Douglas A. Samuelson
We summarize the general observations developed by The Dupuy Institute in a quantitative review of the outcomes of 60 insurgencies since World War II. We then apply the resulting principles to the current Israeli efforts in Gaza. This assessment looks unpromising for the Israelis and, therefore, of concern for the U.S.
Can we assess, objectively, how well Israel is conducting its counterinsurgency in Gaza?
The Dupuy Institute (TDI) published one of the very few writings that assessed counterinsurgency approaches based on quantitative data. (Lawrence, America's Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam ) To summarize briefly (and any misstatements or oversimplifications are entirely the responsibility of the current author), the main points were:Force ratios are critical. Counterinsurgencies tend to fail unless they employ at least four, and most often more than ten, times the force of the insurgents.
Successful counterinsurgencies require long-term involvement, typically more than 15 years, sometimes as long as 30 years. Holding territory requires more resources than taking it. Quick victories are rare, even with what seems to be overwhelming force.
Brutality toward the civilian population (including some who may appear to be civilians part of the time and become insurgent fighters at other times) tends to inflame the insurgency. Unless the counterinsurgency is willing and able to wipe out the insurgents completely, less repressive approaches generally are more effective than brutality.
Not providing a path toward peaceful addressing of grievances fuels the insurgency.
Insurgencies rallied by nationalism and/or defense of a home territory tend to succeed. Insurgencies focused on other motives, such as an ideological cause, tend to fail.
Terrain in which the insurgents have ample top cover, such as jungle or tunnels, blocking aerial surveillance of and attacks against their activities, helps the insurgents.
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