15 January 2026

Can Pakistan Play a Role in Regime Change in Afghanistan?

Masom Jan Masomy

Following Pakistan's strike on Kabul on 9 October 2025 and Afghanistan’s launch of coordinated retaliatory attacks on Pakistani border security posts across the Durand line, there followed a direct war on 11-12 October between the two countries.

At the time of writing, Afghanistan and Pakistan have halted bilateral trade and transit operations for more than two months. Even with the mediation of Qatar and Turkey, as well as a recent mediation hosted by Saudi Arabia, the two countries are not on a path to rapprochement, evidenced by a surge in attacks by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) inside Pakistan. According to The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), TTP have carried out over 630 attacks in Pakistan from January 2021 to September 2025.

Taiwan to fortify critical facilities and ramp up ammunition output to ward off PLA pressure

Holly Chik

Taiwan will double down on strengthening key facilities, including defences against drones, and ramp up ammunition production to withstand growing pressure from the mainland, according to senior officials on the island. Taiwanese Vice-Premier Cheng Li-chiun said on Thursday that the government would continue to reinforce critical infrastructure and defences against unmanned aerial vehicles.

“Taiwan must be more fully prepared, especially in the face of the possibility of various new forms of grey-zone conflicts, including the anticipated risks of drone intrusion,” Cheng said, according to a statement on Friday from the Executive Yuan, Taiwan’s top administrative body. She was responding to concerns raised about ongoing military pressure from the mainland as well as fresh doubts about the US’ defence commitment to the island.

How PLA could use ‘decapitation’ strike to counter Taiwan’s ‘porcupine’ strategy

Liu Zhen

Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare plan – also known as the “porcupine” strategy – could pose a significant threat to a PLA campaign against the island, a mainland Chinese military magazine has warned. But the People’s Liberation Army could counter that strategy with an American-style “decapitation” strike, according to the article in the November issue of Naval and Merchant Ships.

It analysed how the porcupine strategy played out in Taiwan’s annual military exercise in July – known as Han Kuang – which was its biggest ever, and also looked at possible countermeasures the PLA could take.Play The asymmetric warfare strategy would see Taiwan become like a porcupine – covered in “quills” such as lightweight, shoulder-launched air defence missiles to fend off the much larger and better armed PLA.

A Networked Leapfrog Strategy to Recapture Technology Leadership

Michael J. Mazarr

It is now widely agreed that the contest for leadership in frontier scientific and technological progress is one of the foremost elements — if not the centerpiece — of the U.S.-China rivalry. China's leadership appears to believe that science and technology offer the primary engines of development and innovation that will realize its goals of national rejuvenation and is investing massively across many areas. After years of taking a largely hands-off approach to this contest, at least from a government standpoint, the United States now appreciates the significance of the contest for leadership in science and technology as foundational to the economic and national security aspects of the rivalry and has begun responding to the Chinese effort with investments, policies, and export controls of its own.

The author proposes a bold strategy for the United States to regain competitive advantage: large-scale, high-risk experiments targeting transformative technological breakthroughs. Rather than competing head-on with China's incremental innovations, the strategy advocates for leapfrogging current-generation technologies to create entirely new paradigms in such areas as semiconductors, renewable energy, advanced manufacturing, and health care diagnostics. It emphasizes multilateral collaboration with other leading industrial democracies to pool resources, talent, and influence, fostering a shared ecosystem of innovation.

China Wants To Switch Off Taiwan’s Critical Infrastructure

Jack Burnham
Source Link

The January 4 report, which closely followed China’s latest military exercise around the island, highlights Beijing’s growing preparations for a cyber-enabled economic warfare (CEEW) campaign to force Taipei’s capitulation without resorting to an all-out invasion.
China Seeks To Disrupt Service Delivery Across the Island

The report notes that Chinese cyberattacks against Taiwan’s critical infrastructure have increased 6 percent over the past year, including strikes focused on the island’s energy sector, hospital networks, telecommunicators sector, and government agencies. According to the NSB, China has intensively targeted industrial control systems to hijack the power grid, stolen health care data to sell on the dark web, and attempted to penetrate sensitive communications systems to spy on Taiwanese citizens. 

PLA Justice Mission 2025 Further Rehearses Taiwan Invasion Operations - Jamestown

K. Tristan Tang

PLA Justice Mission 2025 Further Rehearses Taiwan Invasion Operations

Executive Summary:The PLA launched another military exercise in late December 2025, with force scale and deployment locations broadly similar to previous drills.
The exercise nonetheless signaled an effort by the Eastern Theater Command to sustain year-round readiness, likely in response to Xi Jinping’s directive to achieve the capability to conduct operations against Taiwan by 2027.
Compared with earlier exercises, this drill advanced invasion-related rehearsals, including scenarios involving the seizure of the Penghu Islands and parts of eastern Taiwan.
Although China displayed a degree of restraint during this exercise, it also suggested that a future operation without such restraint could carry far more serious consequences, which would likely include significant disruption to air and maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel.

The Danger of Reducing America’s Venezuela Invasion to a 60-Second Video

Anna Lagos

Geopolitics are being reduced to videos lasting just a few minutes. Social media has surpassed traditional media, not only in the speed with which it is created and shared but also in its ability to frame our reality. People have the illusion of knowing what is happening and why within just a few hours—or less—of major world events. But reality is more complicated.

In the early hours of January 3, the United States attacked Venezuela. The sky thundered over Caracas with multiple explosions. Cuban president Miguel Díaz-Canel acknowledged that 32 Cuban soldiers died in combat during the US intervention. The attacks caused at least 80 deaths among other military personnel and civilians, according to reporting from The New York Times. The attack included the capture of president Nicolás Maduro, who was transferred to N

Trump’s Maduro raid leaves Xi with no easy options

Drew Thompson

The National Security Strategy released in December 2025 announced that the US will “reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine” to protect the homeland and deny adversaries from using the western hemisphere to threaten the US, describing the new approach as the “Trump Corollary”.
Beijing was caught by surprise on 3 January.

The US military buildup was initially a show of force to intimidate Maduro to stop the flow of narcotics through the country or entice him to step down and leave the country. When incremental escalation and pressure failed to change his behaviour, the Trump administration took action to remove him. Following his capture, Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared: “This is the western hemisphere. This is where we live — and we’re not going to allow the western hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States.”

The Fate of “America First”

Reid Smith

It has been almost a year since President Donald Trump took office for the second time, promising at his inauguration, “During every single day of the Trump administration, I will, very simply, put America first.” Shortly after Trump was elected, I laid out the case in Foreign Affairs for an “America first” foreign policy of restraint, one that acknowledges that the United States “operates in a world of constraints.”

Trump was uniquely positioned to execute such a policy—and in some important respects, he has begun to do so. The administration’s National Security Strategy, released in December, redefines national security around the health and cohesion of the republic, elevating the Western Hemisphere and the economic and moral resilience of American society rather than reinforcing liberal primacy. And on the ground in Europe and particularly in Asia, the rudiments of a more restrained, interest-based approach are indeed emerging. But in the Middle East and Latin America, interventionist reflexes are still shaping the administration’s policy. The Trump administration’s latest foreign policy foray—a military operation to capture Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, and, potentially, to manage the country’s affairs—is the clearest example.

Total Defense for an Era of Total War

Alexander Noyes

When federal agents walked into the municipal utility building in Littleton, Massachusetts, in late 2023, they carried a warning that should have wounded Americans’ sense of security. Chinese state-backed operators had penetrated the town’s water system, quietly compromising its control network for years. Their goal was not espionage or theft but leverage—the ability to sow chaos in the United States and deter U.S. action abroad in the event of a future conflict.

Littleton was not an isolated event. In February 2024, U.S. federal agencies disclosed new details about Volt Typhoon, a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group first identified in 2023, revealing that it had compromised critical infrastructure networks in the communications, energy, transportation, water, and government sectors. Using “living off the land” techniques that mimic legitimate network activity, the hackers set up their positions and remained undetected for years; Microsoft, which first documented the campaign in 2023, reported that it had been active since at least 2021. Other infrastructure hubs, including the Port of Houston and New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority, have also been targeted in separate but related campaigns that used similar intrusion methods. Although not all of these operations were directly linked to Volt Typhoon, they shared its hallmarks: stealthy network access, the exploitation of legitimate administrative tools such as PowerShell, Windows Management Instrumentation, remote desktop services, and network management utilities, and pre-positioning for potential future attacks. The U.S. government still lacks a full picture of how far such operations extend.

US used powerful mystery weapon that brought Venezuelan soldiers to their knees during Maduro raid: witness account

Caitlin Doornbos

WASHINGTON — The US used a mystery sonic weapon that brought Venezuelan soldiers to their knees, “bleeding through the nose” and vomiting blood during the daring raid to capture dictator Nicolas Maduro, according to a witness account posted Saturday on X by the White House press secretary.

In a jaw-dropping interview, the guard described how American forces wiped out hundreds of fighters without losing a single soldier, using powerful technology unlike anything he has ever seen — or heard. “We were on guard, but suddenly all our radar systems shut down without any explanation,” the guard said. “The next thing we saw were drones, a lot of drones, flying over our positions. We didn’t know how to react.”

Donald Trump 'orders army chiefs to draw up plan to invade Greenland': US President emboldened by success of Maduro capture operation

GLEN OWEN and DAN HODGES, DAILY MAIL COLUMNIST

According to the sources, the President has asked the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to prepare the invasion plan, but it is being resisted by the joint chiefs of staff on the grounds that it would be illegal - and would not be supported by Congress.
One source said: 'They have tried to distract Trump by talking about less controversial measures, such as intercepting Russian 'ghost' ships - a clandestine network of hundreds of vessels operated by Moscow to evade Western sanctions - or launching a strike on Iran.'
Diplomats have war-gamed what they describe as an 'escalatory scenario' under which Trump uses force or 'political coercion' to sever Greenland's links to Denmark.
One diplomatic cable describes the 'worst-case' scenario as leading to 'the destruction of Nato from the inside'.

It adds: 'Some European officials suspect this is the real aim of the hardline MAGA faction around Trump. Since Congress would not allow Trump to exit Nato, occupying Greenland could force the Europeans to abandon Nato. If Trump wants to end Nato, this might be the most convenient way to do it.'

How special forces became modern warfare’s go-to solution

Adam Tooze

Special forces are today more lethal than ever and, though covert, also the most visible and culturally ‘relevant’ branch of the US military © Salwan Georges/Washington Post/Getty Images How special forces became modern warfare’s go-to solution on x (opens in a new window) How special forces became modern warfare’s go-to solution on facebook (opens in a new window) How special forces became modern warfare’s go-to solution on linkedin (opens in a new window) Share Save current progress 0% Adam Tooze PublishedJAN 10 2026

The writer is an FT contributing editor and writes the Chartbook newsletter

Blacked-out helicopters fly low across a darkened city. Explosions and gunfire erupt. Masked men surge towards their objective — a kill, a capture, a body, a blindfolded and handcuffed VIP. All of it filmed live through night vision optics, fed back to a command centre where a group huddles, eyes fixed on the screens. The whole event, long trailed in advance and yet a complete surprise. Held secret, for security reasons of course, until unleashed on the world as a sensational PR coup.

Now you can train for the next drone war on simulated Ukrainian front lines

John Breeden II

The war in Ukraine has made one thing unmistakably clear: drones are no longer a support weapon on the battlefield. They are central to how modern wars will be fought. From reconnaissance and targeting to direct strikes, low-cost, fast-moving drones with powerful payloads are causing massive destruction and racking up kills against traditional armed forces. And that mastery of drone warfare is allowing a smaller country like Ukraine to hold its own on the front lines against a superpower, performing devastating strikes that keep the Russian Army on its back foot.

The world is taking notice. Other countries in the region are already planning to use drones in their defense should war come to their door, while also countering those of their potential enemies. The shift in military thinking was on display earlier this year as Estonia announced plans to build a so-called “drone wall” along its border, a layered defensive system designed to detect and counter unmanned aerial threats. As Estonian defense officials explained to Nextgov/FCW, their goal is not simply to buy more hardware, but to rethink how borders and battlespaces are protected in an era where inexpensive drones can have a large strategic impact.

How to Unleash Problem-Solvers in the Pentagon

Peter Newell

Twenty years ago, the Department of Defense invented a Warfighter Acquisition System—a system designed to deliver solutions to battlefield problems at the speed they needed. It was called the US Army Rapid Equipping Force (REF). The organization’s primary role was to quickly provide emerging technologies and solutions to soldiers, often within 90 days, outside the normal, lengthy acquisition process.

Despite its success in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army’s senior leadership abandoned the REF in 2020 for a return to the status quo, claiming: “As our focus changes to great power competition and large-scale combat operations, Army analysis indicated that the personnel and resources [of the REF] could best be utilized in building the operational fighting force.”

Trump's Jihadist 'Board of Peace'

Uzay Bulut

"Israel is left worse off than when Hamas managed Gaza, given the sheer power of Turkey (which is increasing).... The deployment of Turkish forces in Gaza and the sale of F-35s to Erdogan are not policy ideas but a method: regional management through personal deals and assurances rather than hard reality. Trump himself illustrated this approach when he dismissed the issue as if it were a neighborhood misunderstanding: Israel 'will be fine' and Turkey 'won't use them against you'. This is not policy; it is a dangerous assumption. In the Middle East, it does not work. — Christine Douglass-Williams, Frontpage Magazine, January 7, 2026.

"Giving Turkey a role in Gaza's future is a strategic mistake that will sooner or later, reborn Hamas or end up with a new militia with Hamas's goals, with another name." — Hamza Howidy, Palestinian journalist, x.com, October 26, 2025.

From Venezuela to Greenland On the challenges of managing Trump

Lawrence Freedman

It is not unusual to make a dramatic step and then hope things will then work out. What was striking in this case was Trump’s confidence that the hard questions about the future have already been answered when they clearly have not.

I followed this up with an article for the New Statesman. With their kind permission, this is reproduced below as the first part of this week’s post. Since writing this there has been more talk from Trump about control over Venezuela’s oil supplies and indications about how the current regime is seeking to manage the situation - but these developments largely reinforce the broad thrust of the article that the administration currently has no viable plan for the aftermath that it can implement.

Russian Troops Strap Starlink Terminals to Horses as Russian Cavalry Makes ‘Historic’ Return

Sophie Watson

Footage of a Starlink terminal attached to a horse reportedly filmed by Russian soldiers in Ukraine appeared on social media on Thursday.

Russian independent media outlet Astra posted the video to their Telegram channel. Apparently filmed on a shaky phone camera, it shows a horse wearing a saddle with two metal rods attached to it, on top of which is a Starlink terminal. Starlink is a satellite internet device developed by SpaceX, the company owned by US-based billionaire Elon Musk.

“Here we welded it, everything is cool, everything is fucking awesome,” the speaker says in Russian, pointing out how the terminal attaches to the saddle. “This is how the Starlink is pulled out. And it is inserted here. This is the design, it works.”

The Evolution of Russian and Chinese Air Power Threats

Justin Bronk

In 2020, RUSI published papers on the potential threats posed to Western forces by Russian and Chinese combat air capabilities and ground-based air defence (GBAD) systems. Since these studies were published, both Russian and Chinese air power capabilities have evolved significantly.

The aim of this Insights Paper is not to present a comprehensive analysis of the various types, weapons systems and tactics operated by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Instead, it provides a succinct outline of the ways in which the threat posed to Western air power capabilities by Russian and Chinese forces respectively has changed over the five years since 2020. As a starting point, readers are invited to read the two RUSI papers from 2020, mentioned in the paragraph above, for an overview of the primary aircraft types and GBAD systems operated by each nation.

Politicization of the Military: Causes, Consequences & Conclusions

Heidi A. Urben

Heidi Urben argues that the politicization of the U.S. military represents the most serious contemporary civil-military challenge because, as the state’s “legitimate instrument of violence,” the military loses its democratic foundation when perceived as partisan. She defines politicization broadly—encompassing active alignment, passive support, or even the perception of partisan preference. she then identifies three responsible actors: civilian politicians who exploit military prestige for electoral gain, military members (especially retired flag officers) who publicly endorse candidates or express partisan views, and an American public that lacks both understanding of and commitment to military nonpartisanship norms.

The essay traces the steady erosion of the military’s nonpartisan ethic over the past three decades, accelerated by social media, elite behavior, and partisan incentives. Urben demonstrates how attempts to “push back” against politicization can paradoxically deepen the problem, then closes with concrete solutions: curtailing partisan exploitation by civilian leaders, modernizing nonpartisanship training within the force, reducing endorsement activity by retired generals and admirals, and investing in public education about civil-military norms. Her central warning: without intervention, confidence in the military will fracture along partisan lines, recruitment will suffer, and the institution’s effectiveness will degrade as political loyalty supplants merit.

Eight Military Takeaways from the Maduro Raid - Modern War Institute

Patrick Sullivan and John Amble

Despite steadily heightening tensions, heated rhetoric, US strikes against alleged drug trafficking boats, and a buildup of US forces near Venezuela, news of the successful mission to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro still surprised the world. Much of the discussion since has focused on the geopolitical stakes, questions of international law, and the domestic political context. Such discussion will undoubtedly continue.

But apart from these, there is also a military lens through which to examine Operation Absolute Resolve. What can we learn from the raid, which from a purely operational perspective was stunningly successful? How should we understand the operation in the context of the United States’ strategic global military rivalry with Russia and China? And how do the capabilities on display during the few hours in Caracas figure in the context of a potential large-scale conflict with a peer adversary?

Venezuela Oil Sector: Context For Recent Developments

Brent D. Yacobucci

On January 3, 2026, the U.S. military executed a mission culminating in the arrest of President Nicolás Maduro (2013-2026). On January 6, President Trump announcedthat the United Sates would sell 30-50 million barrels of seized Venezuelan oil; on January 7, the Department of Energy announced that Energy Secretary Wright was working with “the Interim Venezuelan Authorities” to execute the sale and to modernize Venezuela’s energy sector. Secretary of State Rubio reportedly noted that an Administration focus is limiting the involvement of U.S. foreign adversaries. Venezuela’s vice president and oil minister, Delcy Rodriguez, has assumed the role of acting president.

Venezuela’s oil sector declined over decades. When Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, took office in 1999, Venezuela’s crude oil production was approximately 3 million barrels per day (mbd). When he died in 2013, production was 2.7 mbd. During Maduro’s presidency, crude production declined further, dropping below 0.5 mbd in 2020 before rising again; by August 2025, it was just above 1.0 mbd.

The UK Is In Economic And Social Freefall

Lipton Matthews

Britain’s relative decline is no longer a speculative talking point but a measurable trajectory. If current income, productivity, and cost-of-living trends continue, Lithuania is on course to overtake the United Kingdom in average living standards by 2030, with Poland following by roughly 2034. What once would have sounded implausible now reflects the arithmetic of growth: sustained convergence in Central and Eastern Europe versus stagnation across most of the UK outside London.

One of the most striking indicators of this shift lies at the bottom of the income distribution. The poorest households in Slovenia and Malta already enjoy higher real material living standards than the poorest households in the United Kingdom. This is not a marginal statistical quirk but a reflection of housing costs, energy affordability, local public goods, and labor-market attachment. In practical terms, parts of Birmingham and large areas of the North East are now poorer than the least affluent regions of Slovenia. Britain is no longer merely unequal; it is uneven in a way that places whole regions below the floor of prosperity reached by smaller, formerly poorer EU states.

Tehran Reloads: Examining The Current And Future Threat Of Iran’s Missile Programs

Can Kasapoğlu

Since the conclusion of the 12-Day War on June 24, 2025, Tehran has worked assiduously to restock its arsenal and enhance its capabilities. The Islamic Republic is rebuilding its stocks of ballistic missiles, pursuing an intercontinental strike capability, and gearing up for the next round of hostilities. These efforts threaten European North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, America’s allies in the Middle East (Israel and the Gulf Arab monarchies), and the mainland United States.

Three developments have been driving Tehran’s actions. First, recent exchanges with Israel have affirmed two aspects of Iran’s strategy: (a) that hiding missiles and launchers underground can ensure that at least a small number survive even the heaviest strikes and (b) that mass salvos can either penetrate or attrit US and allied air and missile defenses. Second, Iran’s missile industry has at least partially weathered sanctions, mainly thanks to support from China and North Korea. Third, Iran’s space program has given Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) cover to pursue the development and acquisition of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of targeting the continental US. President Donald Trump’s recent statements indicate a willingness to support Israeli military action if Iran continues to enhance its ballistic missile arsenal.

AI Applied to Tackle Energy Conundrums For Modern Battlefields

Josh Luckenbaugh

The United States is determined to be the global leader in artificial intelligence, and just as important as the models themselves is having the computing power to run them. Both government and private sector entities are pursuing AI solutions that would work in the energy-constrained environment of the modern battlefield.

The Trump administration is looking to expand the country’s AI infrastructure. The Energy Department in July 2025 selected four sites — Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge Reservation, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and Savannah River Site — where it will look to house AI data centers and energy generation projects.