Benjamin Jensen
In the future, the U.S. Army will field modular systems of drones and loitering munitions alongside electronic warfare and intelligence collection kits that can be tailored to the mission at the tactical level. Soldiers will tinker and adapt, creating unique mosaic effects that enable more rapid adaptation at lower echelons. Grenades will be thrown, fired from a rifle, or dropped from a drone. Sensors will be distributed forward as digital sentries, mounted on small drones, or used to augment crew-served weapons. Entire remote weapons pods will be swapped between unmanned vehicles depending on the mission and threat profile.
War is defined by what J. F. C. Fuller called the constant tactical factor. Every adaptation on the battlefield begets a counter-adaptation. This dynamic creates an imperative to build forces built to maximize adaptation and a family of systems that support prototyping and rapid adjustments on the frontlines. The trend towards smaller, commercial sensors and software packages reinforces this dynamic. It is now cost-effective to build adaptable systems at the company level, but doing so will require a fundamental cultural change and policy reforms.
Specifically, commanders will need to be allowed to assume more risk in training, and existing training areas will need to accommodate more live fire exercises that include small drones operating in the air littorals. Industry will need to participate in these exercises using contract procedures that allow them to support prototyping warfare and constant adjustments. Last, the Army will need to ensure provisions are in place within its contracts to allow units in the field to tinker with equipment and reduce the reliance on field service engineers.
The Logic of Adaptation
For too long, equipment has been given to soldiers with the expectation that there should be few to no adjustments. Soldiers fire javelins. They don’t modify them. This rigidity makes the force brittle to enemy adaptation. If you optimize to find one signature—say the thermal image of a tank or the electronic signature of a command post—and the enemy correctly masks it, you are blind.This is not how modern land armies gain an advantage. Across the frontline in Ukraine, there is a constant cycle of learning to mask signatures and spoof sensors with decoys alongside daily adjustments to drone strike missions.
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