Kateryna Stepanenko
The Russian integration of combined unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack tactics and adaptations is giving Russian forces important advantages on the battlefield in Ukraine and facilitating Russian advances on key Ukrainian towns. Russian UAV adaptations are likely achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI): The use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear of the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term.[1] Neither Ukraine nor Russia has been able to conduct BAI using manned aircraft or UAVs due to the density and sophistication of adversary air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) over the past three years, but Russian forces are now achieving partial BAI effects in support of their offensives.[2] Russia’s allies, especially the People's Republic of China (PRC), have enabled Russia to develop and scale the production of UAVs that are more resistant to EW interference and capable of operating at longer distances, higher speeds, and in challenging environments. Ukraine and its partners must invest urgently in kinetic anti-drone systems that are not reliant on EW to secure near-rear areas and, ultimately, frontline positions as well.
Russian forces are actively achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) of Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), enabling Russian advances in eastern Ukraine. BAI is the use of air power to strike targets in the near rear of the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term.[3] These operationally significant targets include roads, railways, and bridges (infrastructure that supports GLOCs); command posts; ammunition depots; assembly areas; and training grounds. In simple terms, BAI aims to deny the adversary the use of crucial logistics lines and facilities necessary to sustain battlefield operations. Ukrainian servicemen and analysts reported that Russian forces began to systematically target Ukrainian GLOCs and other operationally significant targets with tactical first-person-view (FPV) UAVs and loitering munitions across the entire frontline as early as Winter and Spring 2025, effectively using these UAVs to interdict Ukrainian logistics ahead of the Russian Summer 2025 offensive.[4] Ukrainian sources noted that Russian forces previously only operated tactical UAVs on the battlefield, but that they have adapted these UAVs to strike Ukraine's near rear areas.[5] Russian forces recently made notable advances in the Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions, likely after achieving limited BAI effects with new FPV drone and loitering munitions adaptations.
No comments:
Post a Comment