Can ASEAN Truly Remain Neutral Between the US and China?

Siau Lim Chong

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As the 2025 ASEAN Chair, Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim affirmed his commitment to safeguarding ASEAN’s centrality while advancing a policy of nonalignment. At the same time, this year China’s President Xi Jinping has undertaken an intensive round of visits to several Southeast Asian nations, concluding over 30 strategic cooperation agreements with multiple ASEAN member states in areas such as artificial intelligence, energy, port development, and railway infrastructure. While these initiatives are framed as measures to deepen bilateral and regional ties, they have also drawn international attention to the potential long-term implications for ASEAN’s strategic orientation.

In April 2025, Xi embarked on state visits to Malaysia, Vietnam, and Cambodia, underscoring economic and trade cooperation and emphasizing the importance of ASEAN unity in the face of U.S. trade protectionism – particularly the high “reciprocal tariffs” introduced under President Donald Trump. To look at Malaysia specifically, just before Xi’s arrival, the United States had announced an increase in tariffs on Malaysian goods to 24 percent.

Following negotiations, Washington subsequently reduced the rate to 19 percent on the condition that Malaysia commit to purchasing more than $240 billion worth of American exports, including Boeing aircraft, coal, and telecommunications equipment – an arrangement aimed at narrowing the U.S. trade deficit with Malaysia.

ASEAN is currently China’s largest economic partner, yet the region has also been among the most affected by the tariff regime under Trump. The United States now levies import duties of 19 percent on goods from Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Cambodia, 20 percent on Vietnam, and 25 percent on Brunei. Laos and Myanmar face the highest rates in Southeast Asia – 40 percent – second only to Syria’s global peak of 41 percent.

What do these developments tell us about whether Anwar’s proclaimed “policy of nonalignment” for ASEAN has indeed become a firmly established principle, or remains, in practice, a matter of diplomatic rhetoric?