Charlie Phelps
In Ukraine, a soldier is provisioned a low-cost drone from a factory that only began operations in the last twelve months, modifies it with a 3D printed part from a trench, and uses it the next day to spot Russian logistics movements. Meanwhile, the United States Army is just now beginning to meaningfully contend with mechanisms for tactical units to procure drone systems that match the performance levels Ukrainian forces have achieved while also complying with extensive cybersecurity, electromagnetic spectrum use, airworthiness, and compliance standards. This disparity captures the stark difference in how tactical innovation is treated in wartime versus peacetime militaries and highlights a truth we cannot ignore: If the US Army wants to remain a dominant landpower service in large-scale combat operations, it must radically decentralize innovation, especially in the realm of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS). This innovation must occur at the lowest tactical level, within squads, platoons, and companies—and the Army should spend money accordingly. This will require tolerating failure, embracing commercial technology, and restructuring acquisition pathways to enable rapid, bottom-up iteration. In other words, the Army needs to apply the principles of the lean startup model, not to billion-dollar programs in the legacy defense industrial base, but to the nineteen-year-old specialist in the mud with a drone and a screwdriver.
Modern warfare is being transformed by the mass use of sUAS. Ukraine and Russia deploy drones for every tactical purpose imaginable: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, artillery spotting, electronic warfare targeting, psychological operations, logistics, and direct attack. Drones are no longer specialized tools; they are battlefield essentials. In large-scale combat operations, where contested airspace limits manned platforms and the electromagnetic environment is constantly shifting, the United States cannot rely solely on expensive and exquisite platforms. Recent announcements indicate that the Army recognizes that fact—the service is canceling procurement of the MQ-1C Gray Eagle, for instance, and shuttering the Future Tactical UAS program, which had failed in seven years to field a replacement for the Shadow drone. But the mechanisms the service selects in place of the canceled programs to procure, field, and adapt drones will only succeed if they reflect an overarching principle: getting adaptable, expendable sUAS in the hands of the smallest units. The war in Ukraine has proven the battlefield value of sUAS beyond any doubt, but the US Army continues to treat drones as niche enablers. Drone density remains too low across brigade combat teams. Most formations are organized and trained for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance via manned platforms and top-down control, not decentralized swarms of cheap, modular systems. Despite small-scale pilot programs and innovation units, the Army remains tactically and culturally unprepared for the scale and speed of drone warfare in large-scale combat operations.
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