Mike Casey
I recently had the pleasure of joining the Nuclecast podcast (episode out soon) to discuss China’s evolving nuclear C4ISR and the growing impact of AI on its capabilities and doctrine. I want to tackle these topics here now. This post is the first in a series that will explore China’s nuclear C4ISR, beginning with a deep dive into it’s nuclear C2. We will explore the communications and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) components in subsequent posts.
For over half a century, China’s nuclear strategy was defined by a doctrine of “assured retaliation.” Underpinned by a public No-First-Use (NFU) pledge, this posture was pragmatic. Facing the vastly larger arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, Beijing maintained a small, survivable force designed to absorb a nuclear first strike and then deliver a retaliatory blow sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage. This philosophy shaped a force structure that prioritized concealment and survivability, with warheads kept separate from missiles and a low overall state of alert.
Today, that doctrine is undergoing a major shift. China is moving toward what it calls “early warning counterstrike”a posture known in the West as launch-on-warning (LOW). This is a fundamental change in strategic thinking. Instead of waiting for nuclear detonations on its soil, China is building the capability to launch its own nuclear weapons upon receiving and confirming strategic warning of an incoming attack. The objective is to launch its retaliatory strike before its own arsenal can be destroyed on the ground, thereby ensuring the credibility of its deterrent.
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