Medha Bisht
The Indus Waters Treaty, once described as a treaty that withstood three wars between India and Pakistan, is receiving much flak after being framed as “Nehru’s betrayal of Independent India.”
While the 1960 treaty was neither a celebrated success nor a complete failure, it was nevertheless an example of thin mediation where the Indus Basin was partitioned. It was an institutional mechanism set up to stabilize the competing water claims of India and Pakistan.
Beyond simple allocations, the treaty contained components of a broader transboundary water governance framework.
While much ink has been spilled on the negotiated outcomes of the treaty, less attention has been given to Articles 4, 6, 7 and 8, which offer insights into the treaty from a governance perspective.
For instance, Articles 4 and 6 offer possibilities of an iterative engagement to address interconnected issues related to river erosion, promoting river protection, and treating sewage and industrial water at the source point.
Article 7 alludes to integrated development of the river for optimal use through overseeing drainage works and data sharing. And Article 8 suggests a gradual adaptive response, opening the way for a graded dispute resolution mechanism.
However, the governance potential of the Eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) was never realized. Instead there was an overwhelming focus on the Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab). The treaty soon became hostage to the emerging political tensions between India and Pakistan.
Instead of evolving into a flexible framework of cooperation, a post-facto assessment of the 1960 treaty reveals that it hardened into a rigid legal framework, failing to address emerging water challenges. This came at the cost of ecological degradation of the Eastern rivers, and domestic water mismanagement in both countries, particularly concerning water quality and groundwater over-extraction.
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