29 July 2025

Frontline Fusion: The Network Architecture Needed to Counter Drones


A squad of infantry dismounts their infantry squad vehicle and begins moving toward the objective. As the soldiers approaches their assault position, an alert pings throughout the squad’s command-and-control team awareness kit devices: “HOSTILE GRP 2 DRONE DETECTED, 1.7km, 045°, TRACK-ID 2112.” The drone’s location populates as a red dot on the map, along with its ID, and the text message drops from the screen. The drone was detected by an acoustic sensor from a forward multifunctional reconnaissance company and a small panel radar mounted on an infantry squad vehicle from an adjacent platoon. Although the sensors are distributed among separate echelons, 

the drone tracks from each sensor are fused into a single track and populated on the squad’s team awareness kit devices. The battalion headquarters sees the same threat and directs its multipurpose company to launch a first-person-view drone with the task of destroying Track 2112. Within seconds, the friendly drone is launched, and the hostile drone is destroyed. As the infantry squad approaches the assault position, the hostile track drops off the map, and a text alert—“Track 2112 destroyed”—is sent throughout the squad.

This is the power of deliberately architected networks and sensor fusion: fast, efficient, shared awareness. One track, one threat, one decision, one common operational picture. As drones proliferate across every theater, this kind of seamless, fused detection will define the difference between successful operations and losses of combat power.

Understanding sensor fusion and network architecture isn’t optional to solve the C-UAS (counter–unmanned aircraft system) problem—it’s the entry fee to the professional conversation. To repurpose a well-known aphorism, amateurs will highlight the newest kit on the market, while professionals will discuss network integration and sensor fusion.

There are two critical tasks the Department of Defense must accomplish to solve its current C-UAS challenges: first, prescribing a common command-and-control (C2) system for all services, and second, implementing a network architecture to share sensor and effector data from the tactical to the strategic levels. Science and technology bureaucrats beware: The good old days of implementing bespoke systems on hub-and-spoke networks are ending, as leaders become more aware of our archaic and siloed air defense architectures.

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