apparent inconsistency of his various statements, which to some seem ill considered. They are, however, just as likely to be a deliberate strategy aimed at keeping the enemy, and perhaps the world at large, guessing as to his calculated and detailed plans for the end-game.

Gulf Leaders Didn’t Want the Iran War. They Need Trump to Win It Anyway.

Steven A. Cook

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Throughout four weeks of war, Iran has continued to make the United States’ Gulf partners pay a price for Operation Epic Fury and Israel’s Operation Roaring Lion. The Iranians have fired thousands of missiles and dronesat their neighbors, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) bearing the brunt of the assault. There is also significant damage to energy infrastructure in Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

From the first days of the conflict, part of the Islamic Republic’s strategy was immediately clear: inflict significant pain on Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia so that they would in turn pressure the United States (and by extension, Israel) to end the hostilities. It was a miscalculation. Gulf leaders did not want the war and have privately expressed frustration with the United States and Israel for causing chaos in the region, but they have not pressured President Donald Trump to stop the U.S. attacks. Instead, Saudis, Emiratis, Qataris, and others have closed ranks with each other, signaled that they have a considerable stake in the war’s outcome, and counseled the Trump administration not to end military operations prematurely.

Mapping the damage: Iranian strikes on the GCC

Ellen Clarke

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Since the US and Israel began their air campaign against Iran, the Islamic Republic has launched wide-ranging drone and missile attacks against all six GCC states. The damage inflicted is intended to put pressure on them, spread the cost of the war and expose the limits of US capabilities and will. Iran’s decision to strike its neighbours will reshape how they define their security and defence priorities.

While only a few of the more than 4,000 Iranian projectiles launched against the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have hit their intended targets as of 19 March 2026, they have sent shockwaves across global energy, industrial and financial markets. Iran had already targeted energy infrastructure in 2019 and the United States’ military sites in the Gulf in 2025, but its current response is qualitatively and quantitatively different and has firmly crossed red lines that the GCC had hoped would be safeguarded by their diplomacy and ostensible neutrality. Iran has systemically targeted military, energy and other economic sites as part of a strategy of asymmetric warfare that has left no country unaffected. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait have been disproportionately attacked, while Oman and Qatar, Iran’s traditional interlocutors, have also suffered material damage.

After Modi: Political Leadership and the Future of Indian Foreign Policy

Rohan Mukherjee

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By the time of India’s next national election in 2029, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be 78 years old. At present, it is unclear whether he will run for another term. It is equally unclear who within his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), might succeed him when he eventually retires. In the latter scenario, the BJP itself may be in a difficult electoral position without Modi’s personal charisma and mass following. This unclear line of succession in the BJP could lead to India’s current political opposition, led by the Indian National Congress party, winning the first election of the post-Modi era and consolidating power for itself and its allies with an eye on future electoral cycles.

Against this backdrop, this essay identifies two individuals from within Modi’s own party and from within the opposition as representing the next generation of India’s political leaders. They are Yogi Adityanath, who is a seasoned BJP leader and currently chief minister of Uttar Pradesh (India’s most populous state), and Rahul Gandhi, who is de facto leader of the Congress party and leader of the opposition in the lower house of parliament. Both Adityanath and Gandhi are in their early 50s, at least 20 years younger than Modi, and therefore positioned for long periods of rule, making them “next generation” in terms of age and political longevity as well. Both have already spent long periods in politics, though neither has held a position in the executive branch of government at the national level.

The Infantry Division Transformed: Four Fighting Principles

James "Jay" Bartholomees and Greg Scheffler

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The US Army is rediscovering the division as the warfighting formation. During the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the brigade combat team became the Army’s primary warfighting unit. Brigades trained, deployed, and fought largely independently. Company commanders and platoon leaders were responsible for integrating attached fire support teams, engineers, intelligence collectors, and signal assets into maneuver formations. Successful integration depended on early collaboration, integrated leader development, and habitual relationships. When these conditions were absent, integration became improvisation under the pressure of final manifest call and line-of-departure actions.

Modern battlefields demand longer ranges, more sensors, and tighter coordination between warfighting functions. Many of those capabilities that were previously pushed to the tactical edge now sit at the division level. Consolidating capabilities such as artillery, intelligence, signal, cyber, and electronic warfare at this level reflects the realities of the changing character of warfare—and makes the Army more lethal and more optimized for the modern battlefield, particularly in the long-range joint fight of the Pacific.

Pakistan’s Afghan Frankenstein: The beast is loose and Europe is unsuspecting

Konstantinos Bogdanos

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Is Pakistan finally facing the monster it created? Is Europe prepared for the consequences? The answer is in the smoke rising over the Durand Line. For decades, the Islamabad establishment has played a dangerous game, nurturing the Taliban as a strategic depth agent against India. Today, this plan backfires, and the resulting explosion of violence threatens to send a fresh wave of illegal immigration toward the already strained borders of the European Union.

The “open war” declared by Defence Minister Khawaja Asif marks the end of a thirty-year illusion. The apprentice has not only left the master. He has now turned openly against him. The March 16 strike on Kabul was the moment masks fell. When Pakistani warplanes hammered a rehabilitation centre in the heart of the Afghan capital, the “Islamic brotherhood” of the two neighbours officially ceased to be.

The Gulf States in the Shadow of the War with Iran

Yoel Guzansky

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The war with Iran has placed the Gulf states, against their will, at the heart of the confrontation. Iran identified the Gulf states as an “underbelly” and potential lever of pressure on the United States to shorten the duration of the campaign. Nevertheless, despite the Iranian attacks on their territory, they have thus far refrained from openly joining the campaign and have preferred a cautious policy: allowing other forces to operate from their territory while undertaking limited offensive actions with plausible deniability. 

This policy reflects their concern that Iranian attacks against them will intensify, along with uncertainty regarding the American war objectives. From the perspective of the Gulf states, a key test of the campaign’s outcome is not only the extent of the damage inflicted on Iran, but also, and above all, whether a regional-international framework will emerge that can prevent Iran from rebuilding its capabilities. This article examines the central question of the extent to which the war undermines the logic underlying the hedging strategy that the Gulf states adopted toward Iran or whether it precisely underscores its necessity. It also assesses the implications of the war and the reality that will emerge in its wake for Israel’s relations with the Gulf states while presenting possible opportunities and risks that may limit their realization.

"Iran Must Only Succeed Once to Trigger a Catastrophe"

Claus Hecking

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For days, U.S. President Donald Trump has been trying to end the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz imposed by Iran as a result of the war. He has ordered military facilities on Iran’s oil-loading island of Kharg to be bombed. He has threatened to destroy the oil terminals. And he is calling on other countries to send warships into the Strait of Hormuz.

S. Clinton Hinote is a retired three-star U.S. Air Force general. In the mid-2000s, under U.S. President George W. Bush, he developed scenarios for a possible war against Iran. He says that every military option for securing the Strait of Hormuz involves risks that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to eliminate.

Bottling the World Economy

Adam Hanieh

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Amid the destruction of the US–Israeli war against Iran, much of the world’s attention has fixed on the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passage through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passes. In normal times ships traversing the Strait—which runs between Oman and the United Arab Emirates on one bank and Iran on the other—follow a pair of two-mile-wide lanes for inbound and outbound traffic, separated by a two-mile buffer. Shortly after the onset of the war Iran began attacking commercial vessels and laying mines in the waterway, effectively shutting it to most marine traffic. As of March 18 around 3,200 ships were stranded in the Gulf, with only a handful of tankers permitted to pass each day.

The disruption of this vital artery has sent markets into convulsions, with the international price benchmark for Brent crude oil briefly surging to nearly $120 a barrel on March 9, its highest level since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sparked panic. Donald Trump has urged Western allies to help escort tankers through the Strait in an effort to keep prices in check, so far finding no takers; more recently he has threatened to strike Iran’s power plants if its government refuses to reopen the waterway. Oil, in this sense, has become a proxy for the war’s nearly incalculable costs.

Prepare for turbulence - how a prolonged Middle East conflict could reshape how we fly

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It was once a humble outpost in the world of global aviation, a dusty overnight halt for luxury flying boats making the arduous journey from the UK to far-flung parts of the British Empire, such as India and Australia. By the 1960s, it had a simple runway made of desert sand, used as a refuelling stop by airliners en route to arguably more exotic destinations.

Yet today, Dubai is one of the key pillars of the industry, and Dubai International Airport (DXB) is its beating heart. In 2024, more than 92 million passengers made their way through its gleaming, marble-floored halls and sparkling, brightly lit shopping malls.

‘Everything After This Will Be Harder’: Gen. Stanley McChrystal on Iran

David French

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Did President Trump fall for the myth of surgical warfare? Gen. Stanley McChrystal joins the columnist David French, both veterans of the Iraq war, to discuss what may have been overlooked in the planning of Operation Epic Fury. McChrystal, who retired from the Army in 2010, argues that the United States often overestimates the decisive power of aerial bombing while underestimating the weight of historical grievance. And the general weighs in on the current culture of bravado coming from the secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth.

‘Everything After This Will Be Harder’: Gen. Stanley McChrystal on IranDavid French talks with the retired general about the “great seduction” America fell for in Iran. Below is a transcript of an episode of “The Opinions.” We recommend listening to it in its original form for the full effect. You can do so using the player above or on the NYTimes app, Apple, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcasts.

USS Gerald Ford limps out of hot war and into embarrassment. Why?

Dan Grazier

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A March 12 fire that injured 200 sailors is just the latest embarrassing incident in the history of the USS Gerald R. Ford. The vaunted aircraft carrier has become a case study demonstrating how such a program will fail when policymakers prioritize economic and political concerns over military effectiveness. Navy leaders pulled their premier ship from the front lines after the laundry room fire and sent it to the island of Crete, where it will undergo urgent repairs for at least a week.

Construction on the Ford began in 2009, but the ship wasn’t commissioned until July 2017. Even then, the ship was far from ready for service. It took another five years for the Navy to put the ship to sea on its first operational deployment.

The Countdown to a Ground War

Thomas Wright

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Donald Trump announced this week that the United States and Iran had made significant progress in negotiations, and he was allowing five days to reach a deal. Tehran denied that it was talking with Washington at all. This is not, in any meaningful sense, a negotiation: It is a countdown.

The timing is not coincidental. Thousands of Marines and much of the 1st Brigade of the 82nd Airborne are en route to the Middle East. Trump may intend the talks to act as cover for an escalation decision already made. Even if he doesn’t, the structural reality is the same: When the deadline expires, he will be close to having significant ground-combat capability in the region and a collapsing diplomatic process to justify using it.

Ukraine signs deal with Saudi Arabia offering drone expertise

Vitaly ShevchenkoKyiv

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President Volodymyr Zelensky says Ukraine has signed a deal with Saudi Arabia to share its drone defence expertise and technology. Zelensky said Saudi Arabia was facing the same type of ballistic missile and drone attacks from Iran that Ukraine had been resisting for more than four years from Russia. "We are ready to share our expertise and systems with Saudi Arabia and to work together to strengthen the protection of lives," he said in a post on X.

Ahead of a meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Zelensky posted that the defence deal laid the foundation for future contracts, technological cooperation and investment. "Saudi Arabia also has capabilities that are of interest to Ukraine, and this cooperation can be mutually beneficial," the Ukrainian president added. Zelensky said he had also discussed with Mohammed bin Salman reports that Russia was assisting Iran's regime, as well as developments in the fuel market and energy co-operation.

The world is rediscovering chokepoints — and they are not just geographic

Duncan Wood

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Commercial vessels are pictured offshore in Dubai on March 11, 2026. New attacks hit three commercial ships in the Gulf on March 11, with one of the vessels in flames as Iran pressed its campaign against its oil-exporting neighbours, threatening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and plunging the global energy economy into crisis. (Photo by AFP via Getty Images).

As Middle East tensions rise, the Strait of Hormuz has again become a focal point for policymakers and markets. Roughly one-fifth of globally traded oil passes through that narrow waterway. Any disruption reverberates immediately through global energy prices and, ultimately, the wallets of American consumers.

But focusing solely on Hormuz risks missing the bigger picture. The real story of the global economy in 2026 is not a single chokepoint. It is the proliferation of chokepoints: across geography, infrastructure, industry and even the digital world. These bottlenecks form the hidden architecture of the global economy. And increasingly, they are becoming the terrain on which economic competition and geopolitical rivalry are fought.

When the war is interested in you

Karl Pfefferkorn

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German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier may not be interested in the war with Iran, but that war is certainly interested in Germany. The oil and gas it desperately needs flows through the Straits of Hormuz, which can be secured only by the US Navy. The ballistic missile attack on Diego Garcia shows Iran’s strategic reach now encompasses Berlin, Rome and Warsaw. The nightmare scenario under which an economically weak Iran could blackmail the mighty European Union is forestalled only by the layered ballistic missile defense constructed at great cost by the United States, which includes satellites, ground based radars, and interceptors both ashore and on US ships based in Rota, Spain (hello Pedro Sanchez, and welcome to the party!). The two-stage rockets fired by Iran are clearly sized for use with an atomic weapon, should the current campaign fail to end the nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic.

Rather than express gratitude for American defence against this alarming new Iranian capability, Steinmeier parroted Germany’s traditional faith in international law and the moribund Joint Consultative Plan of Action negotiated by President Obama. That this deal would have ended all restrictions on uranium enrichment a full year ago, and never placed any limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programmes troubles Steinmeier not at all. Apparently words on paper have a magical power far superior to the tawdry complexities of missile defence. The possibility that the inadequacies of the JCPOA encouraged rather than hindered the covert development of hostile capabilities is a notion beyond the sentimental yearnings of the German President.

The War in Iran Could Become Like the War in Ukraine

James F. Jeffrey

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When the United States and Israel started bombarding Iran in late February, U.S. President Donald Trump and his advisers likely believed that they could debilitate the regime and the situation would stabilize quickly, as occurred with the military operation to remove Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January. Given the repeated failure of nuclear talks with Iran and the Israeli desire to neutralize Tehran’s growing missile arsenal, Trump and his advisers likely reasoned that acting now was better than later for a conflict that would eventually have to be fought. Washington had already built up forces in the region, and the Iranian regime, which faced an emboldened Israel and rising domestic unrest, was weaker than it had been for decades.

But what has transpired looks more like Russia’s war in Ukraine than Washington’s quick intervention in Venezuela. The fierce Iranian response has led to a war of attrition and possible stalemate similar to the conflict in Ukraine. The United States, like Russia, does not have an obvious way to achieve a decisive victory and risks getting mired in an endless war.

How the Army’s most tech-forward units are practicing for war

JENNIFER HLAD

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SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, Hawaii—Inside a mud-splattered tent, the Army’s vice chief and the commander of the 25th Infantry Division watched on two giant TV screens as the division attempted to repel an enemy attack from the sea. Just outside, the service’s first launched-effects battery used an unmanned reconnaissance glider that arrived about a month before to provide a picture of the simulated assault, while the division’s new HIMARS rocket launchers shot down “enemy” drones.

“We have old stuff, we have new stuff, and we’re fighting in a new way,” said Col. Dan Von Benken, the division’s artillery commander. It was the last day of a two-week Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center exercise, and this constructed amphibious battle was the end of a scenario in which the soldiers worked with partner forces to defend an archipelago and take back islands seized by the enemy.

Israel’s Lebanese Campaign Will Backfire

Shira Efron

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Israel began planning its operation in Lebanon months ago when it became apparent that since the November 2024 cease-fire, Hezbollah had not depleted its rocket and missile arsenal, that it had rebuilt its command structure and restored its ability to fight and that, despite promises, the Lebanese government had not fully disarmed the terrorist group. On March 2, after Hezbollah joined the Iranian counterattack and fired at the Galilee, Israel seized the opportunity to go on the offensive.

It’s widely agreed that action against Hezbollah — an internationally recognized terrorist group and a Shiite Muslim political party in Lebanon’s multisectarian society — is necessary. However, a prolonged Israeli military operation, the destruction of state infrastructure and a wider presence in southern Lebanon, as Israeli officials now propose, could further undermine weak Lebanese institutions, turn the country’s people against Israel and further entrench Hezbollah’s resistance narrative. That’s precisely the opposite of what Israel and the region need.

Iran’s Long Game Decades of Preparation Are Paying Off

Narges Bajoghli

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Judging by the metrics of conventional conflict, Iran is not faring well against the United States and Israel. Its adversaries are destroying crucial targets in Iran, killing its commanders and degrading its military assets. But these are the wrong measures for assessing Iran’s position in the war. The right measure is not even an assessment of whether Iran is absorbing punishment well—which it is. The question that will matter when the fighting ends is whether Tehran is achieving its strategic objectives. And on that count, Iran is winning.

This outcome is not accidental. Tehran has been preparing for this war for nearly four decades, since the new revolutionary government faced its first major military test in the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988. And it is now executing a strategy that has managed to neutralize key U.S. and Israeli air defense batteries, severely damage U.S. military bases in the Persian Gulf, inflict substantial economic pain, and drive a wedge between the United States and its Gulf allies. The Iranian regime, in other words, is not just surviving the U.S. and Israeli bombardment. The serious economic and political problems it is creating for its adversaries are, on a strategic level, giving Iran the upper hand.

The U.S. and Iran Are Fighting a Massively Asymmetrical War

Nancy A. Youssef and Missy Ryan

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The Iran war started as a test of military capabilities and stockpiles, and the United States and Israel had the clear advantage. The U.S. brought some 20 ships and submarines to the fight—including two aircraft carriers—50,000 troops, and hundreds of planes and drones. President Trump declared that he would decide when the war would end, claiming after just days that the U.S. had won.

But the momentum of the now three-week war has shifted dramatically since Iran effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, stranding tankers that usually carry one-fifth of the world’s oil supply through the channel. Trump responded by dispatching reinforcements. Three amphibious ships, carrying more than 5,000 Marines and sailors, are traveling from Asia and will be in the Gulf as soon as Friday, defense officials told us. The Pentagon is preparing to dispatch 2,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, and more troops may soon get orders to deploy.

Iran Is Putting a ‘Toll Booth’ in the Strait of Hormuz

Keith Johnson

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One month into his war on Iran, U.S. President Donald Trump is now scrambling to secure something that was not previously insecure—the Strait of Hormuz—turning it into the central thrust of the war’s uncertain endgame.

Iran, or more specifically its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has taken effective control of the world’s most important shipping lane and choke point, through which normally passes one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas as well as even more of its fertilizer and helium.

The United States Has Become a Rogue State

Stephen M. Walt

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The second Trump administration has been far more disruptive, damaging, and dangerous than most observers—including me—expected, and the tragically inept war with Iran is driving that point home in spades. As a result, every country in the world is having to figure out how to deal with an increasingly rogue United States. Ask yourself: If you led Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, Nigeria, Denmark, Australia, etc., what would you do?

Here’s why this is a hard problem. The United States is still very powerful, even if it is now pursuing policies—misguided mercantilism, mindless attacks on science and academia, overt hostility to immigrants of all sorts, doubling down on fossil fuel dependence, wasteful military spending, chronic deficits, etc.—that will weaken it over time. For the moment, however, other states still have to worry that U.S. power could be used to harm them either intentionally or inadvertently.

Libya, Iran, and the Limits of Airpower

Christopher S. Chivvis

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For the last few weeks, U.S. policy in Iran has been following a pattern reminiscent of the war it fought 15 years ago in Libya. That was the last time that the United States conducted an air war to change a regime in a large, oil-rich, and Muslim country.

If Iran continues to follow Libya’s pattern, then the world is in for long and dangerous days ahead. Now that the regime has survived the initial U.S. and Israeli salvo, Washington has no good options. Attacking civilian infrastructure, as U.S. President Donald Trump recently threatened to do, would end any chance of a pro-U.S. uprising in Tehran. Inserting ground forces to stem the attacks on energy markets would only compound the war’s cost. Finally, negotiating a cease-fire, while still the best choice available, would publicly confirm the limits of the Trump’s power at home and abroad.

The post-Cold War order is over – what do we do now?

MICK RYAN

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The previous document had shortfalls including its failure to learn from modern war. It did not once mention Ukraine, a consequential protracted conflict that has up-ended many assumptions about modern war and deterrence. Japan and Taiwan have absorbed those lessons, updated their procurement plans and restructured their forces. Australia, not so much.

That oversight cannot continue. We are living through an accelerating convergence of threats, including the rise of Chinese military and economic power, the resurgence of Russian aggression, and a technological revolution in drones and artificial intelligence moving faster than governments can absorb. Australia is also adrift in a new interregnum: the post-Cold War order is over, and the world that comes next has not yet fully revealed itself. In that void, the weak, the feckless and the ­unprepared will pay a high price.

Israel’s Lebanese Campaign Will Backfire

Shira Efron

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The fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, for now, runs parallel to the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. But Lebanon will become a main arena when the campaign against Tehran ends.

Israel began planning its operation in Lebanon months ago when it became apparent that since the November 2024 cease-fire, Hezbollah had not depleted its rocket and missile arsenal, that it had rebuilt its command structure and restored its ability to fight and that, despite promises, the Lebanese government had not fully disarmed the terrorist group. On March 2, after Hezbollah joined the Iranian counterattack and fired at the Galilee, Israel seized the opportunity to go on the offensive.

The Gaza Doctrine

Neve Gordon

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On Friday, March 13, nearly two weeks into the Lebanese front of “Operation Roaring Lion,” Israeli forces bombed Burj Qalaouiyah, a village in the country’s south. The strike destroyed a health care center, killing twelve doctors, paramedics, nurses, and patients; The New York Times reported that “only one severely injured worker survived.” Among the victims, according to the journalist Lylla Younes’s reporting for Drop Site, was a paramedic who had spoken last fall at a memorial service for several colleagues killed by an Israeli airstrike during the previous war in Lebanon. “Even if we are killed one by one,” he reportedly said then, “we will not abandon our duty.”

The US and Israel’s illegal war on Iran, launched in the late stages of negotiations to renew a nuclear deal, spread quickly to Lebanon. Hezbollah joined the fray on the second day, after a US–Israeli strike killed Ali Khamenei in Tehran. Israel has conducted near-daily airstrikes in Lebanon in the fifteen months since the two countries signed a truce, killing more than three hundred people, but since March 2 its fighter jets have been relentlessly bombing south Lebanon, Beirut, and other cities; it recently launched a ground incursion in the south. Where in Iran the US and Israel are operating side by side, in Lebanon Israel has taken the lead, with the US providing arms and other support.

'A game-changing moment for social media' - what next for big tech after landmark addiction verdict?

Zoe Kleinman

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A jury in LA has delivered a damning verdict for two of the world's most popular digital platforms, Instagram and YouTube. It ruled those apps are addictive, and deliberately engineered that way – and that its owners have been negligent in their safeguarding of the children who have used them. It's a sombre moment for Silicon Valley and the implications are global.

The tech giants in this case, Meta and Google, must now pay $6m (£4.5m) in damages to a young woman known as Kaley, the victim at the centre of this case. She claimed the platforms left her with body dysmorphia, depression and suicidal thoughts. Both companies intend to appeal, with Meta maintaining a single app cannot be solely responsible for a teen mental health crisis.

Iran war shows BRICS limits as India pushed to choose sides

Sudhi Ranjan Sen, S'thembile Cele and Dan Strumpf

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Almost a month after the US and Israel began airstrikes on Iran — which killed the senior leadership in that country and triggered a global energy crisis — the BRICS group has failed to take a position on the war. Driving the impasse is the fact that multiple members of the bloc are on different sides of the conflict, making any hard consensus difficult to wrangle. Iran, a BRICS member since 2024, has responded to the US-Israel attacks by firing rockets at the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The UAE joined the bloc in 2024, while Saudi Arabia is weighing an invitation to join.

Iran has asked India — which holds the rotating chairmanship of BRICS this year — to support its bid to condemn the joint US and Israeli military campaign against it, according to people familiar with the matter, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the matter. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are unlikely to agree, the people said, while China and Russia may extend tacit support to Iran.

War in Iran and the nuclear non-proliferation regime: a perspective from Pakistan

Sufian Ullah

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On 28 February, the United States and Israel launched joint missile strikes and airstrikes targeting several Iranian cities. This included a decapitating strike that assassinated the country’s supreme leader, Sayyid Ali Khamenei. The apparent objective of these strikes was to fuel regime change in Tehran (as US President Donald Trump framed the situation speaking to the Iranian people: ‘When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take’) and conduct preventive counter-proliferation measures. The principal disagreement between Washington and Tehran – evident before and during their latest round of nuclear talks – has concerned the latter’s uranium enrichment levels, and monitoring mechanisms. Trump’s hardline stance with respect to Iran’s nuclear compliance – a consistent feature of both his presidential terms – has gradually narrowed the scope for negotiated de-escalation.

Diplomacy falters

In February 2026, high-level talks between the US and Iran, facilitated through third-party mediation, were underway in Oman and Geneva. These sought to reconcile the United States’ and its allies’ demands for caps on Iran’s enrichment levels with Tehran’s insistence on its legal rights as laid out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).