Over the past quarter century, few countries have commanded as much sustained attention from U.S. foreign policy officials as has India. Since the George W. Bush administration, the United States has placed India not just at the heart of its approach to Asia but at the center of its global strategy.
This enduring partnership rested on an unspoken doctrine of strategic altruism. U.S. policymakers believed that supporting India’s rise—economically, militarily, and diplomatically—would pay dividends for the United States in the long term. A stronger, more prosperous India would open markets for American companies,
bolster regional deterrence against China, and serve as a democratic counterweight to authoritarianism in Asia. India’s ascent was perceived not as a threat but as an opportunity. Because India’s rise aligned with American goals,
Washington made substantial investments in India without demanding immediate returns. That long-term bet endured across both Democratic and Republican administrations—including President Donald Trump’s first term.
But Trump’s return to office could mark the end of this approach. The second Trump administration is driven not so much by transactionalism as it is by an insatiable desire to burnish its dominance in virtually all its foreign relationships. Its dealings with India have been no exception.
To preserve the relationship, it now falls to India—not the United States—to practice strategic altruism: making concessions to, generating deliverables for, and limiting what it asks of a U.S. administration primarily concerned with maintaining the upper hand. For a country committed to strategic autonomy and “multialignment,” this is an uncomfortable proposition. Nevertheless, it may be India’s best bet for weathering Trump’s second term and positioning itself for a more favorable future.
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