Bilahari Kausikan,
a former Singaporean diplomat.A screen fixed to a wall shows a video of a mushroom cloud. A soldier in a formal dress uniform stands beside the screen with his hands clasped behind his back as he leans against the wall.A security guard stands next to a screen showing a video about China’s atomic bomb program at an exhibition in Beijing on Oct. 17, 2007. China Photos/Getty Images
It is no longer a question of if but when Japan and South Korea will acquire independent nuclear deterrents within the U.S. alliance system. That system would otherwise loosen in East Asia as the United States’ extended deterrence—the so-called nuclear umbrella—erodes due to China’s and North Korea’s acquisition of second strike capabilities targeting the U.S. mainland. To acquire nuclear weapons will be a politically difficult and highly fraught decision—much more so for Japan than for South Korea, where opinion polls already show considerable support. But regardless of public opinion, changes in the global and regional strategic environment are inexorably pushing both countries in this direction. Resisting the logic of these changes could lead to very grave geopolitical consequences.
In democracies, security policy must rest on a foundation of public support. Such a foundation does not yet exist in Japan on the nuclear question. It is therefore imperative that Japan engage in an open, realistic, and timely public debate to build a national consensus on this vital issue. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took a first step in this direction earlier this month, when she announced that her government is considering a review of Japan’s long-standing policy on hosting nuclear weapons.
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