K. Tristan Tang
Executive Summary:Like many militaries around the world, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) places strong emphasis on Clausewitz’s concept of the center of gravity—the single most important and decisive operational problem to the PLA in a given phase or time window.
A recent PLA Daily article places new emphasis on information-centric centers of gravity, time-sensitive targeting, and the requirement for higher-level approval.
These three shifts reflect intensified preparations for operations against Taiwan, as well as suggesting an ongoing breakdown of trust between military authorities and frontline officers.
Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of the center of gravity remains a key analytic tool for military and operational planning that is used by armed forces worldwide. The 19th century theorist of war derived the term (Schwerpunkt, or “main point” in the original German) from its use in the physical sciences. He used it metaphorically to refer to a focal point in an enemy’s forces when its acts with a substantial degree of unity (Echevarria, 2003). [1] In military discourse within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), analysts define a “center of gravity” (作战重心) as the single most important and decisive “operational problem” (作战问题) in a conflict’s given phase or time window. Analyzing operational problems can uncover the nature and patterns of a military confrontation. This analysis focuses on real adversaries, the PLA’s own capabilities, and potential battlefields, while studying key issues such as guidance, methods, and deployment. The aim is to ensure victory in future wars and keep pace with the evolution of warfare (PLA Daily, July 7, 2022; November 24, 2022; July 8).
On October 2, Xu Shiyong (许世勇), likely a professor at the PLA Army Command College, published an article on the concept of operational centers of gravity in the PLA Daily (PLA Daily, October 2). According to Xu’s operational definition, operational or tactical planners who apply the concept well can seize the initiative on the battlefield and ultimately achieve their operational objectives (PLA Daily, April 23, 2024; October 2). Xu had previously written a piece on the concept that appeared in April 2024 (PLA Daily, April 23, 2024). [2] A comparison of the two articles suggests an evolution in the understanding of this concept within the PLA. The more recent piece focuses more on information-centric gravity, time-sensitive targeting, and approval from higher authorities. This shift in emphasis carries implications for potential operations against Taiwan as well as for recent controversies surrounding the PLA’s personnel management.
Three Aspects of ‘Center of Gravity’
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