Ron MacCammon
The nature of warfare in the 21st century has changed. Open confrontations have been replaced by unconventional pressure and blurred authority. State actors increasingly rely on proxies, criminal networks, disinformation, and technological asymmetries to weaken adversaries—undermining political stability, social cohesion, and institutional trust—without triggering conventional responses. The result is a battlespace defined less by geography and more by narrative, influence, and legitimacy.
In this context, intent has become a central—but often overlooked—signal in irregular warfare. Unlike conventional conflict, where capabilities and declarations often precede action, irregular warfare demands that analysts and policymakers infer intent from patterns, alignments, and behaviors that rarely announce themselves clearly. But when viewed over time, these acts form a coherent strategy.
This article argues that intent in irregular warfare can be identified through an analytical triad: repeated behaviors, alignment with strategic outcomes, and the systematic use of irregular means. It draws from operational practice and doctrinal sources, including the Pentagon’s Irregular Warfare Annex and the work of David Kilcullen. This framework is then applied to Venezuela and its alignment with Iran, whose shared use of proxies, criminal networks, and information warfare illustrates how states weaponize ambiguity to advance their agendas without triggering traditional conflict thresholds.
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