Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds
If a side does not achieve victory within the opening phases of a conflict, protracted warfare necessitates a continuous process of adaptation and counter-adaptation between the parties. The Russo–Ukrainian War has been consistent with this trend, such that the fighting in the first, second and third years of the war saw substantial changes in the composition of forces, equipment, tactics and relative competitive advantages of the combatants. The first year of the war was characterised by comparatively small groupings of well-equipped forces resulting in a mobile conflict. The second year saw the consolidation of areas of control and deliberate attempts to breach the line of contact, first by Russia and then by Ukraine. The third year was highly attritional, with the focus of both parties being the infliction of maximum damage on one another, rather than breakthrough.
The available technology with which the war has been waged has also evolved over this period. The authors of this paper have worked in Ukraine throughout the conflict, and documented the character of the fighting at intervals, noting tactical developments and their operational implications for Ukraine, for support provided by Ukraine’s international partners, and for training and equipment programmes among NATO forces. This report builds on this work, providing an overview of tactical developments as they stand in February 2025 as the war enters its fourth year. The purpose of this paper is to describe the systems of fighting employed by Russian and Ukrainian forces and to identify where changes in how the forces fight reflect peculiarities of the current situation and where they suggest significant changes that will endure. This is not an academic study.
This paper constitutes research notes from fieldwork conducted in November 2024 and January 2025. As this work was written in Ukraine and under conditions consistent with operational security, it does not engage with wider commentaries on the current character of the war. That does not suggest any inadequacy in other studies, and the conclusions and observations in this paper should be read in parallel with similar work carried out by a range of esteemed colleagues. Please also note that this paper provides a discussion of tactics and not an assessment as to the likely outcome of engagements by sector. It does not set out to make predictions.
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