John C. K. Daly
Russia has become increasingly dependent on trade with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with more than a third of Russia’s total trade turnover being generated by the PRC.
The recent memorandum on the development of the “Power of Siberia 2” pipeline could secure long-term PRC purchases of Russian gas. The PRC’s purported aim for severely discounted prices, however, could ultimately render the project unprofitable for Russia.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent pressure on countries buying Russian oil could imperil Russian energy exports, an issue of major concern in both Russia and the PRC, and ultimately deter continued PRC purchases.
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) dominant role as Russia’s largest energy customer has only increased since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine three and a half years ago. Determining the scope of this bilateral trade presents difficulties even as it increases. While the topic of Russia–PRC trade is regularly covered by the Russian media, after the start of the war, Russian government data on its foreign trade was partially classified, leaving analysts primarily with statistics from the PRC customs service. According to the PRC’s General Administration of Customs, in 2024, the trade turnover between Russia and the PRC totaled $244.81 billion, representing a 1.9 percent increase from 2023 (RBC, January 13). According to PRC customs data, in 2024, the Russian Federation’s exports to the PRC, which were primarily in the energy sector, remained practically unchanged from the previous year at $129.32 billion. During the same period, the PRC’s exports to Russia increased by 4.1 percent to $115.49 billion (RIA Novosti, January 13). The positive balance of the Russian side in trade resulted in a $13.83 billion surplus, 23.8 percent less compared to 2023 (TASS, January 12).
According to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBRF), in 2024, the PRC’s share in Russia’s exports was 31 percent, compared to 30 percent in 2023. In imports, the PRC’s share was 39 percent, compared to 37 percent the previous year. At the end of 2024, more than a third of the Russian Federation’s total trade turnover was generated by the PRC. For the PRC, Russia’s share in trade is modest, accounting for 4–5 percent of total turnover (Strategic Culture Fund, September 13). According to the CBRF, at the beginning of 2022, the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Russian economy was $497.7 billion, which by mid-2025 had diminished to $216 billion. This means that since the war began, FDI in Russia has more than halved, decreasing to 43 percent of its pre-war level, demonstrating the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine’s economy. Following the imposition of sanctions against Russia, led by the United States and the European Union in February 2022, and the subsequent abrupt curtailment of trade with the West, Russia’s initial trade losses were largely offset by increased trade with the PRC, India, and other friendly and neutral countries (see EDM, November 13, 2024, January 27, April 28, September 8, 10; see China Brief, July 18). This would diminish over time, however, as more sets of sanctions were imposed, increasing the importance of energy sales to the PRC as options dwindled.
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