Moritz S. Graefrath ·
Few scenarios scare pundits and policymakers as much as the prospect of nuclear proliferation. Russia’s willingness to dangle the threat of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine, U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambiguous interest in nuclear testing, and the imminent expiration of the 2010 New START treaty (which limits the size of Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals) have reminded the world of the abiding destructive potential of nuclear weapons and reanimated fears of their use. American leaders are convinced that the spread of nuclear weapons would deeply hurt U.S. strategic interests and further destabilize the already fragile global order. In recent months, they have doubled down on their commitment to preventing proliferation, and the June strikes against nuclear sites in Iran have shown that Washington will use force to prevent more countries from acquiring the bomb.
For decades, the United States invested in a nuclear order built around nonproliferation, even as Cold War disarmament agreements such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty expired. Opposing proliferation among unreliable states and adversaries makes sense, but a blanket opposition to the further spread of nuclear weapons obscures the significant benefits they can bestow. The United States would do well to reconsider its strict adherence to nonproliferation and encourage a small set of allies—namely Canada, Germany, and Japan—to go nuclear. For Washington, selective nuclear proliferation would allow these partners to take on larger roles in regional defense and decrease their military dependence on the United States. For these allies, in turn, acquiring nuclear weapons provides the most dependable protection against the threats of regional foes, such as China and Russia, as well as a United States less committed to its traditional alliances.
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