Emery Yuhang Lai
On March 4, 2025, Elbridge Colby, the incoming undersecretary of defense for policy, made some comments on Taiwan that raised eyebrows. During his Senate confirmation hearing, Colby asserted that “Taiwan’s fall will be a disaster for American interests,” and that “Taiwan is very important,” but added that “it is not an existential interest” for the United States.
It was not the first time Colby had expressed such a point of view, and he clearly ruffled the feathers of those in Washington who are at pains to “explain to the American people why Taiwan matters and why they should care about its fate.”
Colby was labelled an isolationist due to his position on U.S. support for Ukraine, and he could easily be tarred with the same brush when it comes to Taiwan. However, his position on Taiwan aligns in general with many conservatives who self-identify as “restrainers,” believing that U.S. resources are limited and not everything is a vital U.S. interest. In that context, Colby’s position – and Trump’s changing policy toward Taiwan in general – needs to be situated in a recent debate on whether defending Taiwan is a vital U.S. interest.
For those who lobby the U.S. to play a more proactive role in Taiwan’s defense against China, an unambiguous promise to come to Taiwan’s rescue is necessary. According to this line of thinking, Washington needs a policy of “strategic clarity” rather than the anachronistic “strategic ambiguity.” Proponents argue that Taiwan is worth defending because of its strategically important location, because it serves as a model democracy, and because it is an economic powerhouse capable of producing the world’s most advanced semiconductors.
However, none of these arguments strikes restrainers in Washington as reasonable enough to justify a clear-cut military commitment to the defense of Taiwan. They recognize its importance but warn that Taiwan is also dangerous as a “tinderbox” and a “flashpoint” in East Asia. Therefore, they prefer to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, to turn it into a “porcupine” able to deter China on its own.
For the restrainers, the costs caused by the U.S. direct military involvement in the cross-strait conflict outweigh the benefits, and the avoidance of an Armageddon between two great nuclear powers must take precedence over other goals. As Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim argued in an article for Foreign Affairs, the U.S. “should speak frankly about the cost of a war with China and push back against the misguided idea that the United States’ survival and prosperity turn on Taiwan’s political status.”
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