Daniel Byman,
When Israel attacked Hezbollah last September with exploding beepers and a broad assassination campaign, one thing that dictated the timing was Israel’s concern that the group was about to discover that its communication gear had been boobytrapped—part of a complex intelligence operation that took years, or even decades, to plan. Israeli leaders decided to strike hard rather than risk losing the capability.
A similar consideration might have been at play in the timing of Israel’s decision to go to war against Iran last week. Tehran was not about to field a nuclear weapon. For the last few years,
it had been a few months away from developing a nuclear weapon, and U.S. officials did not see any significant change in the Iranian program, much less a decision to weaponize. But Israel had managed by last week to put in place a remarkable intelligence and covert military operation, placing drones inside Iran that could be used to strike strategic assets and pinpointing the location of key regime figures.
The concern about losing that capability was perhaps one of the factors that led Israel to launch its attack when it did.
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Daniel Byman is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. His latest book is Spreading
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